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HISTORY

OF THE

WAR.

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The opening of Parliament, November, 1914: The Royal Coach arriving at Parliament Square. [*L.N.A.*

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE GOVERNMENT'S WAR POLICY.

THE TRIPLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA—ITS MOTIVES—THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT—THE RECRUITING OF THE NEW ARMY—ITS ORGANISATION AND TRAINING.

SOME account has already (Vol. 1, Chapter VIII.) been given of Lord Kitchener's war policy, and of how the New Army, as it was called, began to be enlisted. It remains to say something of the progress of by far the greatest scheme of voluntary enlistment that the world has ever seen in operation, and also more generally to take note of the political contributions of the Government to a successful issue. Of party politics in the ordinary sense there was none. All political action was mobilised, so to speak, for the service of the war, and the sole test applied by politicians to anything that was done or proposed by the Government was whether it was calculated to hasten the war to a successful end. Never in the whole course of our history has the country been so single in its desire. Certainly, nothing like it was seen in the war with Napoleon, when there was always in this country a respectable body of feeling sympathetic with the French.

Much the most important political act of the Government in the early stages of the war was the conclusion in the first week in September, of a Triple Agreement between Great Britain, France, and Russia. The Agreement, which was signed on September 7th by Sir Edward Grey, M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador, and Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, had only two operative clauses. After declaring that the Allies would not conclude peace separately, it went on to provide that "when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the Allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies." The motive of this Agreement is not far to seek. There were political as well as military reasons for the German plan of campaign which concentrated the whole force of the first offensive against France. It was impossible to deal a vital injury to Russia, but Germany hoped to defeat her troops sufficiently to incline her, if and when France became incapable of further resistance, to conclude an advantageous peace. What its terms should be depended on circumstances. Should things be going ill for Germany, the bribe would have to be a heavy one; but if well,

it might be cheap. In either case, Germany had still enough of the old Bismarckianism left to look to Russia as on the whole the Power from which she had most to fear and to get; she counted, too, in the support of her designs on the influence of the strong German element in Russian bureaucracy. (The percentage of high civil servants in Russia drawn from the German land-owners of the Russian Baltic Provinces is extraordinarily high.) The strength of popular feeling in Russia in support of the war would alone have defeated such hopes, even if France had been decisively beaten; but the Treaty did more than register the determination of the Allies not to leave each other in the lurch. It secured a preliminary agreement between the Allies before any conditions of peace were discussed at all with the enemy, and minimised the risk of any serious disagreement between the Allies after peace had been made with Germany. It is easy to imagine circumstances under which the Agreement might work out more hardly on one of the Allies than on the others, but no one could foresee in advance which of the Allies would do best and which worst, and the arrangement to pool losses and gains—for that in effect was what the Agreement amounted to—was generally regarded as a wise and loyal measure. It is not known which of the Powers took the initiative in the negotiations for the Agreement, but the fact that it was signed in London suggests that it may have come from the British Foreign Office.



Sir Stanley Buckmaster, Director of the Press Bureau.
[*Siggers, Keighley.*

THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE.

Of what the terms of peace were likely to be, only the vaguest indications were given, and indeed, until the fortunes of war had definitely inclined one way or the other, precision of statement was hardly possible and perhaps not desirable, even if it had been possible. A settlement on the Austrian front, doubtfully attributed to official inspiration, contemplated the union of Galicia with the new united and more or less autonomous Poland, a semi-independent Bohemia, separate from Austria, and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Servia.

The most definite statement of the conditions on which the Allies would grant peace was contained in a speech of the French Premier, M. Viviani, at the opening of the French Parliament in December. He said:—

> "Faithful to her signature to the Treaty of the 4th of September, in which she plighted her honour, that is to say her life, France will only lay down her arms when she has avenged outraged right, reunited her ravaged provinces, restored heroic Belgium to the plenitude of her material life and political independence, and crushed Prussian militarism in order to reconstruct on the basis of justice a Europe at last regenerated."

Mr. Asquith was eloquent, but less explicit. At Edinburgh, on September 18th, he had quoted Pitt, on the beginning of war with Revolutionary France, that England would never consent "that another country should arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure the political system of Europe established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent of the Powers," and used language which seemed to regard this war mainly as one for the preservation of the Balance of Power. But at Dublin, in September, he had amplified what was meant by the "destruction of Prussian militarism." He quoted a phrase of Gladstone on the "enthronement of public right as the governing idea of European politics," and continued:—

> "The idea of public right, what does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States and of the future moulding of the European world. It means next, that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities—each for the life of history a corporate consciousness of its own. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, and Scandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan States—they must be recognised as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbours. And it means finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition, for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise—the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and fixed by a common will. A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. . . . . If and when this war is decided in favour of the Allies, it will at once come within the range, and before long within the grasp, of European Statesmanship."

The close resemblance between some of Mr. Asquith's speeches on the objects of the war and M. Viviani's was not an accident; but Mr. Asquith never attained M. Viviani's definiteness, and, indeed, rather deprecated talking about the terms of peace before the war was clearly decided in our favour. "Peace talk," he said, at the beginning of March, "was like the twittering of a sparrow in the midst of a tempest which was shaking the world to its foundations."

A WAR WITHOUT PRECEDENT.

The conditions of the war were without precedent in England. Our last war with a European Power (the Crimean War) was remote from our shores, and except in its great magnitude did not differ in character from

the ordinary "colonial" wars to which our Government was accustomed. The war with Napoleon, again, was fought in a Europe where the distances were immeasurably greater than they have since become. The telegraph—and especially wireless telegraphy, the enormous increase of intercourse, commercial and social, between nations, the improved communications between nations of the Continent brought about by railways, the geographical position with respect to Germany of neutral countries like Holland and Italy, the great number of Germans in England and the high position of many of them—all these things made this a war for which there was no precedent in the history either of our own or of other countries. For years it had been one of the commonplaces of peace advocacy that this increased knowledge and communication of nations with each other made war almost unthinkable, but it was forgotten that there are no quarrels like family quarrels. Europe had become like a street of relatives, all on constant visiting terms with each other, and the quarrel when it did begin was all the more dangerous because of this intimacy. In the Napoleonic wars it was possible for an Englishman to meet a Frenchman without regarding him as an enemy in any than the technical sense. Not so in this war, with wireless telegraph, and backdoors open through neutral countries for people to slip in and out. It was necessary for very safety to take special measures of precaution.



Sir Frank Swettenham, Assistant Director of the Press Bureau. [*Elliot and Fry.*




Sir E. T. Cook, Assistant Director of the Press Bureau. [*Elliot and Fry.*

THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT.

The Government began by taking very wide powers indeed under the Defence of the Realm Act. The Government, not knowing exactly how many powers they would need, protected themselves by asking for as many as they could think of, and the House of Commons at the beginning of the war perhaps naturally seemed to be a little scared, and too anxious to be good to give much real help. The Defence of the Realm Act was in two parts. The first part was designed to give the naval and military authorities power to do everything that might be useful to protect the country against the risk of invasion or raid. They might take possession of any lands or buildings for that purpose, stop and divert roads, commandeer vehicles and vessels, make requisitions of animals and stores, order the inhabitants to leave any area proclaimed, require licensed premises to be closed as directed, order streets to be darkened, enter and search without warrant, and arrest without warrant any person "whose behaviour is of such a nature as to give reasonable grounds for suspecting that he has acted, or is acting, or is about to act, in a manner prejudicial to the public safety, or who is suspected of having committed an offence against these regulations." The second part of the Act was professedly drawn to prevent persons from communicating information likely to be useful to the enemy, but some of its provisions went far beyond that object. Section 27, for example, ran as follows:—

> "No person shall by word of mouth or in writing, or in any newspaper, periodical, book, circular, or other printed publication, spread false reports, or make false statements or reports, or statements likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty, or to interfere with the success of His Majesty's forces by land or sea, or to prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign Powers, or spread reports or make statements likely to prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline, or administration of any of His Majesty's forces."



The concentration camp at Frith Hill, Camberley. [*Topical.*

Further, the Act deprived Englishmen charged with offences under the Act of the right of trial by jury. Section 56 of the Act provides that any one alleged to be guilty of an offence under the Act should be tried either by a court-martial or before a court of summary jurisdiction, and, except where the Act declares an offence against it to be summary, leaves it to the "competent military authority" to determine whether the trial shall be by court-martial or in a civil court of summary jurisdiction. In neither case is there a jury, so that it would be strictly accurate to say that the Act abolished trial by jury for all offences under it, and set up a modified martial law—an institution hitherto unknown in the country. It was reserved to the House of Lords to make a protest, to which the Government so far yielded as to bring in an amending Bill restoring to Englishmen the right to be tried by a jury of their peers, which had been theirs since Magna Charta.

The only other subjects on which the Government had to meet serious criticism in its conduct of the war were the press-censorship and its treatment of enemy aliens. Section 27 (already quoted) of the Defence of the Realm Act made it dangerous for a newspaper to publish any doubtful news without first securing permission, and still more dangerous to criticise. The institution of a Press Bureau became necessary not only to provide official news, but also to keep newspaper editors and writers from courts-martial and gaol. It was not to be expected that the work of the Press Bureau would be well done, and expectation was not disappointed, but the time has not yet come when an impartial review of the work of the Bureau under its successive heads can be attempted.

The aliens problem can hardly have been foreseen by the Government, and there was at first a certain hesitancy and uncertainty in dealing with it. Rather more than a hundred years ago, when the war with Napoleon broke out afresh after the Peace of Amiens, his imprisonment of the English in France was regarded as the height of arbitrary tyranny, but the atrocity of those days became the rule in this war. The reasons were the shrinkage in the size of Europe due to the improvement of communications, the high development of German espionage, the system of universal military service on the Continent, and the great number of German aliens resident in this country. Had the Government worked out the problem beforehand, it would probably have begun the war by excluding all enemy aliens from residence within certain distance from the sea-coast, and made the possession of a wireless apparatus by an alien—and even any attempt to communicate information without the express permission of the authorities—capital offences. In that way it might have been possible to safeguard ourselves against danger without depriving enemy aliens of their liberties and making ourselves responsible for their maintenance. The internment in concentration camps of all aliens, with the exception of those of whose trustworthiness a special department of the War Office was satisfied, can hardly be regarded as ideal. There is, however, little reason to think that our Intelligence Department was deceived in its men, and the spy-mania in this country, though it appeared from time to time in attacks made on Mr. McKenna, the Home Secretary, who was not responsible for our policy towards aliens, was never carried to such ridiculous lengths here as abroad.

THE RAISING OF THE NEW ARMY.

But the main business of the Government lay in the preparation of an army on the Continental model by the British voluntary system of recruitment.

Our Expeditionary Army of approximately 200,000 men was officially designated a "striking" force, and when the hour of trial came this technical description was justified. But our great responsibility in this war could not be begun, continued, and ended by 200,000 men. Automatically, of course, the Army Reserve and the Special Reserves were mobilised, giving us an additional 200,000, and then we had to look to the nation to extemporise an army of volunteers comparable in numbers with those that the great military Powers of

Europe provided by conscription. Had the country only realised at the outset how great the task would be, it might almost have despaired. Lord Kitchener thought in millions at the very beginning. Sooner perhaps than he expected, he was dealing with them.

A prompt response was given to Lord Kitchener's appeal for the first 100,000 men, and on September 2nd this new army of 100,000 was in training. When the appeal was issued, the great gravity of the situation had not been fully apprehended by the people. The age limit, too, was fixed at thirty years. By the time the numbers had reached 100,000 the urgency of the need for still more men had become more widely recognised. Recruiting had also been stimulated by the news of the severe fighting in which the British forces in France had been engaged. The New Army was formed in six Divisions. The Eighth (Light) Division went to Aldershot for training. This Division consisted of the Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Fifth Infantry Brigades. The training centre of the Ninth (Scottish) Division was also at Aldershot, and was made up of the Twenty-Sixth, Twenty-Seventh, and Twenty-Eighth Infantry Brigades. The Tenth (Irish) Division was training at Dublin and the Curragh, and was made up of the Twenty-Ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-First Infantry Brigades. The training centre of the Eleventh (Northern) Division was in the district of Grantham. It consisted of the Thirty-Second, Thirty-Fourth, and Thirty-Fifth Infantry Brigades. The Thirth-Fifth, Thirty-Sixth, and Thirty-Seventh Infantry Brigades made up the Twelfth (Eastern) Division, with training centres at Colchester, Rainham, and Shorncliffe, while the training centre of the Thirteenth (Western) Division, which was made up of the Thirty-Eighth, Thirty-Ninth, and Fortieth Infantry Brigades, was on Salisbury Plain. Three Brigades of Field Artillery, one Howitzer Brigade, two Field Companies of Royal Engineers, a Signalling Company, a train and three Field Ambulances of the Royal Medical Corps were attached to each Division.


In four weeks from the beginning of the war the new enlistments added another 500,000, bringing the army, including the Reserves, up to 900,000, without counting the Territorial Divisions, or contingents contributed by the Dominions or India. This remarkable rush to the colours relieved the situation greatly. It enabled our military authorities to provide for the wastage in the field, and to give the necessary support to our generals, who, in the opening stages of the fighting, had naturally been greatly concerned as to the prospect of getting reinforcements in sufficiently large numbers to replace the fallen.

THE RECRUITING CAMPAIGN.

At this time our people could not learn much about what was happening in the field, and the news that did filter through was known to be unreliable. But what the manhood of the nation did realise was this: That we had entered a life and death struggle, and that the great need of the hour was recruits for the combatant units. The Prime Minister, with a sure instinct, appealed to British sympathy with weak and ill-used Belgium, and a famous passage in his Guildhall (London) speech is worth quoting as an illustration of the reasons which, more than any other, brought men in great numbers to enlist:—


> "The issue has passed out of the domain of argument into another field. But let me ask you, and through you the outside world, what would have been our condition as a nation to-day if, through timidity or through a perverted calculation of self-interest, or through a paralysis of the sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough to be false to our word and faithless to our friends? Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the whole civilised world to Belgium, a small State which has lived for more than seventy years under a several and collective guarantee to which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, were partners, and we should have seen, at the instance and by the action of two of these guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality violated, her independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the easiest and most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression against France.
>
> "We, the British people, should at this moment have been standing by with folded arms, and with such countenance as we could command, while this small and unprotected State, in defence of her vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and overwhelming forces. We should have been admiring, as detached spectators, the siege of Liege, the steady and manful resistance of the small army, the occupation of her capital, with its splendid traditions and memories, the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by them, buccaneering levies exacted from unoffending civil population, and, finally, the greatest crime committed against civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years' War—the sack of Louvain—with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its unrivalled associations, the shameless holocaust of irreplaceable treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance.
>
> "What account could we, the Government and the people of this country, have been able to render to the tribunal of our national conscience and sense of honour if, in defiance of our plighted and solemn obligations, we had endured, and had not done our best to prevent, yes, to avenge, these intolerable wrongs? For my part, I say that sooner than be a silent witness—which means in effect a willing accomplice—to this tragic triumph of force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of the pages of history."

This speech was the first of a vigorous recruiting campaign, in which the various political parties in the country united. The manhood of the nation had responded splendidly to Lord Kitchener's appeal; but there were still many eligible young men who, for various reasons, had postponed their visit to the recruiting office. Manchester and Liverpool had already received sanction to raise a battalion of men who, having worked together in peace, preferred also to work together in their preparation for war. The Earl of Derby, Chairman of the Lancashire County Territorial Association, started this plan of giving the sentiment of civic comradeship its full play in the army enlistments, and he was supported by a patriotic body of merchants and employers, who came forward and offered to equip one or two battalions. This practice of raising local battalions extended to Leeds, Birmingham and other towns, with excellent results. At Liverpool there is a "Comrades" Brigade; Manchester raised two Brigades of "The Pals," and the direct association of these forces with their respective cities has an influence for good. Meanwhile, the Territorials were replying with loyalty to the call of duty which had come to them with such exceptional force. About ninety per cent of the Force volunteered for service abroad, and were at once trained and organised in the larger formations, and are now, without exception, ready to take their place in the fighting line. Some of our Territorials have already received their "baptism of fire," and Sir John French has not omitted, in his despatches, to refer to their great gallantry. In his despatch of November 20th Sir John French says: "In the period covered by this despatch, Territorial troops have been used for the first time in the army under my command. The units actually engaged have been the Northumberland, Northamptonshire, North Somerset, Leicestershire, and Oxfordshire Regiments of Yeomanry Cavalry; and the London Scottish, Hertfordshire, Honourable Artillery Company, and the Queen's



A novel recruiting placard exhibited outside the Manchester Town Hall. The filled-in portions on each figure indicate the number of men who had enlisted for each branch of the Engineers at the time that the photograph was taken.

"Manchester Guardian." Copyright.



A recruiting tramcar used in the streets of Belfast.

[Topical.

Westminster Battalions of Territorial Infantry. The conduct and bearing of these units under fire, and the efficient manner in which they carried out the various duties assigned to them, have imbued me with the highest hope as to the value and help of Territorial troops generally."

THE EQUIPMENT OF THE NEW ARMY.

The empires with whom we were at war have called to the colours almost the entire population. The principle observed in this country, as laid down by Lord Kitchener, was this: That while their maximum force undergoes a constant diminution the reinforcements now being prepared shall steadily and increasingly flow out until we have an army in the field which in numbers, not less than in quality, will not be unworthy of the power and responsibilities of the British Empire. Lord Kitchener specially appealed to the young men of the country, so that the older reservists whom the German Commanders in course of time will be compelled to fall back upon should be met by an army of young, strong, and efficient soldiers. There is, of course, a rise and fall in recruiting which is largely governed by local considerations. The most active time was reached in the middle of September, when for about ten successive days approximately 30,000 men were enlisted. The high-water mark was reached on September 12th, when 33,204 men were transferred from civil to military life, and the Prime Minister specially mentioned in the House of Commons the fact that of this number Manchester contributed 2,151 which showed, he said, that Lancashire was doing her duty. To appreciate the full significance of these figures, it is only necessary to point out that in each of these ten days we recruited substantially the same number of men that in peace times are recruited for the army in a year.

It was during this remarkable period of recruiting that our military machine to convert the raw material into the manufactured article broke down under the great strain. The depôts everywhere became seriously congested, and many recruits did not get the accommodation to which they were entitled. Serious complaints were brought against the military administration in the House of Commons. Allegations were made accusing the War Office of a lack of foresight But the Prime Minister rightly pointed out that there was no machinery in the world which men had ever contrived or conceived to suddenly meet in an emergency, and under great pressure, the difficulty of bringing into the colours and make adequate provision in a day for that which in peace experience they had only to provide for in the course of the year. It was agreed to give to those recruits for whom accommodation could not be found the sum of three shillings a day, to cover their board and lodging. The Government made it clear that those who were showing a patriotic desire to assist their country in one of the most supreme and momentous crises in the whole of its long history were not going to be treated in a niggardly spirit, and that every possible provision would be made for their comfort and well-being, so that under the best possible conditions they would play their part in that magnificent army which has never shown itself more worthy of the long and splendid traditions of the Service than in the fighting in France. In order to relieve the congestion at the depôts and training centres, the minimum height, as already noted, was increased from 5 feet 3 inches to 5 feet 6 inches (the minimum height before the war was 5 feet 4 inches). The minimum chest measurement was increased to 35½ inches.

This expedient seriously checked recruiting. Its meaning to the public was that the army had all the recruits that were needed. It was unfortunate that this should be so, because when action of this character is taken enthusiasm declines. The authorities failed to realise that voluntary enlistment is necessarily spasmodic in character, and that when the patriotic spirit is the driving force any official check is likely to be serious. Happily there was a recovery when the conditions of enlistment were relaxed. But special means had to be employed to convince the men of military age that their services were required. To assist matters, the Recruiting Authorities issued a striking appeal in poster form, as follows:—"Do you realise all that we are fighting for in this greatest crisis of British history? Not only our Imperial honour, our Imperial existence, but our very life as a nation is at stake. Our brave men at the front are now fighting to preserve our honour and independence.

SOME RECRUITING STATISTICS.

A long and bitter struggle lies ahead before the goal of victory is reached. However trained to reach that goal, every day you hold back is an added danger to our beloved country. Five hundred thousand men are now training. Another half million is required." At this date (November 9th) we were still 350,000 short of the second half million Lord Kitchener had asked for. So far as height was concerned, it had been again reduced to the lowest minimum so that every available man might join. The second million men were asked for on November 14th, bringing the total of the army up to 2,186,400.

A further inducement to join the army was the raising of the separation allowance made to wives of soldiers of both the Regular and Territorial Army, but no change was made in the amount contributed by the soldier out of his pay. The allowance made from Army Funds was so increased as to bring the income of the family up to the higher standard. For a wife without a child the income was raised from 11s. 1d. to 12s. 6d.—

Wife and one child	12s. 10d. to 15s.
Wife and two children	14s. 7d. to 17s. 6d.
Wife and three children ...	16s. 4d. to 20s.
Wife and four children.....	17s. 6d. to 22s.,

and the amount increased by 2s. for each further child. For London families the addition of 3s. 6d. was continued to be made to these figures. Arrangements were also made with the Post Office to pay these allowances weekly direct to the women in all cases. These new rates started on October 1st, 1914. The hope was expressed that these new rates would encourage recruiting in the agricultural districts, for Lord Curzon pointed out in the House of Lords in January that the number of recruits obtained per 10,000 of the population showed the agricultural districts in a bad light. Lord Curzon's figures were for the period of recruiting for the new army up to the beginning of November:—

NUMBER OF MEN WHO HAD JOINED THE COLOURS PER 10,000 OF THE POPULATION IN THE INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTRAL DISTRICTS:—

Industrial Districts.		*Agricultural Districts.*	
Scotland (South).....	237	Scotland (North)	93
Warwickshire, Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, Buckinghamshire, Herefordshire and Berkshire	196	England (East)	88
Lancashire	178	England (West)	80
Middlesex and Surrey ..	173	Ireland (South and West)	32
Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland	155		
Cheshire and North Wales	135		
Ireland (North)	127		
Average for Industrial Districts	175	Average for Agricultural Districts	73



The London Scottish, headed by their pipers, on a recruiting march. [*Central Press.*



Recruits training in the snow in Hyde Park. [*Central News.*

This great disparity in the recruiting returns stimulated the activities of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. It arranged speakers for eight hundred meetings, distributed over four million leaflets, and encouraged recruiting wherever asked to do so by the local authorities. The greater effort of the Committee, however, was the sending by post direct from 12, Downing Street a form of return on which householders, whose names appeared on the list of voters, were asked to state the names of those members of their household who were willing to enlist for the war, or who had already enlisted. The filling up of the form was a purely voluntary service to the State on the part of the householder. The names supplied were entered in a register, and arrangements made with the nearest recruiting officer to attest those registered as their services were required. In order effectively to carry out this work, the owners of motor cars in the country were asked to assist in conveying to the nearest recruiting offices those men who lived in places remote from railway stations, and who had not the means to incur the expense which a journey to the recruiting office would in many cases entail. Motorists responded willingly to this appeal, and during the months of January and February many men were enlisted in the ranks who would otherwise have been lost to our fighting strength.

DISTRIBUTION AND TRAINING.


The raising of the Welsh Army Corps (a proposal due to Mr. Lloyd George) has made satisfactory progress. The object of the movement is to allot Wales a definite task in the raising of an army of a million men. For this purpose it was proposed that the quota allotted to Wales should be the numerical equivalent of an Army Corps—about 40,000 men—in addition to those already raised. Welshmen had rallied to the colours in thousands before the Welsh Army Corps was started. The intention of the War Office was to maintain in the field six separate armies. Two of these armies are now in the active field, and are commanded respectively by General Sir Douglas Haig and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. From a succession of Army Orders the following distribution of the various Divisions is made :—

First Army.—General Sir DOUGLAS HAIG.
First Corps, comprising the First and Second Divisions.
Fourth Corps, comprising the Seventh and Eighth Divisions.
Anglo-Indian Corps, comprising the Meerut and Lahore Divisions.
Second Army.—General Sir HORACE SMITH-DORRIEN.
Second Corps, comprising the Third and Fifth Divisions.
Third Corps, comprising the Fourth and Sixth Divisions.
Fifth Corps, composed of Divisions now being formed.
Third Army.—General Sir ARCHIBALD HUNTER.
Sixth Corps, comprising the Ninth and Tenth Divisions.
Seventh Corps, comprising the Eleventh and Twelfth Divisions.
Eighth Corps, comprising the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Divisions.
Fourth Army.—General Sir IAN HAMILTON.
Ninth Corps, comprising the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Divisions.
Tenth Corps, comprising the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Divisions.
Eleventh Corps, comprising the Nineteenth and Twentieth Divisions.
Fifth Army.—General Sir LESLIE RUNDLE.
Twelfth Corps, comprising the Twenty-first and Twenty-second Divisions.
Thirteenth Corps, comprising the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Divisions.
Fourteenth Corps, comprising the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Divisions.
Sixth Army.—General Sir BRUCE HAMILTON.
Fifteenth Corps, comprising the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions.
Sixteenth Corps, comprising the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Divisions.
Seventeenth Corps, comprising the Thirty-first and Thirty-second Divisions.

The larger portion of this, the largest army ever raised in these islands, are now in various stages of training, whilst the manufacturers of equipment are working day and night to satisfy their requirements. The raising of a large army includes material as well as personnel, and our stores were practically, if not entirely, exhausted in the first few weeks of the war. It takes at least six months to train a man for war, and it takes nearly as long to equip him when the expansion is so great. There are in this voluntary army all classes of the population. Under the most severe form of compulsory service it would not be possible to find a more complete mingling of the leisured, the professional, the skilled and the unskilled members of the community. The "superior officer" may be an artisan, and the private "a man with money," but the spirit that prevails in this new army is governed by the desire to do all that is possible to meet the tremendous needs of the Empire. The response to the call has "proved to the world that ideas which cannot be weighed and measured by any material calculus can still inspire and dominate mankind."

Only those who have any idea of the demands of modern war can be expected adequately to appreciate the stupendous task involved in moulding nearly two million men into an efficient war machine. The material at hand is good. It is of a quality which readily yields to the moulding process, for although quite raw, in the military sense, it had gone through the refining process which made its adaptation to military needs comparatively easy. The recruiting field was not so largely confined, as in normal times, to the unfortunate or adventurous class who joined the army in order to obtain regular food and comfortable lodgings, or to escape the restraints of civil life. The artist left his canvas, the clergyman the pulpit, the barrister the Law Courts, the actor the stage, the journalist the office, the singer the concert hall, the doctor his surgery, the merchant the Exchange, the sportsman the field, the clerk the counting house. University and Public School boys left their studies, miners stopped digging coal, spinners and weavers left the mill and shed, the aristocrat and the democrat made great sacrifices to "shoulder arms" and learn all the operations of modern war in order that in their time they might advance against the enemy.


In our army, recruits are at liberty to nominate the branch of the Service they wish to join, and, provided there is no serious objection to granting their desire, they begin immediately the training of their choice. Never before in our history have the people of these islands come into such close contact with the army. Householders have members of this new army quartered upon them ; the trumpet and bugle calls, which were formerly confined to garrison towns and training centres, are now familiar sounds ; public parks and places of amusements are in military occupation, and columns on the march and extended in line of battle are everyday sights which constantly remind us of the great trial of strength going on abroad, and for which all these military preparations have to be made. We live in an armed, but happily, a peaceful camp. All branches of the service are working on sound systematic and progressive lines. The men who joined the colours at the beginning of the war have lately been training in the larger formations, and are now ready to join their regular comrades in the field of active service. The training is made up of many operations, and although in some instances the men have not been properly equipped at the outset, and consequently not in a position to make the rapid advance towards military efficiency that was so urgently desired, the time has not been wasted. It is the training required in the more scientific services that have been most seriously handicapped.



The North Atlantic Fleet of the United States. [*Underwood and Underwood.*



An American battleship at close quarters. [*L.N.A.*



Washington : The Capitol.

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CHAPTER II.

OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR.


AMERICAN SYMPATHIES IN THE WAR—HER GREAT WORK OF HUMANITY IN BELGIUM—THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA—PRESIDENT WILSON'S POLICY—AMERICAN FINANCE AND THE ALLIES' CAUSE—THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN GENIUS.

WHEN, on August 4th, 1914, war was declared between England and Germany many Americans were, as usual at that time of the year, in Europe. Some thousands of American citizens had to be got safely out of Europe, and it was no easy task. Many found themselves unable to get money; many more found it impossible to secure a passage home, owing to the overcrowding of the ships. American officials—ambassadors and consuls—had their hands full for some weeks with the task of repatriation. They dealt with the situation with tact and resource. Money was lent practically on demand, and ships were commissioned by the Government to bring American citizens home. In many cases the American Ambassador enabled English, as well as American, travellers to extricate themselves from critical situations in Germany.

The arrival in America of travellers who had seen the beginning of the war naturally created a wide circle of personal interest in the events taking place in Europe, and the whole situation was closely canvassed from the first. Many had been in Germany, and brought with them the German point of view. Right or wrong, Germany, they thought, was sure to win. The extraordinary ease, rapidity, and efficiency of the mobilisation of the German army, the outburst of loyalty to the Kaiser, and the absolute unanimity of the people made a deep impression on all who saw it. Americans who came from France or England had less to tell that stirred the imagination. They were impressed rather with the sternness of determination and the moral idealism which they brought into the conflict. They spoke of France as regenerated by its task, and of Great Britain as more united than it had ever been.

Public opinion in America began to form with some definiteness with the publication of the official diplomatic papers. But it did not take shape without a period of sharp controversy. The advocates of the German cause had been prepared for the outbreak of war. They had had full warning in 1913, when General von Bernhardi visited the United States, that a European War was to be expected. The German newspapers, especially those influenced by Mr. Herman Ridder, took up the cause of Germany enthusiastically, and became violently anti-English. They alleged that Germany had been compelled to take up arms in self-defence; that the war was the outcome of an English conspiracy set on foot by the late King Edward, when he united England with France and Russia in the Triple Entente; that England's plan of isolating Germany in Europe in order to crush her was due to commercial jealousy, and meant that England, being beaten in commerce by Germany, was trying to get even by prompting France and Russia to fight her battles. German professors wrote and spoke of a German mission to extend a new and higher Teutonic *Kultur* through the world, and especially among the subject nations which were suffering under the decadent misrule of the British Empire.


Against this avalanche of argument there was no formal reply by English advocates. The only argument in return was the publication of the British White Paper, with the speeches of Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons. These made a deep impression. In New York the official papers of the French, Russian, German, Austrian and English Governments were submitted to a well-known lawyer, much respected for his judicial habit of mind, Mr. James M. Beck. His decision was an



Washington : The White House. [*E.N.A.*



The Hall of Records, New York. [*E.N.A.*



The United States Senate, Washington. [*E.N.A.*

unqualified judgment in favour of the Allies. But for the stiffness of Berlin, Austria, he held, would have accepted the apology and surrender of Servia, and the area of disturbance would have been limited to Southern Europe. It was clear that Germany was alone ready for war, and had precipitated war because she was ready.

AMERICA'S GREAT WORK IN BELGIUM.

The events of the first six weeks of war, and especially the violation of Belgian neutrality, were decisive in confirming this first impression of American opinion. The defence of Liége and the subsequent orgy of destruction—at Malines, Termonde, and Louvain—threw the solid weight of American opinion on the side of the Allies. When the Cathedral of Rheims was shelled a New York architect used an expression which echoed through the United States: "This," he said, "is killing a God." The humanitarian feeling—always strong in the United States—at once fixed on the effort to help the Belgian sufferers. Funds were started to relieve refugees, and so began, perhaps, the greatest and the best organised work of philanthropic relief of all times.


The magnitude of this work is so little understood in this country that to defer notice of it until it is completed, and the whole truth is known, would be to run the risk of doing injustice to the United States. The population of Belgium before the war was about seven and three-quarter million people. Of these, battle, bombardment, execution, and crime may have destroyed perhaps 200,000. Rather more than half a million became refugees in foreign countries, of whom Holland took 350,000—much the largest share—England about 100,000, and France the rest. There were thus left some seven millions in a country stricken with the paralysis of invasion. Of these, about a million and a half were completely destitute, and every one of them owes his life to the United States of America, and to the organising genius of Mr. Hoover and his associates. There was a real famine of breadstuffs in the country, which affected rich and poor alike. The work of the American Relief Commission was divided into two branches. A Provisioning Branch sold food (and especially breadstuffs) to those who could afford to pay for it, making a profit thereby amounting to £200,000 a month. A Benevolent Branch distributed food and relief to those who were destitute, at a cost of £660,000 a month. The difference between the two sums was made up by sympathisers in England and in the United States, but especially in the States.

This country, as well as Belgium, had reason to be grateful to the United States for its splendid philanthropy. For much, of course, of the shortage in Belgium was due to the action of the British Fleet. Our dilemma was a horrible one. If we allowed food to go into Belgium without restriction we were feeding the German army of occupation. On the other hand, if we treated Belgium as a blockaded country we were starving our Allies and using our sea-power as the nether millstone to the German military tyranny. From this dilemma the action of the United States Government saved us. It should have been the duty of the German Government in Belgium to undertake the feeding of the people, on the analogy of a military commander of a besieged town with a large civil population. Germany declined that duty, but the United States Government secured from her a pledge that foodstuffs which we allowed to be imported should not be diverted for the use of the occupying army, and to this pledge Germany was honourably faithful.

Another illustration of American efficiency in the service of humanity was the action of the Paris-Americans in the early months of the war. When the tide of invasion surged almost up to the gates of Paris, the ambulance service was found to be very inadequate. The French service was at that time antiquated, and the English service was not yet in the field. The Paris-Americans formed themselves into an auxiliary service. They obtained from the French Government the use of the half-finished Lycée Pasteur, in Neuilly. Architects and artists volunteered their services, and transformed the unfinished school into the best-equipped hospital in Paris.




A view of New York by night. [E.N.A.



The Brooklyn Bridge, New York. [E.N.A.

They found a consignment of Ford cars, of which the pieces had not yet been put together. Out of the packing cases in which the cars had been packed they made an ambulance wagon which could be fixed on the chassis. These cars—holding two men lying down, or four if they could sit up—were recognised by the French authorities as the most convenient form of motor ambulance in the field, and others were made to match. The ambulance plied back and forward from the lines of battle, bringing to Paris in a few hours wounded men who would barely have reached hospital in as many days if they had been left to the care of the official ambulances.



President Wilson. [*Topical.*



Mr. Roosevelt. [*Stanley.*

THE GERMAN MOVEMENT.

Early in August, President Wilson had announced that the policy of the Administration would be one of neutrality, and had exhorted American citizens to respect this policy in thought, word, and deed. His advice would have had a better chance of being acted upon but for the persistent partisan activities of German-Americans, which, as might be expected, provoked a growing irritation. These efforts took various forms. In New York, meetings were held at which the "hypocrisy" of English policy was denounced. Herr Dernburg's paper, *The Fatherland*, maintained a constant stream of protestation that Germany was innocent of any intention of annexing Belgium; that the invasion of neutral territory had been contemplated by England and effected by French soldiers; that English "navalism" was more dangerous to America than German militarism; and that, in any case, America was now so dependent on its German-American population that any offence given to their sympathies would be visited by dire consequences to the politician who was guilty of it. Professor Münsterberg published a book intended to show that the future of civilisation depended on the victory of German *Kultur*. Professor Kuno Meyer lectured on the devastating effect of English rule in Ireland and elsewhere. The effect of this German propaganda was to call forth from leading American citizens a remarkable series of declarations on the other side. Ex-President Eliot, of Harvard, issued a series of letters in the *New York Times*, remarkable for their clear analysis of policy, their mastery of European history, and their exposure of German ambition. Mr. Roosevelt published a pamphlet in which he went further, and declared that no violation of international law could be more glaring than the invasion of Belgium, and that America, by its adhesion to the Hague Conventions, was bound to see these conventions made effective. He appealed to the principle of common law that a legal wrong implies that there is a legal remedy, and insisted that the admitted wrong done to Belgium implied that America should see the invaded country righted.

PRESIDENT WILSON AND NEUTRALITY.

It was unfortunate with the sentiment of the country beginning to run strongly in favour of the Allies that the first official protest made by the United States on the conduct of the war should have been addressed to England, and have been concerned with the protection of important but purely commercial American interests. The question of America's policy in the perennial conflict between belligerent and neutral rights is too large to be discussed here, and will demand separate treatment later in these pages. It is enough here to point out that the suspicions of President Wilson's friendliness, which were so freely expressed in private in England towards the end of the year, were quite without justification, and



New York: A view of

made in complete ignorance of American politics and of the character of the President. His telegram of congratulation to the Kaiser on his birthday, which was misinterpreted in some quarters, was prompted by the wish to maintain friendly personal relations which would leave open a channel of communication when peace proposals became practical politics. Again, in supporting the Shipping Bill, which empowered the Administration to purchase ships interned in the United States, the President was merely acting in accordance with the principles of the Democratic party, which has for some time advocated the importance of America's recovering the position among the great maritime nations of the world which was hers before the Civil War. When, however, he realised that there might be danger of complications in Europe if the Bill was pressed, and that America might, in the phrase of Senator Root, "purchase a dispute with four European Powers with every ship," he modified his position, and a compromise was effected postponing the operation of the Bill to the end of the war. President Wilson's anxieties, however, were much more profound than the fate of any Bill, however important it might have seemed at any other time. He wished, as a man of peace, to preserve America's neutrality, and, as a man with noble ambition to serve humanity, to retain a standing in which he could mediate for peace, as President Roosevelt had done in the war between Russia and Japan. But a just attitude of neutrality was necessary for reasons of even more vital interest to the United States than these. He had the unity of the country to consider, and only by preserving an equal balance between the two sides could he be sure of avoiding a racial cleavage which might ultimately become as dangerous as the old quarrel between North and South. It was above all things necessary that his policy should be neither pro-German nor pro-British, but always pro-American.

THE DANGER OF RACIAL DISUNION.

The war acted like a chemical reagent on the confused mass of humanity drawn from many nationalities and races which is comprised within American citizenship. Nothing has happened in American history hitherto which has made the United States so conscious of the diversity of races and interests gathered under its flag. America has been the greatest example in the world of a genuinely liberal and democratic constitution, opening its ports to all comers, inviting them to meet on terms of equal citizenship, giving them freedom on the principle that the only way to make a man fit for citizenship in a free country is to bestow it, trusting the people in the belief that this would make them worthy of trust. On the whole, the great experiment has worked with success. In no country in the world have men been so free to bring out their best in the service of one another. The mere force of public approval and disapproval has been sufficient to induce men to use their citizenship mainly for the common good.

The German propaganda, which for a good many years had been seeking to create among German-Americans a kind of dual patriotism, has revealed the weak side of this generous policy. Had the propaganda gone on for another generation the American citizen of British tradition might have found himself an outsider in his own country. The universities were being Germanised, and already had more in common with Berlin and Jena than with Oxford and Cambridge. The ideals held up to students were those of erudition rather than of genuine culture, of mechanical and intellectual "efficiency" rather than of that outlook on life which Arnold described as "seeing life steadily and seeing it whole." The cities too were being Germanised. Germans coming to America brought with them the high standard of civic duty and service with which they were familiar in their own land,



A view of the river front. [*E.N.A.*

which has the best governed cities in the world. Americans had been slack and careless about matters of citizenship, too preoccupied with exploiting the natural resources of their country to care much about the paving of streets and the clearing of dustbins. The Germans stepped in, and were becoming the civic politicians of America with the natural result in a democratic country of ultimately acquiring predominant political power. The railways of America already owe more to German example and method than to English. German engineers had proved more adaptable, more scientific, more able to enter into the problems of a system dealing with vast areas than the English. Influential Americans had been received with much favour at Potsdam. Many Americans were beginning to feel almost as much at home in Germany as in England.

Another factor, too, had lately appeared in Washington politics, the German-Irish Alliance. There are in America about three million German-born American citizens, and about ten million Germans of the second generation. There are at least an equal number of Irish—or families of Irish extraction. These two large voting factors had been brought together by common hostility to England. In 1912 a league had been formed for the celebration of a hundred years' peace with England. The league had planned celebrations which were to have extended throughout the United States. But both Germans and Irish opposed it as tending to draw closer the bonds between England and America. For fifteen years there had been a carefully-organised propaganda, initiated by Professor Karl Lamprecht, of Leipzig, which, if had been successful, would have separated German-Americans from the common sentiments of citizenship in the United States. On one occasion the Kaiser was reported in America to have declared that three million Germans had followed his directions in casting their votes at the Presidential election. The policy of the Alliance was to press "neutrality" to the point of hostility to England, preventing the export of munitions of war if possible, and interfering with the execution of contracts by American firms for British buyers, and, if possible, to embroil America with England. Against that policy President Wilson set his face, and for the reason that had it succeeded it would have created a racial division in the United States. For the same reason he was against any policy which would have been open to the charge that it made the United States the servant of British policy. Only by identifying himself with neither belligerent, and pursuing interests which were indisputably American, could the danger of disunion in his opinion be averted. Yet probably there has never been a time since the American Revolution when the English-thinking American has felt so warmly towards the land of his fathers. He is more deeply conscious than ever of the common traditions of liberty, democracy, justice between man and man and nation and nation, constitutional government as the security of the nation against the dominance of a class, of duty as the basis of right, and of service as the only title to honour.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

One of the important effects of the war has been the constant discussion it has entailed of the Monroe Doctrine. George Washington's warning against the entangling alliances of Europe, and the principle formulated by President Monroe that no European Power should be allowed to acquire a new interest on the American continent, are two of the most deeply-seated principles of American political life. They have acquired by long usage almost the weight of religious dogmas. Already before the war broke out the Monroe Doctrine had been challenged by Germany, and its strength tested by



A squad of American marines. [*Underwood and Underwood.*

the proposal to form two hundred thousand German colonists in Southern Brazil into a German principality. It is pointed out that America is now much more a part of the European system than it was in George Washington's day. Steamships and telegraphs have in effect brought America and Europe more closely together than at one time seemed possible. It would in some respects be easier for America to take a definite part in a European Concert than to keep out of it, and might more effectually protect American citizenship. If, as one American publicist has declared, the Monroe Doctrine merely means that European institutions are not to be thrust on America without her consent, there may be room for a good deal of give and take when it is clear that some definite mutual relations may be entered into with her consent. There is no question on which the keen intellect of America is more alert at the moment than American relations with Europe, and it is clearly one of the questions which some future politician will have to set on a new basis.

AMERICAN FINANCE AND THE WAR.


In matters of finance, American policy has throughout the war followed the line of American sentiment rather than of American politics. When war came, American bankers asked the Bank of England to open a branch on the American side of the Atlantic; and when this was done at Ottawa, they lodged twenty millions with the Ottawa Bank to increase the English reserves. In November, Sir George Paish visited the American bankers, at the request of the British Government, and arrangements were then made for easing the strain between London and New York created by the selling of American securities in London, and the maturing of a large annual indebtedness due at this time. The balance was righted by the export of war material from America, which has made it a creditor instead of a debtor country. On the other hand, Mr. Jacob Schiff, the head of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, one of the leading American financial houses, was asked to assist Germany in raising a loan of two hundred and fifty millions (£250,000,000). He consulted other banking houses in New York, and, finding them unwilling to co-operate, he refused to negotiate the loan. The close co-operation between English and American bankers has been an element of strength to England which has not yet received full recognition. The financial solidarity of England and America, resting on a real unanimity of interest, in maintaining the credit fabric of the world has probably been more important than any military action which America could have taken.

OPPOSITION BETWEEN AMERICAN AND GERMAN IDEAS.

It must be reckoned to the credit of democracy that the liberal constitution of America has protected it from some of the dangerous heresies which produced the war temper in Germany. A nation which estimates the value of race and nationality in the terms of common citizenship is secure against the sophistries of Treitschke. Treitschke wrote history in such a way as to make history, and the history he made is a condemnation of the history he wrote. His characteristic essays were reproduced in some of the American papers, and the criticism was at once made: "This is a religion which worships a tribal God." It is no doubt true that God has called Germany to do a special

work in the world, but the same thing may be said with equal or greater force of England and France and Russia. In a mixed citizenship, such as exists in America, the exaltation of nationalism is an absurdity; the insistence on race can only provoke conflict. "Above all nations is humanity," and no religious view of life can be accepted which has not room for the free collaboration of all nationalities in the service of a common humanity. The idea that there is a divine calling for any one nation to impose its *Kultur* on the rest is not Christian, and has no place in Christianity, which recognises in nations only larger or lesser capacities for human service.

American religion is personal and universal rather than historical and mediated. It rejects instinctively the steps of priest, church, and nation, through which religious ideas are mediated to most European peoples. The prevalence of movements like Emersonism in New England, Christian Science throughout the States, Dowieism in Chicago, are symptoms of this craving for the universal and unmediated in religion. There can be no compromise between this point of view and the Kaiser's religious utterances. It is a matter of necessity and obligation for the American mind to resist and criticise a religion which produces the breach of contracts, the devastation of Belgium, sea-murder, and baby killing. To America, Germany seems afflicted with the madness of national egotism. The American mind cannot tolerate either its doctrinaire politics or its doctrinaire religion, and at present is in full reaction from both. Nietzsche has received short shrift from the hands of thoughtful Americans, and the whole train of German criticism which produced his revolt from Christianity has shared the discredit into which he has fallen. It is hardly too much to say that, unconsciously, Germany has performed the function of an *advocatus diaboli* in confirming the hold of the American people on ethical and religious principles.



Mr. W. J. Bryan. [E.N.A.

It goes without saying that every statement about America must be qualified by the fact that in so vast a country, with ninety millions of population, there are many currents and cross currents of opinion. In almost every family or group of families some one member is found to take the German side. In New York there has been a noisy and active centre of hostility to the Allies. In Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, and Cincinatti there are German quarters where everything English is criticised and detested. In face of this diversity it is only possible to register the views of a majority, perhaps ninety per cent, of the population, and to note that divergences exist. There is an element of party in the division of opinion. The Republicans are the heirs of the older American tradition of government, which, although it has sometimes been hostile to England, bases its differences on an essential unity of standpoint. American Republicanism probably has more in common with historical English Liberalism than with any strain of American-born opinion. On the other hand, the Democratic party, now in power, has always depended largely on Irish votes, except in the Southern States, where the Democrats are simply the opponents of the New England tradition. The Democratic principle lends itself to the cry "America for the Americans," and to antagonism to all the influences of foreign politics. It is anti-imperial, anti-military, and to some extent anti-English. It is to the credit of Dr. Wilson that his strenuous and high-principled pacificism has acted as a brake on the impulse of the party which placed him in the Presidential chair.

SOME EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON AMERICA.

There is a marked tendency in American politics at the moment to correct the slowness and hesitation of representative government by experiments in direct popular control. The movement increases the weight and influence of a President in any organisation, and at the same time increases his responsibility to the organisation he directs. Its methods are the initiative—which allows the people to demand legislation on any subject—the referendum, which refers to them a measure which has been approved by the Legislature, and the recall, which enables the people to remove from office any official who has incurred popular disapproval. It is hoped in this way to get over some of the anomalies and absurdities of government by committees which frequently, by the path of futile delays, ends in an *impasse*. This movement has been strengthened by the war. War emphasises the value of personality. It puts a premium on leadership.

The war has had a striking effect in diminishing European immigration to America. It is impossible to predict whether this diminution will continue. There will be an increased demand for men in Europe for some time to come. On the other hand, there will be larger opportunities in America. The country can hardly fail to come out of the struggle in a state of great prosperity. Enormous orders for munitions of war and army supplies will keep American factories busy for many months. It is the only great country where business enterprise is taking its normal course. High prices mean large profits, and

large profits stimulate new expenditure in many directions. The present drop in immigration may be followed by a great increase when the war is over The present tendency in the United States to check and discourage immigration can hardly continue if there is a strong demand for labour.

On the whole, the shock of war may be said to have strengthened rather than weakened the sense of solidarity between America and England. It has checked the tendency to say "we have nothing in common but the language." It has thrown into prominence the common principles which underlie American and English society—democracy, liberty—individual and national, justice—religious and political: as against autocracy, militarism, feudalism, nationalism, and the right of mere force to do as it will. It has restored the claims of reason and law to direct the affairs of nations as against the "will to power"; and it has compelled both America and England to ponder again the principle which John Bright announced in the House of Commons, when he said: "Gentlemen, we may not be able to build an Empire on the basis of free institutions, but it is quite certain we cannot build an Empire on any other basis."



The Statue of Liberty, New York Harbour. [*E.N.A.*



The entry of General Barnardiston into Tokio after the fall of Tsing-Tau. [*Record Press.*

CHAPTER III.

THE INTERVENTION OF JAPAN.

GERMANY IN THE FAR EAST—KIAO-CHAU AND THE GERMAN NAVAL SQUADRON—JAPANESE ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY—HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF KIAO-CHAU—ITS SIEGE AND FALL.


AS soon as war broke out, Great Britain appealed to Japan to take action against Germany under the Anglo-Japanese treaty. The reason for the request lay in the possession by Germany of Kiao-Chau, which she had leased from China in 1898, and which was now likely to be a cause of injury to British interests in the Far East. It was not, however, the existence of Kiao-Chau as a German colony which caused anxiety to England. The true reason why she requested Japan to intervene was not fully appreciated in this country at the time, as the British Government took no steps to explain the motive for its actions, nor was it understood at all in Germany, where public opinion regarded England's policy as only one more step in what was comprehensively described as her "robber war." It was, however, much more than a mere attack on one of Germany's few colonial possessions, and the reason for it lay in the existence of the strong naval squadron which Germany kept at Kiao-Chau. Shortly before the outbreak of the war this squadron consisted of the armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, and the light cruisers *Leipzig*, *Emden*, and *Nurnberg*. What England had to fear was that these ships would issue from their base in order to harass and destroy British commerce in the China seas and beyond them. The damage which they could do might have been very serious. So long as they remained in existence it would have been necessary to concentrate a superior force against them, and to blockade them in Kiao-Chau harbour.

The danger was sufficiently clear to make it possible to appeal with confidence to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese treaty. The preamble of the treaty declared that the objects of England and Japan were to maintain and consolidate the general peace in Eastern Asia, to uphold their territorial rights, and to advance "their special interests." The existence of the German squadron certainly constituted a threat to British commercial interests in eastern waters, and also affected the British naval position. The two articles in the treaty which defined the principles from which Japan's intervention now arose were in the following terms:—

> "It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights and interests."



Tsing-Tau : The harbour and floating dock. [E.N.A.



Another view of the port of Tsing-Tau. [E.N.A.



A view of the bay at Wei-Hai-Wei. E.N.A.

"If by reason of any unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it."

A few weeks later, when the Japanese Diet met, the Foreign Minister, Baron Kato, insisted that Japanese intervention in the war had taken place at the suggestion of England. Japan, he said, had herself no desire or inclination to take part in the war; but when the appeal was made to her, she felt that under the terms of the treaty she had no alternative. He specifically mentioned the commercial interests which were threatened as the main ground for warlike action. He said:—

"Early in August the British Government asked the Imperial Government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. German men-of-war and armed vessels were prowling around the seas of Eastern Asia, menacing our commerce and that of our ally, while Kiao-Chau was carrying out operations apparently for the purpose of constituting a base for warlike operations in Eastern Asia. Grave anxiety was thus felt for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. . . . Inasmuch as we were asked by our ally for assistance at a time when commerce in Eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain alike regard as one of their special interests, is subjected to a constant menace, Japan, who regards that alliance as a guiding principle of her foreign policy, could not but comply with the request to do her part."

There is no good reason to suppose that Japan cherished any such acute feelings of hostility towards Germany as would have led her to plunge into the war, apart from her treaty obligations. The two Powers had, it is true, come into collision at the close of the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-5, when Japan had captured Port Arthur, and was compelled to withdraw from it on "advice" which amounted to an ultimatum from Russia, Germany, and France; and it was often alleged that Germany was the moving spirit at that time. Germany had also started a scramble for Chinese territory among the Powers by seizing Kiao-Chau in 1898; but then Russia had followed suit by acquiring Port Arthur, and England and France had imitated the happy example. Many things had happened since that time. Japan had recovered Port Arthur from Russia by force of arms, and had made two agreements with her defeated enemy, so that she was now on good terms with her. There was no trace of hostility between Japan and France, although France also had played her part in thwarting Japan's earlier ambitions at Port Arthur. But although Japan may not have been inspired by enmity towards a Power which had opposed her twenty years before, she had not forgotten the incident, as she made clear in the form of the ultimatum which she now delivered to Germany. Even at such a time a nation gifted with a sense of humour might have appreciated the delicate irony with which Japan "advised" Germany to abandon her most-cherished colonial possession, just as she had herself once advised Japan to surrender the dearest object of her hopes.

Japan presented her ultimatum on August 15th, demanding that by the 23rd inst. Germany should agree to surrender Kiao-Chau and the leased Hinterland with it, and also to withdraw her ships from Eastern waters. The terms of the document were these:—

"We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbances of the peace in the Far East and to safeguard the general interests as contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain.

"In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:—

"(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.

"(2) To deliver, on a date not later than September 15th, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-Chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

"The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23rd an answer from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the situation."


The phrases in this document which describe a peremptory ultimatum as a kind of friendly advice, and also, perhaps, the suggestion that the existence of Kiao-Chau as a German possession was calculated to disturb the peace of the Far East, were undoubtedly intended to recall to the German Government the language which had been held by it in conjunction with Russia and France towards Japan herself twenty years before. That ultimatum—it is quoted as presented by Russia—ran as follows:—

"The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in examining the conditions of peace which Japan has imposed on China, finds that the possession of the peninsula of Liaotung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East. Consequently, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor would give a new proof of their sincere friendship for the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan by advising them to renounce the definitive possession of the peninsula of Liaotung."


The intervention of Japan aroused everywhere a lively feeling of interest, and in some countries a little uneasiness. The Chinese Government noted the statement that Japan had in view the "eventual restoration" of Kiao-Chau without finding in it any solid grounds for satisfaction. China was disposed to remember that Japan, if Kiao-Chau fell into her hands, was likely to be a more formidable neighbour than Germany, having already established herself in a predominant position in Manchuria. China had suffered much from the rivalries of the Great Powers, but she had nothing to gain by the elimination of one country and the transference of its possessions on Chinese territory to a rival who was already of the most formidable character. The United States, also, was disposed to regard Japan's action critically. Her Government, more strongly than any other, had always aimed at preserving the integrity of China and the policy of equal commercial opportunity for all nations. She was not likely, therefore, to regard the transference of Kiao-Chau to Japan, and still more the extension of Japan's operations into the Pacific, which might also be intended, without some little disquietude. Apart, however, from Japan's reference to her intention of restoring Kiao-Chau to China, she gave some intimations which were intended to reassure the nervous. An official statement published




British and Japanese troops landing at Lao-shan Bay. [*Record Press.*



Japanese artillery going ashore at Lao-shan Bay. [*Record Press.*



British infantry disembarking. [*Photopress.*



Kiao-Chau and the Shantung Province.

in England immediately after the issue of the ultimatum said: "It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific—or in Asiatic waters westward of the China seas—or to foreign territories, except territory in German occupation on the continent of Western Asia." A few days later, in order still further to reassure opinion—especially, it may be supposed, in the United States and the British dominions—the Press Bureau in London published the following extract from a speech delivered by the Japanese Prime Minister, Count Okuma:—

> "Japan's object is to eliminate from Continental China the root of German influence, which forms a constant menace to the peace of the Far East, and thus to secure the aims of the alliance with Great Britain. She harbours no design for territorial aggrandisement, and entertains no desire to promote any other selfish ends.
>
> "Japan's warlike operations will not therefore extend beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of that object and for the defence of her own legitimate interests. Accordingly, the Imperial Government have no hesitation in announcing to the world that they will take no action such as would give to the Powers any cause for anxiety or uneasiness regarding the safety of their territories and possessions."

The United States took the opportunity to place on record its own attitude with regard to Japan's intervention. It underlined the meaning of such assurances as have been quoted, and it noted Japan's promise that Kiao-Chau should revert to China. There was, of course, no possibility that the Japanese ultimatum would be accepted. Germany, in point of fact, merely intimated by word of mouth to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin that she had no reply to make, and orders were despatched to the Governor of the place to hold out to the end. When, therefore, the prescribed period had elapsed, the Emperor of Japan declared war on Germany in the following rescript:—

> "We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, on the throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to all loyal and brave subjects. We hereby declare war against Germany, and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and we so command all our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim within the limit of the law of nations.
>
> "Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which we view with grave concern, we on our part have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality. But the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-Chau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while her armed vessels, cruising the seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening our commerce and that of our ally.
>
> "The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy. Accordingly, our Government, and that of his Britannic Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated in the agreement of alliance. And we, on our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commanded our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the Imperial German Government.



A Japanese siege gun in position during the attack on Tsing-Tau. [*Record Press.*



Japanese siege guns in action against the forts of Tsing-Tau. [*Central News.*

> "By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, our Government failed to receive an answer accepting the advice. It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of our reign and while we are still in mourning for our lamented mother. It is our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valour of our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced."

Germany had first declared her pretensions to Kiao-Chau in November, 1897, when two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung Province. A German squadron appeared at Kiao-Chau, and early in 1898 China conceded to Germany a ninety-nine years' lease of Kiao-Chau Bay, together with about two hundred miles of territory around it. The bay is an admirable harbour, wide and deep, and almost landlocked; the entrance to it is not two miles across—an excellent base for an ambitious Naval Power. Kiao-Chau, properly so called, is the old Chinese village of that name which lies at the inner end of the bay on the northern side, but the town and port which Germany established were called Tsing-Tau, and lay on the peninsula which forms the northern entrance to the bay. The town fronted both towards the open sea and towards Kiao-Chau Bay. Behind it lay a commanding series of hills—Moltke, Bismarck, Iltis—which were fortified, and gave the settlement a strong protection from attack on the landward side.



General Barnardiston and General Kamio, the Commanders of the British and Japanese Forces operating against Tsing-Tau.

[*E.N.A.*

When the Germans came to Tsing-Tau in 1898 they found it barren and undeveloped, and they set to work to found a colony with characteristic industry and thoroughness. They laid down large plantations of trees; they built a railway; they established schools for both Germans and Chinese. They constructed a semi-circular mole towards an island in the bay, and formed a commercial harbour, with quays and floating docks, and coal wharves. They laid down building slips, and established facilities for repairing ships as large as their own *Scharnhorst*. They constructed fine buildings, and laid out broad streets, with gardens and open spaces, after the model of their own towns in Germany, helped by the subsidies of their home Government. They set themselves to develop the trade of the province, and to bring it increasingly to Tsing-Tau as its port. This was, indeed, the one undoubted colonial success which Germany could claim, and she was inordinately proud of it. She looked on it both as a characteristic product of German energy and as a lever for spreading her power in the East. It assured her, Prince Bülow once said, "a decisive influence on the future of the Far East," a position from which she could "look with complacency on the development of affairs." The loss of Kiao-Chau, which was inevitable from the moment when Japan took up arms, was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the fierceness of German hatred towards England. Kiao-Chau had been the German Emperor's own choice. Some accounts had ascribed the decision to seize the bay to Admiral Tirpitz, or to a certain missionary bishop named Anzer. But on the margin of a book which gave the credit to Bishop Anzer the Emperor (so said the Berlin *Post*) made this annotation:—

> "Wrong! I selected Kiao-Chau after I had had Samsa Bay and Wei-Hai-Wei reconnoitred. Both were reported to me as wholly unsuitable. I thereupon took Baron von Richthofen's book and a map of China, and after reading his chapter on Shantung I decided for the port of Kiao-Chau, as Baron von Richthofen's opinion of the Hinterland was so remarkably favourable. Bishop Anzer had nothing to do with the decision."

The garrison at Kiao Chau was in a hopeless position: it was small, and it could not hope to receive any reinforcements. The Japanese, on their side, had nothing to gain by hurrying the attack, and they announced at once that they intended to proceed in a methodical and leisurely manner. The fortress was defended by about 6,000 men; there were 2,500 reservists of various kinds and five infantry companies of active troops, five machine gun sections, one battery of field artillery, one company of engineers, and five companies of garrison marine artillery. There were no submarines attached to the station, but here, as elsewhere, the Germans had provided themselves with an indefinite quantity of mines.

The attack was undertaken by a joint British and Japanese force. Its main object, so far as the British were concerned, had been achieved before the military operations actually began, for the German squadron did not wait for the expiry of the ultimatum, but left harbour for the South Seas, and only a few small warships remained behind. The British decision to take part in the siege resulted naturally from the fact that it was British



Japanese infantry fording a stream during the attack on Tsing-Tau. [*Record Press.*



Japanese soldiers in camp near Tsing-Tau. [*Record Press.*

interests which had led to the entry of Japan into the war; and also that the more active the part which England played in the Far Eastern operations, the more she would be able to make her voice heard in the final settlement in that quarter. Some discontent was shown in the Japanese press that England had not left the whole of this small enterprise to her ally. So far as the numbers of the German garrison were concerned, England might have dealt with it by means of her own forces, although it would have meant drawing troops from India who were required in Europe; but the decisive reasons against taking the attack exclusively into her own hands were the need for employing in it both a powerful naval squadron and numbers of heavy guns.

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

The Japanese force consisted of the Eighteenth Division, under the command of General Kamio; the British was commanded by Brigadier-General Barnardiston, and was composed of the South Wales Borderers and some companies of the Thirty-sixth Sikhs. The plan of campaign was to disembark these troops at Lao-shan Bay, on the coast north-east of Kiao-Chau, to draw a line across the head of the peninsula and then march southward, driving the garrison back from its advanced posts on to the fortifications immediately in front of the town. Comparatively little could be done by attacking from the sea. The entrance into the harbour was barred by the German mines, and all that was possible was for the British and Japanese warships to take an occasional part in the bombardment of the land defences; this became more active as the besieging troops drew nearer on the landward side.



Captain S. Meyer-Waldeck, German Governor of Kiao-Chau. [*E.N.A.*

The campaign opened immediately after the period fixed by the ultimatum had expired with a naval demonstration from the sea. On August 25th the British destroyer *Kennet* was engaged with a heavier German vessel, and, in pursuing her, approached too close to the land battery and sustained some slight damage. The first serious movement took place on September 3rd, when a body of Japanese troops was landed at Lung-kow, in Chinese territory, many miles from the leased zone. The Chinese Government promptly protested against this action as a breach of China's neutrality. The reply given to them was, in effect, that the Germans in making Kiao-Chau a military base for belligerent purposes and capturing merchant vessels there had already infringed the neutrality of China, and if China could not fulfil her duty by protecting her own neutrality, Japan was in her turn released from her obligations to observe it. This was not an answer which could be expected to be satisfactory to China, but it seems to have served the Chinese Government usefully when the German Minister at Pekin protested against the action of Japan. (The German Government was, of course, permitted by the terms of the lease of Kiao-Chau to establish a naval station there, and to erect forts in the leased zone.)

General Barnardiston and his force left Tientsin on September 19th in three transports, and proceeded to Wei-Hei-Wei. There they were joined by a hospital ship, and on September 21st left for their landing place at Lao-shan. Their naval escort consisted of two British vessels and one Japanese. At Lao-shan the main Japanese army was already disembarking. On September 25th an advance was made in a westerly direction, Tsimo being occupied on the following day. During the next few days the advance was pressed forward, and the Germans, without offering any strong opposition, withdrew towards their permanent lines of defence. By the end of September the British and Japanese troops were busy making trenches and building bomb-proof shelters against the fire of the redoubts and forts which they were now to attack. The German shell-fire from this time onward was lavish, but almost harmless. At Kiao-Chau, as elsewhere, it was found that artillery could effect comparatively little against troops who were well entrenched and sheltered. In the twenty-four hours between October 5th and 6th the German guns fired two thousand and fifteen shells without inflicting a single casualty. Up to that time, indeed, the total Briitsh losses were four men wounded.

The British detachment was not forgotten during the progress of the siege by the ruling house of Japan. On October 9th the Emperor and Empress sent a personal aide-de-camp, carrying their good wishes and presents of cigarettes, and, for the officers, five dozen bottles of saké, the Japanese wine. On October 13th General Barnardiston issued an order in these words:—


> "The following message was received to-day from his Imperial Highness the Crown Prince of Japan:—'The British troops are enduring hardships and, in co-operation with the Japanese force, are pressing the enemy back. His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince is much gratified by their gallant conduct, and at the same time sympathises with the sick and wounded. His Imperial Highness hopes that all ranks will do their utmost to keep in good health, so as completely to fulfil their task.'"

SIEGE OPERATIONS.


October was taken up with methodical siege operations. The Japanese brought up heavy guns and closely bombarded the German redoubts and forts, and also at intervals the small warships in the harbour. Sapping operations were carried forward towards the outer line of the defences. The German position had been carefully



After the fall of Tsing-Tau: The remains of the heavy guns on the Kaiser fortress. [*Record Press.*



One of the destroyed guns on the Iltis fortress. [*Record Press.*



Plan of Tsing-Tau and the hills at the back of the town.

prepared and was of a formidable character, even if it were not to be compared with more famous fortresses. The inner line was composed of the Moltke, Bismarck, and Iltis Hills, which were heavily fortified. In front of them, for a distance of nearly a mile, lay open ground, and then came a line of five redoubts. One who was present at the final assault, in describing the obstacle which the redoubts presented to attack, said: "The Allies had to pass a twenty-foot wall running the entire length of the redoubts, across entanglements of the most scientific kind, up a slope without an iota of cover, upon which heavy guns could no longer play for fear of hurting their own men, across another lot of entanglements, and up a second slope, against Maxims, pompoms, rifle fire, and, finally, bayonets. Then, when the redoubts had been taken, they had to cross rather more than three-quarters of a mile of open ground, and climb the steep sides of Iltis, Bismarck, and Moltke."*

The fortress had been completely invested on October 1st; sapping went on steadily through the month, until towards the beginning of November everything was ready for the assault. The Japanese were careful not to make the error into which they had fallen at Port Arthur in 1905, when they attempted to storm the fortress without preparation. The attack was preceded by a general bombardment from land and sea, which began on October 1st, when the birthday of the Emperor of Japan was celebrated. The dockyard and oil-tanks were set on fire, and great damage was done to some of the forts. For the next five days bombardment and sapping continued together, until by November 6th the Japanese were close up to the German lines, and some of the forts were believed to have been so battered as to be capable of little further resistance.

Whether this was so or not, certainly little resistance was offered. In the middle of the night of November 6th, General Yamada, in the centre of the line, captured the two redoubts in front of him, sending only two companies of sappers against each. With a similar force, and just as easily, General Horiuchi captured the two redoubts on the left of the Japanese front. The first redoubt fell to the Japanese right wing and the British section, while by half-past six in the morning the inner line of forts—Moltke, Bismarck, and Iltis—had also fallen before the attacks of only small bodies of besiegers.

A FEEBLE DEFENCE.

The feeble defence which the garrison offered must be explained in some degree by their consciousness that no efforts which they could make would do more than postpone the inevitable end. But even so, and although the Japanese sappers had done their work well, it is a little astonishing that the Germans did not inflict heavier losses on the besiegers, especially from the vantage point of the inner forts. Their casualties amounted to about eleven hundred; the British and Japanese together to nine hundred. The Japanese, whose code of military honour bids them submit to death rather than accept a humiliating surrender, seem to have been frankly contemptuous of the spirit shown by German arms in this

* Mr. E. M. Gull, the only British correspondent who was present during the concluding stages of the siege.


encounter. A statement published in Tokio, which was apparently inspired from official sources, said :—" The garrison at Tsing-Tau surrendered without striking an effective blow in its own defence. There was not much glory in the taking, it is true. One can only applaud the wisdom of the garrison."

So the Japanese and British entered into Kiao-Chau. Not long afterwards it was explained that the fortress and leased territory were not to be handed back to China as a consequence of their removal from German hands. Had Germany accepted the ultimatum, then indeed, it was said in Tokio. Japan might have been called on forthwith to restore Kiao-Chau to China ; but as the ultimatum had been rejected, the suggestion which it made for the restoration of Kiao-Chau to China fell to the ground. A little later, Japan demanded that China should transfer Kiao-Chau to her with all the rights and privileges which Germany had held under the treaty of 1898.

Two other points of friction had arisen between Japan and China during the siege. A German torpedo-boat had run ashore on the Chinese coast, and when a Japanese vessel had gone in to capture it, China protested against its action as a violation of her neutrality. A more important dispute arose out of the railway from Kiao-Chau to Tsinanfu. On the ground that this had been a German railway, Japan finally seized the terminus at Tsinanfu, which lies in the heart of the Shantung province, far away from Kiao-Chau. China protested, and demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese. But these events, which took place during the siege, were only the prelude to the series of most formidable demands which Japan made on the Chinese Government in January, 1915.



Part of the wire entanglements outside one of the Tsing-Tau forts. [*Record Press.*



Off the coast of the Falkland Islands. [*E.N.A.*

CHAPTER IV.


THE NAVAL WAR IN TWO OCEANS.

BRITISH AND GERMAN NAVAL FORCES IN THE FAR EAST—POLITICS AND NAVAL POLICY—THE DEFEAT IN THE PACIFIC AND LORD FISHER'S COUNTER-STROKE—BATTLE OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

WHEN war between England and Germany was declared on the 4th of August, it looked as though one of the chief areas of naval conflict must necessarily be in Far Eastern waters. For a number of years the German Government had maintained on the China station a fleet larger than that of any other European Power, composed of some of the newest and best German ships, and commanded by an Admiral who was second to none in the German navy in energy and capacity. Count von Spee, had he lived, would undoubtedly have become in time Commander-in-chief of the German High Seas Fleet. He was a gunnery expert, and his flagship, the *Scharnhorst*, which was, after the *Blücher*, the latest and best of the German pre-Dreadnought armoured cruisers, held the gunnery record for the whole German navy. Besides the *Scharnhorst* and her sister ship the *Gneisenau*, both of them steaming twenty-four knots, and carrying an armament composed of a late and powerful type of the German 8·2-inch gun (both of them, too, with specially-designed armoured protection), he had a number of cruisers of the German town class, very slightly protected and not heavily armed, but, by reason of their great speed and relatively low coal consumption, eminently fitted to act as efficient commerce destroyers. Besides these, he had a number of torpedo-boats of an older type, and a number of coastal and river gunboats. All these were based on the fortified port of Tsing-Tau. To the north of it, on the southern side of Pechili, lay the British naval base of Wei-Hai-Wei. At this port were collected, under Vice-Admiral Jerram, a miscellaneous body of ships The Vice-Admiral flew his flag on the *Minotaur*, an armoured cruiser of the most recent pre-Dreadnought type, heavily protected, carrying a powerful mixed armament of 9·2, 7·5, and 6-inch guns, and steaming the same speed, roughly, as the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, With it were the *Triumph*, a battleship of light draught, with a light armour belt and medium speed, mounting four 10-inch and a battery of 7·5-inch guns, and the *Hampshire*, an armoured cruiser of the county class with, however, a relatively weak armament of four 7·5's and a number of guns of smaller calibre. Admiral Jerram had, besides two cruisers of the town class, the *Newcastle* and the *Yarmouth*, a number of river gunboats and destroyers, and four submarines of the C class. There was, therefore, no great disparity between the two fleets. The *Minotaur* was perhaps slightly more powerful—but not much more powerful—than the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. The *Hampshire* was in every way definitely inferior to the German ships, and, indeed, belonged to that period of British cruiser construction which redounds the least in credit to Admiralty designers. On the other



H.M.S. Good Hope. [*Topical.*



H.M.S. Monmouth. [*Topical.*

hand, the British Admiral had the *Triumph*, which would have been a valuable ship in an engagement had the Germans sought or accepted action, but could not have been of much service had it been necessary to force an action by pursuit. In light cruisers the Germans had the *Emden*, the *Nürnberg*, and the *Leipzig*, to our *Newcastle* and *Yarmouth*. They were as fast as our ships, but inferior in armament and protection, and probably could have been sunk, even at odds, if an engagement had taken place. Further, we had the submarines, of which they had none, and our destroyers were superior to their minor craft.

Such was the position on the 4th of August, when the King issued his famous message to the Navy, a message which was publicly acknowledged by only two of the British Commanders-in-chief, Sir John Jellicoe and Admiral Jerram. The fact that the Admiral on the China station should have received the message and sent a reply, and the fact that the reply was published, seemed to point to a belief on the part of the Admiral himself, and of the Admiralty at home, that an action in Chinese waters might speedily be expected, and that the British force there would make it its business to prevent the escape and dispersal on the high seas of the German squadron. In fact, the *Emden*, the *Leipzig*, and the *Nürnberg* departed each their several ways towards the commerce routes absolutely unmolested, and the German Admiral himself, with his two armoured cruisers, succeeded equally in gaining the seas and then disappeared from public knowledge for six weeks. With the exception of one appearance at the French colony of Tahiti, he was never heard of again till October.

THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY'S POLICY.

. We do not as yet know anything whatever regarding the Admiralty's policy in Far Eastern waters at the moment when war was declared, and we therefore can only conjecture what were the reasons which induced the British Admiral not to contest the departure of the German ships, or if they departed, as most likely they did, before the actual declaration of war, not to keep in touch with them, and prevent their escape on to the high seas. A conjecture may, however, be made. It seems likely, when the full history of the naval war is written, that the whole campaign in the Pacific will prove to be a capital example of the evil effects of political considerations when they are allowed to weigh in a purely naval problem. It is perhaps worth while for a moment to develop this point. We had ourselves in the Far East no adequate means at our disposal for reducing the strongly fortified German naval base at Tsing-Tau. Even had we had the necessary forces and artillery for this purpose, it is very doubtful whether our alliance with Japan would have permitted us to undertake this work by ourselves. Furthermore, it is clear that by virtue of this alliance the Japanese would have the opportunity, and would feel themselves justified in taking it, of ridding Far Eastern territory of one of the European settlements—a settlement, moreover, occupied by a Power which, twenty years before, had prevented Japan from securing the just fruits of victory, and sixteen years before had begun that process of European encroachment in China which had led to the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur, and, therefore, ultimately to the Russo-Japanese war. It seemed likely that, sooner or later, once war had been declared between ourselves and Germany, the Japanese would come in for the purpose of acquiring Tsing-Tau. It was equally likely that general political considerations would make it desirable that our own forces should co-operate effectively in this enterprise. Accordingly, when Von Spee put to sea, though the right course from the naval point of view would have been to follow him immediately, never to lose sight of him, and to force an action as soon as possible, the right course from the political point of view was to keep the flagship, the *Triumph*, and the *Hampshire* in North Chinese waters, so as to be ready to co-operate in the land and sea attack on Tsing-Tau.

Von Spee, therefore, got clean away, and one of his ships, the *Emden*, went westwards and did a large amount of commerce destruction, which has been described in detail in an earlier chapter of this history. Another, the *Leipzig*, in its turn, destroyed several vessels in the Pacific. Von Spee himself, with his two armoured cruisers, disappeared from sight. But it is clear that he had his plans well laid. In this connection it is not without interest to observe that the Admiral's brother was, up to the July preceding the war, German Minister in Ecuador, and that there seem undoubtedly to have been concerted preparations for supplying, by means of coal and storeships, the needs of the German squadron when it got out into the Pacific. There was another British squadron in the South Pacific. The Australian Fleet, which had only recently been organised, under command of Rear-Admiral Patey, was placed under control of the Admiralty at the beginning of the war. It consisted of the battle cruiser *Australia*, which was a very powerful ship, built on the model of the *Indefatigable*, but of an improved type, of the *Sydney* and the *Melbourne*, two fast protected cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, and similar to the most recent vessels of our town class. Finally, it possessed two modern ocean-going submarines. This fleet was fast and powerful enough to engage Von Spee successfully, but, so far as we can judge from the published report, no effort was made on its part to bring the German fleet to action. Here, again, we shall not be mistaken if we find traces of the predominance of political over purely naval considerations. The first desire of the Australian Government was undoubtedly to occupy those islands in the South Sea archipelago which were colonised by Germans, particularly the German portion of New Guinea. It is, of course, clear that this object could have been attained just as well after the German fleet had been disposed of, and possibly the action of Australia was dictated by a feeling that it was desirable to occupy these territories rapidly before the Japanese fleet, which, after the ultimatum of August 16th came into play, should have been able to move southwards into waters where its presence might possibly have caused a certain sensitiveness on the part of the Australian population. However that may be, while Admiral Jerram's force was co-operating with the Japanese outside Tsing-Tau, and while the *Australia* was doing work which could have been done just as well by an armed liner, the Germans had the Pacific to themselves. A Japanese squadron did, early in October, visit the Marshall Islands and temporarily occupy them with a force of marines in order to prevent them from being used as a German base, but of an organised Japanese pursuit of the German fleet there is no trace whatever, a fact which is all the more surprising when it is considered that with the two vessels of the *Kongo* class the Japanese had an instrument which, unaided, could have swept Von Spee off the sea. By the end of October the German Admiral had met at a rendezvous the *Leipzig*, the *Nürnberg*, and the *Dresden*, which belonged strictly to the German High Seas Fleet, and which had come round from the Atlantic to join him. He had



The last of the Gneisenau: A photograph taken from the British warship Inflexible after the Falkland Islands Battle, showing the survivors from the crew of the sunken Gneisenau in the water. [*Universal.*

therefore united a powerful squadron, which was in the technical sense a "fleet in being," and which did at that time command the eastern waters of the Pacific.

GATHERING OF A BRITISH FLEET.

This fleet, which was unchallenged by the British China squadron, the British Australasian squadron, and the Japanese navy, was left to be dealt with by another force. At the beginning of the war, Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock was in command of a cruiser force in the Western Atlantic. Through a troubled summer he had represented British interests in Mexico with energy and success, and at the declaration of war he commanded the only British squadron of cruisers which was on the high seas outside the Pacific. Shortly after the declaration of war there took place apparently a reorganisation of his force, and he transferred his flag from the *Essex*, which he had occupied during the Mexican crisis, to the *Good Hope*, and at the same time lost a portion of his command. At any rate, in October he moved southwards, with only the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*, and off the coast of South America picked up the *Glasgow*, a more modern protected cruiser of the town class which had been for two years on this station representing British interests. At the same time he was joined by the armed liner *Orana*, and with this force, late in October, he went through the Straits of Magellen into the Pacific. Apparently the Admiralty at home were conscious that some further support was necessary, and an old battleship, the *Canopus*, was sent out to support his force. She arrived, as the event proved, too late to be of assistance, but it may be gravely doubted whether her presence would have made much difference to the action with Von Spee. When the facts were known, the action of the Admiralty, in sending such a ship to reinforce the Admiral of a cruiser squadron operating against another cruiser squadron faster and more powerful than his own, was seriously criticised. It would not be profitable to go into the question at issue, but it may be said that the subsequent actions of the Admiralty in sending out the two battle cruisers with Admiral Sturdee implied a confession that the policy of using ships of the type of the *Canopus* for this purpose was not the best which could have been pursued.

THE BATTLE OF CORONEL.


On November the 1st, off Coronel, on the coast of Chile south of Valparaiso, the two fleets came into touch. Admiral Cradock had no thought of declining an action. A gallant and courageous man, imbued with the fighting traditions of the British navy, he conceived it to be his duty to engage the enemy as soon as possible. The *Canopus*, which was some two hundred miles away, and made no more than eighteen knots at the very best, could not possibly come in time to support him, and he determined to fight without her. The action took place in the evening, and a heavy sea was running. The *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* were both old vessels. Moreover, the secondary armament of the former could not be used in a seaway to its full extent, as the lower tier of guns was mounted too close to the water-line. The more modern and powerful wireless apparatus of the Germans enabled Admiral Von Spee to confuse the wireless signals of his opponent, and to make co-operation between the English ships difficult. Moreover, he succeeded in obtaining the tactical advantage of placing his enemy between himself and the sunset, so that the British ships showed up clear and black against the sky-line, and formed a distinct target for the rapid and powerful fire of the

twelve 8·2-inch guns which his two armoured cruisers were able to bring to bear. Against this, the *Good Hope* was able to do no more than serve two 9·2-inch guns, both of them of an old type, while the *Monmouth* broadside was utterly inferior. The action was short and one-sided. A salvo from the *Scharnhorst* struck and exploded the magazine of the *Good Hope*, and she went down with the Admiral and all hands, and without any effort being made by the Germans to pick up survivors. The *Monmouth* lasted but a little time longer, and was finally, after a series of broadsides from the two German cruisers, sunk close in shore. The *Glasgow*, which was considerably damaged, escaped with the *Orana*. Von Spee, with his victorious and nearly undamaged fleet, made northward to Valparaiso, where he was fêted by the German residents, took in coal and stores, and on November 10th again put to sea.

LORD FISHER'S COUNTER-STROKE.

The effect of this reverse, serious though it was in the loss of life which it entailed, was not to perturb or dishearten English opinion. The Admiralty set about quietly, without any public announcement, to make the necessary arrangements for the destruction of the victorious squadron. Lord Fisher had just gone on the Board when the defeat of Admiral Cradock occurred, and it is impossible not to see, in the new dispositions which were made, traces of his masterly and vigorous handling of ships and fleets. The choice of the Admiral to whom the task of meeting Von Spee in the Atlantic, should he come that way, was entrusted aroused great interest in naval circles. Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee had been Chief of the War Staff since the beginning of the war, and as such he was responsible, under general instructions from the First Sea Lord, for the dispositions of the ships outside the main North Sea area. So far as the Pacific was concerned, these dispositions had failed to catch Von Spee, and indeed the German Admiral had profited by them, succeeded in eluding the China squadron, succeeded in forming the junction with the *Dresden* and the *Leipzig*, and succeeded finally in destroying the weaker portion of the English fleet before it could receive its supports. All this, of course, reflected great credit on Von Spee, and, though, without the full knowledge of the facts which we do not at present possess, it would be quite unfair to indulge in any strong criticism of the Admiralty, what had happened was, superficially at any rate, not entirely to their credit. It was therefore natural that great interest was excited when it was known that Admiral Sturdee had himself gone to sea.

The squadron with which he was entrusted showed by its composition the instant effect of Lord Fisher's return to the Board. Whereas under the *regimé* of Prince Louis of Battenberg an old and slow battleship, carrying guns of a type which had been for some years superseded, was deemed a suitable reinforcement for a cruiser squadron



Plans of the Battle off the Falkland Islands.

to hunt down another cruiser squadron composed of fast ships, Admiral Sturdee was furnished with two vessels which were superior to the enemy in every respect, which could both outsteam and outrange him, and which could not be menaced by any combination which he could bring to bear. There was a further important reason for sending out ships of this kind, in spite of the diminution of strength caused by their absence from the main fighting area. The South Atlantic is not liberally furnished with English dockyards, and a hardly-fought battle, which would entail severe losses or damage to the victors, might have necessitated the laying-up of some of the victorious ships in the Falklands, or, worse still, in neutral harbours, until the end of the war. Von Spee's squadron had to be accounted for, and it had to be accounted for with as little loss as possible, so that the English fleet of cruisers might be released for other duties. Now the battle cruisers were the best means of making sure that this object would be attained. Admiral Sturdee left London very quietly, and, indeed, without the public being aware that he had gone. He joined, at a rendezvous at sea, the *Invincible*, which had already taken part in the Heligoland action over two months before, and the *Inflexible*, which had come from the Mediterranean. With these ships he made a further junction with one of the cruiser forces which had been operating in the Atlantic, and made his way southwards, picking up the *Glasgow*, which had survived the Coronel fight, in the South Atlantic. At 10-30 a.m. on the morning of the 7th December, Admiral Sturdee, flying his flag on the *Invincible*, and accompanied by the *Inflexible*, *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, *Kent*, *Glasgow*, *Bristol*, and the armoured liner *Macedonia*, arrived at Port Stanley, in the Falkland Islands.



Admiral Sir F. C. D. Sturdee.
[*Elliott and Fry.*




Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock.
[*Elliott and Fry.*

VON SPEE'S STRATEGY.

When Von Spee left Valparaiso on November 10th with his five ships and the attendant squadron he had two or three courses open. He might, in the first place, have remained in the Pacific and moved westwards with the object of either establishing himself in one of the South Sea Islands or of interfering with Australian shipping, and possibly menacing the transport of troops from Australia to the main area of war. Given adequate supplies and coaling arrangements, a matter in which the Germans have had a very perfect organisation, he might, with luck, have reached the Cape, where he would, of course, have disorganised the whole of the sailings to this country and afforded indirect, though valuable, assistance to the rebel forces in South Africa and the German administration in South-West Africa. It is clear, however, that Von Spee realised that the good luck which had supported him in his action with Admiral Cradock was not likely to be at his service again. In fact, the South Pacific was becoming an unhealthy area for German maritime enterprise, and the forces which ought to have been concentrated against Von Spee at least two months before were now converging on all possible areas of action in the Pacific. To the west of him was the Australian fleet, short of his own in numbers by one armoured ship, but, by the superiority of the battle cruiser *Australia*, not a force which he would care to attempt to engage unless under compulsion. To the north of that again were the various cruiser squadrons of the Japanese fleet, which had been slow in their pursuit, but which now were bearing down upon the

South American coast. The action of the Japanese Admiral was, of course, being concerted with the Admiralty here, and therefore with Admiral Sturdee. The Pacific being impossible, Von Spee turned to the two other courses of action which were open to him. Which of them he intended to adopt had he successfully evaded the British fleet we shall probably never know, unless the surviving officers of the *Gneisenau* were aware of his intentions. There were, as we have said, two things which he could do. One was to make as rapidly as possible for the Central Atlantic, to paralyse English shipping with America, and to form a junction with the *Karlsruhe* and whatever other German ships might still be out or might be able to get out under cover of a friendly fog through the cordon stretched between Scandinavia to the north of Scotland. His other alternative was to give up the sea and take to the shore—that is to say, to attack and occupy the Falkland Islands, a place from which it would have been very difficult to dislodge him, and from which his light cruisers would have been able to control all the shipping which passes from the Atlantic to the Pacific through the Straits. It is said that when he was brought to action the sailors on the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were actually dressed in their landing gear, and it seems certain, whether he intended to go or not, he certainly meant to attack and capture Port Stanley, and whatever coal was in it, on the morning of the day on which he met his fate.



The wanderings of the Dresden.

THE FALKLANDS BATTLE.

There has seldom been in naval history a coincidence so remarkable as that which occurred on December 8th. The British squadron had arrived only the day before, and it is certain that Admiral Sturdee had no knowledge, and no means of knowing, that the enemy was at that moment approaching, only a day's steam off. It is equally certain, and indeed self-evident, that Von Spee had no conception that there was a British squadron at the Falklands at all, and of course, until the action commenced, he had no knowledge of the presence of English battle cruisers. At 8 a.m. in the morning two of his ships were sighted steering northwards, about eight miles off, the rest of the squadron following about twelve miles behind. The ships were steering north towards the islands. At that moment the British squadron was coaling. The *Canopus* and *Kent* were lying as guardships in Port William and Port Stanley, the two battle cruisers were in Port William with the two county cruisers, and the *Glasgow* and the *Bristol* were in Port Stanley. At 9-20 a.m. the two leading ships of the enemy, the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*, with their guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the *Canopus*, which opened fire at them across the low land at a range of about 11,000 yards. Even at this moment, though they must probably have observed that 12-inch shells were being used, it is clear that the Germans had no idea of the presence of the battle cruisers. They knew that the *Canopus* was in South American waters, and that she was too slow for pursuit, and they consequently made off, though not at their full speed, in a north-easterly direction. At first, indeed, it seemed as if they were closing with a view to coming to action with the *Kent*, which had by that time appeared at the harbour entrance, but about that time it seems that the characteristic tripod masts of the battle cruisers were seen over the low land at the entrance to Port William. The whole German squadron, therefore, turned in the attempt to make good its escape. At ten o'clock, as the *Invincible* left the harbour mouth, the Admiral could see the five ships of the enemy clearly to the south-east, hull down. Visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun on a clear sky, and there was a light breeze from the

north-west, which, by driving the smoke from the enemy's funnels away from our ships, made it possible for better practice to be made. At 10-20 Admiral Sturdee made the signal for a general chase.

The action which followed divides itself naturally into two parts. The *Invincible* and the *Inflexible*, supported at first by the Glasgow and afterwards by the *Carnarvon*, engaged the armoured cruisers. The *Kent* and *Cornwall*, and afterwards the *Glasgow*, engaged the light cruisers, while the *Bristol* was detached to deal with the colliers and transports which had accompanied Von Spee, and had made off on the approach of the British fleet. The armoured cruiser action did not begin until two hours after the signal for general chase had been given, and it was not until a quarter to one that the signal to open fire and engage the enemy was made. The fire of the battle cruisers, after one or two preliminary salvoes directed against the *Leipzig*, was turned on the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and between 1 and 2 p.m. shots were constantly exchanged at a range between 13,000 and 14,000 yards. At 2 p m. the enemy made another desperate attempt to escape, and it was not until nearly 3 p.m. that action was again joined. From 3 to 4 p.m. the *Scharnhorst* and the *Invincible* conducted their unequal duel. By 3-30 p.m. the third funnel of the German Admiral's ship had been shot away. Some guns were not firing, and the ship was obscured by clouds of smoke and fire and escaping steam. At times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4-5 p.m. the *Scharnhorst*, with the Admiral's flag still flying, listed heavily to port, gradually settling down till she lay on her beam end, and at 4-17 p.m. she disappeared. With her went the Admiral, his staff, and every one of the officers and men. At 5-30 it became clear the *Gneisenau*, which had been fighting the *Inflexible* meanwhile, was in its turn in a desperate condition. At 6 p.m. she also turned turtle and disappeared. A considerable number of her crew were rescued. An hour and a half later the *Kent* and the *Glasgow* had sunk the *Leipzig* and the *Nürnberg*, and by sundown, of the whole German squadron, only the *Dresden*, which had made off early in the action, remained afloat. The British squadron moved slowly back, its fuel all but exhausted, to Port Stanley, and in the chill southern evening the Admiral made the signal by wireless: "God save the King."

A MIDSHIPMAN'S STORY.

Many accounts of the fight have been published, but the following, taken from a letter written by a midshipman on the *Invincible*, is the most vivid, and deserves to be quoted :—

"The stokers worked like mad down below. We use our precious oil now that we have got the enemy at last. The funnels belched out dense black smoke and flames, and we up-anchored and rushed out. Just before we up-anchored we heard the *Canopus* open fire on the *Scharnhorst*. The *Scharnhorst* fired eight shots. All fell a long way short, and the *Canopus* fired six 12-inch shells, all of which missed also. The Germans then retired a bit.

"In the meantime we were tearing out, ramming anything that got in our way. We cut two small boats in half—happily there was no one in them. Once out of the harbour we formed up as follows :—

"*Bristol : Invincible.*
"*Kent : Inflexible.*
"*Carnarvon.*
"*Cornwall : Glasgow.*

The Chase Begins.

"On our starboard bow we could see the enemy. They looked quite close. We increased speed slowly. We were rapidly catching the Germans, and could see them manœuvring and signalling to one another. I have heard from one of their survivors that when Admiral von Spee saw that we were the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, instead of the inferior force he had hoped to bully, he gave all the men in his squadron one hour for prayers, which was used by a large proportion of them to get drunk.

"At 11-15 I managed to get some bread and cheese to eat, and then ran back to the turret. From the top of my turret (A turret) I watched the Germans trying manœuvre after manœuvre, all to no purpose, as they were countered by our movements, directed by the Admiral. At 12-55 the *Inflexible* fired the first shot. . . . At 12-59 we fired our first shot. We fired at the *Leipzig* and nearly hit her. We went on firing, and finally caused her to drop out of the line. But now we had a more serious quarry in sight, and we engaged the enemy's flagship, the *Scharnhorst*. In the first bout we were about equal. She hit us three times, and we did about the same to her. But we equalled her and, as was shown later, utterly out-manœuvred and out-gunned and out-matched her. After the first bout there was a short lull, and I climbed upon the top of the turret to have a look round. Suddenly we altered course and made for the enemy. I now noticed we were closing, and when their first salvo went off I was still on the top of the turret. I could see all the shells coming at us, and I felt that they were all coming straight at me. However, they all missed except one, which hit the side of the ship near the wardroom, and made a great green flash and sent splinters flying all round. I hopped below armour quickly and started working again. We were nearing the *Scharnhorst*, and began firing for all we were worth. We hit again and again. First, our left gun sent her big crane spinning over the side. Then our right gun blew her funnel to atoms, and then another shot from the left gun sent her bridge and part of the forecastle sky high.

Invincible's Turret Hit.

"We were not escaping free, however. Shots were hitting us repeatedly, and the spray from the splashes of their shells was hiding the *Scharnhorst* from us. Suddenly a great livid flame rushed through the gun ports, and splinters flew all round, and we felt the 150 or 200 tons of the turret going up in the air. We thought we would go over the side and get drowned like rats in a trap. However, we came down again with a crash that shook the turret dreadfully, and continued firing as hard as ever. Nothing in the turret was out of order at all. The range continued to come down, and the whistles of the shells that flew over us grew into a regular shriek.

"Down came the range—11,000, 10,000, 9,000, 8,800. We were hitting the *Scharnhorst* nearly every time. One beauty from our right gun got one of their turrets fair and square, and sent it whizzing over the side. Suddenly our right gun misfired—we had got a jamb, and one gun was out of action. The breach had caught against one of the cages, and would neither open nor shut. We opened up the trap hatch, and I jumped out and down the ladder with two men to try and find a crowbar. The 12-inch guns were firing all round us, and our left gun was doing work for two, now that the right was jambed. The German shells were whistling unpleasantly close, and there were splinters flying all over the place.

End of the Scharnhorst.

"The *Scharnhorst* was firing heavily, but I could see she was in a bad way. She was down by the bows and badly on fire amidships. I got the crowbar and brought it in, but they wanted a hack saw as well, so I jumped out again, and just as I was coming back I saw the *Scharnhorst's* ensign dip (never knew whether it came down or not, because just then one of our lyddite shells hit her and there was a dense cloud of smoke all over her). When it cleared she was on her side, and her propellers were lashing the water round into foam. Then she capsized altogether and went to the bottom! So the German flagship that had shown so little mercy to the defenceless *Monmouth* a month before sank with Admiral von Spee and 900 German sailors, not a man being saved. To save any was impossible.

"We then turned to the *Gneisenau*, and fought on for nearly two hours. The Germans had fought well and were done. She had a heavy list to port, and was burning furiously. The first funnel was down and she was an absolute shambles. Her turrets in splinters and her guns twisted into corkscrews, she looked a sad sight. It is not certain whether she hauled

down her flag or not. I think she did. She slowly heeled over to port and then capsized just ahead of us.

A Dreadful Sight.

"You could see her side. It looked like a huge whale's back. Then she sank, and you could see wretched men caught one after another and sucked down in the vortex. When we came near we could see that the water was all yellow where she had sunk, and there was a dreadful smell of lyddite in the air. It was absolutely dreadful, and what with all those wretched Germans drowning and sending up pitiful cries for help, which we could not give because most of our boats were in splinters, I hope I shall never have to go through it again. There were a lot of men floating when we saw the ship go down, but when we reached the spot half of them were drowned. It was awful to see them in the water just alongside, trying to hold on to the slippery sides of the ship, and then slipping off and going down, fighting hard for life, but going down and down till they were lost to sight. One grew sick seeing men in their death struggles. Some of them had arms and legs blown off, and it was absolutely sickening seeing them sink, leaving behind a red trail of blood. We got out all the boats we could, and so did the *Inflexible*, and we managed to save some 300 men, including their captain—a tall man with a black beard.

"Some of them had their heads quite turned when they were picked up, and tried to kill their rescuers, or jumped into the sea again and drowned themselves. One officer tried to shoot us with an automatic pistol, but it was wrenched from his hand, and we escaped.

"This is a leaf from a German officer's note-book (just before the *Gneisenau* sank):—

"'5-10, hit, hit.
"'5-12, hit.
"'5-14, hit, hit, hit again.
"'5-20, after-turret gone.
"'5-40, hit, hit; on fire everywhere.
"'5-41, hit, hit; burning everywhere and sinking.
"'5-45, hit; men lying everywhere.
"'5-46, hit, hit.

"It ends just before the ship sank. The officer is on board here now.

The Kent Burns Her Boats.

"The *Kent*, a twenty-one-knot cruiser, was ordered to chase the *Nürnberg*, a twenty-five knot ship, and also a much more modern one than the *Kent*. She had only a few hundred tons of coal on board to catch the *Nürnberg* with. The old *Kent* set off, and they worked up to twenty-two, more than she had ever done on trials. Then the word was passed up that there was hardly any coal left. 'Well,' said the captain, 'have a go at the boats.' So they broke up all the boats, smeared them with oil, and put them in the furnaces. Then in went all the armchairs from the wardrooms, and then the chests from the officers' cabins. They next burnt the ladders and all—every bit of wood was sent to the stoke-hold. The result was that the *Kent's* speed became twenty-four knots, and she caught the *Nürnberg*, and after a stiff fight, in which several men were killed, the *Nürnberg* was sunk.


"This ship had a hot time of it, as we were fired on by the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, so that we had only six 12-inch guns to fight twelve 8·3 and six 6-inch guns. We got twenty 8·3-inch shells on board and several 6-inch shells. There is one 8·3-inch which did not explode, and we have got him whole. He weighs 280 lbs., or 300 lbs. without the armour-piercing cap.

"The action was a very hard one—five hours' solid firing. The guns were nearly red-hot to finish with. I escaped all damage except a trivial burn on one of my fingers by a splinter. It is all healed up now.


"It must have been a regular inferno on the German ships, with heaps of dead men and fragments of them all over the decks, and the officers, whose heads had been turned, shooting the men and themselves with their automatic pistols. The prisoners we have look back on it as a kind of nightmare."

EFFECT OF THE VICTORY.

The effect of Admiral Sturdee's action, completed as it was by the sinking of the *Dresden* on March 14th off the Chilian coast, was to remove, with insignificant exceptions, German naval power from the seas of the world outside the area of the Bight of Heligoland. Henceforward the numerous and powerful British cruiser squadrons were to be free for the task of controlling commerce on the high seas, and therefore to make possible the policy of blockade by cruiser cordons which was announced by the Prime Minister as a reply to the German attempts to destroy English commerce by submarine. From the technical point of view the action was interesting, in that it showed the immense superiority of the battle cruiser over the most powerful and best-handled vessels of the earlier armoured cruiser type. Finally, the action, along with that of Coronel, seemed to prove that in modern naval warfare it is the conquered that pays, and that the successful force in a naval action can destroy its opponent utterly with insignificant loss to itself.



A photograph taken from the deck of a British warship patrolling the North Sea.
[*Alfieri Picture Service.*



The British Grand Fleet in the North Sea. [*Alfieri Picture Service.*



Admiral Beatty's famous First Battle Cruiser Squadron. [*Cribb, Southsea.*

CHAPTER V.


THE BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK.

THE LOSS OF THE "BULWARK" AND THE "FORMIDABLE"—THE CRITICISM OF THE ADMIRALTY—THE THIRD NAVAL RAID—THE FIRST DREADNOUGHT ACTION—THE SINKING OF THE "BLÜCHER"—THE INJURIES TO THE "LION"—COMMENTS ON THE ACTION.

BETWEEN 1898 and 1901 twenty armoured ships were launched, and of the eight armoured ships lost in this war all but one belonged to this period. It is a high rate of mortality, but the rate is higher still if the 1898 ships are excluded, for of what may be called the Boer War ships six out of fifteen have gone to the bottom. The *Aboukir* (1900), the *Cressy* (1899), and the *Hogue* (1900) were torpedoed off Holland. The *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* (1901) were lost at Coronel. The *Bulwark* (1899) was blown up in the Medway at the end of November, and in the first hours of the New Year the *Formidable* (1898) was torpedoed in the Channel. The *Bulwark* and *Formidable* were sister ships of 15,000 tons displacement, 400 feet in length, and 75 beam; both were built in the Government yards, and cost a million apiece. They were, like the other ships of this period, too old to lie in line with more modern ships, but they were powerful and serviceable, mounting four twelve-inch and twelve six-inch guns. The *Venerable*, of the same date, did most useful work against the German trenches near Ostend; the *Ocean*, *Canopus*, *Irresistible*, and *Vengeance*, all of the same period, with the much earlier *Majestic*, were later to take part in the forcing of the Dardanelles, the most difficult operations in which the British Navy has ever been engaged. The sinking of the ships of this period was, therefore, even apart from the drowning of their crews, a very serious loss to the British Navy.

The *Bulwark* was blown up on the morning of November 26th, at a few minutes to eight o'clock. She had been near Sheerness for some days, and other ships were about her in the Medway. Leave had ceased at seven o'clock that morning, and almost the whole crew was on board, most of them at breakfast, some drilling on deck. The ship's band was playing. Suddenly, without any sort of warning, a spurt of flame broke out near the after barbette. "Then a volume of flame seemed to rush towards the after funnel. The whole interior of the ship appeared to be blown into the air, and everything seemed alight." "I saw a sudden flash aft," said one of the very few survivors of a crew of 800. "It moved forward. I turned aft, and at that moment the decks seemed to open, and I fell. I remember coming up in the water with great force. Rising to the surface, I looked round and saw that the ship had gone." Observers on shore heard nothing but the roar of the explosion—people at a distance thought that there had been a Zeppelin raid, and that bombs had been dropped—and saw nothing but immense clouds of smoke, first black, then yellow and white, and, when they had cleared away, nothing of the ship but its masts in the water. None of the other ships was injured, though the ruin of the explosion was flung out on all sides.

The other ships in the neighbourhood put out their torpedo nets after the explosion, but all the evidence goes to show that the explosion was due to an internal cause,



The big guns of H.M.S. New Zealand. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



H.M.S. Bulwark, blown up off Sheerness. [*Topical Press.*

and neither to treachery nor to submarine attack. All the causes suggested at the inquest—the dropping of burning cigarette ends on loose cordite and the like—were rejected ; nor was anything alongside at the time of the explosion. There was an Admiralty inquiry, which, however, was held privately, and nothing was published of its labours except the finding that the explosion was due to the accidental ignition of ammunition on board, and that there was no evidence to support the suggestion that the explosion was due to treachery on board the ship. Rear-Admiral Gaunt, at the inquest, went beyond this limitation, and said that the Admiralty were satisfied that it was most improbable that there could have been any sort of treachery, or any act of the enemy. But no explanation of the causes of the disaster was ever offerred by the Admiralty. The parallels of the loss of the *Bulwark* were the blowing up of the *Doterel* in the Straits of Magellan, in the early'eighties, the destruction of the *Maine* in Havana Harbour—which was certainly not the work of a Spaniard—just before the war between the United States and Spain, and the loss of the *Liberté* in Toulon harbour, which was proved to have been caused by defective ammunition.



The British battle cruiser New Zealand. [*L.N.A.*

THE LOSS OF THE FORMIDABLE.

The loss of the *Formidable* was less mysterious in its cause, but hardly less obscure in its circumstances. The Admiralty, at first uncertain whether her loss was due to mine or submarine, later came to the conclusion that she was torpedoed by a submarine, and a German official statement said that one of their submarines, whose number, however, was not given, had reported that she had sunk the *Formidable* off Plymouth. Out of a crew of nearly 800, 546 officers and men went down with her. That is all the official information that has been given out about one of the most serious losses in the war, and there is remarkably little agreement between the survivors on some very essential points. For example, while one survivor declared that the night was "the clearest moonlight night he had ever seen, with the sea like a mill-pond," others spoke of "mountainous seas" and a gale of wind. That there should be any conflict in the evidence on such a point as this is eloquent of the difficulty that there is in fixing even the most elementary facts from a number of unsifted reports.

The *Formidable* was struck on the starboard side about 2-20 on New Year's morning. Immediately the water poured into the boiler rooms, and the electric light and all steam power failed. At the same time the ship began to list heavily, which would have made the task of launching the boats one of great difficulty even in a smooth sea. It was a bitterly cold night, and most of the men, suddenly wakened out of sleep, came up on deck in their shirts. About a quarter of an hour after the first hit there was a second explosion, either through a second torpedo or through fire reaching a magazine, but this second injury made things better by righting the list. The ship, however, soon began to settle down in the water, and by three o'clock all the men were on the top deck. An hour later the ship's decks were nearly perpendicular.

The men, obeying the orders of the captain, jumped into the sea or slid down the side of the ship into the sea, and at half-past four the ship dived, bow first. Seventy men were rescued by a light cruiser; eighty more drifted about for twelve hours in an open cutter in a sea which by this time, whatever the weather may have been early on the preceding night, was running very high. They were rescued some fifteen miles off Berry Head by the Brixham smack *Providence*.


"The *Providence*, bearing north-west, was running before a gale to Brixham for shelter, and, when off the Start, had to heave to owing to the force of the wind. She had just previously been struck by heavy seas, and, when on the starboard tack, Jack Clark, the third hand, noticed an open boat under the lee of the smack. He shouted to his captain and his mate—the latter named S. Carter—to jump up, saying, 'Here's a sight under our lee.'

"They were amazed to see a small open boat driving through the mountainous seas with one oar hoisted as a staff, from which was flying a sailor's scarf. The little cutter was hidden from view for minutes together in the seething foam.

"Captain Pillar swung the *Providence* clear. The crew, with almost superhuman efforts, took another reef in the mainsail and set the storm jib, for until that had been done



H.M.S. Lion. [*Cribb, Southsea.*




The German cruiser Blücher. [*Central News.*

it would have been disastrous to have attempted a rescue. Meanwhile, the cutter drifted towards them, although at times they lost sight of her in the heavy sea. Clark climbed the rigging, and presently discovered the cutter braving the storm just to leeward of his boat.

"The captain decided to try a perilous manœuvre in such weather, since the mast was liable to give way. Four times did the gallant steersmen seek to get a rope to the cutter. Each effort was more difficult than the last, but in the end they obtained a good berth on the port tack. A small warp was thrown and caught by the sailors. This they made fast round the stem of the capstan, and with great skill the cutter was hauled to a berth at the stern. The warp was passed round to the lee side, and the cutter brought up to the lee quarter. Then the naval men began to jump on board, but even now there was a danger of losing men, as the seas were rising some thirty feet high at times.

"The rescues from the cutter to the smack took thirty minutes to accomplish. A lad of eighteen, having suffered from exposure, required immediate treatment on board to save his life. The officer in charge of the cutter—Torpedo-Gunner Horrigan—was the last to leave, and he found himself clutching the mizzen rigging to get aboard the *Providence*. This accomplished, the cutter's rope was then cut. She was full of water, having a hole under the hull. This had been stuffed with a pair of pants, of which one of the seamen had divested himself for the purpose. One of the men had his fingers jammed between the cutter and the fishing-smack."




Admiral Sir John Jellicoe going up to the fore bridge of his flagship.
[Alfieri Picture Service.

It was one of the finest of the many services that fishermen have rendered to the navy in this war, and Captain Pillar richly deserved his decoration and the congratulations of the King on his seamanship.

THE CRITICISM OF THE ADMIRALTY.


Gossip has been unusually busy with the loss of the *Formidable*. According to one account she left Sheerness on Thursday, December 31st, for Portland, but it is not explained how in that case she was forty miles to the east at the time of the disaster. She is also said to have been the last of a line of eight battleships, and steaming at a speed of not more than twelve knots. Although submarines were known to be about, she is said to have neglected precautions against attack. To these and other charges—most of them insinuated in interrogatives—the Admiralty has opposed a steady silence, and most of the circumstance of the disaster is for the present unverifiable gossip which may or may not be true, but cannot be utilised as the material for history. That rumour, however, should be so busy lends point to the complaint made against the Admiralty for its discretionary disuse of the old practice of holding a court-martial on naval losses. The public interest could easily have been safeguarded by the suppression of such details of the inquiry as it might be useful to the enemy to know, and a trial would certainly have been more just to the survivors of disaster who could be held to have been in any way responsible.

A great deal of the work of the Admiralty was brilliantly done—better, perhaps, than in any previous war. But it is undeniable that some mistakes were made, and it is perhaps a pity that they have not been more freely discussed, for nothing is so certain as that they are known and discussed in Germany, and far more victories are won by intellectual and moral courage, which is a rare virtue in a nation, than by physical courage, than which no virtue is more widely diffused. Before the war had been long in progress people were satisfied that our gun-ships, at any rate, were more than the equals of the German. If there was at any time any tendency to criticise the Admiralty, it was certainly not due to any lack of faith in the material and design of British ships. The causes were quite different. Perhaps the most widely-felt cause of uneasiness—and it was more thought about than talked of—was a certain tendency to boastfulness on the part of the Admiralty spokesmen. In the middle of September Mr. Churchill made a speech in which he spoke contemptuously of digging the Germans out of their harbours like rats out of their holes, and on the very next day occurred the disaster to the three British cruisers (Vol. I., page 227). There is no lesson in history more certain than that the wrong sort of pride always brings its punishment, for with vaunting always goes a certain carelessness and inattention



The German Cruiser Blücher: on fire and sinking after the running fight in the North Sea.

[By permission of the "London Illustrated News.



THE ACTION OFF THE DOGGER BANK.

to details which are dangerous in war. Mr. Churchill was also somewhat unfortunate in his reference to the loss of the *Bulwark*. "It is no exaggeration to say that we could afford to lose a super-Dreadnought every month for twelve months without any loss occurring to the enemy, and yet be in as approximately as good a position of superiority as we were at the declaration of war." Mr Churchill had in mind the additions that had been made to our navy since the outbreak of war, but many felt that there was something wrong in the attitude of mind which applied this particular balm to the wounds made by a great disaster in which hundreds of gallant and highly-trained sailors had met their death. Another unfortunate phrase occurred in the letter to the Mayor of Scarborough after the raid. He described the incident as "one of the most instructive and encouraging that has happened in the war." These things were joyfully seized hold of by his enemies, and his admirers could only regret that he should have given them a handle for personal attacks which have had a much greater effect on public opinion than is commonly supposed. Whether the Admiralty was right in suppressing detailed information about certain disasters—the loss of the *Formidable*, for example—experience only can show, but the critics of the Admiralty were not slow to allege that its real anxiety was not to keep the enemy in ignorance, but to escape a too close enquiry into its own conduct of the war.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE MINE AND SUBMARINE.


A more definite and probably a juster charge against the Admiralty was that it had not adequately thought out the new problems created by the mine and submarine (*compare* Vol. I., Chapter XXIV.). The best statement of this charge is that of Mr. Gibson Bowles.*

* In the *Candid Review* for February.


"So long as we have the good fortune to meet our enemy in the old above-board way, we know how to deal with him, and are usually able to dispose of him. But to the new ways we have not yet accustomed ourselves. We have not tackled them. Despite all experience we still fail to estimate their deadly importance. The admiral of seventy cannot attune his mind to that of the lieutenant of thirty who lives among them and knows them, and drowns because of them. He can scarcely do so much violence to himself and his traditions as to attend to them. And to this day he never has duly attended to them, or addressed himself to them with an adequately full sense of their deadly urgency.

"The mine, although no new thing in naval warfare, is altogether new in its present form and present uses. Murder at sea had never before been erected into a fine art. Yet long ago—at least so long ago as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904—the mine had shown its capacities in this way, and the young fighting captains and lieutenants at sea began to be well aware of it, and very anxious about it. But the thinking old admirals ashore could not be moved to sustained attention to this new thing with which they had never been shipmates. Neither they nor any Cabinet, nor any Committee of Defence, ever became really aware of the mine. The fighting lieutenants and captains sighed to see the years go by with nothing invented, nothing done, to help them in that to which they thought the whole of the genius, ingenuity, and constructive power of the Admiralty should years ago have been directed, and kept incessantly directed, until some probable defence for the ship against the mine had been found. They are still, and are still left, at their wits' end, while the sea is still daily strewn with wrecks and corpses, no remedy yet found, and all the remedies suggested still pigeon-holed or half-heartedly and leisurely criticised and examined. No doubt it is hard to find an adequate remedy; but it is no less true that during those ten years of peace, and especially during these last six months of war, a greater, more intense, and more sustained effort should have been made to find one than any of which there are any fruits to be seen to-day.

"The submarine also is not new. And the same criticism applies to it as to the mine—that in all this time no method has been found, or has with persistency been sought, of tackling it with any reasonable prospect of success. Its limited radius of operations, its need of monthly supplies, its inability to



What a battleship and her big guns look like in action. [*Record Press.*



H.M.S. Princess Royal. [*Cribb, Southsea.*

remain under water for more than some thirty hours, its slow speed of fourteen knots on the water, and still slower speed of nine under the water, and above all its entire inability to work in the dark—all those limitations are known to all. Such limitations invite ingenuity. Yet, as with the mine, so with the submarine, no adequate or probable plan of meeting it is yet found; and because of that we still look helplessly on while one battleship after another is torpedoed and sunk in our own waters. It is to be supposed that the Admiralty mind has been given to this peril; but if there be any plans for dealing with it they still remain, like prize money, under consideration. Here, too, there has been a fatal want of forethought and of preparation in due time, extending over years, and still apparent."

Adequately to investigate the justice of these criticisms would take us further into current controversy than is consistent with the plan of this work, but the existence of this undercurrent of critical opinion is an important fact which cannot be ignored in a contemporary history.

THE THIRD GERMAN NAVAL RAID.

On Saturday night, January 23rd, the German fleet set out on its third raid towards the British coasts. Since its visit to Scarborough and Hartlepool, on December 16th,* it had done nothing, in spite of the provocation given by a very well-managed air raid on Cuxhaven on Christmas morning. The German official account spoke of the expedition as "an advance in the North Sea," as though nothing more serious were on hand than a reconnaissance. In fact, the squadron was stronger than came on the last raid. In addition to the three "Dreadnought" cruisers—*Derfflinger* (completed 1914), *Seydlitz* (1913), and *Moltke* (1911)—which took part in the Scarborough raid, the squadron included the *Blücher*, several light cruisers, and two destroyer flotillas. Admiral Hipper was in command. There is no apparent reason why the *Blücher* should have been chosen rather than the *Von der Tann*, a battle cruiser of the same type as the *Moltke*, and completed in the same year. The *Blücher* was laid down in 1906, as an answer to the first Dreadnought cruiser, and like Germany's first Dreadnought battleships was a comparative failure. She carried 8·2-inch guns, against the 12-inch guns of the British cruiser of the same period. The German designers held by the intermediate sizes of guns. Whereas the British designers from the first chose 4-inch for their secondary armament and 12-inch for their primary, the Germans preferred 5·9-inch for their secondary armament, and it was only gradually that they were converted to the 12-inch primary armament, by which time our cruisers had worked up to 13·5-inch. Thus, the *Blücher*, completed in 1910, had twelve 8·2-inch guns; the *Moltke* and *Seydlitz*, which followed, ten 11-inch guns, and it was not until the *Derfflinger* that the Germans used 12-inch guns on their battle cruisers. The following table of the armament of the armoured cruisers that were engaged in the Battle of the Dogger Bank shows the gradual conversion of the German designers.

BRITISH.

	Tons.	Completed.	Guns. In.		In.		Speed (knots).	Men.
Indomitable	17,250	1908	8	12	16	4	26	780
New Zealand	18,800	1912	8	12	16	4	25	780
Princess Royal ..	26,350	1912	8	13·5	16	4	28·5	980
Lion	26,350	1912	8	13·5	16	4	28·5	980
Tiger	28,000	1914	8	13·5	16	4	28	—

GERMAN.

	Tons.	Completed.	Guns. In.		In.		Speed (knots).	Men.
Blücher	15,550	1910	12	8·2	8	5·9	25·3	888
Moltke.....	22,640	1911	10	11	12	5·9	28·4	1,013
Seydlitz	24,640	1913	10	11	12	5·9	29·2	1,150
Derfflinger	28,000	1914	8	12	12	5·9	27	—

The *Blücher* was thus the extreme example of the theories of the German designers before their conversion had begun. A still more serious fault was her comparative slowness. Whether she was employed in the new raiding squadron because the *Von der Tann* had suffered injuries of which no news had been allowed to come out, or because it was intended that she should act as decoy while the three faster cruisers carried out more important work, there is no means of knowing. Certain it is that she was a source of weakness to the raiding squadron.

THE FIRST STAGE—THE SIGHTING AND THE CHASE.

The German squadron was sighted off the tail of the Dogger Bank soon after dawn on January 24th. It is surmised from its position that it may have been intending to attack the Tyne, possibly the Forth. A possible theory of the German intentions is that there was a more ambitious plan contemplated of gaining access to the Northern Atlantic. The Dutch gossips had it that the Germans had troops ready to embark on transports and to take advantage of the confusion that it was hoped might be caused by the appearance of their squadron to effect a landing at some point. As on the occasion of the last raid, there was a British squadron patrolling the coast. This time it was ahead of its beat in December, and it caught the first sight of the German squadron at dawn, some seventy miles from the Yorkshire coast. It is possible that the British had had information from submarines off the German coast that the Germans had left their ports. The British squadron was steaming south. In addition to the five battle-cruisers whose names have been given, the British admiral had four light cruisers, which were on his port beam (that is, between the battle cruisers and the Dogger Bank), and ahead were the destroyer flotillas with three light cruisers, among them the celebrated *Arethusa*, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, the *Aurora* and the *Undaunted*. (See p. 49, Fig. 1.) Admiral Beatty was in command, with his flag on the *Lion*.

The first shots were fired about 7-25, by the *Aurora*, which became engaged with the enemy's destroyers. Under favourable circumstances the ideal tactics might have been to retire, in the hope that the enemy would give chase and so allow the battle cruisers to work their way round between the Germans and home. The Germans, however, were too wary, for almost immediately they turned right about. They had been steering north-west; they now made east, some points south. At 7-30 the battle squadron sighted the enemy fourteen miles away, on the port (east) side. The Germans turned almost at sight, and the scouting cruisers had never any chance of leading them on. The only chance was for them to detain the enemy by engaging him, which they had already begun to do before receiving Admiral Beatty's orders. With his battle cruisers, Admiral Beatty steered south-

* Some of the details of the casualties in the East Coast Naval Raid given on an earlier page of this work (Vol. I., p. 355) should here be corrected. At Scarborough, since the bombardment, there has been one death from injuries received in it, so that the total death-roll there was not seventeen, as stated, but eighteen. The number of the killed outright at Hartlepool was eighty-two, and thirty-seven have since died, making a total of 119. The times of the bombardment, about which the statements have been contradictory, were as follows: Scarborough, 8-5 a.m. to 8-50; Hartlepool, 8-15 to 8-50; Whitby, 9-0 to 9-15. The Hartlepool bombardment, it will be seen, lasted longer than is stated in Vol. I., p. 355, and synchronised more nearly with the bombardment of Scarborough.



The funeral procession, with full military honours, of the captain of the Blücher, who was rescued after his vessel had sunk, but who aferwards died in the military hospital at Edinburgh. [*Central News.*

east in the hope that he might not have been seen, and that his light cruisers might be able to edge the Germans to the south, and so enable him to work round between them and their own ports. The German Admiral, however, made straight for home, and, finding that the enemy was not to be seduced from their course, Admiral Beatty began to run parallel with them. And so, as he said in his first report, the situation developed by degrees into a stern chase. (Fig. 2).

The *New Zealand* and the *Indomitable* were both slower than the other three, and the *Lion* and *Tiger* drew ahead, with the *Princess Royal* third. The leaders were steaming at nearly twenty-nine knots, and the slower ships greatly exceeded their nominal speed, thanks to the exertions of their engineers. Fire was opened at 18,000 yards, and the first hit, soon after nine o'clock, was at 17,000 yards. The German ships were in single line ahead, with the *Moltke* leading and the *Blücher* in the rear. The British ships, after a chase of nearly sixty miles, were now beginning to overhaul the Germans. At 9-20 the *Tiger* was level with the *Blücher*, and five minutes later the *Princess Royal*. Each ship, as it passed her, raked her with fire. Soon after 9-30 the *Lion* was sufficiently advanced to fire with effect on the German leader, which, at 9-45, was observed to be burning. The third in the line, probably the *Derfflinger*, which was engaged by the *Princess Royal*, was also on fire. At this time the prospects of the annihilation of the German squadron were decidedly good.

THE SMOKE OF THE DESTROYERS.

All this time our light cruisers had been on the port (north) side of the Germans. Between the two parallel lines of battle cruisers were the destroyers, the Germans ahead, the British following close behind. (Fig. 3). The wind was north-east, and the smoke from our destroyers obscured the sight of the gunners. The *Tiger*, for example, could not see the leaders for the smoke, and had to fire on the unfortunate *Blücher*; the apparent immunity of the second in the German line (perhaps the Seydlitz)—she is not mentioned in Admiral Beatty's report—may well have been due to the smoke. So serious was the nuisance that our destroyers were ordered to fall behind, so as to give the battle cruisers a better sight.

The German destroyers, relieved of the pressure of the British destroyers' chase, were able to screen the starboard (right) side of their cruisers. At the same time, having noticed perhaps the inconvenience caused to our gunners by the smoke of our destroyers, they began to emit vast volumes of smoke, and under cover of the smoke the German battle cruisers completely changed their direction, and turned nearly due north. Some of the German destroyers threatened to attack, and, as their torpedoes were dangerous, one of our destroyer divisions

came up again between the lines and drove them off. In this division, which Captain Meade handled with conspicuous ability, was the *Meteor*, which was very badly mauled.

THE SECOND STAGE—SINKING OF THE BLÜCHER.

When the German destroyers had been driven off, and the smoke had cleared away, the German battle cruisers—the *Blücher* was well in the rear, and her case was already hopeless—and especially the second and third in the line, were seen to have increased their distance from their pursuers. The manœuvres of the destroyers must have consumed some considerable time, and it may now have been about 10-30. The chase was now running north. A second attack threatened by the German destroyers, the *Lion* and *Tiger* made short work of, and a quarter of an hour later the *Indomitable* was detached to close with the *Blücher*. But just before eleven a fresh complication appeared. German submarines began to hang on the starboard side of the *Lion*—that is, the side nearest the shore to which the chase must by now have been running parallel. Just after eleven a lucky shot from one of the German cruisers damaged one of the feed tanks of the *Lion*, and reduced her speed very considerably. Admiral Beatty's long report on the engagement does not state the cause of the injury, and mentions it in a way which might connect it with the appearance of the submarines. The statement in the earlier reports, however, that it was caused by a "lucky shot" seems against that theory, and, moreover, the feed tank that was injured was on the opposite side from that on which the submarines were sighted. Whatever the cause, the *Lion* had to retire. She had led the attack since the beginning of the action, and she must often have been hit, though her casualties were small. The Admiral signalled to his squadron to attack the rear of the enemy, and the chase continued.

Admiral Beatty transferred his flag at 11-20 to the destroyer *Attack*, and in a quarter of an hour was hastening to rejoin his squadron, which had gone on ahead. He met the *Princess Royal* returning at 12-20, and then learned that the *Blücher* had been sunk, and that the pursuit of the other three ships had been discontinued. In the final report no reason is assigned for breaking off the action. The reason given in the first Admiralty statement was that the pursuit had been carried up to the enemy's mine-fields, which made its continuance too dangerous. It is, however, difficult to square that explanation with the German statement that the battle ended seventy miles from Heligoland, and the true explanation, no doubt, is that given by Admiral Beatty in his preliminary report, that it had been discontinued owing to the presence of the enemy's submarines.

The sinking of the *Blücher* was a terrible sight, and its incidents at the end—the heeling over of the ship and the sliding of the crew down the sides—have a remarkable resemblance to what happened at the sinking of the *Formidable*, except that the *Blücher* went down in broad daylight, and many of her crew were rescued by the victors. She stood a great deal of pounding, and it was a torpedo that ended her. A Zeppelin appeared at the end, and, with the stupidity characteristic of all the performances of these craft, began to drop bombs.

COMMENTS ON THE ACTION.

Neither the British nor the German accounts of the engagement have been ingenuous. The first British account did not mention the injuries to the *Lion*, and it was not until the Germans had published accounts of the sinking of a British ship that the Admiralty admitted that she had received any. Only in the later and fuller reports did it appear how important her injuries were in the story of the battle. But the German versions were worse. It was natural that they should make the most of the end of the battle, which was so much more successful for the enemy than the beginning, and no doubt the crews, after seeing destruction before them at ten in the morning, were quite honestly jubilant at getting back to port at all. It is possible, too, that they believed that the *Lion* had been torpedoed—for all we know, she may have been by one of the submarines—and could not possibly get home. But the story of the sinking of a battleship besides—even though battleship is only a bad translation of the German word *Kriegschiff* (war ship), which is quite possible—was a mere embellishment, for which there was no excuse.

The first battle between Dreadnoughts was a very considerable British victory. One German cruiser was sunk, and at least two of the others were so badly damaged that they will be out of action for months. The British losses, on the other hand, were by comparison very slight, in spite of the temporary disablement of the *Lion*. Two criticisms have been heard on the battle. One, that our chances of cutting off the Germans were spoilt by undue precipitancy in beginning the action, is based—as this narrative may have shown—on a misreading of the facts. The other criticism, which blames Captain Brock for breaking off the action too early, may have more behind it, but cannot be made with fairness on our present very imperfect knowledge of the facts. There is nothing in Admiral Beatty's report to suggest that he would not have made the same decision had he been present at the end.

The battle brilliantly justified the British designs, and exhibited our superiority in gun-fire in the most favourable light. It was a great triumph for the gunners and engineers, and generally for the mechanical side of the fleet. The leading on both sides was extremely competent, and there was some very pretty manœuvring with the destroyers. Their smoke is like a curtain, which came down between the first act, in which our success was unmarred, and the second act, in which our success was somewhat equivocal. But the end of the battle once more showed the revolutionary importance of the submarine in naval war.



A German general and his staff directing the operations in Poland. [*Central News.*



Austrian troops advancing over marshy ground in Poland. [*Topical.*



The massing of German troops by rail : A troop train halted on the way to Lodz. [L.N.A.

CHAPTER VI.

THE GERMAN COUNTER-STROKE AGAINST RUSSIA.


THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE NIEMEN—POSITION IN THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER, 1914—GERMAN COUNTER-STROKE FROM THORN—ITS FIRST SUCCESS—THE RUSSIAN RALLY—TWO GERMAN CORPS BREAK THROUGH—REMARKABLE SITUATION—THE CLOSE OF THE LODZ FIGHTING.

ABOUT the time when the German armies were preparing for their first advance on Warsaw they were sending forward an army estimated at a quarter of a million men from the frontiers of East Prussia towards the Rivers Niemen and Bobr. They had invaded the Russian province of Suwalki after the heavy defeat which General Samsonoff had sustained in the lake region of East Prussia in August, and it was now their purpose to force the passage of the Niemen and take up a defensive position on its eastern side. There was no alternative between this course and that of standing on the defensive along their own frontier, which would have rendered East Prussia liable to a second invasion if the Russians could have threatened their flanks either from the north or the south. On the other hand, to attack the line of the Niemen was an adventurous policy, because the movement which was about to be directed against Warsaw was much more important than anything which the Germans could accomplish on the East Prussian front, and it is doubtful whether it was worth while to risk defeat. Success alone could justify the experiment, and success was not obtained. The men and guns which were thrown away on the Niemen might have averted the stroke by which the Russians outflanked the weak German left wing in the great attack on Warsaw. There was, however, one further advantage to be gained by a successful stroke beyond the acquisition of a strong defensive line, and this may have strongly influenced the Germans. Not far from the Niemen, at the points where the Germans attacked it, runs the main railway line from Petrograd to Warsaw. A German army firmly established on the right bank of the river north of Grodno would have broken this line—which would have caused the greatest embarrassment to the Russians defending Warsaw and the Vistula—or would at least have threatened it, which would have compelled the Russians to bring up fresh troops for its defence at the moment when they needed them urgently for use in Poland.

In order that their attack on the Niemen might not be outflanked from the south, the Germans combined with it an advance on the fortress of Ossowiec, which defends the crossing of the Bobr river. The Bobr is one of the three rivers, the Niemen and the Narew being the other

two, which protect Russia from serious invasion north of the Vistula, and at Ossowiec the Bobr is crossed by the important trunk railway which runs from Brest Litowsk, the centre of Russian concentration, in a north-easterly direction through Bielostok (on the Petrograd-Warsaw line), and so into East Prussia. So long as the Germans occupied the attention of Ossowiec and its army they hoped that their operations against the Russians would be able to proceed unmolested from the south. In this they judged correctly. What led to their failure was that they could not bring to bear either the superior numbers or the sudden attack by which they had gained their victory in East Prussia. They found the Russians well prepared, and failed altogether to make any impression on them.

The stretch of country around the towns of Suwalki and Augustowo in which the German advance was taking place is in its natural features a continuation of the lake region in East Prussia. Around Ossowiec, and for a number of miles to the north-east, lies a great area of marshland. Immediately north of the marshes begins the forest of Augustowo, which is about twenty-five miles by thirty-five in extent, and is interspersed with lakes; the lake-country stretches far beyond its northern border. All this country would have been as easy to defend as the Germans, at one time or another during the war, showed their own lake-country to be. But the Russians decided to withdraw almost up to the Niemen river, partly because they feared to be outflanked, but mainly because the farther they could draw the Germans on from the numerous railways of East Prussia, the more they would be able to deal with them on terms of equality, and the better would be their prospects of gaining a complete success if they once succeeded in repulsing the attack.



The map illustrates the first German advance on the Niemen and the attack on Ossowiec.

By September 23rd General Rennenkampf's rearguard had reached the Niemen, and two days later the Germans, who were commanded by General Morgen, opened their attack. The corps which were engaged, in whole or in part, were the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth. The left wing lay between the Augustowo forest and the railway from Königsberg to Kovno, thrown forward from Mariampol and Simno towards the Niemen, but not intended to attack the river line. In the centre the attack was directed against two points: Drusskeniki and Sopockinie, which lie respectively at the northern and southern extremities of the Augustowo forest on its eastern side. Drusskeniki is actually on the Niemen; Sopockinie is a few miles west of it. From both points, had the Germans crossed the river, they would have been within easy striking distance of the railway between Grodno and Vilna. The strongest force was employed in the movement on Drusskeniki. The extreme right wing of the attack was formed by the column advancing against Ossowiec.

The contest which now took place had taken a long time to mature, but it was decided with remarkable speed. The Germans began their attack on the Niemen on September 25th. At both points it failed completely. The Russians, who met the attack in front of the river, took the offensive at Sopockinie on the next day, and, pushing their way rapidly through the southern outskirts of the forests, reoccupied the town of Augustowo on September 28th. At the same time they drove the Germans who had attacked Sopockinie back in a north-westerly direction through the forest. Their right wing, no less successful, began to repel the German left on Simno and Mariampol, but at Drusskeniki, where the Germans had massed their largest forces, the fighting was much more obstinate. The advance of the Russians on the flanks, however, made it impossible for the Germans to hold their ground in the centre, and at the end of the month their whole army was in full retreat, but contesting fiercely the outlets from the woods and the difficult passages between the lakes. Pursuit and retreat alike were made difficult by heavy rains, which turned the country into swamps. West of Augustowo the Germans turned and flung back for the time a large Russian force. It was a local success which figured little in the Russian

reports, but was the only incident of the retreat from the Niemen which was allowed to be reported in the German press.

THE ATTACK ON OSSOWIEC.

The operations against Ossowiec fared no better than those on the Niemen, but this was not unexpected, for they were only a demonstration intended to prevent the Russians from advancing on Lyck and threatening the rear of the main German forces. On September 26th a bombardment was opened against Ossowiec, and a day or two later an infantry attack was made. It was easily repulsed ; the garrison sallied out and fell on the flanks of the attacking force. With the announcement of the failure on the Niemen, the besiegers retired from Ossowiec, and in a few days' time a Russian detachment, following on their heels, was once more over the East Prussian borders By October 6th the whole German expedition was back on its own frontiers, and had been heavily reinforced so as to make a stand. This it did, and for the next month the Russians could only advance by slow and painful steps. The campaign became now an affair of trenches, entanglements, and mines, to which the Germans had added lines of blockhouses, made of timber and heavily armed.

By the middle of November the position of the Germans looked critical along their whole eastern front. In East Prussia the Russians were along the frontier. In Poland, south of the Vistula, they had pressed the retreating Germans back beyond the Warta river, and were drawing in on Cracow ; in Galicia they were driving the Austrians from the waters of the Upper San towards the Carpathians, and were pushing in towards the space between Cracow and the mountains. Danger seemed to threaten not East Prussia only, but, what was vastly more important, Silesia also. The time had come for the counter-stroke which the German commanders had been preparing ever since they had failed to force the passage of the Vistula, and had drawn their armies off in a south-westerly retreat. The Russians, following them, had also moved in a southerly direction, and so had opened up a region weakly defended between the Vistula and Warta rivers. The Germans now struck at this, the weak spot in the Russian line.

THE ADVANCE FROM THORN.

The centre from which the new German advance set out was the fortress of Thorn, which stands on both banks of the Vistula, a mile or two within the German frontier. Thorn is the junction of a number of important railways. Two run northward into East Prussia—one of them down the Vistula to the fortress of Graudenz, the other north-eastward along the borders of the province. A third railway comes into Thorn from the east, and a fourth from the south ; while yet a fifth follows the course of the Vistula as far as Wloclawek, and then runs south-eastwards to Kutno and on to Warsaw. From Thorn the Germans looked out on both banks of the Vistula, and it was from here that they decided to strike at the flanks of both the Russian armies—the one attacking East Prussia, and the other threatening Posen and Silesia. They concentrated at Thorn not only part of the army which had been retreating through Poland, but also a large force drawn from the lake region of East Prussia, where a purely defensive policy was at present being pursued.

The movement which was to take place north of the Vistula was of secondary importance. It was expected that it would lead to the retreat of the Russian forces which had penetrated up to the East Prussian frontier along the railway from Warsaw to Mlawa, and would prevent the main operations south of the Vistula from being hampered by the necessity of withdrawing troops. But the movement directed southwards from Thorn and from that part of the German frontier between the fortress and the Warta river was of first-rate importance. Its ultimate object was to force the withdrawal of the whole Russian army now before Czenstochowa and Cracow, and further, if possible, to break through the Russian front and penetrate to Warsaw ; the withdrawal of the Russians on the whole front extending down to Cracow might even lead, with the co-operation of a fresh Austrian offensive, to a complete evacuation of Galicia. In order to shake the Russian position in the southern half of Poland, the Germans hoped, after dealing a blow at the weak army immediately in front of them to the west of Kutno, to penetrate to the railway between Lodz and Lowicz, and then, still pushing their way south-east, to cut the line leading from Warsaw to Petrokow and Czenstochowa. The successful achievement of this aim would mean either a withdrawal of the Russian armies in Poland towards the Vistula, or that they would be cut into two sections, each in danger of being outflanked.

By November 12th the new German concentration was complete, and on the 13th the Russians discovered the advance of fresh forces both north and south of the Vistula. On the north the advance took place on a front of about forty miles between Rypin and Lipno. Here, the Russians were unprepared for an attack in such comparative strength (neither side was in great force), and were driven back on Plock, about half-way between Thorn and Warsaw, with a loss of 5,000 men and a few machine guns. The Russian forces advancing from Mlawa began to withdraw, and the Germans were freed from embarrassment on the southern flank of their position in East Prussia.

A GERMAN SUCCESS.


South of the Vistula the German advance was first noticed along the railway which follows the course of the Vistula to Wloclawek. It soon appeared, however, that the new front covered almost the whole distance of the German frontier down to the River Warta ; and in order to facilitate their task of putting themselves in the rear of the main Russian army, the Germans still continued to fall back slowly south of the Warta. The farther they could draw the Russians towards the German frontier, without allowing them actually to cross it, the greater would be the fruit of their victory if they could once reach the two railways from Warsaw at which they were aiming. Their opening success on the Vistula-Warta front was as rapid and much more substantial than that which they had won to the west of Plock. They were in greatly superior numbers, thanks to the railways which had enabled them to bring up, not only men, but also heavy guns ; whereas the Russians had only been able to move forward slowly, because of the complete destruction of all means of communication which had been carried out by the Germans in their retreat. Possibly, indeed, the German victory would have been even more complete than it was had they not destroyed so thoroughly the railways, roads, and bridges. The Russians, being compelled to reconstruct everything as they went along, had the great masses of their army still in mid-Poland ; had they been able to move more swiftly they might have made a more stubborn resistance to the first German




Grodno, seen from across the Niemen. [E.N.A.



The road into Kovno. [E.N.A.



A view of Kovno and the Niemen. [E.N.A.



The map illustrates the German advance in Poland in the middle of November, 1914.

attack, but they would have been in any case outnumbered, and they would not have had the same strength in reserve forces behind them. As it was, north of the Warta they were driven hurriedly back on Kutno, with the loss of an army corps.

The first stage of the new movement had therefore gone in favour of the Germans, but as yet they had made no impression on the Russian main armies, against whom their attack was really directed, while in Galicia the Austrians were still falling back towards the Carpathian passes and the country south of Cracow.

THE RUSSIAN FRONT BROKEN.

By November 17th the German front stretched from Plock on the Vistula, in a south-westerly direction through Kutno and Leczyca, to Uniejow on the Warta. (See the map.) The second stage now opened. The Germans directed the full force of their attack from Kutno towards Lowicz, in the hope of breaking through the Russian right wing. (See Fig. 1.) At the same time they took up the offensive farther south, and attacked from Czenstochowa in the hope of preventing the Russians from moving the troops to the north, which were now badly needed there. In this they were only partially successful, but the movement of the Russian reinforcements northward was necessarily slow, and could not be carried through in time to prevent the Germans achieving a great success. On November 18th the German forces south of Kutno forced their way over the Upper Bzura, and appeared at Piatek, due west of Lowicz and due north of Lodz. This meant a definite and very serious breach in the Russian line, and was followed immediately by the withdrawal of the extreme Russian right wing on to the Lower Bzura. It was not, however, so much the Russian right which was now in danger, as the whole Russian position to the south of Lodz. The Germans proceeded immediately to pour their troops like an avalanche through the breach made at Piatek. Two army corps—a Guards Reserve Corps and the Twentieth Corps—immediately rushed south-eastward across the first of the railways between Lodz and Lowicz, and advanced into the whole of the region east of Lodz from Strykow on the north, through Brzeziny and Koluszki (due east), to Tuszyn on the south. (See Fig. 2.) The Russians were at this moment in extreme danger. A wide gap had been made in their front. The German corps which had broken through were within a few miles of the all-important railway from Warsaw to Petrokow. They were on the flank both of the Russian right, which rested on the Vistula, and of the left on the line of the Warta, and of its reserve forces at Petrokow. Not only so, but they were actually in the rear of a considerable body of Russian troops west and south-west of Lodz. If General von Mackensen were now able to throw in his reserves after the first two corps, to widen the breach which they had made, and to cut the Petrokow railway as he had already cut the less important line north of it, the German plan would have succeeded almost completely; the Russian

front would be broken in two, and the least that would have followed would have been a disastrous retreat to the Vistula.

THE GERMAN CORPS ALMOST TRAPPED.

The German corps had made, as it were, a sack for themselves as they advanced to the south-east. It was the business of Von Mackensen to widen, if he could, the mouth of the sack; but at all events, if he could not do that at once, to keep it open in order that he might pour reinforcements through it, or hold it as a way of escape for the two corps should they be compelled to retreat. The Russians, on the other hand, had to arrest the progress of the invading columns, and, having done so, to cut them off by closing the mouth of the sack. Well aware of the critical state of their fortunes, they now counter-attacked with the utmost vigour. They brought up troops on the east against those German forces which had reached Brzeziny and Koluszki; they hurried up reserves from Petrokow, and barred the southward progress of the Germans who had reached Tuszyn. After fierce fighting the German offensive was stopped. The two corps could penetrate no farther towards either the east or the south, and were compelled to think of retreating in their own track towards Strykow and the gap in the Russian line through which they had come. (Fig. 3.) But it was no longer certain that they would find the gap open. While they had been trying to break their way through the opposing troops on the east and south, the Russians had directed strong columns from the north-east (Lowicz and Skierniewice) towards the line by which the Germans had advanced. This attack seemed likely to close the mouth of the sack completely, for the Russians captured both Brzeziny and Strykow, and it was at this time that reports reached Petrograd that two German army corps had been completely cut off and had surrendered.

GERMAN EFFORTS TO SAVE THE CORPS.

The complete victory, however, to which the Russians had come so near escaped them. As soon as the German corps which had broken through from Piatek had been reduced to the defensive, it became clear to the Germans that only the most supreme efforts could save them from catastrophe. Their endeavours to widen the breach in the Russian line had failed, and it had become a question only of rescuing the endangered corps. They set about it with characteristic vigour. By November 22nd large forces were seen to be advancing from the middle Warta, along the line of the railway which runs in a north-easterly direction to Lodz. This army was directed against the flank of the Russian forces from Petrokow, which were now harrying the retiring Germans back to Strykow. The Russians were thus compelled, while pursuing the enemy to the north, to beat off a formidable flank attack from the east. (Fig. 3.) This they succeeded in doing, but the German flank movement was so far successful that it facilitated the retreat of their two corps from the country east of Lodz. At the same time, the Germans fought desperately to keep open the gap in the Russian line. They hurried up reserves and assailed the Russian positions furiously, both north-west and north-east of Lodz—at either extremity of the mouth of the sack. East of Piatek in particular they attacked the Russian forces which were advancing from Lowicz, and sought to throw them back. (Fig. 3.) Meanwhile, the two army corps were fighting their way slowly northwards again. The Russians were on their rear and both flanks, and had often to be cleared from their front as well. Some of the points which they had occupied in their dash southwards had now passed into Russian hands. They were attacked and attacking both by night and by day. But they held on, and at last, by dint of their own heroic exertions, and thanks to the diversions which their main armies made both north and south of Lodz, they contrived to win through.

By November 26th they had regained touch with the main body, and both the Russian and the German lines had straightened out again. (Fig. 4.) But it was only remnants of the two corps which succeeded in escaping. They had been fiercely attacked from every side, and their losses were so great that for some time they were withdrawn entirely from the front in order that they might be reorganised. Companies had been reduced from a strength of 260 or more to 70, and the dead along some stretches of the line of retreat lay too thickly to be numbered. Their advance and retreat constitute one of the most remarkable episodes in the war.

THE GERMAN RECOVERY.

So ended a remarkable adventure. The Germans had succeeded admirably in breaking the Russian line, but they had pushed their advance too rashly, and had not allowed sufficiently for the stubbornness of the Russians in resisting all efforts to widen the breach, nor for their rapidity in moving forward from all sides to close the gap. On the other hand, the retreat of the two army corps was conducted with a dogged resolution worthy of the Russian infantry itself, and the German counter-attacks were well devised and boldly handled. The whole movement had, however, entailed very heavy losses on the German armies. Besides the severe handling of the German forces east of Lodz, the Russians had gained a substantial success during the fighting to the north-west of the city, and had defeated the flanking movement from the Warta. The German position had been severely shaken, and the net result of the prolonged fighting which began on November 18th was that the Germans had failed in their plan of breaking through the enemy's front, and that they now stood on a line which ran from the middle Warta to a point not many miles west of Lodz, and on to the north-east of the city. The expectation that the hard blows which they had suffered would lead to their retreat to their own frontiers was not fulfilled. Their withdrawal soon came to an end; the line on which they fell back was strongly entrenched, and they prepared forthwith to renew the advance. They had lost heavily, but in the process they had brought up strong reinforcements. Altogether they had received over six new corps, composed partly of troops which had been on the western front and partly of fresh formations from Germany; Hungarian cavalry also appeared on this front. It was the more necessary that the Germans should pursue their original plan to a successful end, in that they had not yet relieved the danger threatening Silesia and Cracow. The Russians still held their ground in Southern Poland; in Galicia and the Carpathians they were advancing. At the time when the Russian front was being broken at Piatek, the Russians in the Carpathians were capturing the Dukla and Uszok passes, and by the time, a week later, that the broken front had been re-formed Russian columns were well advanced into the Ung and Zemplen districts of Hungary, on the southern slope of the mountains. A few days later Bartfeld, at the head of an important railway running down into Hungary, was captured. Similar successes had fallen to the Russians in their




Fig. 1 shows the positions before the Germans broke the Russian front near Piatek.—In Fig. 2 the Germans have broken through at Piatek, and are pouring southwards into the country east and south of Lodz. Russian reserves are beginning to move forward against them from Lowicz, Skierniewice, and Petrokow. A German flanking movement is developing from the Warta river.—In Fig. 3 the Germans, who have broken through, are fighting their way northwards. They are shut in on the east, west, and south, and the Germans are directing desperate counter-attacks against the Russian forces in the north, who are seeking to close the way out.—In Fig. 4 the Germans have succeeded in keeping the exit open for their retreating corps, which have escaped. The Russian front has been re-formed.

advance on Cracow. The Austrians were driven back over the Szreniawa, to the north-east of the fortress, and the Raba, to the south-east, and at Bochnia, about twenty-five miles to the west, 7,000 prisoners and thirty guns were taken. From Bochnia the Russians advanced to Wieliczka, the seat of the famous salt mines, and almost within range of the fortress guns, while their left wing began to swing round into the space between Cracow and the mountain ridges, and to approach the city from the south. It was high time for the Germans both to renew their attack on the Russian right wing from Petrokow to the Vistula, and to spur on their Austrian allies to the defence of Hungary and the recovery of Galicia.

RENEWED ATTACK ON LODZ.

The withdrawal of the Germans to entrenched positions barely delayed operations beyond a single day. The two army corps had reached safety by November 26th, and on November 27th the Germans began a renewed onslaught on the Russian line north, west, and south of Lodz, throwing into it the large masses of new troops whom they had brought up. The Russians made an attempt to counter this almost immediately by advancing from the mouth of the Bzura river along the Vistula, in the hope of threatening the left flank of the new German attack. Their advance, however, could not be pushed sufficiently far, and all their available forces were immediately needed to hold the front near Lodz.

The struggle continued from November 27th up to December 5th. It was most intense to the north-east of the city, between Glowno and Lowicz, and in the neighbourhood of the small manufacturing town of Zgierz, from which the Germans set up a hot attack in a south-easterly direction towards Lodz itself. The Russians now attempted, as they had done once before, to bring up reinforcements from Petrokow to Lodz. But the Germans, repeating their former tactics, made a fresh flanking movement from Sieradz, on the middle Warta, and Szczercow, which lies farther to the south. On December 2nd and 3rd, while a tremendous attack on this flank held the Russians in their positions, the Germans pressed up to within a few miles due west of Lodz. They did not succeed in carrying the Russian positions, but their attack became more and more dangerous on both sides of the city, and on December 5th the Russians decided to abandon it. It was no doubt true, as their reports explained, that the holding of so large a town was a serious weakness to them, but the abandonment was due to the fighting of the previous days, for the Russians were finding it increasingly difficult to maintain their front.

The capture of Lodz, though it was not an important strategic point, was of great significance at the moment. It is the chief manufacturing centre of Poland, and was regarded as of more importance than any other place except Warsaw itself. Its fall marks the first success of the Germans in the third stage of these operations. The opening stage had comprised the victory at Kutno and the withdrawal of the Russian right wing towards the Bzura river. The second consisted of the breaking of the Russian line, and the complete failure of the Germans to press home their advantage. The third, which began on November 27th, was to end in a general Russian retreat, which, while not great as distance is measured, was of extreme importance, in that it relieved both Germany and Austria from the fear of invasion for an indefinite time.



Czenstochowa, the headquarters of the German Army operating in Poland. The photograph shows the Cathedral and Convent. [*Central News.*

Appendix.

THE ACTIONS OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND IN THE NORTH SEA.

I.

Admiralty, 3rd March, 1915.

The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. Doveton-Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., reporting the action off the Falkland Islands on Tuesday, the 8th of December, 1914 :—

Invincible at Sea,
December 19th, 1914.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward a report on the action which took place on 8th December, 1914, against a German Squadron off the Falkland Islands.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
F. C. D. STURDEE,
Vice-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.

THE SECRETARY, ADMIRALTY.

(A.)—PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.

The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships *Invincible*, flying my flag, Flag-Captain Percy T. H. Beamish ; *Inflexible*, Captain Richard F. Phillimore ; *Carnarvon*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart, Flag-Captain Harry L. d'E. Skipwith ; *Cornwall*, Captain Walter M. Ellerton ; *Kent*, Captain John D. Allen ; *Glasgow*, Captain John Luce ; *Bristol*, Captain Basil H. Fanshawe ; and *Macedonia*, Captain Bertram S. Evans ; arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at 10-30 a.m. on Monday, the 7th December, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the enemy's squadron the next evening, the 8th December.

At 8 a.m. on Tuesday, the 8th December, a signal was received from the signal station on shore :—

"A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northwards."

At this time the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows :—

Macedonia : At anchor as look-out ship.

Kent (guard ship) : At anchor in Port William.

Invincible and *Inflexible :* In Port William.

Carnarvon : In Port William.

Cornwall : In Port William.

Glasgow : In Port Stanley.

Bristol : In Port Stanley.

The *Kent* was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed.

At 8-20 a.m. the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8-45 a.m. the *Kent* passed down the harbour and took up a station at the entrance.

The *Canopus*, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8-47 a.m. that the first two ships were eight miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8-20 a.m. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about twenty miles off.

At 8-50 a.m. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in sight to the southward.

The *Macedonia* was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the other ships, and await orders.

At 9-20 a.m. the two leading ships of the enemy (*Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*), with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the *Canopus*, who opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the *Invincible*, at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.

A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the *Kent* at the entrance to the harbour, but about this time it seems that the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.

The *Glasgow* weighed and proceeded at 9-40 a.m., with orders to join the *Kent* and observe the enemy's movements.

At 9-45 a.m. the squadron—less the *Bristol*—weighed, and proceeded out of harbour in the following order :—*Carnarvon*, *Inflexible*, *Invincible*, and *Cornwall*. On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the south-east, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the north-west.

At 10-20 a.m. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the *Carnarvon*, and overtook the *Kent*. The *Glasgow* was ordered to keep two miles from the *Invincible*, and the *Inflexible* was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to twenty knots at 11-15 a.m. to enable the other cruisers to get into station.

At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.

Information was received from the *Bristol* at 11-27 a.m. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably colliers or transports. The *Bristol* was therefore directed to take the *Macedonia* under his orders and destroy transports.

The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12-20 p.m., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the *Glasgow*.

At 12-47 p.m. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was made.

The *Inflexible* opened fire at 12-55 p.m. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser ; a few minutes later the *Invincible* opened fire at the same ship.

The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1-20 p.m. she (the *Leipzig*) turned away, with the *Nürnberg* and *Dresden* to the south-west. These light cruisers were at once followed by the *Kent*, *Glasgow*, and *Cornwall*, in accordance with my instructions.

The action finally developed into three separate encounters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.

(B.).—ACTION WITH THE ARMOURED CRUISERS.

The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. The effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1-25 p.m., with the *Scharnhorst* leading, they turned about seven points to port in succession into line ahead, and opened fire at 1-30 p.m. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to twenty-four knots, and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line ahead, with the *Invincible* leading.

The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased, until, at 2 p.m., it had reached 16,450 yards.

The enemy then (2-10 p.m.) turned away about ten points to starboard, and a second chase ensued, until, at 2-45 p.m., the battle cruisers again opened fire ; this caused the enemy, at 2-53 p.m., to turn into line ahead to port, and open fire at 2-55 p.m.

The *Scharnhorst* caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly ; the *Gneisenau* was badly hit by the *Inflexible*.

At 3-30 p.m. the *Scharnhorst* led round about ten points to starboard ; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel ; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the *Scharnhorst* became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam ; at times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4-4 p.m. the *Scharnhorst*, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship ; for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4-17 p.m. she disappeared.

The *Gneisenau* passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers.

At 5-8 p.m. the forward funnel was knocked over, and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much.

At 5-15 p.m. one of the *Gneisenau's* shells struck the *Invincible ;* this was her last effective effort.

At 5-30 p.m. she turned towards the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes, and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal "Cease fire," but before it was hoisted the *Gneisenau* opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun.

At 5-40 p.m. the three ships closed in on the *Gneisenau*, and, at this time, the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.

At 5-50 p.m. "Cease fire" was made.

At 6 p.m. the *Gneisenau* heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking.

The prisoners of war from the *Gneisenau* report that, by the time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water.

When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded sur-

vivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the cold water, many of them were drowned within sight of the boats and ship.

Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; life-buoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued. The *Invincible* alone rescued 108 men, fourteen of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board; these men were buried at sea the following day with full military honours.

C.).—ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS.

At about 1 p.m., when the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* turned to port to engage the *Invincible and Inflexible*, the enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the *Dresden* was leading, and the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* followed on each quarter.

In accordance with my instructions, the *Glasgow*, *Kent*, and *Cornwall* at once went in chase of these ships; the *Carnarvon*, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle cruisers.

The *Glasgow* drew well ahead of the *Cornwall* and *Kent*, and at 3 p.m. shots were exchanged with the *Leipzig* at 12,000 yards. The *Glasgow's* object was to endeavour to outrange the *Leipzig* with her 6-inch guns, and thus cause her to alter *course* and give the *Cornwall* and *Kent* a chance of coming into action.

At 4-17 p.m. the *Cornwall* opened fire, also on the *Leipzig*.

At 7-17 p.m. the *Leipzig* was on fire fore and aft, and the *Cornwall* and *Glasgow*. ceased fire.

The *Leipzig* turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 p.m. Seven officers and eleven men were saved.

At 3-36 p.m. the *Cornwall* ordered the *Kent* to engage the *Nürnberg*, the nearest cruiser to her.

Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine-room department, the *Kent* was able to get within range of the *Nürnberg* at 5 p.m. At 6-35 p.m. the *Nürnberg* was on fire forward, and ceased firing. The *Kent* also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colours were still observed to be flying in the *Nürnberg*, the *Kent* opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later, on the colours being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The *Nürnberg* sank at 7-27 p.m., and, as she sank, a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived.

The *Kent* had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by one shell.

During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig*, the *Dresden*, who was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The *Glasgow* was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the *Leipzig* for over an hour before either the *Cornwall* or *Kent* could come up and get within range. During this time the *Dresden* was able to increase her distance and get out of sight.

The weather changed after 4 p.m., and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the *Dresden* to get away unobserved.

(D.).—ACTION WITH THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORTS.

A report was received at 11-27 a.m. from H.M.S. *Bristol* that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The *Bristol* was ordered to take the *Macedonia* under his orders and destroy the transports.

H.M.S. *Macedonia* reports that only two ships, steamships *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crew.

I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the engineer officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed.

II.

Admiralty, 3rd March, 1915.

The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, the 24th of January, 1915:—

H.M.S. *Princess Royal*,
2nd February, 1915.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th January, 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company.

The battle cruisers *Lion*, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O., flying my flag; *Princess Royal*, Captain Osmond de B. Brock, Aide-de-Camp; *Tiger*, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; *New Zealand*, Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.; and *Indomitable*, Captain Francis W. Kennedy.

The light cruisers *Southampton*, flying the broad pennant of Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; *Nottingham*, Captain Charles B. Miller; *Birmingham*, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff; and *Lowestoft*, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my port beam.

Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in *Arethusa*; *Aurora*, Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson; *Undaunted*, Captain Francis G. St. John, M.V.O.; *Arethusa* and the destroyer flotillas were ahead.

At 7-25 a.m. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly afterwards a report reached me from *Aurora* that she was engaged with enemy's ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E., increased to twenty-two knots, and ordered the light cruisers and flotillas to chase S.S.E. to get in touch and report movements of enemy.

This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed my wishes had already been forestalled by the respective senior officers, and reports almost immediately followed from *Southampton*, *Arethusa*, and *Aurora* as to the position and composition of the enemy, which consisted of three battle cruisers and *Blücher*, six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course to S.E. From now onwards the light cruisers maintained touch with the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.

The battle cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme visibility. At 7-30 a.m. the enemy were sighted on the port bow, steaming fast, steering approximately S.E., distant fourteen miles.

Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to S.E., parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28·5 knots. Great credit is due to the engineer staffs of *New Zealand* and *Indomitable*—these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed.

At 8-52 a.m., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship, the battle cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so that guns would bear, and *Lion* fired a single shot, which fell short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with light cruisers ahead, and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam.

Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9-9 a.m. *Lion* made her first hit on the *Blücher*, No. 4 in the line. The *Tiger* opened fire at 9-20 a.m. on the rear ship, the *Lion* shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvoes. The enemy returned our fire at 9-14 a.m. *Princess Royal*, on coming into range, opened fire on *Blücher*, the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards, at 9-35 a.m. *New Zealand* was within range of *Blücher*, which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. *Princess Royal* shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her.

Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our range with their smoke; but the enemy's destroyers threatening attack, the *Meteor* and M Division passed ahead of us, Captain the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this division with conspicuous ability.

About 9-45 a.m. the situation was as follows:—*Blücher*, the fourth in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gun-fire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. *Lion* was engaging No. 1, *Princess Royal* No. 3, *New Zealand* No. 4, while the *Tiger*, who was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4.

The enemy's destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed.

Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. *Lion* and *Tiger* opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume their original course.

The light cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port quarter of the enemy's line, enabling them to observe and keep touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.

At 10-48 a.m., the *Blücher*, which had dropped considerably astern of enemy's line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently ordered *Indomitable* to attack enemy breaking northward.

At 10-54 a.m. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I personally observed the wash of a periscope two points on our starboard bow. I immediately turned to port.

At 11-3 a.m. an injury to the *Lion* being reported as incapable of immediate repair, I directed *Lion* to shape course N.W. At 11-20 a.m. I called the *Attack* alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11-35 a.m. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, and met them at noon retiring N.N.W.

I boarded and hoisted my flag in *Princess Royal* at about 12-20 p.m., when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the *Lion* fell out of the line, namely, that *Blücher* had been sunk, and that the enemy battle cruisers had continued their course to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of *Blücher*.

The good seamanship of Lieut.-Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S. *Attack*, in placing his vessel alongside the *Lion* and subsequently the *Princess Royal*, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in the shortest possible time.

At 2 p.m. I closed *Lion* and received a report that the starboard engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3-38 p.m. I ordered *Indomitable* to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 p.m.

The greatest credit is due to the Captains of *Indomitable* and *Lion* for the seamanlike manner in which the *Lion* was taken in tow under difficult circumstances.

The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a conspicuous feature.

I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men who specially distinguished themselves.

Where all did well it is difficult to single out officers and men for special mention, and as *Lion* and *Tiger* were the only ships hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mention belong to those ships.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(*Signed*) DAVID BEATTY,
Vice-Admiral.



The Archduke Charles Francis, the heir to the Austrian throne, and his Staff.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

CHAPTER VII.

THE FRONTAL ATTACK ON WARSAW AND THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE.

A COMBINED AUSTRO-GERMAN OFFENSIVE—THE DANGER TO HUNGARY—FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE RUSSIAN LINES BEFORE WARSAW—AUSTRIAN ADVANCE THROUGH THE CARPATHIAN PASSES—RUSSIAN RETREAT AND RECOVERY—GERMAN MASSED ATTACKS ON THE BZURA AND RAWKA—RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN BUKOWINA.

AT the end of the first week in December the Germans were in possession of Lodz, but the Russian centre maintained its ground in Southern Poland. On the left their army was within range of the forts of Cracow and, what was even more important, it stood on the southern side of the Carpathians at several points. Not only had Germany to fear the possibility of an invasion of Silesia, but she had to anticipate an irruption of the Russians on a great scale into the plain of Hungary. Such an occurrence threatened not only the Austrian Empire, but Germany as well. "Hungary for the Hungarians" is a maxim well understood at Buda-Pest, and it was quite certain that if the Russians descended in strength from the Carpathians the Hungarian Government would not merely have been compelled, but would of its own motion have been quick to summon the Hungarian army for the defence of the country. The defection of Hungary would have meant that more than half the value of Austria as Germany's ally would have been lost, and before long the Germans would have had to take on themselves the task of defending their right flank, which they had so far deputed in many desperate battles to the Austrians.

They could not even be sure that Hungary would wait to be overrun by the Russians. The independence movement was always smouldering, and there were ominous murmurs that the interests of Hungary were being sacrificed to those of the Germans. How far the discontent and the talk of an independent peace with Russia were genuine and deep-seated it is impossible to say. Partly at least they may have been a manœuvre devised to put pressure upon Germany, and compel her to lend assistance in the Carpathians; at all events, little was heard of them when once the Russian tide had been turned back. But whatever their character, about this time Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister and a man of great force of character, paid a visit to the German headquarters and discussed with the Emperor and the military staff the nature of the joint action which should now be taken by the Allies for the defence of Hungary. Many versions of this famous interview became current. Some spoke of stormy scenes between the Emperor and Tisza; of threats from Tisza, and of appeals from the Emperor. Probably we may detect a lively imagination in these details; it is certain at least that Germany could not allow Hungary either to be detached from her by a separate peace, or to be overrun by the Russians if she could possibly prevent it by military aid; and the Magyars, the ruling race of Hungary and the prime enemy of its minor nationalities, could have little confidence that they would be able to obtain from Russia conditions of peace which they could tolerate. It is more reasonable to suppose that both the Hungarian and the German Governments desired to arrange the new scheme of defence in their common interests, and that they contrived to construct it amicably in the same spirit in which, to all outward appearance, they afterwards carried it out.

THE PLAN OF ATTACK.

The main idea of the attack on the Russian positions was that while the German centre should hold its ground an attempt should be made to break or force back the Russian wings. The Austro-German line in the Czenstochowa



Russian field artillery in action. [*Record Press.*



Russian transport advancing over the snow-covered country in Poland. [*Central News.*

region having been fortified long before, it would be possible for large numbers of troops to be withdrawn without seriously weakening it, especially as the Russians were likely to be much too hard pressed at other points to have any prospect themselves of breaking through the opposing centre. In Northern Poland there was now no chance of outflanking the Russian right wing. It was firmly planted on the Vistula, and the best that the Germans could hope for was to break through it by sheer force of numbers; and this they were determined to do, both because of the positive advantages which they would hope to gain from a successful advance on Warsaw, and also because of the importance of preventing the Russians from diverting an indefinite number of reinforcements to the southern field. The attack on the Russian left flank was to be left in the main to the Austrian and Hungarian corps, but for the first time a large body of German troops was sent south of Cracow to assist in the movement. The operations on this flank furnished more hope of success than those in front of Warsaw. Russia's best chance to strike at Germany lay past Cracow and through the Carpathian passes into Hungary. In advancing through the mountains and emerging on the Russian flank, the Austrians were carrying out what has long been regarded as the soundest strategy in a war with Russia, for the farther the Russians advanced westward towards Cracow the longer and more vulnerable became their line and the more complete their defeat if the Austrians could descend the northern slope of the Carpathians, relieve the fortress of Przemysl, and set themselves astride of the line by which the Russian army was supplied. At the beginning of the second week in December the Germans pressed hard on the heels of the Russians, who were withdrawing from their positions at and near Lodz. Large forces were transferred southwards from Czenstochowa. The Twenty-Fourth German Corps was discovered in the mountain-region south of Cracow, forming the right wing of an enveloping movement. A large Austrian army was seen moving up towards the Carpathian passes over a front of about 120 miles. The second Austro-German plan for the defeat of Russia was in full operation.


THE RUSSIANS IN FRONT OF THE BZURA.

The Germans began their attacks on the Warsaw front with characteristic impetuousity immediately after the occupation of Lodz. The Russian line was a few miles in front of the Bzura river, running southward from its junction with the Vistula through undulating country slightly to the west of Lowicz, an important junction of roads, and Glowno, a little to the west of the railway from Warsaw to Petrokow, and on down the line of the railway to Petrokow itself. Beginning with December 8th, the Germans, who had assembled about six corps in this quarter, threw themselves in repeated attacks on the Russian lines north of Lowicz. After four days' fighting they had made but little progress, but on the 14th they were found to have been very strongly reinforced, and their incessant attacks, delivered persistently and in close formation, eventually succeeded in shaking the Russian position. The Russian commanders decided to strengthen their ground by putting in front of them the obstacles presented by the two rivers which they at present had behind them—the Bzura and the Rawka, which, running from the south, joins the Bzura a few miles north of Lowicz. They calculated, and with reason, that the difficulty which the Germans had found in capturing entrenched positions in the open country ought to be insuperable when to it was added the barrier even of rivers which were as small as these two. The retirement on the Bzura front covered about ten miles—in the region of Skierniewice it was rather more—and it was necessarily accompanied by a retreat of some twenty-five miles to the east of Petrokow. For once the retirement might perhaps be called genuinely strategic, in the sense that the Russians could have held out in their old positions, but found it more practicable and more sparing of life to withdraw behind the rivers.

THE CRACOW FRONT.

While the Germans were preparing their attack on the positions in front of the Bzura, the Russian army was still pressing into the country south of Cracow. It forced the passage of the Upper Dunajec river, and in the valley of the Lososina—a tributary of the Dunajec—defeated the German corps (recently brought from Belgium) which was seeking to envelop its left wing. This was, however, the limit of the advance. Within the next few days the Russian forces which had been south of the Carpathians, in the districts of Bartfeld, Ung, and Zemplen, rapidly withdrew, and by December 12th all the passes in the Western Carpathians were in Austrian hands. To assist in this movement the Austrians had withdrawn troops from their Servian campaign. The Russians in Galicia now began to fall back slightly along the whole line. Even when they were in possession of the more important passes they had not sufficient men to be able to defend the flanks of their positions, and, since the initiative now lay with the Germans and Austrians, they were not able to bring up reinforcements with sufficient rapidity to hold their ground. Throughout the war the announcement of a fresh offensive on the German or Austrian side was followed almost invariably by a temporary retreat of the Russians. The explanation was that the enemy, being able to choose the direction of their attack and to concentrate superior forces, could force the Russians steadily back until they were able to redress the inequality of numbers. The Russians never lacked men, but only the means of planting them rapidly where they were most needed.

The Russian retreat in Galicia, combined with the retirement behind the Bzura and Rawka, meant the definite failure for the time of the great plan of invading both Hungary and Silesia, and it was received in Germany with an outburst of joy which was the measure of the popular feeling of relief. But one of the objects of the Austrian advance was not accomplished—the relief of Przemysl. The Russian tide rolled back from the Carpathians towards the line of railway between Przemysl and Cracow, but it did not uncover the fortress. Przemysl is about fifty miles from the Lupkow Pass, and at one time the Austrians had penetrated almost half the distance. While they were advancing, the garrison, which was informed of their movements—for there was regular communication by aeroplane with the fortress—made repeated sallies against the lines of investment. On one occasion a sortie was made which reached a point to the south-west of the city which was only some fifteen or twenty miles from the advancing Austrian army. But the effort failed: the Russian lines were too strong, and the last chance of joining up with the relieving army passed from the garrison. Nor did the retreat in Galicia long continue. For three or four days the Russians had fallen slowly back towards the north from the Carpathians and towards the north-east from Cracow




The map illustrates the attack made on the Russian front during December, 1914, and the first half of January, 1915 by the Germans west of Warsaw, by the Austrians through the Carpathian passes.

But on this occasion, as on others, reserves were being steadily pushed up, and on December 19th the Austrians found themselves confronted by much larger forces, and their offensive was brought to a standstill. Another stage was now entered on. On the Vistula front the Russians maintained the defensive on a line which ran behind the Rawka and southwards to the Pilica ; in Galicia they resumed the offensive and began, but only very slowly and at some points, to push the Austrians back again over the way by which they had come.

A WEEK OF GERMAN FURY.

The Germans, encouraged by the Russian retreat in the north, threw themselves with redoubled energy against the new positions of the enemy, and from December 18th to December 25th fighting followed which for its ferocity and the loss of life involved can be compared only with the attempts to break through the British line in the neighbourhood of Ypres. The Russian entrenchments had been carefully prepared in advance, and at some parts of the rivers the banks were steep and excellent for defence. The Russian soldier has shown in many wars that he has few equals in defensive fighting, and that, in the attack, he excels at close quarters. He had now an admirable opportunity of showing his characteristic qualities, and he took full advantage of it. The German soldiers, on their side, exhibited the same courage and stubborn perseverance which marked their campaign in the west, and their commanders showed a like faith in the power of the direct attack, relentlessly driven home and repeated regardless of all costs.



Cracow : One of the gates leading into the old city.

[*H. J. Shepstone.*

The chief place on the Bzura between Lowicz and the Vistula is the village of Sochaczew, where the road from Warsaw crosses the river. Against this point and several more to the north and south of it the Germans directed their attacks. On several occasions, especially in the night time, they succeeded in establishing detachments on the eastern bank. On the night of December 19th they delivered five successive attacks, their men wading across the river, which was here about 50 yards wide and fordable. At the junction of the Bzura and Rawka as many as seven battalions made good their footing, and were counter-attacked by the Siberian rifles and virtually annihilated. About the same time, and a little to the north of this attack, two battalions got across by a footbridge ; they, too, did not return. Sometimes the Germans succeeded in getting machine guns across with them. Sometimes they were attacked while actually crossing the river, or were driven back into it by the fury of the counter-attack, so that the stream was filled with bodies floating slowly down towards the Vistula. The number of the losses on either side is unknown, but these sustained attacks with massed troops on prepared entrenchments must have been paid for at a bitter cost, and at last, when the violence of the assault slackened on December 25th, the Germans were no nearer to their object. A small stretch of ground on the right bank of the Bzura north of Sochaczew remained in their hands, but they shortly abandoned it of their own accord, and withdrew to their old positions on the left bank of the river. Simultaneously with the fighting on the Bzura, they had endeavoured to break the Russian line further south—at Bolimow on the Rawka and near Inowlodz on the Pilica. The same methods were followed, and with the same results. Occasionally they gained a foothold, and even carried the front line of Russian trenches, but they were destroyed or driven into the river behind them before they could be sufficiently reinforced to hold the ground.

EXPEDIENCY OF GERMAN TACTICS.

The whole of the German operations since they first came up against the main Russian positions in the middle of November constitute an excellent example of their military doctrines and the way in which they are carried out. The result would suggest that they should be regarded with suspicion. The principle underlying the attacks from November 18th to December 25th was simply that of the battering ram, inspired by the faith that it



The Market Square. Cracow. showing the oldest church in the city. [E.N.A.



A street scene in Cracow. [E.N.A.



The plight of Poland: Peasant refugees clamouring for food at a relief station.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

would eventually burst its way through any opposition, however terrible, if it was applied without intermission. In a case where no alternative method of attack is open, a commander may have to choose between such tactics and a barren defensive, but in November and December the Germans had another course open to them, which in fact they accepted two months later—a flank advance on Warsaw from the north-east. During the fighting south of the Vistula they made a tentative advance in this direction, and on one occasion they tried to throw a force over the Vistula on to the northern bank. But these were only demonstrations. They put their whole faith in the frontal attack and the close formations, and in this stage fortune declared decisively against them.


The week of continuous fighting which came to an end about Christmas Day was followed by a slight respite, during which the Germans were resting and reorganising their forces. During this time they strove persistently to find a weak spot in the Russian front farther south, on the upper course of the Rawka, and on the Pilica and beyond it. On the Rawka their fiercest attacks were again directed towards the neighbourhood of Bolimow. To the south and east of Bolimow there lies an extensive stretch of forest. To the north-east is a comparatively open area, and in the last days of December the Germans succeeded in throwing some picked regiments over the river, who turned north-east through the open country and established themselves here at a place called Borzimow. They failed, however, to hold the positions, and before the end of the year all the troops which had reached the Russian trenches were either destroyed or thrown back across the river. An attempt immediately followed to break the Russian front to the south of Bolimow by penetrating through the woods; while in the region of the Pilica, the German attack, having failed at Inowlodz, was also diverted to points both north and south. It is difficult entirely to understand the motives which directed the German attacks at this stage. They had certainly calculated that the shortest road to Warsaw, and that by which their victory would be most complete, lay across the Bzura and the lower Rawka, and having failed for the time at least in that quarter, but being determined at all costs to break through, they were driven desperately to assail first one point and then another in the hope of at last repeating the success which they had won a month before when they shattered the Russian front to the north-west of Lodz. Yet they had by no means abandoned the direct attack on the Bzura. At the close of the year they delivered a sudden and unexpected series of assaults on Sochaczew, fifteen of them being made in one day, and all defeated. For the next week fighting raged incessantly along the eastern bank of the Rawka to the north of Bolimow, where the Germans at last succeeded in establishing themselves so firmly that repeated counter-attacks failed to recover the lost ground. No sooner were they firmly planted in this quarter than they repeated their tactics a few miles to



Austrian troops in the trenches, showing the shelters and communication trenches. [*Topical Press.*



An Austrian field gun in action on the Bukowina front. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



The main German attacks on the Warsaw front in December were delivered against the Russian positions on the Bzura and Rawka rivers.

the north, and succeeded in capturing part of the Russian trenches at Sucha on a small tributary of the Bzura. The importance of the advantage which they had gained here, and the reason for their persistence in pressing it, was that they had in front of them an open stretch of country from which they could advance against the road and the railway leading direct to Warsaw. But this span of country had to be fought for foot by foot, and they had to face a line of entrenched positions about half-way to Warsaw which the Russians believed to be even stronger than those which the Germans had attacked with so little success for almost two months. While, however, they held their ground here without being able to enlarge it, a new movement developed to the north of the Vistula, where the Russians had begun a wide sweeping movement towards the frontiers of East Prussia. From this time, although the attacks west of Warsaw had not come to an end, this part of the front relapsed into the normal trench-warfare of the winter campaign, and active movement was more and more restricted to the opposing flanks.

THE MISERY OF THE POLES.

The condition of Poland at this time was pitiable in the extreme. Since the beginning of October wave after wave of invasion had swept over it. For the whole of the time the country from the northern to the southern bend of the Vistula had been in the occupation of huge contending armies. Galicia, with its large Polish population, was in no better case. Little information about all this misery reached the outer world, for there were no avenues of communication comparable with those which revealed the horrors of the German invasion of Belgium, and even Servia, because of its smallness and its heroic efforts against the Austrians, aroused more interest, and therefore excited more compassion. Poland, however, was reduced to as great depths of distress and misery as even Belgium and Servia had endured. One of the statements issued by the Polish Committee, of which M. Sinkiewicz, the novelist, was president, declared that in Poland more than 200 towns and 9,000 villages had been submerged by the tide of war, and that 5,000 of the villages had been completely destroyed, either in the course of the actual fighting or during the retreat of one side or the other in order to embarrass the pursuit. Everywhere within the war-zone innumerable farms and houses had been burned; all grain had been seized; almost all the cattle had been taken by the armies or had died for lack of pasture. Seven million people, it was estimated, were destitute. "The most hapless of the villagers, without shelter and in rags, seek a refuge in the town or wander in the forests, living on roots, or the bark of trees, or carrion flesh." It was estimated that in all three million peasants were in a state of utter misery. Manufactories had been destroyed and mines flooded or wrecked by dynamite, so that the output of coal was one hundred wagons a month, instead of the normal 30,000 per week. "In a word," said the Committee, "people are literally dying of hunger, especially the inhabitants of the little towns, who have been forced to



A typical shepherd and his flock on the plains of Hungary. [*E.N.A.*

fly to Warsaw, or further off, in a state of destitution beyond words. Everywhere in the town as well as in the country epidemics are raging, typhus and cholera and dysentery, especially among children, in consequence of the total lack of milk." Galicia suffered as much as Poland; 2,500 villages were destroyed, and some of the towns. Eight hundred thousand horses and one and a half million head of cattle were carried away. Seven hundred churches were damaged or demolished. A million fugitives fled into the interior of Austria. Meanwhile, the Poles whose territories were equally laid waste by the war were fighting against each other in the armies of Austria and Russia.

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE SOUTH.

In Western Galicia and in the Carpathians the Russians once more had the advantage. But the character of the fighting on this front had now begun in some measure to resemble that in Flanders or on the lines west of Warsaw. There was apparently little to choose between the opposing armies in point of strength, and the possibility of out-manœuvring the enemy was diminished by the extent to which here too he had recourse to entrenchments. The Austrians had found that they could only drive the Russians back with difficulty mile by mile; and now that the Russians were reinforced and could take the offensive, they on their side found progress no less painful. In the west of Galicia, east and south of Cracow, they succeeded in forcing the Austrians back, after very heavy fighting, over a narrow stretch of country. They pushed forward towards the Dukla Pass—the lowest, and therefore the easiest, of the roads into Hungary. They repelled the army whose main object it was to relieve Przemysl, but for the present they failed to regain the crests of the Carpathians anywhere west of the Uzsok Pass. From that point eastward their progress was more rapid. The main hope of the Austrian offensive, and the object of the support which it received from Germany, had been to relieve Cracow and the Silesian frontier, and to drive the Russians from the Hungarian valleys. This had been accomplished for the greater part of the Carpathian range. The Russians, on the other hand, while withdrawing for the time in Western Galicia, had not weakened their forces in the east. They had maintained their hold on the upper reaches of the Latorcza river, which, running southward from the Carpathians, turns due west, and stretches right across the Hungarian plain. At the beginning of January they strengthened their position, and, which alarmed the Austrians much more, they began to press southwards into Bukowina, along the Roumanian frontier.

THE OCCUPATION OF BUKOWINA.

The dispersion of military forces on secondary enterprises is always to be avoided, but the invasion of Bukowina is not open to this criticism. Russia's chief military disadvantage is that her resources of supply are inadequate to the numbers of her men. It is not merely a question of producing the munitions which war on the modern scale demands, but of feeding the armies at the front with supplies of every kind. Precisely the same problem beset Russia in her war with Japan, when the size of her army in Manchuria was severely limited by the capacity of her one channel of supply—the single line of the Trans-Siberian railway. So now, the excellent railway systems of Germany and Austria, largely devised with a strategic purpose, made it possible for them to maintain in the field an army of a given size with much greater ease than could Russia, with few railways and not many good roads at her disposal. In all probability Russia had as many men on the Polish and Galician fronts during this period as she could support,

and she was therefore justified in employing another army elsewhere which would have its independent line of supply, if there was an object of sufficient military value to be gained. This was the case in Bukowina. The railway from Odessa passes through Czernowitz, its capital, while from Czernowitz a line runs south to the Roumanian frontier. It is likely, therefore, that Russia could enter on the Bukowina campaign without prejudice to her prospects of success elsewhere.

Russia's hopes were based on a nice calculation of Austria's political and military fears. Bukowina is a pleasant province of woods and mountains, a holiday and health resort, with a remarkably mixed population of many nationalities, including Roumanians. It was its contiguity to Roumania that now brought the Russians into it. As the winter grew, it had become clear that Roumanian sympathies were leaning towards the side of the Allies. Roumania had had a close connection with Austria, she had been estranged from Russia by the loss of the Roumanian population of Bessarabia after the Turkish war of the late 'seventies, and she had been kept in the straight path by her king, a Hohenzollern. But of late years the ill-treatment of the Roumanians in Transylvania had altered her outlook. King Charles was dead, and, what mattered most, the impression was abroad that Austria was a dying empire, and that the war, sooner or later, would lead to her dissolution. There was still a party in Roumania which was favourable to Austria, and stood firmly for neutrality, but popular feeling was growing in favour of intervention against Austria and the forcible acquisition of Transylvania. The Russian advance, therefore, was well timed. It would bring home to the Roumanians that the moment might be at hand when they must make their choice or lose their opportunity. It it were successful, and a Russian army descended from the Bukowina passes, then, if the Roumanians threw in their lot with the Allies, Austria would be faced with a gigantic encircling movement of armies stretching from Cracow and the Dukla Pass to the Adriatic—Russian, Roumanian, Servian, and Montenegrin; if the Roumanians hesitated, they would be in danger of seeing the Russian army entering on their inheritance in Transylvania.

Whatever the hopes which the Russians cherished, their new movement had an immediate effect on Austria. The Russian advance followed the line of the railway from Czernowitz to Suczawa, close to the Roumanian border, then turned westwards towards the mountains and reached Kimpolung on January 6th. The Austrians were in weak force, and were pushed backwards until, by the middle of the month, the Russians were on the ridge separating Hungary from Bukowina, and in possession of the Kirlibaba Pass. If the Russians had expected that their advance would bring Roumania into the fray they missed the mark; if, as is probable, they at least counted on drawing off an Austrian army, they succeeded. For Austria, it was imperative that a wedge should be thrust in between the Russian army and Roumania, and that the Roumanian Government should be relieved from the encouragement or the pressure of Russian forces on its borders. Accordingly, about the time when the Russians were attacking the Kirlibaba Pass, the Austrians pushed forward in great strength to dispose of the invasion.



Corn being unloaded at a Government store at Nish, the Servian Government having taken over the control of all food supplies. [*Central News.*



Primitive transport and bad roads: One of the Servian military ox-carts passing along a flooded road.
[*Central News.*



Austrian prisoners taken by the Servians resting for their mid-day meal on the banks of the Danube.
[*Central News.*

CHAPTER VIII.

THE THIRD INVASION OF SERVIA.

A FRESH AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE.—NEGLECT OF MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS—SERVIAN RETREAT—EXPECTED COLLAPSE OF SERVIA—THE AUSTRIAN PLAN AND THE SERVIAN ATTACK—DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT AND CENTRE—RECAPTURE OF BELGRADE—COMPLETE SERVIAN TRIUMPH.

THE campaign against Servia hung like a mill-stone round the neck of Austria. The first invasion had been heavily defeated; the second had left the Austrian army with a bare foothold in the hills on the right bank of the Drina; a third had now to be attempted at the very moment when Austria needed to put every available man into the field against Russia. At the end of October, 1914, when Servia discovered that the Austrian army confronting her along the Danube, Save, and Drina—the rivers which form her northern and western frontiers—had been heavily reinforced, Austria was in the thick of the prolonged battle on the River San, on the result of which depended whether the Russian army would be able to reap the full fruits of its victory over the Germans in Poland. Again, at the beginning of December, just when the engagement was beginning which was to end in the greatest and most humiliating of all the Austrian defeats in Servia, the Austrian armies in the north were advancing on the Russian positions in Western Galicia and the Carpathians, in the hope of clearing Hungary of the invader, relieving Przemysl and averting the threatened siege of Cracow. This was clearly the region in which Austria's fortunes would be decided, and nowhere else could she employ her forces so profitably. But though she drew off a number of troops in November from the Servian invasion, she still pursued the enterprise. While reason would have urged her to remain on the defensive, which she could safely have done with a small army, pride impelled her to renew the attack. There were, it is true, some political grounds on which, had she cared, she might have sought to justify her decision. Had Servia been overrun, Bulgaria would have been tempted to recover by force the Macedonian territory which she had lost in the second Balkan war, and the Germanic Powers, who were already counting on the aid of Turkey, might have been able to join hands with her through Bulgaria. But this was not Austria's principal motive, for Bulgaria's position—with her late enemies, Roumania and Greece, on her flanks—was too ambiguous to be counted on. Unfortunately for Austria, the military considerations which she now rejected exacted from her a heavy penalty. Maintain the defensive on the Servian front while throwing her whole force against Russia she would not. Divert from the Russian campaign an army so strong as to overwhelm Servia she dare not. To calculate nicely the forces needed in Servia and send to the north all those whom she thought herself well able to spare was the plan which she adopted. It was one, as the event showed, which she could not carry to success.

THE AUSTRIAN ADVANCE.

The Austrian advance began on November 4th with an army of seven corps or more—probably about 300,000 men. As in August, it followed the lines which the geographical character of the country mark



Types in the Servian army: Peasant recruits walking into Nish to present themselves for training.
[*Central News.*

out for the invader. North-western Servia thrusts out into Austria in a salient which has the Save and the Drina for its sides, and the aim of the attack is to make one Servian position after another untenable by means of armies marching from these rivers on converging lines. Most exposed of all Servian territory is the plain of Matchva, which lies between the mountain ranges and the Save in the extreme northern corner of the country. Then, in the first range of hills, lies the military centre of Valjevo; at the close of the next stage of the advance, Kragujevatz, the national arsenal, which, having undergone the strain of two Balkan wars and two Austrian invasions, was ill-adapted to meet the needs of yet another and a more exhausting campaign; and finally, still further away in the interior, Nish, the temporary capital.


These were the places at the occupation of which the Austrians now aimed, and to reach them they prepared to penetrate the mountain chains from three sides, throwing forward either one wing or both towards the Servian rear. It was a scheme which promised a successful issue provided that there was a substantial superiority in numbers, so that the Austrian front could be extended without dangerous weakening; but the Servians had the advantage of the interior lines, and if they could extricate themselves and fall back until the appropriate moment for the offensive came, the Austrians would be greatly hampered by the mountainous country in meeting the attack. In such a terrain a great advantage rests with the side which has the initiative, for the army attacked has neither railway nor good roads (nor, indeed, many roads of any kind) by which to modify its dispositions at short notice. There was one avenue of attack which the Austrians would have been glad to use—the valley of the Morava, a broad path by which one can penetrate from the Danube far into the country past Kragujevatz and on towards Nish. But this gate is not really open. The use of it is forbidden to an invader by the mountain heights which flank it, at certain points coming down close to the river, and also by the distance which would separate an army marching up it from the columns co-operating in Western Servia. There was some fighting at Semendria, near the mouth of the Morava, but it was an Austrian feint, designed to keep a Servian detachment busy.

The Austrians, bombarding the Servian positions from across the rivers and from monitors, made the passage of the Save and Drina in force too strong to be seriously resisted. They cut in at the bases of the Matchva plain and compelled the Servians forthwith to abandon it. At the same time they crossed far up the Drina and thrust in on the Servian left, while another force began to descend upon its right. The Servians fell back on Valjevo and the Kolubara river, which runs north-eastwards from Valjevo and then turns northwards until it falls into the Save not many miles from its junction with the Danube.

The Servian commanders decided, however, that the line of the Kolubara was too long and too exposed to be defended against such superior numbers, and on November 15th they evacuated Valjevo and withdrew into the mountain passes lying between it and Kragujevatz, which was now the object of the Austrian advance.

CRITICAL POSITION OF THE SERVIANS.

The position of the Servians appeared at this time to be critical. Their earlier victories had cost them dear, and they were now greatly outnumbered. The



The map illustrates the advance and defeat of the Austrian army in Servia in December, 1914.

renewed invasion had caused them to abandon their expedition against Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. Their resources of all kinds were scanty. Especially they had to economise in munitions, for their own capacity of production was limited, and, having no direct access to the sea, they could only obtain supplies from their Allies or foreign countries in small quantities. They were embarrassed by the exhaustion of a large part of their civilian population. What few industries there were in the districts occupied by the Austrians had been destroyed, and the farming population, which forms the bulk of the community, had fled or been driven from its villages. The Austrians were well aware of their advantage, and military writers in the Austrian and German Press proclaimed openly at this time that Servia was on the point of complete collapse. The fierce rearguard fighting which took place during the Servian retreat on the Kolubara and its little tributary, the Ljig, did not lead them to change their opinion. So confident were the Austrians that they had the campaign in their hands that they decided to weaken the army of invasion and to transfer a considerable force—three corps, it is said—to the north, where, towards the end of November, the Russians were appearing on the southern side of the Carpathians and drawing in on Cracow. That these troops did excellent service against the Russians there is no reason to doubt, but in allowing them to be taken from him Marshal Potiorek, the Austrian Commander in Servia, was either taking an inexcusable risk or he was the victim of an extraordinary error on the part of his intelligence department.

After the Servian army had withdrawn behind the Kolubara in the middle of November, the Austrians made slow progress with their advance. But at the close of the month they won a success which was very soothing to them ; they captured Belgrade. The Servian capital had no military importance, was not strongly fortified, and could not be defended against Austrian attack ; the Austrian army which was advancing south-east from Shabatz, on the Save, made it untenable, and in any event the Servians were in no condition to spare men for a separate adventure, possibly glorious, but certainly unfruitful, in defence of Belgrade. But the fall of a capital, especially a city with the memories and associations of Belgrade, cannot but make a noise in the world, and in Vienna and Buda-Pest it resounded with all the circumstance of a great triumph. Hitherto, with the exception of some early successes at Lublin in the first weeks of the war, the Austrians had had to find their satisfaction in German victories, and the capture of Belgrade had the rare merit of being their own achievement. And now, at the beginning of December, the Austrian forces were moving forward on the roads to Kragujevatz. They had made but a few miles' progress in a fortnight, although at this stage of the campaign, if ever, time was precious. Whether the transport arrangements had been thrown into some confusion by the withdrawal of part of the army, or the difficulties of movement in the hill-country were being felt increasingly, it is impossible to say, but it is certain that the Servians, having received certain supplies of munitions from their Allies, and encouraged by the personal presence of the King, took fresh heart when they were ordered to begin the attack on December 3rd.

THE SERVIAN OFFENSIVE.

The Austrians proposed to repeat against Kragujevatz the tactics which they had used successfuly against Valjevo, and to converge upon the Servian army defending the position from north, west, and east. To do so they had to make themselves masters of the Maljen and Suvobor ranges, which lay to the south of Valjevo in the centre of their position. These were mountains rising to 3,000 feet and more, with only two or three roads leading across them. The Servians had good reason to dispute the possession of these ridges if they hoped to save Kragujevatz. For once the Austrians were across Maljen and Suvobor, and had reached the road which runs north and south to the Kolubara from the valley of the Western Morava (not to be confused with the Morava already mentioned, which enters the Danube near Semendria), they would be in a much stronger position to drive the Servians out of Kragujevatz. If on other fronts the movement of armies depended largely on the possession of railways, in Servia it was limited mainly by the control of roads. If the Austrian advance over Maljen, Suvobor, and the heights of Rudnik succeeded, the right wing would march past Cachak, down the valley of the lower Morava, threaten Kragujevatz from the south, and march on it by two roads which strike northwards from the river bank. Simultaneously, the Austrian centre, arriving at Milanovatz, on the road joining the lower Morava and the Kolubara, would march directly forward, while other columns would descend by two roads from the north-east, and a detachment on the left would find another road running east and west from which to work behind the Servian right. All these roads, which it was important for the Austrians to seize, it was indispensable for the Servians to hold, and the possession of them gave the Servian army an advantage in the movement of both troops and transport.

THE AUSTRIAN PLAN.

The plan adopted by the Austrians was to advance slowly against Maljen and Suvobor in the centre while their right wing worked along to the south of the ranges, past Uzice and on to Cachak, so as to get in the rear of the Servian positions. The scheme was sound enough, but it postulated at least that the centre should hold firm while the right wing was doing its work of grasping after the Servian left. It demanded, also, what the Austrians never succeeded in doing, that their various columns from the Drina past the Kolubara to the Save should be in close co-operation so as to put the maximum pressure on the Servians at each point of the line. There was at this time an Austrian column at Belgrade, and another marching southwards on the Austrian left, but the Servians contained them with small forces, and struck with all their might at the centre and right wing.

The Austrians had the Sixteenth Corps on their right wing and the Fifteenth, Thirteenth, and part of the Eighth in the centre. The Servian attack began on December 3rd, and after three days' heavy fighting, the Fifteenth Corps was driven in. Its retreat weakened the position of the Sixteenth, on its right, which also began to retire. The Servians then reinforced their right centre and threw back the Thirteenth Corps. The Austrian left wing proved unable to make a diversion or to send troops in time to stem the main Servian attack, and on December 6th the whole of the Austrian centre and right were in full retreat on Valjevo and the Drina river. Driven steadily north and north-west, they were pushed away from their left flank and could only endeavour to save as much of their forces as was possible by hastily re-crossing the Drina and the Save. Their retreat was as rapid as their advance had been

slow. On December 8th the Servians were again in possession of Uzice, Valjevo, and almost the whole line of the Kolubara. Two days later they were on the banks of the Drina. The Montenegrins came up on their left and hastened the Austrian retreat. By this time, too, the Servians were dealing effectually with the northern Austrian force and driving it back on Belgrade and the river country to the east of it. On December 14th they were in front of the capital, and the Austrian army was retreating across the river over a pontoon bridge. The rearguard, in order to facilitate the retreat, fought stubbornly in positions commanding the city which had been carefully prepared, and it was not until the next morning that the Servians succeeded in forcing an entrance and destroying the bridge by shell-fire. A considerable number of Austrians had failed to make their escape, and laid down their arms. King Peter entered Belgrade on the 15th at the head of his troops, together with the Commander-in-chief (the Crown Prince Alexander) and Prince George, and a service of thanksgiving was held in the Cathedral. Everywhere the Austrian army of invasion had fled to the north of the rivers, and Servia was once more free of the enemy.

A COMPLETE VICTORY.

The victory was complete. From the beginning of the battle to December 15th the Servians captured over 40,000 prisoners, 130 guns, and 70 machine-guns, together with large quantities of transport which the Austrians abandoned in the haste of their retreat. To that must be added heavy losses in killed and wounded. But the moral effects of the Servian triumph were as least as great as the material damage which it inflicted. The invasion had been planned in great strength for the purpose of avenging the unlucky "punitive expedition" of August; it was backed by far greater resources of every kind than Servia could bring to bear; it had been accompanied by confident predictions of the enemy's collapse; and it had begun as a triumphal progress. There was deep humiliation in Vienna and Buda-Pest, and Marshal Potiorek was recalled in disgrace. He had certainly mismanaged the campaign, not only in underestimating the strength and toughness of his opponents, though this was the prime mistake, but in the tactical handling of his forces. With the Servians constantly slipping from his grip during the retreat, he could not but anticipate the possibility that they would at last make a stand and take up the offensive between Valjevo and Kragujevatz. It was reasonable also for him to suppose that if they did so they would strike either at his right wing, which was grasping at them like the crook of a stick, or at his centre, which was aimed directly towards Milanovatz and Kragujevatz. From this, and from the difficulty of transferring troops rapidly in such country from one part of the field to another, it followed that the different parts of his forces should have been as closely linked up as was possible, whereas the Servians had little difficulty in dealing first with the Austrian right and centre and, later, with the northern force. Correct timing is of the essence of the converging attack, but neither in August nor in December was the Austrian column which marched on the left flank from the direction of the Save river able to give useful help to the main advance.

Before the echoes of this hapless enterprise had died away there were rumours that it would be speedily renewed, and on this occasion with the help of German troops. But an attack on Servia would have had no attraction for the Germans except that, if carried through successfully, it might have drawn Bulgaria from her neutrality and made the German front continuous through the Balkans into Turkey. Germany was too busy in Poland and the Carpathians to indulge in such insecure investments, and probably would have restrained Austria had she shown any stomach for another venture. But Austria did not, and Servia, for the time at least, was allowed a breathing space. She had other enemies to contend with. The greater the strain on her resources, the heavier became the burden which she had to bear. Austrian prisoners and sick and wounded were left on her hands, although she could scarcely support her own poverty-stricken refugees, nor find hospital room and medical aid for her own people. To add to her misfortunes, early in 1915 an epidemic of typhus broke out, which she had neither the means nor the knowledge to subdue. The Servians, as the Crown Prince Alexander said, had raised on their mountains and rivers "great and everlasting monuments of heroism." But disease was a more deadly enemy than the Austrians, and one not to be killed by the heroism of a primitive people.



Peasants from what was once part of Albania drilling for the first time. [*Central News.*



A scene in the Caucasus. [E.N.A.



A pass in the Caucasus, showing the military road. [E.N.A.



Turkish artillery leaving Constantinople on active service. [*Central News.*

CHAPTER IX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS.


RUSSIAN AND TURKISH ARMENIA—THE CHARACTER OF THE COUNTRY—THE TURKISH PLANS OF ATTACK—THE TURKISH DEFEAT AT SARIKAMISH—THE RAID ON PERSIA.

TURKEY nowhere marched with the frontiers of the belligerent Powers except in the desert of Sinai and in the Armenian Highlands. Of the two obstacles, desert and mountain, the desert was much the more serious, and the first frontier to feel the effect of Turkish intervention in the war was that of Russian Armenia. The name ordinarily and loosely given to this Russian frontier province is the Caucasus, but in fact it lies far to the south of the Caucasus range which makes a natural boundary between Europe and Asia Minor. Russia had overstepped this boundary into Asia more than a century ago. Georgia became hers in 1802, and every war between Russia and Turkey in the nineteenth century saw some extension further south of the Russian frontier. These extensions had never been easily won, for the character of the country is very favourable to the defence. In the last war, in 1877-8, the Russian victory had been particularly expensive, and a too venturesome advance had been punished by a severe defeat, which was not redeemed until five months later by the storming of Kars. The military power of Turkey had always shown at its best in the campaigns in these highlands. The frontier as fixed after the war of 1878 ran from the Black Sea, just south of Batoum, to Ararat, some three hundred miles to the east. The crest of the range along this front is in Turkish territory, in the latitude of Erzeroum, so that Russia, after crossing the Caucasus, was still after a century's fighting climbing the northerly slopes of the Armenian plateau. Nowhere has the conflict between the Christian and the Mohammedan races been more severe than on these Caucasian slopes. Less fortunate than the Georgians, whose deliverance from the Ottoman yoke came early, the bulk of the Armenians remained subject to Turkey. The Turkish system was to use the Mohammedan Kurds against the Armenians, much as in Europe she used the Albanians against the Serbs and Bulgars; and the Armenians, partly because their proximity to the Russian frontiers made them the objects of suspicion, were the victims of the worst of the Turkish atrocities. The Armenians, to their credit, had cherished the hope of national independence, and well it would have been if the Powers—and especially England—had encouraged an aspiration which their long and distinguished history had fully entitled them to indulge. Unfortunately, in the late 'seventies British policy was violently anti-Russian, and

the continued subjection of the Armenians to Turkey was morally perhaps the most disgraceful of its manifestations. It was also, from the standpoint of selfish interest, singularly unwise. A rational policy of obstruction to Russia's advance in Asia would have sought rather to encourage the making of a free Armenia, which could in time have grown into a strong buffer State between the Russian and Turkish Empires. But at the outbreak of the war their continuous sufferings at the hands of the Turks had almost killed the Armenian hopes of independence. Their hopes were now fixed on Russia as the only Power who could secure them tolerable conditions of existence, and some 8,000 Armenian volunteers enlisted in the Russian armies when Turkey's intervention brought the prospect of final liberation from her misrule.

THE WAR OF 1877.

The geography of Trans-Caucasia is difficult, and for that very reason—because communication is so difficult and the mountain system so complicated—the military operations have of necessity been restricted to certain well-marked routes. In the war of 1877, the Russians, not then in possession of Kars, invaded the Turkish territory in Trans-Caucasia in four columns. One advanced by Batoum, a second on Ardahan, a third on Bayazed, and a fourth, the strongest, on Kars. The Turkish General, Moukhtar Pasha, whose army was much weaker than the Russian invaders, lost Ardahan and Bayazed, and, abandoning Kars to its own defence, fell back on the line of the Soghanli Dagh, north of Erzeroum. Here the Russians were badly beaten, and forced to retire. At the same time a force of Kurds broke through and menaced the communications of the column operating against Bayazed, and the Batoum column had no better success. The whole Russian army was compelled to fall back, and not until October, four months later, was it able to return to the attack, this time with complete success. Kars was carried by assault in November, and in the following February Erzeroum capitulated. The Treaty of Berlin drew the southern frontier along the line of the Soghanli Dagh, where the Russians had been defeated in June, and gave the Russians Kars, Batoum, and Ardahan, leaving Erzeroum and Bayazed to the Turks.




Where three frontiers meet.

THE TURKISH PLANS.

When Turkey joined in the war, Russia had hopes that by taking the offensive without delay she might be able to rush Erzeroum, or at any rate secure advanced positions for an early spring campaign. Her main advance, accordingly, was made, as in 1877, along the road from Kars to Erzeroum. Two other columns crossed the frontier further east, without, however, gaining any other success than the occupation of Bayazed. The column from Kars began very well, and pushed on towards Erzeroum as far as Kopri Koi. That was the limit of the southern advance, for, much to the Russian surprise, the Turks in December began a counter-attack, which, though it ended in disaster, met in its earlier stages with very considerable success.

The Turkish plans were well laid, and both in their faults and in their vigour and comprehensiveness bore characteristic traces of their German authorship. They proposed with one of their corps—the Eleventh, reinforced by a division from the Baghdad Corps—to hold the Russians in front of Erzeroum, and with the two other corps—the Ninth and the Tenth—to envelop their right flank and cut off their main army from its base at Kars. In order to cover and complete this flanking movement the First Army Corps was brought up from Constantinople, landed at Trebizond, and moved up towards Ardahan. There, if all went well in the south, it was in a good position to take advantage of the confusion caused by the expected annihilation of the Russian army near Erzeroum and to cut the railway between Kars and Tiflis. Had this bold scheme succeeded, the Russians might well have suffered a disaster of the first magnitude. The Mohammedans of Trans-Caucasia have always been somewhat unmanageable subjects of Russia, and at the beginning of the war there were very persistent rumours in the German press that they were preparing to rise against their conquerors. Whatever truth there may have been in these rumours, there is no doubt that a great Russian defeat would have made them true; and with Trans-Caucasia in rebellion, Russia would have had a serious business on hand, which would have compelled her to withdraw corps from Poland, and might even have cost her Warsaw. These operations in the Caucasus were not a campaign detached from the rest of the war. Had it not been for the German hopes of influencing the war in Europe in their favour by some striking success in the Caucasus, the Turks might well have deferred their attack until the spring. Campaigning in the Caucasus hills in the winter is extraordinarily difficult. There are few roads; the passes are not only very high but steep, and the winter, which in Europe had been exceptionally mild, had set in on the frontier hills early and with unusual severity; moreover, the Turks were ill-equipped for the hardships of winter campaign in these wild, barren hills. There is probably not another army in the world, equipped as the Turks were, that would have attempted so ambitious a scheme of operations in such country at such a season.



The Russo-Turkish frontiers.

DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE RUSSIANS.

But the Turkish army not only attempted but came near to success. The Russian army which had advanced along the Erzeroum road as far as Koprikoi was compelled by the steady pressure of the Turkish Eleventh Corps to fall back on Khorasan. Meanwhile, the movements of the Turkish First Corps away to the north were developing well. Advancing down the valley of the Chorok, this corps crossed the frontier and defeated the Russian forces in the Yalanuz Pass, and Mohammedan rebels joined the army in such numbers that the garrison at Ardahan thought it prudent to evacuate the town. At this time the gravity of the turning movement by the Ninth and Tenth Corps was quite unsuspected by the Russians. On Christmas Day the Ninth Corps attacked Sarikamish, the head of the railway running south from Kars, while the Tenth Corps, which had marched through Id towards Olti, threatened the railway further north. Both Sarikamish and Olti were weakly held.

THE BATTLE OF SARIKAMISH.

The position of the Russians was now one of great anxiety. Their right at Ardahan and their left at Kharasan had been driven in, and their centre at Sarikamish was in serious danger. Had they known how serious, it is probable that they would have left the Turks at Ardahan to do their worst, and rushed every available man to extricate the army at Khorasan from its difficulties. But it was not until they had attacked and defeated the Turks in Ardahan that they learned that the main Turkish concentration was against Sarikamish. The Turks were driven back from Ardahan on January 3rd, and the fighting at Sarikamish had begun on Christmas Day. From the 25th to the 28th the weak garrison



The raw material for Turkey's army: Recruits from Anatolia. [*Topical Press.*



Turkey's army: The finished product on parade in the streets of Constantinople.
[*Record Press.*

held its own against a whole Turkish division, which, realising that there was no time to be lost, attacked with the utmost fury. Sarikamish had to be abandoned, but the Russian force was finely handled, and it was still within three miles of the place when reinforcements arrived and turned a defence which, even in the obscure accounts that have reached this country, is still recognisable as one of the finest feats in the war into a brilliant victory. The Ninth Corps had suffered very severely in i s march through the snows, over passes 10,000 feet high, to the attack on Sarikamish. Great numbers fell in the attack, and what remained surrendered. The Turkish army was in a terrible state of exhaustion. It had had to march light to reach Sarikamish at the appointed time. It had no supply convoys, and counted on the assistance of Mohammedan rebels. It arrived in time, but it had not been able to bring artillery over the almost impassable roads, and the attack on the garrison was made by exhausted and starving men without artillery preparation. In any other conditions of roads and weather the strategic scheme, which showed very real ability, might have succeeded. The great difficulty in carrying out plans of this kind is the proper timing of attacks made at different points by columns which, though not distant from each other as the crow flies, could not keep in touch owing to the absence of cross roads. The timing of the attacks in this case seems to have been excellent, though what it might have cost in human agony has not, and never will be, adequately described. The great fault of the plan was that it asked too much of human flesh and blood, and the Russians, outmanœuvred and outnumbered as they were, were able to win a brilliant victory because by the time the Turks reached the point of attack the heart had been taken out of them by the struggle with the difficulties of the march.

The official Russian accounts, ordinarily clear and good, break down somewhat in the description of the battles in these Caucasian campaigns. Some of the confusion caused by a comprehensive and bold plan of attack of which the Russians evidently never thought the enemy capable is reflected in the reports of this fighting. "Having repulsed the frenzied attacks of the Turks on the front, and at Sarikamish they" (that is, "our gallant troops of the Caucasus") "enveloped and annihilated almost the whole of two Turkish army corps, taking the remainder of one of these corps prisoners, together with its commander-in-chief, three divisional generals, the staff, numerous officers, thousands of prisoners, artillery, machine guns, and baggage animals." When it is remembered that the First Turkish Corps was also defeated at Ardahan, the wonder is that the Turks were able to keep up the struggle at all. It would appear, however, that only one Turkish Corps was annihilated, and not two, as was at first officially reported.

The Tenth Corps escaped the destruction which overtook the Ninth, thanks mainly to a diversion made by the Eleventh Corps in the direction of Kara Urgan. Here the Eleventh Corps held the Pass until January 17th, until the Tenth Corps had effected its retirement, and then, although repeatedly defeated, succeeded in outdistancing its pursuers, and in withdrawing to Erzeroum. Throughout this fighting in the Caucasus, it is impossible not to be struck with the great competence of the Turkish leading, and with the quite remarkable quality of the Turkish troops.

Here the campaign in the Caucasus rested until it could be renewed in the spring. Both the Russian and the Turkish attempts to take the offensive had been defeated by the snow and the high passes, but the victories of the Russians, though tactical, had made their prospects of decisive success when they should take up the campaign in the spring exceedingly bright.

THE RAID ON PERSIA.


The raid on Persia in January had no military interest, and its chief importance was in the extreme cruelty with which the irregular Turkish troops treated the inhabitants. The violation of the neutrality of Persia was quite without just excuse, and her sufferings gave Persia a just claim to the consideration of Russia and England which has not always been shown to her in the past. Tabriz was reoccupied without difficulty by a small Russian detachment at the end of January.




Turkish infantry training at Constantinople. [*L.N.A.*



"Manchester Guardian"] **The making of khaki: (1)—Wool blending.** [Copyright.



(2)—Making the warp. (These photographs and the remaining ones in the series illustrating the manufacture of khaki were taken at the Huddersfield Mills of Messrs. Martin, Sons & Company Ltd., where about 50,000 yards of khaki for the army is being turned out every week.)



Naval guns arriving at a dockyard. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*


CHAPTER X.

TRADE AND COMMERCE.


TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT DURING THE WAR—THE TEXTILE TRADES—IRON AND STEEL—THE DYE SCHEME—SHIPPING AND WAR LOSSES.

IN times of peace we can measure changes in trade conditions by examining railway traffic, banking, unemployment, poor-law, and foreign trade returns, but when a great war is in progress these tests are apt to be fallacious. Railway traffic returns are not in fact being issued, for that very reason; unemployment figures are unsatisfactory, because they ignore short time; poor-law statistics are misleading, because vast sums are being paid by the Government, employers, and charitable organisations to prevent distress among the dependants of our soldiers; and foreign trade returns need critical examination, because they take no account of the enormous amount of work that is being done for our armies on the Continent and elsewhere. We might imagine from these figures that one community, which is known to depend upon exports, must be in a parlous condition, whereas we know that in fact it is so busy that it cannot possibly do more. There are some industries, engaged in the production of munitions of war, which are so pressed that they have actually been allowed to recall men from the trenches. Yet they are exporting little, and make quite a poor show in the returns.

The first effect of the war, no doubt, was to give a great shock to all our industries, and particularly to the cotton trade, the greatest manufacturing industry in the world. The raising of the New Army, however, and the strengthening of the navy soon transformed the situation. Birmingham was called upon to produce rifles and other weapons to its full capacity. Sheffield had immense orders for armour-plate and cutlery; the shipbuilding centres were spurred on to activity in making warships; engineers who had been engaged in the ordinary work of civil life were asked to turn to munitions of war; the West Riding was replete with orders for khaki, and also for materials for uniforms for France; and even the cotton trade began to get War Office orders. By Christmas, therefore, an immense transformation in industrial organisation had been effected, and this became even more pronounced when the new army was about to take the field, and Parliament went to the length of commandeering workshops. People ceased entirely to speak of unemployment. It was shortage of labour, congestion of the railways and docks, and scarcity of coal, through sheer inability to get it conveyed to users, that were uppermost in men's minds, as far as industrial matters were concerned.



The making of khaki: (3)—In the weaving shed.



(4) Washing the grease out of the cloth.

OUR OVERSEAS TRADE.

Subject to the reservations mentioned, the Board of Trade figures of foreign trade are not without interest :—


	IMPORTS.		EXPORTS.	
		Decline from previous year		Decline from previous year
	£	£	£	£
August	42,362,034	13,613,670 ..	24,211,271	19,899,458
September..	45,051,937	16,303,788 ..	26,674,101	15,750,763
October ...	51,559,289	20,170,887 ..	28,601,815	18,020,884
November .	55,987,058	12,480,017 ..	24,601,619	20,154,569
December...	67,554,960	3,559,914 ..	26,278,928	17,047,992
January....	67,401,006	604,003 ..	28,247,592	19,558,573
February ..	65,268,814	*3,215,163 ..	26,176,937	15,084,860

* Increase.

In considering these figures, regard will, of course, be had to the fact that we have necessarily cut off the large trade we have been doing for years with the enemy countries, and that, in the interests of national defence, the exportation of many valuable articles to other countries was prohibited. Nothing in the nature of war materials was allowed to leave the country, and it is surprising what a long list these things make. There was also a very long list of articles which could only be sent to British possessions and protectorates, so that the marvel is, not that the declines in our exports were so large but that they were not considerably larger.

The railway companies had an arrangement with the Government by which, in return for the conveyance of troops and stores and the first call on the use of the lines, their net receipts were to be made up to the totals for 1913, subject, however, to deductions which experience before the war indicated might have been expected to occur if there had been no war. All but two of those in the front rank had to reduce their dividends because of the falling off in traffic in the first seven months of the year, but the loss was not heavy. The companies which were able to pay the same dividends for 1914 as for 1913 were the Great Eastern and the Lancashire and Yorkshire. In March it was understood, though it was not reported officially, that the Government and the railway companies had made a fresh agreement, more favourable to the latter, in consideration of the fact that the Government were then using the lines to a much larger extent than was at first contemplated.

The banks all showed very good profits for the second half of the year, though not as much as they would have expected in a time of peace. Several of them maintained their dividends, but six of the leading institutions paid a little less. They had an agreement, which was pretty generally observed, that their investments should be written down to the prices on July 27th. The investments were not realisable at those prices, but as there was a hope that the war would turn more decidedly in our favour before many months were over, and as this would be certain to raise the prices of securities, it was felt that the banks could very well wait a while before fixing the value of their investments in a way which would affect the distribution of profits materially. The directors had regard, no doubt, to the heavy sums which had been applied to investment depreciation in the last two years.



The finished product of the armament works: Hoisting shells on to a British battleship. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*

COTTON TRADE.

The cotton trade received a blow on the outbreak of the war which can only be described as staggering. It was already suffering from depression which necessitated putting the operatives on short time, in order that foreign markets might have time to absorb the goods in stock. The collapse on the outbreak of war was the greater because the American cotton crop turned out to be the largest in history. It was evident that a crop of such dimensions could not be used up this season, and prices fell so low that it became a question with some of the growers whether it was worth while picking all the cotton. The decline put many of the merchants and brokers, both in America and in Liverpool, in a perilous position, and it became necessary to close all the exchanges hastily. Prices were then fixed arbitrarily by the governing bodies of the exchanges, and such business as must be done was at those prices. They were still low, however, and their fall brought about a drastic reduction in the value of all stocks of manufactured goods. Indian and Egyptian cotton, of course, fell simultaneously with



The making of khaki: (5)-Examining the finished cloth.



(6)-Packing the bales of khaki for despatch to the Government.

American, and the purchasing power of those countries was reduced to a corresponding extent. Exchange was difficult everywhere, and America's heavy indebtedness was particularly embarrassing, as it interfered very seriously with trade. It will be remembered in this connection that London, as the great clearing-house for the business of the world, held many foreign as well as English trade bills. America was naturally reluctant to ship gold, which might be seized at sea, and was anxious to wait until its great crops of cotton and wheat could be marketed. The collapse of the Lancashire cotton trade made this wait rather a long one, but eventually matters were righted again, though only for a short time, as the purchases of the Allies in America were so large that we became the debtor nation, and exchange gave trouble again.

Meanwhile, merchants found it useless to take in new supplies of goods—their warehouses were crammed already—and manufacturers had either to stop their mills entirely or restrict their running to a small number of hours per week. In its acutest form, this state of things continued for about six weeks. The Government's general financial measures then began to tell, and by October spinners began to buy cheap cotton in America. The mills gradually increased their working hours, and early in November the Liverpool cotton market was partially reopened, and the American markets followed suit. By this time many of the men in the factories had enlisted, and, although there was no great amount of work to be done, inconvenience was felt because certain sections were undermanned.

The Government had not contemplated in the first instance that they would be able to provide work for the cotton operatives, but eventually they placed a number of contracts for army purposes, and this helped the trade materially. The home market also became fairly good when other industries had recovered from the first shock of the war, but foreign trade contributed nothing like its usual quota. German, Austrian, and Turkish trade, of course, was lost entirely, except so far as it percolated through neutral channels, but India and China, which are usually two of the greatest outlets for Lancashire goods, remained very poor customers for a long time, and no market of much consequence fully recovered. The value of the exports of cotton goods, as shown month by month in the Board of Trade Returns, were as under. We add the yardage of piece goods as a further measure of the decline, this being necessary because of prices being lower than in the period with which comparison is made :—

	Yarns and Fabrics: Total Values.	Decline from previous year.	Piece Goods.	Decline from previous year.
	£	£	Yards.	Yards.
August	5,839,981	4,629,939	313,074,600	266,471,900
September....	6,220,501	3,664,502	374,358,500	174,614,000
October	6,109,580	5,264,533	370,711,500	260,225,600
November ...	5,492,762	4,902,190	306,666,600	257,183,500
December ...	5,131,873	4,874,065	276,015,100	254,677,200
January	6,370,476	6,210,704	349,441,800	338,663,300
February	5,941,563	4,582,370	309,982,300	273,469,300

It should be explained that in the cotton trade the figures for any particular month are not an accurate reflex of the manufacturing done in that month, as it takes some time to finish and ship a large portion of the goods.

The decline in the business done and the heavy depreciation in stocks told heavily against some concerns ; for example, one concern, which often has a profit of about £180,000 in the second half of the year had to report a net loss of £276,560. Manchester warehouse companies all suffered to some extent, though not so badly as at one time seemed probable. Many of the spinning companies went on merrily paying 10 per cent dividends, but these were taken from the reserves which the directors, with commendable prudence, had built up during the recent prosperous times.

The experience of the operatives in the first four months of the war is reflected in the report of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners. This shows that the total unemployment benefit for the year amounted to the large sum of £107,623, which compared with only £17,718 in the previous year. Fortunately, the Board of Trade came to the assistance of those operatives' associations which showed willingness to help themselves by imposing levies upon the members still employed. The Spinners Amalgamation received £10,711 from that source, and was thus enabled to give all the benefits promised by its rules.

Board of Trade reports showed that the wages paid to the cotton operative. as a body were 40·7 per cent less in September than in the corresponding month of 1913. In November 36 per cent of the looms were idle, and 33 per cent more were on short time. In December things were a little better—37 per cent of the looms were idle, but only 27 per cent were on short time. In January the corresponding figures were 24 and 26 per cent, and the trade as a whole worked forty-seven hours a week. In February there was a further improvement, forty-nine hours per week being worked. By that time the decrease in the number employed, as compared with 1914, was only 6·3 per cent, and the wages bill was only 9 per cent less. Considering the enlistments, that meant a near approach to normal conditions.

SHORTAGE OF DYES.

The war had not been going on long before the textile industries of this country began to experience a shortage of aniline dyes. It is estimated that we use £2,000,000 worth of dyes every year, of which nearly nine-tenths come from Germany. With that supply cut off, prices rose enormously, and it became necessary to see if anything could be done. The question was by no means an easy one. The fact that many of the dyes have been patented by Germans was the smallest of the difficulties. We can require a patent to be worked in this country, and, as the Germans were not doing this, a special court which was set up granted licences to applicants. We had few works, however, which were capable of producing the choicer dyes, and our organisation was inadequate at all points. The Germans, of course, have works of great magnitude and considerable staffs of highly-trained chemists, and everybody has realised that when peace is restored these men will make a stiff fight for the retention of the industry in which they have so long been masters. We have also had to face the fact that we cannot possibly supply all our own wants during the war, and that we shall still be dependent on the Germans to some extent when peace is restored. There was at first a widespread disposition to take a gloomy view of the prospect of any works we might set up, and nothing whatever was done.

In November the Board of Trade took the matter up. A committee of users was formed, and the whole question was threshed out in the country, or at all events in Lancashire and Yorkshire. The upshot was the issue of a prospectus by a company named British

Dyes, Ltd. This appeared first on the 6th March. The authorised share capital was £2,000,000, in £1 shares, but only half that amount was offered at first, and the million was not all payable at once. The Government had resisted many proposals that they should impose a tariff for the protection of the company after the war, but offered to take up debentures equal in amount to the share capital subscribed up to £1,000,000, and after that £1 for every £4 of further share capital up to a maximum of £500,000. An ultimate share capital of £3,000,000 was contemplated as possible, and in that case the Government would advance £1,500,000, secured by debentures. The interest on these debentures was fixed at 4 per cent, but for the first five years this interest was to be non-cumulative and contingent on the net profits of each separate year being sufficient to provide it. An option to purchase the works of Read Holliday and Sons, Ltd., at Huddersfield, had been acquired, and the acquisition of other works by the company was spoken of as being probable. More important still, negotiations were in progress with the object of securing a considerable supply of dyes from Switzerland, where they were already being produced with considerable success. The response to the prospectus, however, proved disappointing to the directors. Instead of £1,000,000, only £571,000 was offered in subscriptions for shares, and £83,000 of this was subject to conditions. The directors did not feel justified in going to allotment upon this, and a meeting of the applicants for shares was called to see if they could be induced to enlarge their applications. At that meeting the directors modified the scheme to some extent, and at the close they were assured that more money would be supplied.



Receiving shells for the naval guns on the deck of a battleship.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

Directly after the company's prospectus had been submitted to the public the Government announced that they had acquired the greater part of the crop of natural indigo that was coming forward, in the interests of the dye-users of the United Kingdom. They did this, as they said, to mitigate the effects of the shortage of the synthetic product and to avert the danger, which was doubtless a very real one, of speculators holding-up the available supply. Our imports of natural indigo had already been going up, and it was expected that the Government's action would give them a further impetus, although it was impossible that the natural product could be found in sufficient quantities to dispense with the need of synthetic indigo.

Some surprise was created by an announcement that the Board of Trade were granting licences for the indirect importation of dyes from Germany. It was understood that this was only to be done on a limited scale, but when the Germans heard of it they announced, in a wireless message, that they would shortly prohibit all exports of dyestuffs from their country.

WOOLLEN AND OTHER TEXTILE TRADES.

The woollen trade became very bad in the early days of the war, buyers cancelling orders on a very large scale in August. Then the demand for khaki arose, and it soon became so enormous that it could not be met by ordinary methods. France also wanted cloth for uniforms, and we were asked to do our best to supply her needs. The making of coarse goods like khaki is not exactly a delight to firms who have been accustomed to fine goods, but it was khaki or nothing in many cases, and that clinched the matter. Yorkshire had been sending a large quantity of valuable dress goods to Germany, and even if the makers were able to turn to the production of army cloths this would not be a full compensation. Exports of woollen goods fell off about 50 per cent in September, October, and November, but they were not quite as bad as this in subsequent months. Worsted yarns lost a great part of their foreign market—the fall in February being nearly four-fifths—but worsted tissues only declined to the extent of about one-third. By January, 30 per cent of the operatives in the woollen and worsted trades were working overtime, and in February they were earning 12 per cent more in wages than in the second month of 1914. On the 12th of March a royal proclamation made raw wool, wool tops and noils, and

woollen and worsted yarns absolute contraband of war. This, of course, had no direct effect upon our trade, but it may have had an indirect effect upon markets in other countries than those of the enemy. All markets, however, have been kept very bare since the war began, and are likely to remain so. We shall be glad to remember that when we are at peace again.

The linen trade had all the difficulties of manufacturers generally and some special ones of its own, for it has depended very largely upon flax from Russia, which was unable to ship the usual amount. Belgium has also been a source of supply, and this, too, was cut off early in the war. Ireland had a pretty good crop of its own, and this went to very high prices, to the great gratification of the growers, no doubt, but not of the manufacturers who required it. The United States of America are by far the largest market abroad for British linen goods, and for the first four months of the war they kept up their demand very well. There were slight increases in their takings in August and November, and a very large one in September. October showed a decline, but not an important one. Since then, however, there have been very substantial declines—about 5,000,000 yards in December, 6,000,000 yards in January, and 4,000,000 yards in February.

The silk trade also suffered a diminution in its exports, but Mr. Frank Warner, President of the Silk Association, stated in March that some firms, making a certain class of goods, had as many orders on hand as they could cope with. The greatest loss had fallen upon the importers of raw, thrown, and spun silks and of manufactured goods, upon the makers-up, and upon the wholesale and retail distributors. The spinners were doing badly, owing to the export restrictions, and so were the makers of the richer kinds of goods, but still the condition of the industry generally was not pathetic.

IRON, STEEL, AND ALLIED TRADES.

The iron, steel, and other metal trades were already experiencing a period of comparative depression when the war broke out. The Board of Trade showed that in the first seven months of the year there were declines of £3,499,524 in the exports of iron and steel and manufactured goods, £1,003,617 in other metals, and £1,133,260 in electrical goods. The outbreak of war made the comparison much worse; but on the other hand, Germany ceased to compete in our markets at once and Belgium ceased soon afterwards. This made a considerable difference to the trade, and prices were further improved by the great demand which set in from the shipyards and the armament works. The following table compares the imports and exports of iron and steel in the war period with those for the corresponding months of the previous year:—

	IMPORTS.		EXPORTS.	
		Decline.		Decline.
	£	£	£	£
August	400,383	733,804	2,295,351	1,822,615
September	267,898	923,640	2,456,636	1,663,924
October	334,954	1,031,372	2,810,817	1,861,771
November	450,196	756,384	2,586,111	1,987,589
December	497,488	968,287	2,346,265	1,773,447
January	580,302	637,738	2,670,903	2,192,756
February	419,152	747,162	2,236,472	1,609,005

There were also heavy declines in the imports and exports of other manufactured, or partly manufactured, metals, but the table given will suffice to illustrate the general dislocation which occurred. Unfortunately it was accompanied, as in other leading industries, by an increase in the cost of production, all requisites being dear and the workshops being incapable of yielding their full output through the shortage of labour caused by the numerous enlistments.

Shipbuilders set aside a great deal of private work in order to cope with the requirements of the Admiralty. Overtime, night-shifts, and Sunday work were common in the departments which did not require daylight, but even then the output was not as large as was desired. A body of men on the Clyde, not realising the gravity of the position, struck work for a larger advance of wages than was offered them, but on the urgent plea of the Government went back after a few days, on the understanding that their claims would be investigated and justice done to them.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF ARMAMENT WORKS.

Engineers who were able to produce munitions of war were asked to do so, and they responded with great readiness, although the work was unfamiliar to many of them. Sheffield and Birmingham firms, as we have indicated, were particularly busy from the first, and after the lapse of a few months there were so many engaged on war supplies that Lord Kitchener told a member of the House of Lords the country's output of these articles had been multiplied three-hundred-fold. Even Railway Companies had by that time placed their locomotive works at the disposal of the Government, and in many places not only were overtime and night shifts worked but Sunday labour was resorted to. Still, Lord Kitchener—in view, no doubt, of the requirements of our Allies, as well as our own—was far from being satisfied, and in March a very remarkable Act of Parliament was hurriedly passed, giving the Government power to take full control of all the armament works—regular as well as casual. They proceeded at once to set up a species of Socialism, as a means of extending the existing powers of production. It was announced that a limit would be put upon profits, and an agreement was made with the leaders of the trade unions connected with engineering by which the ordinary safeguards against the intrusion of unskilled labour upon the sphere which skilled labour regarded as its own were suspended for the period of the war. This meant that, in order to increase the output, men who were called unskilled would be allowed to attend to certain machines, provided the rate of pay was "the usual rate of the district for that class of work," and also that when normal conditions were restored the men recognised as skilled would have preference in the selection of those required. Another very important provision, for the immediate purpose of the Government, was that there should be no strikes of men engaged in the manufacture of munitions of war, arrangements being made for the settlement of disputes by arbitration or other means.

COAL MINING.

Virtually all the colliery companies reduced their output after the war began. The main cause of this was the high percentage of enlistments among the miners, but the railway congestion was also an important cause. Prices went up smartly, but coalowners with heavy contracts did not get much out of that, and in virtually all cases their working expenses per ton

produced were heavier. The Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company increased its profit in 1914 from £347,800 to £395,100, and the United National Collieries Company advanced from £117,600 to £160,000, but these were quite exceptional cases, due to special circumstances. The typical experience was that of the Consolidated Cambrian, which dropped from £134,900 to £97,100; the Great Western Colliery Company, which dropped from £158,419 to £111,820; North's Navigation Collieries Company, which dropped from £100,145 to £65,578, and the Fife Coal Company, which had to reduce its ordinary dividend from 27½ to 10 per cent.

The extent to which foreign trade was dislocated will be seen by the following table, showing the values of the exports of coal, coke, and manufactured fuel this year:—

	Total.	Decline from 1914.
	£	£
January.....	2,580,262	.. 1,715,431
February.....	2,686,845	.. 1,506,963

It is also significant that 1,140 pits only reported 551,260 workpeople as being in their employment in February, this being 81,718, or 12·9 per cent, less than in the second month of 1914.

SHIPPING AND WAR LOSSES.

It is a remarkable fact that, despite the activities of the *Emden* and a few other enemy cruisers and the preference which shipbuilders gave to naval work, the British mercantile marine was stronger at the end than at the beginning of 1914, the net addition being 119 vessels, with a total tonnage of 404,630. This made the aggregate 21,057 vessels, of 20,009,530 tons. Another fact in connection with the shipping industry, which has perhaps not been generally recognised, is that at one time the Admiralty had no less than one-fifth of the British mercantile tonnage under charter, and has not had much less than that at any period for several months. The ships, it may be as well to state, were not bargained for—they were commandeered, the question of remuneration being left for subsequent settlement. Some of the great lines had their fleets substantially reduced in this way, but they quite understood, when freights went up to fancy rates, that they would not be paid on that scale. It must be acknowledged, however, that they did not clamour for them—that, in fact, they showed a perfect disposition to be reasonable in their demands.

The shortage of shipping for commercial purposes was slightly relieved by the employment of such of the interned steamers belonging to the enemy as were capable of carrying coal from the North to London, and freight rates fell a little in consequence of that being done, but there were not enough of such ships to make any great impression, although March saw a rather sharp reduction from other causes. It was rather curious that this decline coincided with the new activity of the enemy submarines, which succeeded in sinking a number of ships, mostly small and slow, but still valuable.

On the question of the value of the ships sunk and the losses sustained by the insurance organisation, Mr. Bruce Ismay, Chairman of the Liverpool and London War Risks Association, had some interesting things to say at the meeting on the 23rd February. The policies they had issued covering King's enemy risks amounted, he said, to over £107,000,000. They had received in premiums £1,540,000, but the losses to date left them £691,000 to the good. The State, having accepted 80 per cent of the risks, took £552,800 of that, and the Association got the balance of £138,200. Put in another way, the premiums amounted to 28s. per cent, but the losses were less than 16s. per cent.

The Association's report gave some additional details. The insurance rates that had been in operation were as under:—

	Single Voyage. Per cent.	Round Voyage. Per cent.	Time (91 days) Per cent.
Aug. 4 to Aug. 31..	25/-	50/-	50/-
Sept. 1 to Dec. 16..	20/-	40/-	40/-
Dec. 17 to Feb. 3...	15/-	30/-	30/-

The total value of the British vessels entered in this and other War Risks Associations was over £150,000,000.



A British cruiser taking a German prize in tow. [*Central News.*

CHAPTER XI.

SEA-POWER AND SEA-LAW.

THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF MARITIME CAPTURE—THE DECLARATIONS OF PARIS AND OF LONDON—THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE—THE POSITION OF HOLLAND AND THE UNITED STATES—PRESIDENT WILSON'S CRITICISMS—THE CASE OF THE "DACIA" AND OF THE "WILHELMINA."

OF all the questions raised by the war none has touched the interests and the sentiment of this country so closely as those which have turned on the law and the use of sea-power. As the carrying-nation of the world, the greatest naval power, and the only country absolutely dependent on the sea for its life-breath, Great Britain has the strongest interest in making the most effectual use of naval offence that does not injure her defence—an antithesis which, though many would maintain it to be quite unreal in warlike operations on the ground that whatever increases our means of offence must also strengthen our means of defence, may well be valid in the realm of law. Hardly less important in the eyes of this country are the morals of the use of sea-power. For the ground of the average Englishman's attachment to the navy, and of his determination that it shall be supreme, is not solely material, but is also moral and political. He is genuinely convinced that the British navy is an instrument of human liberty, and this conviction became doubly precious in a war which exhibited the German army as the instrument of tyranny. The tests of whether a great piece of mechanism is being used on behalf of freedom or tyranny are largely political, but they are also legal. The conduct of the German army in Belgium was condemned in this country on grounds not only of humanity but of law, which with the Englishman lies much nearer to the springs of action than with most people. This war, to the English mind, is being fought to justify and establish the rule of law against force. It was therefore a necessary part of our case to prove that our "navalism" is not German militarism on another element. The war, again, is being waged largely in defence of neutrals, and therefore it became doubly necessary that our naval power should be used with the utmost respect for neutral rights. Such are the moral and political issues beneath the questions of law which are the subject of this chapter.

The law of war at sea is not an easy branch of international law, and a brief sketch of its modern history, though it may seem to begin by taking us away from its applications in thi war, will probably be the shortest way to an understanding of the issues.

THE OLD RULES OF CAPTURE.

The rules of capture on which this country acted in its wars with France were those of the *Consolato del Mare*, a code dating back to the days of the Italian Republics. Under this code the property of a belligerent, whether publicly or privately owned, was always liable to capture at sea; on the other hand, neutral property was not so liable. For example, if the nationality of the ship was hostile, and of the cargo neutral, the ship could be seized, and, if condemned by a Prize Court, confiscated; but the cargo was restored to its neutral owners. Similarly, if the ship was neutral and the cargo the property of the enemy, the cargo was good prize, but not the ship. These were clear and logical rules; but the objection to them was that by giving a belligerent the right to examine a neutral ship for belligerent property, they in effect, and for no offence such as the carriage of contraband, violated neutral territory, the neutral ship being considered as a portion of the territory of the State



Firing with rifles from the deck of a mine-sweeper in order to explode a floating mine. [*Topical Press.*



The crew of a mine-sweeper wearing the safety collar and lifebelts, which are part of their working attire. [*Topical Press.*

to which it belonged and whose flag it was flying. Accordingly, an alternative set of rules was propounded, first by the King of Prussia, and later supported by others. Under these rules the flag covered the cargo. A neutral flag redeemed enemy property carried under it from its hostile character, while an enemy flag infected neutral cargo with its hostile character and made it liable to seizure and confiscation. The object of this rival set of rules was not only to prevent the infringement of the territory of the neutral ship, but also to secure and to retain for neutrals the carrying trade. These rules were adopted by the so-called Armed Neutrality of 1780, of which the Baltic Powers, with Holland, France, Spain, and the United States, were members. Pitt was fierce in his denunciation of these rules. "Shall we give up our maritime consequence," he asked, "and expose ourselves to scorn, derision, and contempt? . . . Four nations have conspired to produce a new code of maritime laws which they endeavour arbitrarily to force on Europe. What is this but the same Jacobin principle which proclaimed the rights of man, which produced the French Revolution, which generated the wildest anarchy, and spread horror and devastation through that unfortunate country? Whatever shape it assumes it is a violation of the rights of England, and imperiously calls upon Englishmen to resist it even to the last shilling and the last drop of blood rather than tamely submit to degrading invasion or meanly yield the rights of the country to shameful usurpation." These, then, were the issues at law in Napoleonic times, Great Britain, as the strongest naval Power, asserting the right to capture all enemy property at sea under whatever flag it might be, the weaker Powers and neutrals maintaining that the neutral flag ought to cover the enemy's property. England had her way.

THE DECLARATION OF PARIS.

But fifty years later, by the Declaration of Paris, England agreed to a compromise between these two sets of rules. She took from either set the part which was most favourable to neutrals. While the Armed Neutrality had held that the enemy's flag ought to infect even a neutral cargo with its hostile character, the Declaration of Paris enacted that it should not, but that the British rule which refused to touch neutral property under the enemy's flag should be the law. On the other hand, it accepted that part of the Armed Neutrality's code which held that a neutral flag should exempt enemy's property carried under it from capture. The same Declaration abolished privateering, and declared that a blockade to be legal must be effective—a somewhat cryptic rule the meaning of which will appear later. Every important Power signed the Declaration except Spain and the United States, which objected to the abolition of privateering on the ground that it was unfair to the Powers with weak navies and large mercantile marines.

The signature of the Declaration of Paris was a very remarkable sacrifice of belligerent power to neutral right which produced a cleavage of opinion running clean across the lines of party division. Some argued that it went much too far, weakened our power to injure the enemy when we were at war, and by giving immunity to neutral shipping would lead to a great transfer of British shipping in time of war to the protection of a neutral flag. Others, again,—among them Cobden and Bright—following a line of thought that had been popular in the United States since Benjamin Franklin's day, held that the whole system which permitted the capture of private property at sea was indefensible, that the right of capture should be restricted to public property and to contraband, and that all non-contraband trade should be free, whether under the enemy's or a neutral flag, except to ports which were blockaded. The controversy on this question went on for more than half a century. Liberals like Cobden, and Conservatives like Mr. F. E. Smith, have argued for the complete exemption of private property from capture; philosophic Radicals like Mill have opposed the change; and independent Conservatives like Mr. Gibson Bowles have advocated the denunciation of the Declaration of Paris and the return to the law of capture as it was practised in the Napoleonic Wars. The line of division cut very deep. It was drawn in the first place by different estimates of the results which the law, as modified by the Declaration of Paris, would have on our position when we were at war. But it was deepened by a radical conflict of opinion as to what ought to be the position of neutrals and non-combatants in war-time, the one side holding that war was a relation between States and not between their subjects, and that subjects and—*a fortiori*—all neutrals ought to be protected as far as possible against loss; the other side arguing that the State was not a separate entity but merely the sum of all the individuals composing it, who could therefore not expect to continue their affairs as though nothing was happening, and that, as the world was now "all one," even neutrals must be content to suffer some inconvenience. The critics of the Declaration of Paris were therefore divided amongst themselves. But, except officials, there were few whole-hearted supporters of the Declaration.

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON.

In 1909 the Powers met to draft a code of maritime law in war which should be administered by an International Prize Court, thus freeing the law from any risk of control by the belligerent Executive. The result of their deliberations was the Declaration of London, which was violently criticised from the outset in this country and was never approved by Parliament, whose consent was necessary to establish the jurisdiction of an International Court. The key to the understanding of the contentious clauses in the Declaration, and also of the legal argumentation that arose in the course of the war, is the distinction between contraband, conditional contraband, and the free list. On the free list were put articles amounting in value to about one-third of our annual trade, and including cotton and the raw materials of textile industries. In these the trade under a neutral flag, except to a blockaded port, was to be free from interference by the belligerents. On the list of absolute contraband were placed articles entirely or mainly used for the prosecution of the war if destined for a belligerent country. These could be seized and confiscated under whatever flag they were being carried. The difficulties began with the third list of conditional contraband, made up of articles capable of warlike and peaceful use. Foodstuffs, which could be used both for feeding an army and for feeding non-combatants, were the first on this list. The Declaration proceeded to draw up a number of rules for determining when articles of this character were to be considered as contraband and liable to confiscation, and when the trade in them was to be free. These rules are set forth in Articles 33 to 36 of the Declaration, which must be textually quoted, for most of the controversies on maritime law in this war have turned upon them.

"ARTICLE 33.—Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a Government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 (4).

ARTICLE 34.—The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, however, arises in the case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these places if it is sought to prove that she herself is contraband.

"In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed to be innocent.

"The presumptions set up by this Article may be rebutted.

"ARTICLE 35.—Conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.

"The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation.

"Article 36.—Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in Article 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy country has no seaboard."



The German Admiralty Building, Berlin.

[*Central News.*

These articles have probably been more written and talked about than any articles of similar length in any other international treaty. Their broad effect, however, is clear; and had they been followed as they stand, the general situation as regards imports into Germany would have been as follows:—

(1) Germany under a neutral flag would have been free to import through her own ports all foodstuffs, clothing, and the raw materials of most manufactures, unless it could be shown that these were meant for her armed forces or for the use of one of her Government departments.

(2) She would have been able to import all these articles under a neutral flag through neutral ports, *e.g.*, Rotterdam, irrespectively of their ultimate destination (Article 35), or of the use to which they were to be put.

It will be seen at once that these articles put an island country—which must get all that it requires from abroad through its own ports or go without—at a great disadvantage as compared with a Continental country, which can obtain all that it wants, in the way of foodstuffs and the raw materials of manufactures, by railway from a neutral port without any possibility of its supplies being touched by an enemy, however complete that enemy's command of the sea may be. "Does any one say," asked the Leader of the Opposition when this Declaration was being debated in Parliament, "that the fact that an American ship, having tinned meats which were going straight to the German army, could pass through our Channel Fleet and we not touch it does not mean a prejudicing of our position?" If by "going straight" is meant through Dutch ports or up the Rhine, the sentence is an exact description of what might have happened under the Declaration.

THE AMENDED DECLARATION.

The Declaration of London had fortunately not been ratified by Parliament, and the Declaration of Paris was still the statement of the law that was legally binding on this country. The Government must have felt profoundly thankful that Parliament had resisted its attempts to get the London Declaration through. Under the Declaration of London, as it stood, practically the sole injury that we could have done to Germany by our naval strength was to hold up German shipping and stop the dividends of their great shipping companies. That degree of injury was not worth the losses of our own shipping through the depredations of the German commerce destroyers. It is impossible to read the Declaration of London, or even of Paris, without feeling that the British signatories

had either ceased to contemplate our intervention in a European War as a possibility—which was likely enough in the 'fifties, after the Crimean war, when the Manchester doctrines of foreign policy were in the ascendant in both the political parties—or else were completely out of touch with the conditions of modern naval war. The drafting of the Declaration of London certainly put the Government in serious difficulties when war broke out. True, it was not the law; still, by signing it, the representatives of the Powers had set out a greatest common measure of agreement by which their actions were sure to be judged in a great European war.

THE BRITISH PRACTICE.

At the outbreak of war an Order in Council was issued declaring, on behalf of this country and France, that they meant to observe the provisions of the Declaration of Paris, subject to certain modifications and additions. These were of so great importance as almost to change the character of the Declaration. The principal modification was the virtual cancellation of Article 35 of the Declaration, by which importations of conditional contraband into Germany in neutral ships through neutral ports were exempted from capture by belligerent shipping. Instead, precisely the same tests were applied to all importations into Germany, whether through German or neutral ports. That was to remove one of the principal objections to the Declaration, but it was the beginning of difficulties with neutrals. For the cancellation of Article 35 meant that all imports of articles not on the free list into neutral countries were liable to retention and search, and if it should be found that they were intended for the use of the enemy's armed forces, or to come within the provisions of Article 33, to confiscation.



Admiral von Tirpitz. [*Central News.*

It has not been generally understood in England how much that meant for Holland. Some 75 per cent of the imports of Rotterdam normally find their way into Germany, and of that percentage probably more than a half comes under the head of conditional contraband. Moreover, the whole of the British shipping ordinarily engaged in this trade ceased to visit Dutch ports, and not a single German merchantman was able outside the Baltic to keep the seas. It has been calculated that not more than a fifth of the ordinary number of ships was arriving at Rotterdam in October, and in Rotterdam and Amsterdam alone some 50,000 men were thrown out of work. But for the modification of Article 35 of the Declaration, Rotterdam would probably have done the bulk of the import trade of Germany. Yet if the Dutch Government was ever under temptation to protest against the change in the Declaration they resisted it. Not only did the Dutch Government not protest, but it made arrangements at very great loss and inconvenience to second our efforts to keep anything from passing through her ports into Germany that might assist the enemy in his prosecution of the war. By the Rhine Convention the Dutch Government must keep open the Rhine for transit into Germany. Consignments for Germany are loaded into lighters in the Rhine at Rotterdam, and then proceed to their destination. These do not count as importations into Holland, and the Dutch Government could not without violating its treaty interfere with their carriage. But over all its imports destined for re-exportation to Germany it exercised a strict control. It agreed to purchase all cargoes consigned to Holland which came within our list of conditional contraband, placed them in bond, and only issued them to the consignees in return for a deposit and a guarantee that they were not for war consumption or for use of the German Government. Scrupulous regard for the obligations of neutrality could not have been carried further.

THE RIGHT OF SEARCH AND THE AMERICAN PROTEST.

Less fortunate were our first experiences with the United States in this war. Between Britain and the United States there is an old tradition of quarrel over the laws of naval war. Our last war with the United States in 1812 arose out of the exercise by the British navy of their right of search for British subjects on American vessels. By British law at that time a British subject could not divest himself of his nationality, and America was full of English and Irish emigrants, whom the United States had received as her subjects, but who were still by English law British subjects. These our navy made a practice of apprehending whenever they could find them on American ships, and this harsh violation of American asylum was bitterly resented, and to this day has made the American Government extremely critical towards any suspicion of arbitrariness in the exercise of the right of search. It was a curious coincidence that the centenary of the Treaty of Ghent, which made peace at the end of this foolish and unnecessary war, should have seen another dispute arise over British search of American vessels. Between Christmas and New Year's Day the United States Government sent a long despatch to Great Britain protesting against the wrongful treatment of American ships. The protests

fell under three general heads. In the first place, President Wilson complained of delays and losses caused to American shipping by detention and search. Reimbursement for wrongful detention would not, he said, remedy the evil, because the chief difficulty was the moral effect of British practice on American exporters, who were refusing to take risks. The British naval practice was directly responsible for the depression existing in many American industries. Secondly, the American Note complained that we were detaining American steamers on mere suspicion. It quoted, with approval, the old British doctrine that foodstuffs were only contraband when they were meant for the armed forces of the enemy, pointed out that the burden of proof in such cases was on the captor, and argued that there was no right of detention and search merely in the hope of making up a case that cargoes of foodstuffs were so intended, but that there must be solid ground for suspicion before the loss of detention and search in port was put on the neutral shipowner. Lastly, the Note protested against the cancellation of Article 25 of the Declaration of London, the effect of which was that cargoes of foodstuffs and other conditional contraband consigned to Holland, which should under any circumstances have been free, were made subject to precisely the same regulations as if they had been consigned to German ports. The Note was very friendly in its phrasing, but many people in England felt it to be unfortunate in view of the grave breaches of international law committed by the Germans in Belgium: that these should have been passed without protest from the United States, and that their first appeal to law should have been made in defence not of humanity but of purely commercial and, it was thought, somewhat trivial grievances of the American trading community. But the motives of President Wilson's policy, and the extreme difficulties of his position, have already been discussed in this History (Vol. II., Chapter II., page 15).

Sir Edward Grey's reply is an extremely important public document, for after a statistical argument to show that the trade losses of the United States were not so great as had been alleged, he then proceeded to justify his policy in modifying the provisions of the code agreed upon by the London Naval Conference. The reason, in a word, was railways, which made the Continent of Europe "all one."

> "No one in these days will dispute the general proposition that a belligerent is entitled to capture contraband goods on their way to the enemy. That right has now become consecrated by long usage and general acquiescence. Though the right is ancient the means of exercising it alter and develop with the changes in the methods and machinery of commerce. A century ago the difficulties of land transport rendered it impracticable for the belligerent to obtain supplies of seaborne goods through a neighbouring country. Consequently the belligerent actions of his opponents neither required nor justified any interference with shipments on their way to neutral ports. The principle was recognised and acted on in the decisions in which Lord Stowell laid down the lines on which captures of such goods should be dealt with. The advent of steam power has rendered it as easy for a belligerent to supply himself through the ports of a neutral contiguous country as through his own, and has therefore rendered it impossible for his opponent to refrain from interfering with commerce intended for the enemy merely because it is on its way to a neutral port.
>
> "No better instance of the necessity of countering new devices for despatching contraband goods to an enemy by new methods of applying the fundamental principle of the right to capture such contraband can be given than the steps which the Government of the United States found it necessary to take during the American Civil War. It was at that time that the doctrine of continuous voyage was first applied to the capture of contraband; that is to say, it was then for the first time that a belligerent found himself obliged to capture contraband goods on their way to the enemy even though at the time of capture they were *en route* for a neutral port from which they were intended subsequently to continue their journey.
>
> "The policy then followed by the United States Government was not inconsistent with the general principles already sanctioned by international law, and met with no protest from His Majesty's Government, though it was upon British cargoes and upon British ships that the losses and the inconvenience due to this new development of the application of the old rule of international law principally fell. The criticisms which have been directed against the steps then taken by the United States came and come from those who saw in the methods employed in Napoleonic times for the prevention of contraband a limitation upon the right itself, and failed to see that in Napoleonic times goods on their way to a neutral port were immune from capture not because the immediate destination conferred a privilege, but because capture under such circumstances was unnecessary. The facilities which the introduction of steamers and railways have given to a belligerent to introduce contraband goods through neutral ports have imposed upon his opponent the additional difficulty, when endeavouring to intercept such trade, of distinguishing between goods which are really destined for the commerce of that neutral country and the goods which are on their way to the enemy."

Later in the despatch, Sir E. Grey pointed out how increasingly difficult it had become, with the growth in the size of modern armies, to maintain the old distinction between the civilian population and the army, between the individual and the State. "The reason for drawing a distinction between foodstuffs intended for the civil population and those for the armed forces or enemy Government disappears when the distinction between the civil population and the armed force itself disappears. In any country in which there exists such a tremendous organisation for war as now obtains in Germany there is no clear division between those whom the Government is responsible for feeding and those whom it is not." The whole despatch is a remarkable piece of reasoning, and Sir E. Grey undoubtedly had the better of the argument. But the conclusion undoubtedly has its tragic side, for if conscription has made it all but impossible to distinguish between soldier and non-combatant, between public and private interests, it is obvious that the ground on which the legislation for humanising war has been built up is rapidly subsiding, and the Germans, in refusing to be bound by distinctions between neutrals and belligerents, combatants and non-combatants, may be only expressing the wicked logic of conscription. One cannot, on the other hand, refrain from wondering why if railways and conscription have made so much difference to the law of war, the Government's advisers should not have realised the fact until after the war had begun, when their tardy enlightenment exposed us to a charge of inconsistency and vacillation in policy.

THE CASE OF THE DACIA.

The two most famous cases in maritime law during this war were those of the *Dacia* and the *Wilhelmina*, The *Dacia* was a Hamburg-America liner, which was in New York when the war broke out, and stayed there, fearing capture if she left. There were very many other German ships in the same plight, and the sight of so many must have strengthened the desire of many good Americans to restore the old glories of their mercantile marine. Before the Civil War America possessed the second largest merchant navy in the world, but after the war it declined, and now bears no sort of proportion to her commercial greatness. Among the causes of the

decline were the substitution of iron for wood as the material of ships, and the high Protectionist policy of the United States, which made ships more expensive to build in America and prohibited ships not built in America from being placed on the American Registry. But the extensive transfers of ships to a neutral flag during the war began the decline, and many Americans hoped that what war had taken from them war might help to restore. The Democratic party, with its Free Trade sympathies, was, and had been for some time, identified with these hopes of reviving the American merchant navy, and in his message to Congress at the opening of the session in the autumn the President had announced a project of legislation for the State purchase of foreign-built shipping to the American flag. An Emergency Registration Law had previously been passed which allowed ships not built in the United States to be placed on the American Registry. The movement for acquiring some of the German ships was a genuine American movement in its origin, and it was not against our interests.

The *Dacia* was bought from the Hamburg-America Company by a Mr. Edward Breitung, an American subject, and when first heard of in this country was at Galveston loading cotton for Bremen. Cotton had been put on the free list by the Declaration of London, and kept there by our own Proclamations, so that there was no question of the cargo being contraband. Equally, there was no more doubt about the right of an American ship to go to a German port with a non-contraband cargo than there was of its right to go to Liverpool—so long as there was no blockade. The sole question was whether the *Dacia* was in fact an American ship, placed on the Registry under such conditions. If she were, we had no right to stop her; if she were not, she would be good prize, not, of course, as an American ship, but as a German ship whose transfer to the American flag we could not recognise as valid. By English law, the decision would have been a ticklish one; but the problem was evaded by arranging for the French to capture her. The French rules recognise no transfers of shipping made after war has begun.

This may be a convenient opportunity to deal with a question which was often asked in the early months, namely, why no blockade was declared of the German ports. A blockade would undoubtedly have avoided some difficulties, notably this one of the nationality of the *Dacia*, and of the *Wilhelmina*, an American ship bound for Hamburg with foodstuffs and detained for trial before a Prize Court on the ground that the German seizure of the foodstuffs made (Vol. I., page 380) imports of food into Germany imports for the use of the Government, and therefore contraband. If there had been a blockade of German ports there could be no question of our stopping anything and everything that tried to get through. Unfortunately, there were greater difficulties in a blockade. Submarines, as has been observed in a previous chapter (Vol. I., page 226), had made anything like a close blockade impossible, and the validity of a blockade distant from the coast would probably have been questioned as also barring access to neutral coasts within Article 18 of the Declaration of London, or as not being "effective," that is, constituting a continuous risk to all ships seeking access to the blockaded coast. A still graver objection was that a blockade of German ports was quite useless so long as the Dutch ports were open. These could not be blockaded, and to blockade German ports would have made our action in preventing the importation of conditional contraband into Holland still more invidious. Sir E. Grey had argued against the proposal to exempt private property at sea from capture by saying that it would logically involve the abolition of a commercial blockade. In fact, commercial blockade of Germany, or of any Continental country, with a neutral neighbour was impossible in any real sense under the rules either of the Declaration of London or of Paris. Only an island which has no neutral neighbours to import by sea and re-export by rail can be blockaded without infraction of neutral rights. These, then, were the reasons which led the Government to modify the Declaration of London, and to avoid the proclamation of a blockade of Germany which was generally expected.

So far as our survey has gone, the policy of the British navy towards commerce during the war seems to have been wisely and humanely directed. The war brought the country face to face with problems that had not been adequately thought out. Some legal ideals had to be jettisoned, and it was fortunate for the country that the Declaration of London had not the binding force of law, not having been approved by Parliament. Had it been in force, except for the local injury done to German shipping interests, our fleet would not have been able to exercise any real economic pressure on Germany, and this country might have had to begin the war with a repudiation of the Treaty or have resigned itself to complete confession of failure to stop the importation into Germany of what she needed other than absolute contraband, for everything else could have gone through Holland. When accounts are cast up at the end of the war, it may be found that the injury that we were able to do Germany by restricting her commerce no more than counterbalanced the injury that we suffered ourselves, and that we may decide that a commercial blockade is not worth while in the future. That remains to be seen. But having decided to bring economic pressure to bear, the modifications in the law of war as it was most generally accepted were confined within the strictest limits. Until the German Proclamation about foodstuffs in January, no attempt was made to hurt Germany by starving the civil population. Neutral ships were free to enter German ports with cargoes for other than military and Governmental use without hindrance from our fleet. If the ships did not bring everything that a peaceful civilian population might want, the reason was in the cessation of British traffic to Germany and the disappearance of the German merchant marine from the seas.

It was indeed necessary to restrict to some extent the rights of neutral trade, but we were able to come to an amicable arrangement with Holland, and every possible concession was made to the United States of America. It was the blunders and vices of German policy that made it possible for this country to exercise real economic pressure on Germany, not only without offending neutral sentiment, but even with a considerable measure of approval from neutrals. These blunders are the subject of the next chapter.



War time lifebelt drill on board an ocean liner. [*Central News.*



Inflating one of the safety collars supplied to the sailors of the British Fleet. [*Central News.*



The safety collar in position. [*Central News.*



A German artist's idea of the sinking of a British merchantman by a German submarine.

[*Central News.*


CHAPTER XII.

THE SUBMARINE "BLOCKADE" AND THE LAW.


THE PROCLAMATION OF A "WAR ZONE"—GERMANY'S EXCUSES EXAMINED—THE "LUSITANIA" AND HER FLAG—THE BRITISH REPLY—THE PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES—INCIDENTS OF THE "BLOCKADE."

IN the first week of February the German Government issued a Proclamation which will be as famous in history as the Milan Decree of Napoleon. It was in three clauses. By the first, the waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the English Channel, were declared a military area. "From February 18th every hostile merchant ship in these waters will be destroyed, even though the lives of crews and passengers should thereby be endangered." The second clause warned neutrals that their ships, too, would incur danger in this military area. A third clause left a free passage into the North Sea round by the Shetlands, along the east part of the North Sea, and a belt thirty miles wide along the coast of Holland." Shortly after the issue of this Proclamation an official Memorandum was published explaining the reasons which had driven Germany to these courses. The reasons given for the measures against British merchantmen were (1) the inclusion on the British list of contraband of articles which were not, or at most indirectly, useful for military purposes; (2) the "abolition of the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, inasmuch as Great Britain has subjected to capture all articles of conditional contraband intended for Germany without reference to the harbour in which they are to be unloaded or to the hostile or peaceful use to which they are to be put;" (3) the removal from neutral ships of German reservists of military age; (4) the British Proclamation declaring the entire North Sea to be a military area.

Of these reasons, the second, which is much the most important, has been discussed at length in the last chapter. Again, what is loosely described as the closing of the North Sea was forced upon us by the improper sowing of mines away from the main area of operations, off the north coast of Ireland, which nearly destroyed a great American liner crowded with passengers. This was a necessary measure of protection not only of our own but also of neutral interests (Vol. I., page 231). The other two reasons turn on the legal interpretation of some clauses in the Declaration of London, which, though valuable as a guide to the law, was not legally binding, and could therefore legitimately be modified by the Government in these as in other of its provisions. Both on the supposed rights of German reservists to sail in neutral ships and under the nose of the British navy to rejoin the colours and in compiling the lists of contraband



A type of hospital ship for submarines constructed for the German Navy. The ship has a tank in the middle into which the submarine enters as into a floating dock. [*Record Press.*



A submarine entering the repair ship. [*Record Press.*

the policy of the British Government had been somewhat hesitating. It was only in consequence of popular agitation that the British Government decided to stop the reservists from joining. As for the lists of contraband, it is undoubtedly true that the British Government in its revised list, published on October 29th, modified the list of the Declaration. Rubber and certain metallic ores which had been put on the free list in the Declaration were put on the list of absolute contraband, and so also were copper and certain mineral oils not specifically mentioned in the Declaration. But the Declaration was an illustration of what would probably be held to be good law, not a contract binding on the Government. Even if the German reasons had all substance, they would be quite inadequate to support the measures of retaliation now announced.

NEUTRALS AND THE BLOCKADE.

The reasons for including neutrals in the dangers of the new blockade were not so succinctly stated, but the principal reason would seem to be that they had acquiesced in the illegal acts of the British Government at sea.

> "Especially they had not succeeded in inducing the British Government to restore the German individuals and property seized in violation of international law. In certain directions they had also copied the British measures, which are irreconcilable with the freedom of the sea, in that they have, obviously under the pressure of England, hindered by export and transit embargoes the transit of wares for peaceful purposes to Germany. The German Government has in vain called the attention of neutral Powers to the fact that it must face the question of whether it can any longer persevere in its hitherto strict observance of the rules of the London Declaration if Great Britain were to continue its course and the neutral Powers to acquiesce in these violations of neutrality to the detriment of Germany. For her violations of international law Great Britain pleads the vital interests which the British Empire has at stake, and the neutral Powers seem to satisfy themselves with theoretical protests. Therefore, in fact, they accept the vital interests of belligerents as sufficient excuse for every method of warfare. Germany must now appeal to those same vital interests."


Germany, in fact, made much the same grievance against Holland and the United States for not making their protests effective against what she regarded as England's violations of international law at sea that some Englishmen made against the American President for not protesting at all against German violation of international law in Belgium and elsewhere. As the neutrals had not considered Germany, Germany's position now was that she could not let consideration for neutrals stand in her way. Without actually threatening neutral ships in the military area with the same destruction as British merchantmen, the Memorandum said that it was "advisable" for their ships to avoid entering the military area.

Germany did not decide hastily upon this policy. As early as December 2nd, Admiral von Tirpitz, the German Minister of Marine, outlined the whole policy to an American interviewer. "America," he said, "has not raised her voice in protest, and has taken little or no action against England's closing the North Sea to neutral shipping. What will America say if Germany declares submarine war on all enemy merchant ships? . . . Why not? England wants to starve us! We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and torpedo any British or Allies' ship which uses any harbour in Great Britain, thereby cutting off large food supplies." Nor was Germany the first to think about the possibility of using the torpedo as a weapon of blockade and commerce destruction. But no one had yet carried thoughts into action, and for reasons which are not far to seek. In the first place, until the improved ocean-going submarine came into existence, there was no reason or opportunity of doing by torpedo what could be done so much more advantageously by gunfire. Secondly, the torpedo is cruel and undiscriminating. It cannot disable like gun-fire; it destroys or misses. It is like a policeman armed with nothing but a rifle, who cannot arrest and take for trial, but can only shoot dead on suspicion. Those who use the torpedo, again, cannot, except under exceptional circumstances, search a vessel and take off non-combatants, but must overwhelm all alike in a common destruction. The use of such a weapon against merchant shipping must, of necessity, be a complete negation of all the laws of war. For the whole theory of the law of capture is that it is a process of execution by an order of a court of justice in accordance with rules and regulations laid down beforehand. The law knows nothing of summary executions except under conditions parallel to those which would justify a policeman in killing a man caught in the act of felony who resisted arrest. Against all non-combatants the law is that the warship can only take such steps in preserving the rules of the sea as a policeman can take in maintaining civil order. The warship may search; if suspicions are confirmed, it can arrest and take for trial; and only after sentence, which carefully distinguishes the various interests, can punishment be inflicted or judgment executed. The submarine can normally do none of these things.


It is true that practice has made certain inroads in the rule of the law of naval capture at sea. The sound old British rule that a captor who could not take his prize for legal adjudication must let her go had been so far relaxed that in the Declaration of London a captor was allowed to sink a captured ship if to take her into port would endanger his safety or the success of the operations on which he was engaged, and Captain von Müller of the *Emden*, and others less humane, had availed themselves of this permission. But there was never any difficulty, for a cruiser, even if it sank the ship, to take the crew and passengers off first; Captain von Müller's practice was to spare every fourth or fifth capture, and send his captives ashore with it. But the submarine had no room aboard for non-combatants. It must be inhumane to do its business at all against merchantmen.

THE LUSITANIA INCIDENT.

Long before the Germans formally announced their intention to torpedo merchantmen, and declared the coasts round these islands to be a military area dangerous to all shipping, their submarines had sunk ships in the Channel, off Havre, and just before their Proclamation there were German submarines in the North Sea which had done damage to shipping, and temporarily interrupted the cross-Channel service to Ireland. The Admiralty seems to have circulated by wireless general instructions or advice to merchantmen to sail under a neutral flag if they were in any danger from submarines; at any rate, the *Lusitania*, which was then due to arrive from New York, was so instructed, and, in fact, she came into Liverpool under the American flag. The instruction was a grave error of judgment. The Germans seemed to have picked up the message, and they clutched at what they called the misuse of the neutral flag as an excuse for warning neutrals away from the proclaimed area. It is not we, they said in effect to neutrals, who are inconveniencing



The famous German submarine U29, photographed by the captain of the British steamer Headlands from his vessel just before it was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands. [*Central News.*



The wake left by a torpedo as it passes through the water.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

you, but the British, by making an improper use of your flag. The use of false colours is a legitimate strategem of war, and one that the Germans themselves had employed. But there is all the difference in the world between a strategem, the use of which is infrequent, and making a practice of sailing under neutral flags, and the issuing of the order was a singularly unhappy inspiration, and in fact did much to damp down the indignation which the new German policy excited in neutral countries, and especially in the United States. The Admiralty saw quite clearly that the submarine could not make a formal search, at any rate of the large liners, and its idea clearly was to kill the new German policy at the very outset by using the neutral flag to produce such a state of confusion between ships of belligerent and neutral nationality that their character could not be told with certainty without search, which the submarine could not make, or at any rate without an inspection, which would betray its presence. But such a policy, however intelligible, was unfair to neutrals, because it diminished the security of their shipping. The United States protested under such circumstances against the use of their flag, which, it said, would afford no protection to British vessels, while it would be a serious and constant menace to the lives and property of American citizens. It trusted, therefore, that the British Government would do all in its power to discourage the deceptive use of the United States flag. Even more serious than the protests of neutrals, however, was the British dislike of the whole idea, which struck most people as undignified and unworthy of the greatest Naval Power. Much to the general relief the strategem was abandoned, and British ships henceforth sailed under their own flag. That the order was ever issued at all still rankles in many minds.



The crew of the Headlands being landed at the Scilly Isles after their vessel had been sunk by U29. [*Topical Press.*

The protest of the United States Government against the German submarine "blockade" was extremely sharp, and for the first time in the war there was visible a marked difference in the tone of the official communications of the United States as between the two sides in the war. The American Note was indeed regarded in some quarters as opening up for the first time the prospect of American intervention in the war; and though that was to misunderstand the whole tendency of President Wilson's policy, there is no doubt that in spite of the incident of the *Lusitania's* flag the whole controversy greatly strengthened the position of the Allies' cause amongst neutral nations. The American protest gave an excellent summary of the law, and went on to convey a distinct threat to Germany if her policy should cause loss of American lives or property.


"It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise the right to attack or destroy any vessel entering the prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this place contemplates it as possible.

"The suspicion that enemy ships were using a neutral flag improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing the prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly these questions that this Government understood the right to visit and search to have been recognised.

"If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States is not being used in good faith, and should destroy on the high seas American vessels or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two Governments. If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, to take any steps which might be necessary to safeguard American lives and property, and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."



The precautions taken by neutral vessels against the German submarine menace: Painting in large letters the name and nationality of a Danish merchantman on the vessel's hull. [*W. Watson, Hull.*



The first British merchantman to establish her claim to having sunk a German submarine: The Thordis in harbour at Saltash after having satisfied the Admiralty inspectors that she had rammed and sunk a submarine off Beachy Head. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*

THE BRITISH REPLY.

The British Government debated long and anxiously what reply should be made to the new German policy. The best reply of all would have been one addressed not by the Government to the world at large, but by the British navy to the submarine. Unfortunately, the Admiralty was not prepared with an effective answer to a danger which it had never considered seriously. And there was some excuse, if not for its general under-estimate of the gravity of the submarine problem, at any rate for its failure to foresee that Germany would carry its disregard of law to such lengths as to start sinking merchantmen at sight. The British Government seemed to be driven to retaliation, but it was not easy to decide what form it should best take. It was unfortunate that we could not retaliate on Germany without trespassing still further on neutral rights. Already we had had one controversy with the United States, friendly in tone, it is true, and one that had been adjusted by mutual consideration, the United States recognising the peculiar difficulties in which we were placed, and we on our side agreeing to accept the formal certificate of the United States Government as conclusive of the character and destination of the cargoes carried in her ships; but it was not possible to foresee how far she would submit to further restrictions on her trade. There was the additional difficulty that whatever we did along these lines would carry us further away from that rule of law at sea to which our Government rightly attached great importance. and might even compromise our character as the natural defender of neutral rights. Already after the German Proclamation nationalising the sale of breadstuffs in Germany, there had been circulated an official hint that it might affect our contraband policy very seriously, but it was necessary to move very cautiously so as not to prejudice our position with neutrals.

While the Cabinet was considering what reply it should make, America had proposed (amongst other things) that in consideration for our agreeing not to place restrictions on the importation of foodstuffs for the civil population of Germany, submarine attacks on merchantmen and the laying of drifting mines should be discontinued. Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in America, again, had suggested that Germany would abandon the submarine "blockade" if we would consent to allow food to pass freely through German ports under a guarantee that it should only be used by the civil population. Except in the case of the *Wilhelmina* we had not yet stopped neutral ships carrying foodstuffs for the civil population of Germany, and it was, so far as our belligerent interests were concerned, a very nice calculation whether the prospective risks of the submarine campaign were more or less than the prospective advantage of a further restriction of Germany's supplies, which would, at the least, not increase our popularity with neutrals. A number of people in England, who had no sort of sympathy with Germany, believed on a cool calculation of the gains and losses that an arrangement of some sort—if it could be made without loss of dignity—would on the whole be advantageous to us. If the Cabinet considered this suggestion seriously, the idea must clearly have broken down on the objection to making any sort of bargain with threats of a policy so illegal and inhumane as that of sinking merchantmen at sight. When the Government's decision was announced by Mr. Asquith, on March 1st, it was sufficiently uncompromising. He recited the German violations of international law, and announced that in retaliation for her excesses our policy, and that of France, henceforth was to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. The Government did not propose to proclaim a blockade, because they did not intend their efforts to be strangled in a network of judicial niceties. In other words, what they did they proposed to do by Executive prerogative, and not in execution of the judgment of a Prize Court.

THE ORDER IN COUNCIL.

The Order in Council, however, embodying this policy, issued a fortnight later, showed that in certain important respects the hard outlines of Mr. Asquith's pronouncement had been softened. It began with a recital of Germany's violations of the law of nations in the form of a Preamble, clearly implying that if Germany wished to modify our policy her best chance was to abandon the practices of which it was the consequence. The opening words of the first three clauses of the Order, which give the effect of the Order, are as follows:—


> "1 No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the 1st March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port.
>
> "2. No merchant vessel which sailed from any German port after the 1st March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port.
>
> "3. Every merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the 1st March, 1915, on her way to a port other than a German port, carrying goods with an enemy destination, or which are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or Allied port."

A distinction now makes its appearance, which was not in the original statement by Mr. Asquith, between German trade through German ports and through neutral ports. The first "shall" not be allowed to continue; but German trade through neutral ports "may" be diverted to British ports. That distinction at once opens the way to such concessions in practice to neutrals as the occasion may suggest to be prudent or desirable.

In effect, what the Order in Council did was to establish a blockade of German coasts without proclaiming one. The effect of not proclaiming a blockade was to prevent doubtful cases coming before a Prize Court, and to keep the direction of policy in the unfettered discretion of the Executive; on the other hand, the penalties for breach of this *de facto* blockade were much lighter than they normally are of a legally-proclaimed blockade. The usual penalty for a breach of blockade is confiscation of the ship and her cargo. Under the Order one of three things might happen to a ship apprehended on her way to or from a German port. She may be told to discharge her cargo in a British port, where it may be requisitioned for our own use or else restored to the owner by direction of the Prize Court. Or, secondly, the ship may be given a pass to some neutral or Allied port, in which case the cargo is dealt with according to the ordinary uses of trade. Only, thirdly, if the ship after receiving a pass to a neutral port attempts to reach an enemy port is the ship liable to confiscation. The same rule applies to ships intercepted with cargoes for Germany on their way to a neutral port, except that in this case the powers of the Executive are discretionary only. On the whole, the Government solved the difficulty of combining the maximum injury to the enemy with the minimum of injury to neutral trade and neutral rights. The wording of the Order in Council showed signs that the British policy as announced by Mr. Asquith had been pruned to meet the objections of neutrals.



A remarkable photograph taken by one of the survivors from the Falaba. It shows the passengers on deck with their lifebelts. The taker of the photograph was picked up after more than an hour in the sea, and the edges of the photograph have been damaged by salt water. [*Daily Mirror.*




The submarine which sank the Falaba photographed from the deck of the sinking boat.
[*Daily Mirror.*

THE AMERICAN PROTEST.

The heart had been taken out of neutral objections by the ingenuity of the Government's proposals, by the badness of the German case, and by our obvious intention to relax the strictness of the embargo whenever that could safely be done. None the less, the United States Government sent a protest, somewhat stiffly worded in parts, though friendly in its spirit. The blockade of German ports was accepted; the main objection taken was to the prohibition of German trade by way of neutral ports.

> "The novel and quite unprecedented feature of that blockade, if we are to assume it to be properly so defined, is that it embraces many neutral ports and coasts, bars access to them, and subjects all neutral ships seeking to approach them to the same suspicion that would attach to them were they bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain and to unusual risks and penalties.
>
> "It is manifest that such limitations, risks, and liabilities placed upon the ships of a neutral Power on the high seas—beyond the right of visit and search and the right to prevent the shipment of contraband already referred to—are a distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce is interfered with."

To this criticism there was no answer possible, except that our measures were in the nature of reprisals for the grave offences of Germany, and that the powers which we were taking were discretionary only, and would not be exercised in a harsh or unreasonable spirit. American opinion, which at first had been markedly hostile, now rapidly quietened down.




Passengers from the Falaba clinging to an upturned lifeboat which capsized in launching. [*Daily Mirror.*

INCIDENTS OF THE "BLOCKADE."

A full narrative of the "blockade" must be deferred until later, but notice of some of its earlier incidents may be taken at once before the subject of this chapter is left.

The submarine blockade of British ports, which according to the German press was to be a "milestone in the world's history," began on February 18th. That date found the shipping community in Leadenhall Street, London, little perturbed, and conditions at the great ports unaltered. Scarcely any sailings were cancelled, and even the cross-channel services were not suspended. At the same time, the shipping paper *Syren and Shipping* offered £500 to the first British merchantman that should ram and sink a German submarine, and this was the first of several offers of the kind. The feeling was general that no appreciable damage could be done to a shipping trade averaging some 1,500 sailings a week by submarines operating in a sea area of some 400,000 square miles, and it was soon seen that this feeling was on the whole justified. In the week succeeding February 18th seven British ships were torpedoed by submarines, while 708 ships arrived at British ports and 673 sailed. In the second week Germany not only achieved nothing, but lost a submarine to the attack of a merchantman. The little steamer *Thordis*, of 501 tons, was attacked off Beachy Head, on February 28th. The torpedo aimed at her passed underneath her, and before a second could be fired her captain put her head for the submarine and rammed and sank it. In his account of the adventure the captain of the *Thordis* said:—

> "The submarine crossed the bows and took up a position about thirty or forty yards on the port beam. A few minutes after that I saw the wake of a torpedo on the starboard. All the crew saw it as well. It was like a long, feathery arrow. It was clear that the submarine had fired at us and missed us through the lifting of the boat, and I said to myself, 'As she's sure to have another shot I'd better try and ram her. It's about the only chance. So I called out to the man at the wheel, 'Hard a' starboard!'
>
> "A minute later—or it may have been two or three minutes, for you don't think much about time when you see a thing is trying to sink you—we closed on the submarine. The bows of my ship and the periscope—which was all we could see—came nearer and nearer together, and I could have touched the periscope with my hand as we went over if I had been on the deck. There were two distinct noises. One was like a slight crash, and then a scraping noise followed. We didn't see the periscope at all again, and some time after there was a quantity of oil on the water in the neighbourhood we had left behind.
>
> "I think we must have sunk the submarine, but I don't believe we got any damage. I can only attribute our escape



Lieut. Bell, R.N.R., captain of the Thordis, being presented by the Lord Mayor of London with the reward offered to the captain and crew of the first British merchantman to sink a German submarine.

[*Topical Press.*

> to the fact that owing to the heavy seas we lifted at the moment the torpedo was discharged, so that it passed under us, and also that the submarine treated us with contempt, as it were, and never thought we would be likely to turn and run her down. This ship pitches pretty heavily in a rough sea, and that might easily account for the torpedo missing us when it might strike a big vessel."

In the following weeks the submarines succeeded in doing more damage, but nothing commensurate with German expectations. The first six months of the blockade resulted in thirty-one British vessels being sunk or captured by submarines or cruisers, out of a total of 8,960 ships of all nationalities sailing and arriving.

The progress of the blockade made it amply clear that the German warning to neutral ships was no idle one. Norwegian, Dutch, and Danish vessels bound for British ports suffered the same fate as British merchantmen, though as a rule more care was taken in their case to allow sufficient time for the crews to take to the boats. The conduct of the submarine commanders in this respect differed widely, ranging from observance, in some cases, of all possible courtesies of war to the most shameless inhumanity in others. One outrage in particular which greatly damaged German prestige in neutral eyes was the sinking of s.s. *Falaba*, on March 28th. The *Falaba*, a 4,806-ton liner of the Elder Dempster Line, carrying 160 passengers, was hailed by a submarine, which after a chase closed with her, and gave her crew five minutes to take to the boats. The respite was impossibly short, and was rendered quite valueless by an accident to one of the boats. Before the passengers could be got off, a torpedo was fired, and the vessel sank with many still on board. The conduct of the submarine was the more barbarous since there was in the offing a trawler, which, had it been allowed to come alongside, could easily have taken off the *Falaba's* crew and passengers. The savagery which characterised the crew of this particular submarine was further shown by the fact, for which there are many witnesses, that appeals for help from those in the water were greeted by them with laughter and taunts.


The Yeoward line steamer *Aguila*, again, was pursued by the *U*28 on March 27th, off the Pembrokeshire coast, and her determined attempt to escape seems to have infuriated her pursuers. Her crew were given four minutes to get into her boats, and before they could do so the submarine opened fire, killing several members of the crew.

A much better spirit was shown in many cases. The crew of the *U*29, for instance, which was active off the Scillies for some days, treated their victims with consideration. The case of the *Adenwen*, torpedoed by the *U*29, twenty-five miles N.N.W. of the Casquets, was typical.

> "The captain asked the commander of the submarine to spare his ship, but the commander replied that as war was war he was unable to accede to the request, adding, 'I am very, very sorry to have to sink your ship.' The captain was allowed ten minutes to launch lifeboats, as the commander of the submarine said: 'We wish that no lives should be lost.' Two lifeboats were lowered. One sailor either fell or jumped overboard, and the commander of the submarine,

noticing this, sent a suit of dry clothes for him. Four German sailors boarded the *Adenwen* and took the ensign and other flags as souvenirs. The submarine took the two lifeboats in tow, but subsequently fell in with the Norwegian steamer *Bognia*. The Germans gave the British a box of cigars, and made enquiries as to their supplies of food."

Although the *Thordis* was the only ship whose claim to have rammed a submarine was considered proven, the enemy's tactics were frequently baulked by manœuvring on the part of merchant captains, and several ships showed their pursuers a clean pair of heels, or steered so cleverly erratic a course as to make torpedoing impossible. Meanwhile cruisers and destroyers were accounting for a certain number of the blockaders. The *U8* was sunk off Dover on March 5th, H.M S *Ariel* accounted for the *U12* on March 10th, and the *U29*, one of the largest of her class, with a speed of over eighteen knots on the surface and twelve submerged, was sunk on March 25th. Proportionate to the total size of her submarine fleet these were considerable losses, and they were in no way compensated for by the measure of success that attended the attempted blockade




The explosion of a submarine mine. *[Universal Photo Exchange.*



Cairo: The citadel and mosque of Mohammed Ali, seen from the Arab village. [E.N.A.



Cairo: Allée de Ghoubrah. [E.N.A.



General Sir John Maxwell (at the back of the car and second from the right of the photograph), in command of the troops in Egypt, motoring through one of the camps. [*L.N.A.*

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL

THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE IN EGYPT—THE BRITISH FORCES—THE PLAN ADOPTED—THE TASK BEFORE THE TURKS—THE SCHEME OF ATTACK—ATTEMPT TO CROSS THE CANAL—REPULSE OF THE ATTACK—THE TURKS ALLOWED TO RETREAT—REASONS FOR BRITISH POLICY.

THE Turkish attack on Egypt, and the possibility of its renewal, were something of an embarrassment to England. One of the objects of Germany in drawing Turkey into the war had been to threaten Egypt and the Suez Canal—the main highway of communication with the British Empire in the East. Probably the Germans were not hopeful that Turkey would be able to reconquer Egypt, although they may have counted on the possibility of assistance from the natives both in Egypt and in the Sudan. But at any rate it was certain that England would take no risks in Egypt, and that she would assemble and maintain there a force which would be capable of dealing with any attack which the Turks could make. So much the better, they calculated, for their cause in Europe. For England, on the other hand, the problem was how to make Egypt safe without weakening her position in France and Belgium more than could be helped. Ill-organised as the British Empire was for a great Continental war, it was able not only to meet the demands made on it in Egypt, but also to turn the means adopted to profit in the main ends of the war.


England had, at the beginning of the campaign, a considerable number of troops who were excellent military material, but they were at this time deficient in training and wholly lacking, individuals apart, in experience in actual warfare. Among these were the East Lancashire Territorial Division, under General Douglas, which had volunteered as a unit for foreign service, and the Australian and New Zealand contingents, which were disembarked and kept in Egypt while on their voyage to England. The Lancashire men were admirable citizen soldiers, and required only a few months of hard work and combined training; and this they obtained in active preparations to meet the Turkish attack and in performing all the varied duties of the regular Army of Occupation whose place they had taken. The Australian and New Zealand forces were characteristic products of their countries; men of fine physique, full of vigour and individuality; a little averse at first, so far as a minority were concerned, from the fetters of discipline; full of the exuberance of a young people, and affluent with a prosperity which gladdened the entertainment vendors of Cairo. There were Indian and native troops, too, among the defence forces, and Egypt, perhaps, among the many strange sights that she has seen, has known little stranger than this mingled army of Sikhs and Punjaubis, Australians and New Zealanders, Lancashire business men, miners and cotton operatives, who were now to defend the Suez Canal against an army



Allied warships at the entrance to the Suez Canal. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



A British camp on the Turkish side of the Suez canal, showing the soldiers bathing from a barge.
[*Alfieri Picture Service.*



Egypt and its Eastern Frontiers.

of Turks and Arabs tutored by German officers in a Holy War against the infidel. These Lancashire Territorials were responsible for a curious canard which sprang up in Egypt in the autumn, and was reproduced in the German press. Whether it was a spontaneous rumour among the population of Cairo, or whether it was set on foot by German agents, is not known: but when the Territorials in their khaki paraded through Cairo, the report ran that the "citizen soldiers" were civilians dressed up in uniforms in order to impress the people with the power of Great Britain.

CHARACTER OF THE CANAL.

Towards the end of the year it became known that the Turks were collecting a large army in Palestine to the south of Jerusalem. Between sixty and seventy thousand men, it was said, were gathered under Djemal Pasha. There was never any doubt that the Turks could accumulate a large army to attack Egypt; the question was how many men and guns they could transport across 120 miles of desert and carry back again in safety if the invasion were defeated. There was only a comparatively small part of the Canal where they could hope to force a passage, and there were only three routes by which they could get there. The northern road, running along the coast by way of El Arish, was at certain points exposed to attack from the sea; it crossed the Canal at El Kantara, and the greater part of the country on the east bank of the Canal between Port Said and Kantara had been inundated as a defensive measure. South of Kantara lies Lake Ballah and then the principal cutting of the Canal, at the southern end of which stands Ismailia—the headquarters of the Canal Company, and the point at which the central road over the Sinai Desert touches the Canal. This is the road that runs to the ancient Beersheba, Hebron, and Jerusalem. Beyond Ismailia lie Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes, with a narrow stretch of ground between them; and there is a last section between the southern extremity of the Bitter Lakes and Suez which is crossed by the third road—150 miles long—leading to Akaba. Of these three roads the central is worst supplied with water, although, as it happened, there had been during the winter months a greater rainfall than for several years past.

The Turks had to choose by which of the roads they would make their advance. Towards the end of January their advance parties were discovered to be approaching the Canal, and there were some skirmishes both near Suez and at El Kantara—preliminary movements which were directed against these two points in the hope of persuading the defence that the main attack was to be delivered there. In point of fact, Djemal intended to make his main effort along the central road, and to cross the Canal between Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes. No attempt was made by the defending forces, of which Sir John Maxwell was in chief command, to oppose the Turks on the eastern side of the Canal. The plan adopted, which arose from the character of the British forces at our disposal in Egypt, and the necessity of husbanding our military resources with a view to keeping the army in France at its maximum strength, was to take the fullest advantage of the natural obstacle of the desert and the artificial barrier of the Canal, and to run no risks. Prudence was the watchword. The extent and the waterless character of the desert were relied on—and, as it



A scene on the Suez Canal. [E.N.A.



Alexandria: The Mahmoudieh Canal. [E.N.A.

proved, justly—to prevent the Turks from coming in really dangerous strength ; and the Canal was to be called in aid as a defensive line in order to drive the attacking army back into the desert, where it would be left to withdraw to the country whence it came, unless it chose rashly to renew its enterprise.

REASONS FOR DJEMAL'S CHOICE.

There were good reasons why Djemal should make his general attack south of Lake Timsah. The railway which joins Port Said, Cairo, and Suez runs to Ismailia from the east, and then turns and runs north and south beside the Canal. An enemy crossing the Canal south of Lake Timsah would find himself within a few miles of the railway, and, turning north, he would be within striking distance of Nefishe—the railway junction from which the lines spring north and south to Port Said and Suez. There were, too, from the Turkish standpoint, some slight natural advantages about the Canal at this point. About eight miles south of Ismailia lies the Canal "Station" of Tussum, and three miles beyond that is Serapeum, both on the western bank. On the eastern side of the Canal, between Tussum and Serapeum, the ground is uneven and covered with scrub for a distance of about seven miles, when there begins a low line of hills—the kind of country in which an attacking force might find useful cover. Besides this, for a short distance the Canal bank is comparatively low and sloping, which was likely to help the Turks in launching their pontoons and rafts, while on the opposite side of the Canal, also, there were points at which the bank was less steep and formidable than elsewhere. All these reasons have been mentioned by people on the spot as likely to have influenced Djemal in choosing this area for his attack, and it is therefore scarcely possible for anyone to say that his selection was not anticipated by those in charge of the defence. It was, of course, impossible, if a considerable army was spread over the course of the Canal by night from the Bitter Lakes right up to El Kantara, that the precise objective of the main advance should be discerned beforehand with certainty, but equally it cannot be supposed that the attack on the section between Tussum and Serapeum came in any sense as a surprise to the defence.




The latest and official portrait, taken after his accession, of Sultan Hussein of Egypt.
[Anglo-Swiss Studio, Cairo.

By February 1st, Djemal and his army, whose strength was variously estimated at from 15,000 to 25,000 men, had arrived within about ten miles of the Canal, and an entrenched camp had been formed due east of Tussum. His troops belonged in the main to the Damascus Division of the Eighth Army Corps ; there were with them some from the Adrianople Corps. Djemal's general plan was to attack on the night of February 2–3, and, in his own words, "seize the Canal." That he really hoped, with the comparatively small army at his disposal, to establish himself west of the Canal, defeat the British forces, and regain Egypt for the Sultan of Turkey it is difficult to believe. If he had any such idea it can only have been because he had no conception of the strength of the defending troops, a supposition which is incredible in view of the time that they had been there and the possibility of communication between Egypt and Turkey. He may, of course, have thought that he would get assistance from the native population of Egypt, but that again was necessarily a matter of conjecture on which no prudent leader would have placed the slightest dependence. His action would have been intelligible had he been supported by a larger army coming up behind, which would have used the foothold across the Canal gained by him to undertake a serious attack on the British forces There was, however, no such army in reserve. But if it was not a serious attempt to capture the Canal and regain Egypt, then it was only a reconnaissance in force, and this was what Djemal and his Turkish colleagues always declared it to be after their defeat. It is, however, a remarkable reconnaissance which goes out with ten or twenty thousand men to attack and to break through a strong position heavily defended, and it is scarcely to be supposed that the Turks intended to take positions on the western bank of the Canal with the intention forthwith of abandoning them and withdrawing their armies. It seems likely that the Turks came with as large a force as the difficulties of the desert permitted them to transport, and with the intention of doing what damage they could and extricating themselves as best they might. In any case it was a reckless and even desperate adventure, and only the peculiar military situation of Great Britain saved it from utter disaster.

THE TURKISH PLAN.


Djemal's plan was to attack with the main body—the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Regiments—between Tussum and Serapeum, while threatening the Canal at other points both north and south. On his right wing one detachment was to attack El Kantara ; another—the Sixty-eighth Regiment—was to move against El Ferdan, just to the north of Ismailia, and Ismailia itself. On the left flank an attack was to be made on Suez and



The Australian troops encamped near the Pyramids build a suspension bridge over an irrigation canal. [*Topical Press.*




New Zealand field artillery returning to camp from the desert. [*Topical Press.*



Unloading food supplies at the New Zealanders' camp. [*Topical Press.*

the Canal to the north of it. By these means Djemal hoped to keep the defenders in uncertainty as to the point at which danger really threatened, so that they would be unable to reinforce their troops near Tussum; his movement on Ismalia was intended also to prevent the British from moving out to deliver a counter-attack against his flank. Among the troops detailed for the crossing of the Canal were the Champions of Islam, the chosen warriors from Tripoli. Djemal made his preparations also to deal with the warships, both British and French, whose guns he knew to be an important part of the defences of the Canal. He therefore sent his heavy artillery (two 6-in. guns) to stations lying east and south-east of Lake Timsah, with instructions to destroy the warships on the lake, and, if possible, to sink a ship at the southern entrance to the lake, so as to prevent any interference with the bridging operations. Having cleared Lake Timsah, the guns were to move south at once and perform a similar service at the Great Bitter Lake.



The Section of the Canal attacked by the Turks.


There can be no doubt, from the terms of the orders which Djemal issued to his army on February 1st, that he had hopes of crossing the canal by stealth and unopposed. "All the detachments of the enemy," he said, "have been pushed back to the western bank of the Canal. A part of the eastern bank of the Canal, between Ismailia and the large Bitter Lake, is occupied by a few sentries of the enemy." Accordingly, he gave elaborate instructions to his troops that during the advance of the last two days—February 1st and 2nd—nothing should be done which could possibly attract the attention of the British. Commands were not to be issued in a loud voice. Coughing was forbidden. There must be no cigarette smoking. Entrenching tools and water flasks were to be carefully tied so that they would not rattle. The parties sent forward to the Canal must carry their rifles unloaded so long as they were on the eastern bank, and examination was to be made and repeated to make sure that the order had not been evaded. When the crossing had been made, rifles were only to be loaded on officers' orders. Soldiers were to be told off specially to man the pontoons and rafts which were carried with the expedition, and they were strictly warned that they must embark and disembark with speed and noiselessness. All the officers and men engaged in the night attack were to wear a white band on the upper part of their arms as a distinguishing mark. The password was to be the "Sacred Standard," and "if the detachments which cross the Canal meet the enemy in the vicinity of the Canal they are to attack and disperse him." So little, apparently, did Djemal expect to find the canal held strongly in this section. The advance troops carried with them a number of rafts (kerosene tins joined together in threes, with a wooden framework) and twenty-four pontoons, which had been dragged across the desert on trucks, or sometimes hauled with ropes along the sand. Each of them was now carried, during the last stage of the advance, by eighteen men. The pontoons were made of galvanised iron, about six metres long by one and a half broad, and could accommodate between thirty and forty men. And so, at six p.m. on February 2nd, the attacking force moved down towards the Canal—the bridging parties first, with a brigade in support. The main body waited in the camp. To the north the flanking parties were working towards the Ismailia Ferry and El Kantara.

THE NIGHT ATTACK.

The bank of the Canal between Tussum and Serapeum was held by the Twenty-second Indian Brigade. The main positions were behind the western bank, where the defence was for some distance made easier by a belt of fir trees; on the opposite bank, however, there were the Tussum and Serapeum advanced posts, which threatened danger to the advancing enemy. About three o'clock in the morning of February 3rd the Turks came down to the edge of the water and began to launch their pontoons. Prisoners stated afterwards that they heard no sound on the Egyptian side except the barking of an occasional dog; but the Turks did not themselves carry out Djemal's orders for complete silence, and their presence was first betrayed by the voices of officers giving orders and by the exhortations to each other of the Champions of Islam. Fire was immediately opened from machine guns and rifles on the bridging parties. Five




Seven hundred Turkish prisoners, taken at the attack on the Suez Canal, in the barracks square at Kasr-el-Nil under a guard of Lancashire Fusiliers. [*Topical Press.*



One of the Turkish pontoons left behind in their flight from the Suez Canal.
[*Sport and General.*

pontoons had been launched, and of these three were immediately sunk. Two succeeded in getting across the Canal, and the soldiers in them endeavoured to climb the western bank. The whole of one boatload were shot down and thrown back into the water; of the other, a few men succeeded in getting to land, where they hastily dug a shallow trench, partly with their bare hands, in order to obtain shelter. Only four men were left by the morning, and they were quickly seized. Active assistance was given in repelling the attack by a torpedo boat, which, having discovered the presence of the Turks south of Tussum, dashed in between the opposing fires and shelled their trenches.

By half-past three a hot engagement had developed. One Turkish detachment moved towards the advanced Serapeum post, while another attacked that at Tussum, and the troops in the centre quickly entrenched themselves, while more pontoons and rafts were brought up, and the bridging parties continued their efforts to span the Canal. Mr. W. T. Massey, who visited the scene of the fighting a few days later, thus describes the final repulse of the attack :—



Australian cavalry riding through the streets of Cairo.
[*Central News.*

"Only a few of the boats were launched. These were recovered, with many bodies in them, while beneath the pontoons on the bank were dead men, crushed to death when some of the carriers had been mown down by fire, causing the boats to fall. During the hours of darkness rifle and machine gun fire prevented any progress being made with the bridge. Indeed, the first minutes of the engagement must have made it clear that there was not the remotest chance of communication being effected with the other side, and the concentrated fire on the Anatolian engineers and their supports would have convinced most troops that they must retire. However, they came again and again to their task, and it was not till the first shafts of light in the sky behind them made them good targets that they gave up.

"From almost the whole of the enemy's brigade heavy firing continued, but more than 10,000 Turks massed in a deep depression near the Canal did not come into action. Four field guns—18-pounders—were in action in this hollow, and other field guns and two 15-centimetre guns were in rapidly-made emplacements two miles north-east of Tussum. The Turks adopted the German method of artillery practice, and subjected the ground between Tussum and Serapeum to a searching fire, but although the direction was good the ranging was indifferent, and the majority of the shells fell well over the camps. Shell fire did small damage, though the marks of shrapnel bullets were plentiful.

"As soon as the enemy's positions could be made out we poured in a hot cross-fire from two batteries cleverly concealed two miles apart, their shells continually raking the trenches and giving infinite trouble, not merely to the Turks dug in on the bank, but to the infantry supporting. The effect of the fire was signalled from an observation post fixed in the topmost branches of a slender tree, which bent under an officer's weight. The gunners have been warmly commended by the officers who watched their work. Under the gun fire most of the enemy's infantry were driven to retire to the shelter given by the uneven, sandy ground behind the scrub.

"Meanwhile, some of the troops occupying the Tussum post moved to a position where they could pour a heavy enfilading fire into some of the Turkish trenches, and they killed and wounded scores before the remainder surrendered By this time it was obvious the attack had failed completely, and that the enemy must retire.

"The enemy had to try to do something to extricate the remainder of the bridging party and supports, and accordingly made a pretence of attacking the Serapeum post to cover the retirement. The defenders of this post were ready, too, and the Turks, who could not get within three-quarters of a mile of the advance line, never pressed home their attack. During this part of the operations the artillery again gave valuable support by a well-directed fire.

"The British made a counter-attack, going out to a ridge commanding the ground on which most of the enemy were massed, and compelling them to retire hurriedly across the rolling, stony plain to the hills. They were afterwards seen to move off in a south-easterly direction, but some came back during the night and carried off many of their dead."

DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE TURKISH RIGHT.

The Turkish attack at the other points of the front did not develop until somewhat later in the morning. At Kantara it was about six a.m. before the Turkish flanking party—some 3,000 strong—was discovered approaching the British advanced positions, which here also were held by Indian troops. The attack had scarcely even the value of a serious demonstration. The Turks discovered that the position at Kantara was strongly entrenched and amply provided with a formidable



Lancashire Territorials marching the Turkish prisoners taken during the fighting on the Suez Canal to a detention camp on the outskirts of Cairo. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Lancashire Territorials digging trenches in the desert.



The trenches almost completed.

system of wire entanglements, and after what amounted to little more than an outpost action they withdrew. In front of the Ismailia Ferry, where they moved up a force estimated at 4,000 men, they did not approach within closer range than about one thousand yards of the British outposts. At Lake Timsah their 6-in. guns produced a greater liveliness. Near the southern entrance to the lake a gunboat was hit, and the Indian transport *Hardinge* was struck by two shells. One of them, hitting the fore funnel, completely shattered the leg and broke one arm of Temporary-Lieutenant Carew, of the Naval Reserve, who was acting as pilot; and it was afterwards recorded as one of the most gallant actions of the day that "he continued to advise on the piloting of the ship with coolness and equanimity," for which he received the Distinguished Service Cross.

By mid-day it had become clear that the attack on the Canal had failed. Most of the bridging material which the Turks had with them had been destroyed. Their entrenched positions between Tussum and Serapeum were becoming untenable. Their guns had been well served, but they had too few of them. By three o'clock in the afternoon they were in retreat towards their entrenched camp. It remained to be seen whether they would make a renewed attempt on the following day, or whether the British would be able to push home their success and prevent the enemy's escape.

THE LAST STAND.

During the late afternoon and the night of the 3rd some scattered firing took place from the trenches which had been held by the Turkish advanced parties, and the next morning it was discovered that some hundreds of Turks had not joined in the general retirement. A British warship was brought to shell them out, and Indian infantry was moved up to the attack. Some confusion took place among the Turks, part of whom were apparently anxious to surrender, while others continued their resistance, but eventually the whole body was disposed of. It was here that the body of Major von den Hagen was discovered, and among his equipment was a white flag, the purpose of which has been much discussed. Unless it was intended merely for signalling purposes it must have been designed for use in case of surrender—surely the last refinement of warlike preparation—or as a means of treachery. But it seems never to have been put to actual use of any kind, and the dead may therefore have the benefit of such a doubt.

With the destruction of this last party of Turks the fighting came to an end. The British losses, all told, were only 110 killed and wounded. On the Turkish side 600 prisoners were taken, and in all the Turks probably lost more than 3,000 men. The greater part of their army, however, they succeeded in withdrawing unhampered to Palestine, and many reasons were afterwards offered why no serious effort was made to pursue and destroy them. It was said that until the Turkish detachment near Tussum had been ejected from its entrenchments on the 4th, it was impossible for the British force to move either from Ismailia or from Serapeum and attack the Turkish camp. On the other hand, it is not disputed that the British were in greatly superior strength, so that there was no lack of men for the pursuit, and aeroplane reconnaissance must have made it known that no serious attack was impending at this time at any other section of the Canal. For the same reason it is scarcely possible to suppose that comparative weakness in mounted men deterred the British from the pursuit, nor, as has already been said, is it conceivable that the Turkish attack near Tussum had not been anticipated long before. The fact seems to have been that the British had from the first determined on their settled policy for the defence of the Canal, and that they intended, while repulsing all attacks, to resist every temptation themselves to take the offensive and carry the war into the desert. The history of desert warfare, of which the British have had many and sometimes bitter experiences, shows that it makes heavy demands on even the most experienced troops, and it may have been



What the Turks had to cross in order to attack the Suez Canal: Typical desert land on the eastern side of the Canal. [*Topical Press.*

thought desirable not to allow forces who had had so little experience of any kind of warfare to become entangled in desert operations with an enemy who, whatever his defects, had come across one hundred miles of desert with a considerable force, was armed with more guns than had been expected, and was very formidable for his military qualities.

A SETTLED POLICY OF CAUTION.

The view that a settled policy of caution accounts almost wholly for the unhampered withdrawal of the Turks is borne out by all the other incidents which took place on the Canal during the winter months. In no instance does there seem to have been any serious design to pursue and cut off the enemy. Thus, towards the end of March a party of about a thousand Turks approached the southern end of the Canal, opposite Suez. They were driven off by British artillery fire on March 22nd, and encamped about eight miles east of the Canal. On the following day Sir George Younghusband marched from Suez, attacked and routed them; but afterwards they made good their retreat. This decision to allow the Turks to break themselves against the defences of the Canal, but not to run the hazard of manœuvres in the desert, may have been inconsistent with the rule which enjoins that the enemy should be relentlessly pursued when his attack has been broken; but it was justified by the special circumstances of the time and place, and it was eminently characteristic of a nation which was feeling its way through a great war, improvising new armies, and not only fitting them for their tasks but, in Egypt at least, fitting their tasks to them.

The repulse of the Turks was largely the work of the Indian troops. There were also in the action two companies of the Canterbury battalion of the New Zealand force, the 19th Battery of the East Lancashire Territorial Artillery—Bolton men, who had four or five wounded among them—and the Fifth Battery of Egyptian Artillery; the captain of the Egyptian battery afterwards received the Military Cross for his services, and the same honour was awarded to a member of the native Medical Corps attached to the battery. The vigour and decision with which the attack was driven back were as creditable to the troops engaged as were the measures taken for the defence of the Canal to the staff who settled them. Criticism of the handling of the situation after the retirement began falls to the ground, of course, if the explanation is that which has been suggested. The precise objects of the Turkish enterprise must remain a mystery. It was certainly a mad adventure, which escaped with much less punishment than it deserved, and it was foredoomed to failure. But it would be unfair not to admit that the Turks did much better than was expected of them: that they transported guns, pontoons and water supply for a large force over the desert without difficulty, laid their plans with some skill, fought a stubborn action under most difficult conditions, and carried their guns, their wounded, and the bulk of their army back to Palestine and safety. If, as Djemal Pasha said, he had conducted a reconnaissance, it should certainly have been an instructive one. He must have learnt not a little about the difficulties of the desert and how to overcome them, and certainly he had discovered much about the strength of the defences of the Suez Canal.



A view of the Aisne. [*E.N.A.*

CHAPTER XIV.

THE GREAT FRENCH RECOVERY.

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE EAST FRONT AND ITS IMPORTANCE—THE OPERATIONS ROUND NANCY—A GREAT RECOVERY—GENERAL JOFFRE AS ARMY REFORMER—SWEEPING CHANGES—THE PROBLEM OF MUNITIONS IN FRANCE—THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL JOFFRE.

THE popular view in England of the Western operations tended, at any rate in the first few months of the war, to do much less than justice to the French. Over the greater part of the front a close veil was dropped, which was not lifted until after Christmas, and the only part of the campaign about which there was a regular, if somewhat scanty, supply of information was the extreme west wing, in which the British army was conspicuous. Seeing in this section of the front the British army acting decisively at each of the turning points of the war, it was natural perhaps that the uninstructed in this country should mistake the part for the whole, and even speak as though the British army was carrying on its shoulders the main burden of defending France. This false and, to the French, most unfair view was encouraged by the prevailing ignorance about the size of the British army. The popular guesses at its numbers were all widely in excess of the truth. At Mons there were not more than 50,000 British in the fighting line, and at no time before the spring did our effectives much exceed 150,000 men. In numbers, therefore, our army was never more than a very small fraction of the total forces engaged, and it says much for its quality that the fraction should have had so considerable an influence in the opening months of the war. The British Expeditionary Force was undoubtedly the highest-trained and in some ways the best-equipped of all the armies engaged in France and Belgium; but it was after all only a section of one wing, and that, numerically, not the strongest wing. It did not save France. The French, helped by the British, saved France.

Attention has been drawn from time to time (Vol. I., p. 117 and p. 384) to the importance of the operations on the eastern front. The early operations in Alsace, designed to hamper the German turning movement through Belgium, not only failed in that object, but were so incompetently conducted that the general was relieved of his command. A fresh beginning was made on August 14th, under General Pau, but in the meantime the French had suffered their severe defeat at Morhange, in Lorraine, and on August 28th the Alsace army was broken up and reduced to a mere garrison holding the region of Thann and the Vosges. The defeat in Lorraine was the first indication that there was something seriously wrong with the French army. It took place on August 22nd, two days before the defeat at Charleroi, which led to the retreat from Mons; and while the Anglo-French army was falling back in Northern France before the Germans advancing from Belgium, the Eastern French Armies were in difficulties that at one time were even more serious. The Northern Army, broken at Charleroi, could still retire south provided the Germans did not get round its left wing, where the British were stationed. But had these eastern defences broken down nothing could have saved it. The Germans would have been round on its line of retreat, Paris must have fallen, and the main French army would have been surrounded. The Germans, in fact, planned a double encircling movement, one by the north and west, the other by the south-east. That the first movement failed was due to the stubbornness of the British army, and to the skilful application in the strategy of General Joffre of the doctrine of "detached reserves." (Vol. I., p. 145.) That the easterly envelopment failed was due to the army of Nancy, and to the ability of General Castelnau. And the achievement on this eastern front was the more remarkable because the army which



A postal waggon delivering the mails at a French artillery camp. [*Central News.*



A French artillery camp in the Woevre. [*Central News.*

accomplished it began with a bad defeat--probably the worst suffered by France in the war. The merits of the French recovery on the west have been generally recognised, and our national vanity has not been slow to assign even more than its due share of the credit to the presence there of the British army. But the recovery in the east was quite as remarkable, and these operations, whose merits have been very imperfectly understood as yet in England, are the subject of the first part of this chapter.

THE INVASION OF FRENCH LORRAINE.

The retreat from the defeat in Lorraine was covered by the Twentieth French Army Corps, which did the same service as the British army did in the west after the defeat of Charleroi, and at enormous cost to itself. It is not the German way ever to remain content with the repulse of an attack, and after the retirement of the French from Lorraine the victors invaded France in four columns. One column advanced southwards from Metz, along the valleys of the Moselle and the Seille; a second and stronger column came from Saverne--better known in England as Zabern (name of evil reputation)--through Chateau Salins. Both these columns were directed against Nancy. The two other columns started from Strassburg; one crossed the frontier near Blamont, and moved on Lunéville, and the other crossed the Vosges and penetrated into France through St. Dié, and besieged or rather blockaded Epinal. At no time was Epinal in any danger, though in the early spring of 1915 it was still, like Belfort, in a "technical" state of siege. The danger came from the operations of the first three columns against Nancy and Lunéville.

THE GREAT CROWN OF NANCY.

After the war of 1870, France was forbidden to build fortifications within a certain distance of the frontier for a period of forty years, and Nancy came within this prohibition. Two or three years ago, this period having then expired, the French began to fortify the heights round the town, and the outbreak of war found these works just approaching completion. They made a great semi-circle round the east side of the city of an average radius from its centre of some twelve miles. On the north side the arc began near Mont Sainte Geneviève, sixteen miles from the city; it curved through the Forest of Champenoux across the Plateau d'Amance, overlooking at a height of 1,200 feet the plain over which the French armies came back after their defeat at Morhange, and thence continued to Dombasle, about ten miles south-east of Nancy. This semi-circle of hills was known as the Grand Couronne of Nancy, on which it is the boast of the French Army of the East that no German ever set foot in this war.

The German invaders advanced with great rapidity. Lunéville was occupied on August 22nd. A detachment crossed the Meurthe and pushed towards Mirecourt, but the main body turned north and attacked the Grand Couronne at the height of Le Rembêtant, near Dombasle. The other columns attacked the Couronne from the north side. Le Rembêtant suffered badly from the German artillery fire, but at no point did the attack make any impression. The defence of the Plateau d'Amance was particularly skilful, and the heavy guns were so well concealed on the summit that they were never located in the course of a long and terrific bombardment by big guns brought up from Metz, and their fire was never subdued. The losses of the infantry in the attacks were extremely heavy, and have been put as high as 20,000 in the Amance district alone, and most of them fell on the Bavarian regiments. After the repulse of the infantry attacks, General Castelnau made a counter-attack from the plateau, and drove back the eastern columns through the Forest of Champenoux, across the Seille. The southern column had to fall back on Lunéville.

The attacks were renewed in the beginning of September, but with no better success, in spite of an attempt on September 6th by the White Cuirassiers of the Imperial Guard to storm Amance. On September 11th, the French advanced and took the village of Champenoux, which lies on the far side of the forest of that name, and on the following day Lunéville, which had been held by the Germans for nearly a month, was evacuated. Nancy was safe; and not only Nancy, but Paris, for the battle of the Marne had now been fought and won. Yet even the Marne would not have relieved Paris of all danger had Nancy fallen. For there would still have been nothing to prevent the Germans from pushing through the Gap of Mirecourt and attacking Paris from the south-east. Moreover, had the Germans appeared on this side, the whole strategy of the French would have been hopelessly compromised. No wonder that General Joffre's instructions to General Castelnau were to hold the Grand Couronne at all costs. Yet in the first few days of the war there had been talk of evacuating Nancy, and a semi-official statement was put out that a German occupation of the town need cause no alarm, as it would have no importance. It is hardly conceivable that such a statement should have been put out on military authority, and it almost looks as though its inspiration were the desire on the part of commercial interests to save themselves against prospective loss should the city be the centre of military operations.

Nancy had been an "open town" for a generation, and there may have been those who desired that it should remain so even if the Grand Couronne had to be sacrificed. But whatever backing such a policy may have had elsewhere, it had none in Nancy itself. The city authorities and the people of the town were most anxious that it should be defended to the last. In this respect, Nancy contrasts most favourably with Lille. At Lille "the Mayor and other civil authorities strongly opposed General Percin's efforts to defend the town, telegraphed to Paris demanding that he should be ordered to stop the measures of defence, and finally succeeded in getting him withdrawn, and Lille declared an open town."* The circumstances, however, it is but fair to remember, were not quite the same in the two cases. Lille lends itself very well to defence, but its old fortifications had been dismantled, whereas Nancy had just been equipped before the war with an excellent system of defence works. Still, an obstinate defence of Lille, though it might not have arrested the German advance on Paris, would certainly have increased its difficulties, and the town would not have suffered much more than it actually did under the German occupation.

GERBÉVILLER.

Few details of the fighting round Lunéville and across the Meurthe have reached this country, but it is known to have been very severe. Near Gerbéviller an exceedingly promising French attack was most tragically ruined by the fire of its own artillery--unhappily not the only instance in this war. The Germans were strongly entrenched on high ground, near the Mortagne river, on the road to Lunéville. There were three lines of trenches--

* The Paris Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, March 22, 1915.



German soldiers in the woods on the banks of the Aisne. [*Central News.*




German prisoners being marched through a ruined French village. [*Topical Press.*

the first one hundred yards in advance of the road, the second on the road, and the third at the edge of a wood which backs the road. The wood itself was full of trenches and dug-outs.

"The 222nd Reserve Regiment attacked this terrible position in a dense fog, having crossed the river by the footbridge during the night. It was arranged that the heavy French guns on the other side of the Mortagne should support the assault by bombarding the wood. The regiment, leaving two companies in reserve, crept up, covered by the fog, and carried the first German trench with a rush, bayoneting every man therein. They then without stopping carried the second line on the road, the defenders sharing a like fate. Then with another irresistible rush they hurled themselves on the wood, swept over the first trenches, and penetrated a long way in attacking the dug-outs and bayoneting every man they met.

"Success seemed assured, when one of those tragedies which are sometimes unavoidable in war overwhelmed the 222nd Regiment. The heavy artillery, which had been ordered to support the attack by bombarding the wood as soon as the first line of trenches had been carried, suddenly opened a terrible and destructive bombardment. No one believed that the attack would be carried through with such irresistible *élan* that all three lines of trenches would be carried at one wave of the advance. The high explosive shells, charged with melinite, fell with awful effect amongst the French who had won the Bois de la Paxe. Terrible cries arose through the fog. The Germans, strongly reinforced, reoccupied the first two trenches. For some time it looked as if the French would be driven right into the Mortagne. However, the Germans, badly knocked about and exposed likewise to a heavy artillery fire, did not follow up their success.

The two French reserve companies retired slowly and dug shelter trenches 200 yards down the slope from the first German trench, which remained unoccupied. The ground on the far side of the Mortagne was held until the final German retirement."



The country round Nancy.

But this was not the only tragedy associated with the name of Gerbéviller. The conduct of the German column south of Lunéville was as bad as anything that happened in Belgium, and the desolation of the countryside by the war in this part of French Lorraine probably surpassed anything to be seen west of Poland. Every yard seems to have been shot to pieces. The ground is pock-marked by shell fire, and it was possible for months afterwards to trace the course of a battle by the deformities of the landscape. The Germans, there is reason to believe, lost much more heavily here than in any battles of the war until Ypres. But no fury of battle could excuse the cruelties of the Bavarian Highlanders, who did most of the fighting on this section of the front. At Gerbéviller they were seen at their worst. It is (or was) a small town of about 1,500 inhabitants, with a fine chateau situated, not like the chateaux in other parts of France, outside, but right in the centre of the town. The River Mortagne divides the town in two. On August 24th it was in French hands. The chateau had been converted into a hospital, where Soeur Julie, afterwards decorated by the French President with the Cross of the Legion of Honour, nursed both French and German wounded with equal care, and the two bridges over the river were held by seventy Chasseurs. They had barricaded the bridges, and in order to make the enemy think that they were in great numbers they moved about on bicycles, and kept firing from different parts of the town. The strategem succeeded. The enemy, who was in considerable force, delayed the attack with his infantry and began to bombard the town. It was two in the morning when they arrived, and seven in the evening before they ventured to cross the bridges, by which time the Chasseurs, who had suffered only slight losses, made good their retreat, having gained a day for the retreat of their main body. Whether mortified at having been held up for so long by so few men, and desiring to conceal from their commander what had really happened, or disbelieving that so few could have accomplished the feat of holding up a whole German regiment for a whole day, the Germans on entering the town immediately began to arrest and shoot the inhabitants, accusing them of being *francstireurs*. The houses that the bombardment had spared were sprayed with petroleum and fired. The soldiers began to loot indiscriminately. "This is what we do" said two German officers, "to civilians who fire on our soldiers." That the civil population of the town sat with folded arms while the Chasseurs were conducting their defence is not to be supposed; but there is not a scrap of evidence that any civilians actually fired on the enemy, and even if some did, there was no justification for collective punishment of the whole town for acts of a few unauthorised individuals. Nor could anything justify the dragging of frightened old men out of the cellars of their houses and murdering them in cold blood. In addition, some forty-seven "hostages," so-called, seized when the Germans entered the village, were shot. Only the courage of Sister Julie saved such few buildings as escaped the fire. A German officer went the round of the hospital, turning down the bedclothes to see that the men were really wounded. "I could not," said Sister Julie afterwards, "allow them to kill my wounded, and told them that they had no business to act as they had done.



French artillery advancing into position. [*Graphic Photo Union.*



French Chasseurs get a lift on their way to the trenches. [*Graphic Photo Union.*

They insisted on coming in and going all over my hospital, and then they agreed to let it alone. But I had to protest with them again, as they wanted to set fire to the rest of the street, and that would probably have meant the destruction of the hospital as well. Eventually I and the three sisters with me had their wounded to look after, as well as our own. It was a hard trial to Christian charity, but we did it."

SUCCESS NOT FOLLOWED UP.

By the defence of Nancy the Army of the East had brilliantly redeemed its early failures. But some of the benefits of these successes were lost later in September by the German occupation of St. Mihiel and of the Camp des Romains, on the Heights of the Meuse, which has already been described (Vol. I., p. 267), and it is greatly to be regretted that General Joffre had not sufficient men at his command to follow up the repulse of the German attacks on Nancy. Not that it would have been wise to attempt again the invasion of German Lorraine. France had already paid a sufficiently heavy penalty for her slavish imitation—with inferior resources in men, material, and organisation—of the German policy of attack. But it would seem that much could have been done at this time by a bold counterstroke on the Woevre Plain. Holding the Germans on the front—and that required no elaborate defensive works of bricks and mortar, but only entrenchments—the French might have swept north of the Woevre, broken up the investment of Verdun on its north side, and perhaps have attacked the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne Forest. That would have been a movement exactly parallel to the transference of the British army from the Aisne to Flanders. It would have exposed the German main armies in France to a simultaneous attack on both its flanks, and had it made any sort of progress it might have defeated the German plan of entrenching themselves in Champagne. For this plan depended for its chances of success on two conditions—first, the security of the right flank of the armies in Belgium and Picardy, and, secondly, the maintenance of its position in the valley of the Meuse; and combined movements into Flanders and down the Meuse would have threatened the German strategy at its two weakest points. It may have been that but for the losses incurred during the ill-considered advance into Lorraine this plan would have been possible. As it was, the French army was much too weak to begin an aggressive movement on both flanks at once. It needed a period of rest for reorganisation. The experience of the first two or three months of war had revealed grave faults; and before any ambitious strategic scheme of attack could be thought of, some very thorough-going reforms were necessary. General Joffre was probably not altogether sorry at the approach of winter, which made it possible for his army to entrench itself securely and prepare for the resumption of the offensive in the spring.



General Foch.



General de Castelnau.

THE REJUVENATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

It was now that General Joffre's greatness began to show itself. Hitherto he had appeared as a cool and patient commander, who had shown himself capable of building up a new strategy out of the ruins of the old. He was now to appear in the new and even more difficult part of army reformer. It has been given to few commanders to be great alike in the broad, clear thinking which makes the strategist and in the mastery of detail




The new French armies: Conscripts and volunteers waiting to enrol for service. [*Photopress.*



German troops in the trenches along the Aisne. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*

and singleness of purpose which are necessary to anyone who attempts to reform an army in the face of the enemy. But General Joffre is one of these few. His reforming work in the winter of 1914-15 will probably be recognised when the full story of it can be told as the best proof of his military capacity and of his strength of character. At present his work as a reformer is known only in outline. At the time no hint of it ever reached this country. People here had no conception of the gravity of the problems which he had to solve; and they saw in the long winter months of trench warfare, in which neither side advanced or retired, except here and there a mile, either a stalemate, only to be relieved by the arrival of British reinforcements in the spring, or evidence of a planless hesitation and indecision. In reality it was the period of a great military recovery, more remarkable because so much more rarer in war than victories in the field.

The gravest faults had shown themselves in the higher commands of the French army. An official retrospect, published in the spring, in its enumeration of the causes of the great French defeat at Morhange, mentioned among them "the default of certain units." The phrase hides perhaps the most serious fact in the early history of the war. The units which "defaulted" belonged to the Fifteenth Army Corps, who at a critical moment in the battle either failed to stand their ground or refused to obey the order to advance—it is not clear which. What does seem to be clear is that these units had been ordered to advance without being properly protected by artillery, and therefore with the certainty of being cut to pieces. "The officers were stupefied at the order, and refused to send their men to certain death to no purpose.* Coming after the fiasco of the first French invasion of Alsace, for which the general was relieved of his command, this incident raised the gravest doubts about the capacity of the higher ranks in the French army. Nor were these two examples the only ones. The leading in the battle of Charleroi was bad. "There were in this affair," said the French Retrospect in the spring, "individual and collective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy, divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments and precipitate retreats, a premature waste of men, and finally the inadequacy of certain of our corps and of their leaders in the use of both infantry and artillery. In consequence of these lapses, the enemy, turning to account the difficult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from the advantages which the superiority of his subaltern cadres gave him." Censure could hardly be stronger; and it is clear that in the early months of the war there must have been a serious breakdown in the higher ranks of the French army. "Long before war broke out," General Joffre is reported as saying, in an interview suppressed at the time but afterwards republished in the most famous of French provincial newspapers, "I had realised that a great number of our generals were worn out and tired. Some I found absolutely unfit, absolutely unequal to their task, and about others I had grave doubts. I had made it clear that I intended to replace these worn-out and unsuitable members of our General Staff by younger officers; and in spite of all the obstacles that were then laid across my way to frustrate



General Maunoury. [*Record Press.*



General D'Amade. [*Central News.*

* Paris Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, March 22, 1915. Later this corp, under better leadership, undoubtedly distinguished itself.



The war on German territory: Alpine Chasseurs removing a German frontier post in Alsace.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

such a plan, I should have seen it through. But the war came too soon. . . . I admit that in this war a few of our generals in whom I had confidence did not come up to my expectations, for the real leader of men mostly reveals himself during actual war only, and not on parade during peace. The keenest intelligence and the widest knowledge are of no use unless they are combined with the gift of resolute action. . . . Responsibility in war is often such as to leave men of otherwise great merit and inherent qualities and power quite helpless."

Such were the first difficulties that faced General Joffre. A kindly man, and with the Southern Frenchman's warmth of personal friendship, he can have found no task more painful than this weeding of the incompetent or worn-out men from the higher commands. He allowed no friendship, no personal feeling to stand between him and what he believed to be his duty to France. As a result of his purge, the average age of general officers in the French army was lowered by ten years. At the end of the winter more than three-fourths of the officers commanding armies and army corps were less than sixty years of age. His task was simplified by the fact that for three years, as a result of his reforms, some of the higher regimental commands had been duplicated. Every French cavalry and infantry regiment had two colonels, and there was thus a reservoir of officers used to command from which to draw upon to fill vacancies in the higher ranks. The difficulty of filling the lower commissioned ranks was not so great as in the German and the British army. In both there is a caste division between the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks. Not so in the French army, which is the most genuinely democratic in spirit in Europe. Promotion from the ranks was frequent, and indeed there was no reason why it should not be, seeing that the commissioned ranks in the French army were not separated from the rank and file by any differences of education, of wealth, or of social status.

REPAIRING THE WASTAGE OF WAR.

The next problem before General Joffre was to repair, so far as was possible, the wastage of war. First, all men of the contingents between 1889 and 1909, that is, men between twenty-five and forty-seven, who had hitherto been exempted from service, were called up. Secondly, local committees were appointed to hold musters of the men of military age exempted from field service, and engaged in some auxiliary service of the army, in order to detect the shirkers and draft them into the fighting force. Lastly, all the reservists between the ages of twenty-six and forty who had hitherto escaped active service were called to the colours; and in addition the 1915 contingent, which ordinarily would not have been called up till the autumn of that year, were already in training in December of 1914. By these means a new army was created, ready for the spring, of nearly a million men; and with the prospect of a British army rising to a million or more, spring had fewer anxieties so far as the supply of men was concerned.

But it was not enough to raise the men; a more serious difficulty was to equip them. A correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, writing on January 3rd, says that already on that date appeals had been issued to every industry capable of supplying equipment to the army. At the same time, immense preparations were made for

increasing the manufacture of guns and ammunition. The following passage from the correspondent of the Zurich paper is interesting as showing that the French at the beginning of the year were hard at work on the problem of munitions, which in England did not obtain public notoriety until three or four months later.

> "The arms of the new units are being manufactured at full speed by all the branches of the armament industry. A veritable trial of strength is being carried out by the great metallurgical works which supply the material for the artillery. Only last June attention was drawn by General Maitrot and then Senator Hombert to the lack of heavy artillery in the French army. At that time only a few batteries of the 150 mm. (6-inch) gun of the Rimailho type were in existence. Immediately the French set to work to create within a few months a completely new heavy artillery—something between the Rimailho and the 75 mm. field gun—and this artillery has already taken part in the fighting and given excellent results. Week after week new batteries are being sent to the front. It is especially in the matter of artillery ammunition that almost fabulous results have been achieved. All factories and works in any way connected with the steel and iron industry have been turned into manufactories of shells and grenades. . . . The chief aim is to be in a position, when the decisive moment comes, to pour out a rain of shells "as from a watercan" on the enemy's position without need for economy."

In no direction did the energies of the French manufacturers yield better results than in the equipment of the great fortresses. It is believed—naturally the details are not made public—that the fortifications of Verdun and their armament have been largely remodelled since the beginning of the war. The fate of the Belgian fortresses, and in particular the fate of Namur, which had such serious effects on the plans of defence in Northern France, naturally made the French extremely anxious for the safety of their great line of fortresses along the Heights of the Meuse, on which, even more than on the successful defence of the northern frontier, the safety of France depended. The French Staff was not slow to grasp the lessons of the Belgian failures. They saw, in the first instance, that no strength of defence could make up for the lack of guns of long range, and they re-armed such of the French forts as were deficient in this respect. Secondly, they saw that the best protection for fortress guns was not masonry and steel cupolas, but concealment, frequent change of position, and mobility. Lastly, they saw that the right use of forts was as bases for the operations of a field army, and not as shelters against the fury of a storm of fire which had been allowed to come near and break over them. Nowhere are these principles more clearly recognised than at Verdun, whose defence in this war will probably go down to history as a classic example of the right use of forts in a system of national defence.

All through the winter faith in General Joffre steadily grew. "Besides his military qualities," said a shrewd Swiss observer at the beginning of 1915, "it is his strength of character, his doggedness, and the moral authority which he inspires that deserve our admiration."

> "It was only he who was in a position to prevent a disaster after the battle of Charleroi by inspiring the entire army with the conviction that the retreat was an intentional move and pursued with the object of placing the storming Germans between the two blades of a pair of scissors. The army believed him, and not only was a fight avoided, but the strategical manœuvre was crowned with complete success. Thanks to this moral authority, which has become still more profound since then, he has succeeded in making the French soldiers adapt themselves to the war of positions, which has ever been a speciality of General Joffre in his capacity of engineer. It is still owing to his personal influence if in the present phase, when the strategical operations are paralysed and the armies are condemned to inactivity, the officers and men do not give vent to their native temperament, but are waiting patiently for the moment when Joffre considers it at last opportune to act.
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> "His firm character is also revealed in his attitude towards incapable leaders. Since Joffre has been in supreme command he has dismissed or replaced no fewer than seventy-seven generals—a number which has since then probably increased. Of all the political generals and corps commanders—that is, those who owed their places to the good offices of politicians—only one has remained, General Sarrail, who has exhibited high strategical abilities. The slightest error in the leading of the troops is severely punished, and the number of high officers treated in this way amount to 150.
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> "This hecatomb of political generals has not been effected without some resistance. But Joffre remained obstinate, and when a high personage one day asked him to cancel a certain order he categorically declared that should these efforts continue he would put his sword on the table. This was carefully noted for future guidance. To-day Joffre is the most popular man in France, and had he really tendered his resignation for reasons which could not long remain a secret there would have arisen a storm in the land which the Government would not have been able to resist."

As a strategist, his principal characteristic was his patience and his firm belief that the surest way to defeat an able and resolute enemy is not to try to imitate him, but to develop an opposing system of strategy and tactics which would feed his weakness and at the same time bring out all that is best in one's own national character.



British troops drawn up outside their billets before returning to the trenches.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*



French troops returning to their trenches in the Soissons district. [*Topical Press.*



Serving out winter coats to the English soldiers in France. [*Central News.*

CHAPTER XV.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE.

THE DIVISIONS OF THE BATTLE FRONT—THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH FLEET OFF THE COAST OF BELGIUM—THE BRITISH LINES—THE FIGHTING ROUND LA BASSÉE—LA BOISSELLE—SOISSONS—RHEIMS AND CHAMPAGNE—THE ARGONNE—VERDUN AND THE WOEVRE—THE ALSACE FRONT.

UP to the middle of November the campaigns in Belgium and France made a continuous and rapidly moving story, big with great events. But with the approach of winter the movement is arrested, and the flow of the war in the west no longer moves in a single broad channel, but breaks up in a delta of seemingly disconnected streams, like those rivers of Siberia that flow north and lose themselves in the frozen tundras on the shores of the Arctic Sea. In the trench warfare of the winter the excitement and passion of the summer is frozen stiff in an iron mould, like molten metal poured out of the furnace into a frosty air.

The chief interest of this winter campaign is not strategical or tactical, but moral; and its significance is to be found not in records of military movements—such movement as there was was never more than could be covered in half-an-hour's walk—but in the life of the soldiers in the trenches, and in the hard philosophy which sustained them in a reversal to the existence—short, brutish, and nasty—of primeval cave-man. Some description has already been given of this strange life, and in the next chapter a further account is given of the appearance of typical trenches on the west front. The object of this chapter is to give a general view of the opposing lines, and to take note of such operations as were of importance in the long winter that set in soon after the failure of the German attempts to force their way to Calais past Ypres. The result of all these operations was almost of necessity inconclusive, but some idea of their character, and of the condition in which they left the opposing lines, is necessary to an understanding of the military problems which presented themselves in the spring.


The length of the firing lines was more than 450 miles, and extended from the sea near Ostend—a few hours from Dover—to the Vosges mountains and the Swiss Alps. A front so long cannot be envisaged as a whole, and it is necessary for the sake of clearness to divide it into its several sections, each of which has fairly well-marked distinguishing characteristics. The battle front divides naturally into three parts, a Western, a Southern, and an Eastern; and each front in its turn is divisible in three sections—a left and a right wing and a centre. The divisions may be set out thus:—

(A) THE WESTERN FRONT, extending from Nieuport, near Ostend, to the junction of the Oise and the Aisne.

- (i.) *The Left Wing*, from the sea to Ypres. Held by French and Belgian troops, flanked by the British fleet. Flat, sandy, intersected with canals.
- (ii.) *The Centre*, from Ypres to La Bassée. Held exclusively by the British. Damp clayey soil, enclosed country, flat, with isolated hills.
- (iii.) *The Right Wing*, from the neighbourhood of La Bassée to Compiègne. Dry, well wooded, warmer soil.

(B) THE SOUTHERN FRONT, extending from Compiègne to the Argonne. Held entirely by French.

- (i.) *The Left Wing*, along the valley of the Aisne, through Soissons to Rheims. Rolling country, chalky soil.
- (ii.) *The Centre*, from Rheims across the Champagne and up the valley of the Suippe to the Forest of Argonne. Flat plateau, light, chalky soil.
- (iii.) *The Right Wing*. The Forest of Argonne. Heavy clayey soil, rolling hills. Thickly wooded, roads and communications few.



The Battle-front in the West.

(C) THE EASTERN FRONT. Again held in its entirety by the French. From Verdun to Belfort.

(i.) *The Left Wing.* The great bastion round the fortress of Verdun, curving like the top loop of a note of interrogation, with a hollow made by the German lines round St. Mihiel.

(ii.) *The Centre.* The plain of the Southern Woevre, south of St. Mihiel to Pont-a-Mousson to Nancy and Lunéville. The Woevre is an undulating plain of woods and meres, intersected by deep cloughs, known locally as rupts, *e.g.*, the Rupt de Mad. Round Nancy the country is hilly.

(iii.) *The Right Wing.* The crests of the Vosges mountains overlooking Alsace, crossing the German frontier opposite Munster to the lower spurs of the Vosges, and re-crossing to Belfort, near Thann.

Something more must be said of most of these parts, for each of them has an interest of its own, and each presents problems that are distinctive.

THE OPERATIONS ON THE BELGIAN SEABOARD.

The strength of the Belgian army after its reorganisation was about 150,000 men, which, with some assistance from the French, held the line of the Yser from its sea coast to near Ypres. No serious attempt was made by the Germans during the winter to cross the Yser by the coast road. There was, however, a very general popular expectation in this country at the beginning of the winter that the Allies might make a forward movement along the coast in conjunction with the British fleet. It was even thought possible that a force might be landed under cover of its guns, and that in this way the German flank might be turned. At one time the Germans took this danger very seriously, and began a series of very elaborate fortifications along the sand dunes from Ostend to the

Dutch frontier. It is conceivable that important results might have been achieved by a landing near the Dutch frontier, but the operation would have been a very hazardous one, with the Germans holding Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges; and the Allies, even if they had men available at that time—which is doubtful—were wise not to take risks, unless the Belgians had been in a position to take the offensive along the coast, which they certainly were not. The operations of the fleet were much less ambitious in their object.

"The flotilla was organised" says Admiral Hood, in his report on the naval operations in October and November, "to prevent the movement of large bodies of German troops along the coast roads from Ostend to Nieuport, to support the left flank of the Belgian army, and to prevent any movement by sea of the enemy's troops." In these objects the flotilla succeeded for a time, though not without suffering loss; but as the enemy succeeded in mounting heavy guns on the coast, the older battleships, like the *Venerable*, took part in the work. The fleet did not, however, succeed in preventing the Germans from forming a submarine base at Zeebrugge, and the net result of the operation was to confirm the generally accepted view that battleships can accomplish nothing very serious against shore batteries unless there is an army ready to co-operate with their work.

THE BRITISH LINES.

Ypres, the scene of the terrible fighting at the end of October and the beginning of November, was taken over by the French on November 17th, and a few days later was subjected by the Germans to a bombardment which destroyed most of what the previous fighting had spared. The assistance of the French at Ypres considerably shortened the British lines, which were now divided into two equal portions by the River Lys. The northern section of the British lines ran through broken and rolling country, in which the Germans, generally speaking, occupied the higher and the British the lower ground. That disadvantage was the legacy of the fighting round Ypres in October, when the Germans, it will be remembered, though they failed to break down the defences on the east, succeeded in driving a wedge into the British lines and occupying the wooded ridges which overlook the town from the south-east. Wytschaete and Messines are the principal positions on this ridge, the possession of which by the Germans was a constant annoyance to us all through the winter. An attack made on December 14th against one of the spurs of the Wytschaete position broke down with over 400 casualties, mainly in two Scotch regiments, and was not renewed.

South of Messines, which marks the western limit of this German indentation, our lines ran almost due south to the Lys, which they crossed at Houplines, just east of Armentières, which, like Ypres, suffered heavily from the German bombardment, and had a celebrated organ destroyed in the old church of St. Vaast. The floods, which were two or three miles broad east of Houplines, were as complete a protection to the German lines near the Lys as were the floods on the Yser to the Belgian army. About three miles north of Armentières the British trenches run through to Ploegsteert Wood, corrupted by the army to Plug Street, which, at first a treacherous bog, became later one of the few pleasant spots in the British lines. This was the British equivalent of the Argonne, and the only place in which our troops had any experience so far in the war of forest fighting.

But it was south of the Lys that the hard fighting took place. This district is a flat, water-logged plain, in which trench life was at its worst. Here, too, the Germans held the higher ground, running from La Bassée, where there are two considerable hills surrounded with mounds of slag, through Neuve Chapelle and Aubers, in a direction parallel to the Lys. Almost the only dry spot in the British lines on this section is at Givenchy, standing on rising ground, just opposite La Bassée. Between La Bassée and Givenchy is the famous "railway triangle" formed by the looplines running east from La Bassée and by the Bethune Canal. It is described as one of the most desolate and forbidding spots on the whole front.

> "The familiar poplar trees and the placid surface of the canal contrast with the trench-tormented ground, which is full of huge circular fortified holes, plots of barbed wire. The place is a warren of trenches, old and new. There are trenches built by the French, the Germans, and the British, abandoned and subsequently reoccupied, blown to pieces by mine and by shell fire, captured and recaptured in this amazing war in which armies appear to attach more importance to sentiment than to comfort. It is dotted with strange defensive works, such as keeps, which suggest the sixteenth rather than the twentieth century. It is pitted with shell-fire as the face of a person is pitted with small-pox. Water stands stagnant and fœtid in every shell-hole, every hollow. The gauntness of telegraph poles, here and there snapped in two by shell-fire and lying in a coil of telegraph line, the sinister mazes of wire entanglements, complete the panorama of desolation."*

Even "Eye-witness," incorrigible optimist as he is, can find nothing pleasant to say of this region. He compares the confused mass of trenches, crossing and re-crossing, to a huge gridiron. "A trench runs straight for some distance, then it suddenly forks in three or four directions. One branch merely leads to a ditch full of water, used in drier weather as a means of communication; another ends abruptly in a *cul-de-sac*, probably an abandoned sap-head; the third winds on, leading into galleries and passages further forward." When new ground is broken the spade turns up the dead. The life of the soldier is a "strange, cramped existence, with death always near . . . a life which has one dull, monotonous background of mud and water."

THE TWO BATTLES OF GIVENCHY.

There were two battles fought at Givenchy in the course of the winter. On December 18th, in the early morning, two Indian Divisions began an attack on the German positions opposite Givenchy. The Meerut Division, which was on the left, after capturing the enemy's advanced trenches, was heavily counter-attacked and forced to retire. In the meantime, the Lahore Division on the right had captured the position opposite, and not knowing, apparently, what had happened on its left had crammed as many men into the captured trenches as they would hold. When morning came they found themselves unsupported, with both flanks in the air. The ground behind them was swept with fire. Attempts to reach them broke down, and it was equally impossible for the Division to withdraw. There was nothing to be done but to hold on till nightfall, which was done, and the trenches were then evacuated. The next day, Sunday, the 20th, the Germans began a violent bombardment on the whole front occupied by the Indian Corps, and then followed it up with an attack on Givenchy. Part of the line on the left gave way, and the enemy even

* A *Times* Correspondent's description.

entered Givenchy. It was a very critical moment, for Givenchy was one of the most important points in the British line. The chief honour for the recovery of Givenchy belongs to the First Manchesters, who late in the evening advanced through the village and re-occupied the old support trenches. Again the same situation arose as had confronted the Lahore Division on the 18th. The Manchesters in the trenches were unable to go forward, and none of their reserves could move to them. They not only hung on all night, but at dawn they moved out to attack the enemy's trenches in front. The attack did not succeed, and the regiment was presently back in the support trenches, its left flank still exposed and its right unable to get into touch with its supports. The situation was serious, and in the afternoon the Manchesters fell back, having been in action continuously for twenty hours. Had they known that reinforcements were on their way, they might have held still longer to their positions. For on the day before Sir John French had ordered up first a brigade of the First Army Corps, then in general reserve, and later the whole corps up to the support of the Indian Corps. The position was recovered before dusk, but it was not until the night of the following day that the line was restored, and the regiments who had stood their ground when part of the line gave way early on Sunday were all relieved. The defaulting regiments seem to have been Gurkhas and Baluchis, and it is not to be wondered at that they broke down temporarily under conditions of war and climate so different from those to which they were accustomed. But as a whole the Indian troops, as Sir John French is careful to say without any qualification in his account of this unfortunate affair, fought with the utmost steadiness and gallantry.




British soldiers in the trenches in Flanders during the winter campaign. [*Photopress.*

A month later, on January 25th, the enemy were again in Givenchy, but our artillery fire had the effect of deflecting their line of advance, and they all crowded into the village on its north-eastern corner. Thence they penetrated into the centre of the town, where there was a stronghold known as a keep. (This trench war sometimes skipped more than the two centuries to the wars of position of Marlborough's days, and became mediæval.) On this occasion it went back further still. There was desperate hand-to-hand and house-to-house fighting. Some men fought with bayonets in their hands, others with bare fists, while "Eye-witness" tells a story of a man who entered a house occupied by eight Germans, bayoneted four, and captured the rest, all the time sucking at a short clay pipe. Before noon the village was again clear. More successful, however, was the German attack south of the canal, where the enemy drove in a part of our line, and though he was repulsed later, we had to be content with a position slightly in rear of our old trenches. In the following month there was some successful hand-to-hand fighting in the brickfields between the canal and railway.



A mouth organ provides a little music for the men in the trenches. [*Photopress.*

Throughout the whole of this winter fighting at La Bassée the British army suffered severely from the low-lying and swampy positions which it occupied. Its conditions were much worse than those of the enemy occupying the higher ground on the ridge overlooking the valley. Sir John French, in his despatch of February 2nd, allows himself the luxury, in which he rarely indulges, of general reflection, and points out the great difficulties of warfare under such conditions.



Givenchy and La Bassée.

"To cause anything more than a waste of ammunition long-range artillery fire requires constant and accurate observation; but this most necessary condition is rendered impossible of attainment in the midst of continual fog and mist.

"Again, armies have now grown accustomed to rely largely on aircraft reconnoissance for accurate information of the enemy, but the effective performance of this service is materially influenced by wind and weather.

"The deadly accuracy, range, and quick-firing capabilities of the modern rifle and machine gun require that a fire-swept zone be crossed in the shortest possible space of time by attacking troops. But if men are detained under the enemy's fire by the difficulty of emerging from a water-logged trench, and by the necessity of passing over ground knee-deep in holding mud and slush, such attacks become practically prohibitive owing to the losses they entail."

There were few moments of excitement, and still fewer brilliant passages, in the winter months on the front opposite La Bassée; what little movement there was was movement backwards. Yet the quality of the British army showed in no less favourable a light than amid the excitement of the opening months of the war. Nearly all armies will rise to great feats of endurance when nerves are strung up; but an even greater test for an army is its power to resist the depression of uneventful suffering, and perhaps no army in the world would have stood this test so well as the British. It emerged from a winter in the wet and the mud high-spirited still, and with no change of temper other than an added touch of impatience. There had been surprisingly little sickness—for which the country has to thank the sanitary and the medical services, whose work usually never finds a chronicler until the war is over, when people have grown so weary of its incidents that they forget to express their thanks.


On the west front, between La Bassée and Compiègne—the French right to our centre—there were some useful gains in the winter, of which perhaps the most important were the capture of Vermelles, south-west of La Bassée, and the pushing of the Germans back from Albert. This last success led to one of the most horrible passages in the whole history of war. Behind Albert, and hidden away in a fold of the ground, is the small village of La Boisselle. It was impossible for the French gunners to reach the place with their fire, and the only way of approach was by trench and sap. The French infantry sapped up the hill side (the ground all along this west front rises gradually towards the east), and then, early in January, reached the edge of the village. Contact was established with the enemy's trenches in the village churchyard, and there, through the rest of the winter into the spring, fighting went on amongst and in the tombs, sapping from grave to grave. (See page 157.)

THE BATTLE OF HILL 132.

Some of the most serious fighting of the winter took place along the stretch of the Aisne river held by the British in the last fortnight of September. Early in January the French attack opposite Soissons began to make very considerable progress. They worked their way up from the river along two valleys flanking one of the spurs with which the gentle slope of the hills running down to the river is ribbed. They captured Cuffies and Crouy, and the hill between them, marked on the official maps with the number 132, and they also gained a footing




The bombarded church at Albert. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Rheims Cathedral with sandbags piled round the lower portions of the front in order to protect the carvings from shell splinters. [*Central News.*

on the plateau at Vregny, which, when the British fought on this section of the front, had been the centre of the German position. Immediately behind is Anizy, an important railway junction, the loss of which would probably have forced the Germans to retire from their positions in the angle of the Aisne and the Oise, and to fall back on the Laon-La Fère line. General von Kluck was alarmed, and brought up heavy reinforcements from other points of the front—the excellent railway system within the German lines made their prompt concentration easy. He had hopes not only of checking the French advance, which was not in very great strength—perhaps three brigades or about 12,000 men—and had been pushed forward rather too rapidly, but also of effecting a capture and perhaps of breaking across the Aisne. With two army corps at command, it did not need much of Von Kluck's great ability as a tactician to force the French back from the plateau down to the river. Fortune favoured his projects. The weather was wet and stormy, and the Aisne rose very rapidly. First the bridge at Venizel and then the bridge at Missy was carried away. Night fortunately came down, and the engineers on the south laboured all night to construct a bridge at Missy. What followed was told in an article in the *Matin*, which seems to have had authentic information.



French dragoons advancing past an English outpost. [*Photopress.*

"The morning of the 13th saw the Missy bridge up, the engineers who had been working upon it having had their feet frozen whilst engaged upon their task. Immediately reinforcements and munitions began to pass across. But at twenty minutes past eight the bridge was again swept away. Thus the French forces were again separated from their main body. They had but fifty cartridges left, and they charged the Germans, fighting furiously with their bayonets and rifle butts. Practically the whole of the First German Army was engaged in a counter-attack, and the French were forced to a retirement, which they carried out in perfect order.

"German reinforcements continued to arrive from Laon, Verins, and Mézières. A hundred times the French charged; a hundred times they were forced back upon the ruined villages. Their orders then were to hold on. New bridges were being built, and on the other side of the river reserves impatiently awaited for the opportunity to cross.

"On the morning of the 14th the retreat began. The bridge had again been repaired, and would probably hold for an hour or two. Rapid action was necessary. The battery of artillery covering the retreat was reduced to its last four shells, with only six men to work the guns, the rest having been killed. As the last company crossed the river a young officer in charge of the battery, whose arm had been broken, gave the order to fire, and then rendered his guns useless as the French troops safely recrossed the Aisne."

The German account pays high testimony to the work of the French gunners in the advance to the plateau, but is curiously silent about the swollen river. It must be supposed that the bridges up stream stood, for they crossed the river apparently without difficulty and penetrated to the suburbs of Soissons, where, however, they never established themselves. Another version of the story current in France was that the bridges across the Aisne were destroyed not by the floods but by the German artillery. The net result of these operations which began so well for the French was that the whole of the ground won by the British at the Battle of the Aisne, and held by them for the last fortnight in September, was lost to the enemy.

THE OPERATIONS IN CHAMPAGNE.

East of Soissons is Rheims, persistently bombarded for eighty days in succession in the winter; on the edge, the plain of Champagne, to which the Germans attached such great importance. The remarkable operations which the French began in Champagne on February 15th, like the operations in the Woevre, belong rather to the spring than to the winter campaign, and they are best treated later in connection with the events which followed them. But their earlier stages round Perthes-les-Hurlus and Beausejour Farm have been described by the official British Observer with the French forces in a letter which gives the only good description of the day-to-day progress of active trench warfare that has yet appeared in this war. The whole value of the letter is in its detail, which does not lend itself easily to summary. But some idea of the character of trench war is conveyed by his map, which we give. These operations, it must be remembered, were amongst the most successful conducted



A battery of British field guns in action. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



French soldiers sharpening their bayonets in a village behind the firing lines.
Wyndham, Paris (C.N.)




Diagram to illustrate the Trench Fighting in Champagne.

by the French during the winter. The figures in the map are the dates of the month on which the lines to which they belong were won; the letters mark the points at which the fighting was particularly obstinate or interesting. "A," for example, is a little redoubt holding 500 men. It was first attacked by the French in January and retaken, except for the southern corner, where they held on for a fortnight. On February 16th and 17th it was taken and lost, retaken and lost again. On the 23rd the French were again in the fort, successfully repulsed five counter-attacks, and were turned out by the sixth On the 27th they took the whole of the fort except a piece of trench on the far side, and on the 29th they captured that too.

A similar history attaches to each of the letters. "Observer" will perhaps bear quoting on the history of "D."

> "At 'D' there are two woods; the southern we will call No. 3, the northern No. 4. On the 16th our Allies got a trench just south of No. 3; they got into the wood on the 18th, and fought backwards and forwards in the wood that day and all the 19th and 20th; by the evening of the 20th they had almost reached the northern edge. On the 21st a stronger counter-attack than usual was repulsed, and in pursuing the retiring enemy they secured the northern edge. On the 22nd there was more fighting in No. 3, but in the end the French managed to make their way into No. 4, as far as a trench which runs along a crest midway through the wood. The next six days saw continuous fighting in No. 4, sometimes near the northern end, sometimes at the crest in the middle, and occasionally back near the southern end. The French now hold the northern edge, and have pushed troops into the 'Square' wood just north of the line of the 25th."

The progress in this three weeks' fighting varied from 200 to 1,400 yards, and the total casualties on both sides in the same period cannot have been less than 50,000 or 60,000.

SOME OFFICIAL CALCULATIONS.

The winter campaign was a period of disillusionment for many in this country who had hoped for an early issue from the war. There were those who, when the retreat from the Marne began, had visions of a German




The horse lines in a British camp in the North of France. [*Central News.*



A Ghurka regiment returning to the trenches at La Bassée. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Indian troops baking native bread. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



From Compiègne to Rheims (page 147).

Sedan, in which the war would be dramatically ended by the interception of the main army in France by a converging movement on both flanks, or of a disastrous retreat through Belgium. When the retreating army dug itself in on the Aisne, and then with fresh reinforcements attempted on this firm pivot a new great turning movement through Belgium, taking Antwerp on its way, the earlier over-confidence gave way to depression which refused all the comforts of official optimism. Some measured up the cost of a mile gained here and there, and figured by a sum in simple proportion that the total cost even of driving the enemy back to his own country would be prohibitive, even in a war that has been more spendthrift of human life than any in history. They failed to see any signs of a definite strategic plan emerging through the operations of the winter. Between the official optimism and the hard facts of the situation they saw no correspondence, and the severity of the censorship spread scepticism of the accuracy and value of the official reports. Criticism was driven underground, and the people became the prey of rumour, extravagant alike in their gloom and again in their confidence of early victory, and swung uncertainly from depression to elation and back again.

Much the most valuable of all the official statements of the grounds of hope was the French Retrospect on the first six months of the war, published in March. The argument of this writer was that the Germans had wasted their resources in order to win the quick victory which was their only chance, and at the end of six months had entirely failed, and that the French, on the other hand, had conserved their resources by a defensive which was more economical of men, and had gradually all through the winter been accumulating power in men, supplies, and organisation, which, when the spring came, would carry them to victory. By the middle of January, Germany's losses on the two fronts were 1,800,000 men, excluding sick. The French critic assumed that of these 500,000 would be able to rejoin after being cured, and he therefore estimated the net losses at 1,300,000 men, or 260,000 per month. The entire resources of Germany in men amounted to nine millions, from which some half a million should be deducted for men employed on railways, in police, and in armament works, leaving a net total of 8,500,000. Of these, half were at the front at the end of the winter, and 1,300,000 had been lost. Deducting from the remainder inefficients and men of over 39 years of age, the writer arrived at the conclusion that Germany's untouched resources in 1915 would not amount to more than two millions, of which 800,000 might be immediately available, 500,000 in April, and another 700,000 (anticipating the 1916 and 1917 classes) before the end of the year. These resources would not enable Germany, at an average rate of loss of 260,000 a month, to do more than fill the gaps for eight months. He thus arrived at the conclusion that Germany had reached her maximum, would not be able to do more than maintain her standard of numbers for eight months, and then would begin to weaken. France, at the period at which he was writing, had more than 2,500,000 men at the front, with 1,250,000 in the depôts. In addition, there were the British and the Belgian armies, and the enormous untouched reserves of Russia. The time must come when the Allies would be in a decided numerical superiority. He further detected signs of growing inferiority in the German munitions, and with the whole world open to the Allies to draw upon and closed to Germany, thanks to British sea-power, he was confident that the German weakness in this respect would become more marked as time went on.

"We have before us two systems. The one, the German system, demanded a rapid success at the opening of the campaign—a success against France before the Russians could come upon the field, before the British reserves could intervene, before the economic trouble could make itself felt. Hence the creation in all haste of new corps. Whether or not they could be kept up for a long time, by predetermination the victory was to be immediate. Now this necessary victory the Germans did not have.

"The other system, the French system, consists, with the advantage of the freedom of the seas, in maintaining in good and complete form a number of sufficient formations, and in creating new ones only in the measure in which they can with certainty be kept up and suitably and durably equipped with regimental organisation. This system is established with a view to a prolonged war.


"Of these two systems which, after six months of trial, shall triumph? To put the question is to answer it. The Germans can no longer oppose us with forces superior to ours. They will therefore not be able to do in the future what they could not do in the past when they were one-third more numerous than ourselves."

"NIBBLING."

But would a superiority of, say, thirty per cent be sufficient to carry the German positions in Belgium and Northern France, which she had been fortifying assiduously for six months? The first answer to that question was the conviction, held very strongly both in the French and the British army, that a "moral superiority" had been established over the Germans, and in particular that the French regimental organisation was much superior to the German especially in its officers. The French regiment, according to the author of the Retrospect, had no fewer than forty-eight officers against the twelve to which the Germans had been reduced. The second answer was that enormous as the problem was of turning the Germans out of Belgium and France, it might not in reality be so insuperable as it was in appearance. The real depth of the German position in Flanders and Belgium was not the hundred miles which separated their existing lines from their own frontier, but something very much less. It was that of a number of belts representing the possible lines of defence that an enemy might take up in succession. The depth of the first line in Flanders was the distance between the German front and Menin, that being the railway junction on which the communications between the German army in the west depended, or about fifteen miles. Menin lost, the whole of the west front was gone, and the next line of defence would run from Antwerp along the Scheldt, through Le Cateau to La Fère. Behind that was the Antwerp-Brussels-Mons line, and behind that again the line of the Meuse. To force the enemy back from one line to the one behind it was sufficient to pierce it to a sufficient depth at any one point. That fact governed the strategy and tactics of General Joffre during the winter. He called it "nibbling," but there was no timidity or lack of decision in the policy. His aims were these:—

(1) By "nibbling" he meant an attack which, while it was not pressed to the ultimate issue of decisive success or failure, should make sufficient impression on the enemy's lines to encourage him to counter-attack in the hope of recovering what he had lost. These counter-attacks are always expensive of men, and General Joffre wished to feed the military faults of the enemy—his wastefulness of men and of material.

(2) The effect of this policy would be not indeed to break the enemy's lines, but to provide the Allies with a number of *points d'appui*, jumping-off places, from which a serious attempt to break his lines could be made in the spring at the right time and at the right place. Such *points d'appui* might be found in Flanders, French or Belgian, in Champagne, in the Woevre, or in Alsace, and by keeping the enemy in doubt at which of these places the serious attempts to break his line were most likely to be made, General Joffre hoped to encourage him to resist at all points, and so fail to retain decisive superiority at any; to keep him in a general state of apprehension all along the line, so that the task of the attack in effecting a concentration at the chosen spot and breaking through might be rendered much more likely of accomplishment. The great advantage of attack is that it can choose its objective. General Joffre's strategy was designed to put the Allies in a position to utilise that advantage when the time came, and his tactics to encourage the enemy to weaken his strength in counter-attacks for the recovery of lost points that might or might not be of importance.



General Joffre and King Albert at the headquarters of the Belgian army in Flanders.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

Such were the ideas that governed General Joffre's conduct of the operations in the winter. There was nothing heroic about them; they were frankly Fabian, and looked to the power of delay, wisely used, as one of the great military assets of France. Yet no one knew better the importance of striking hard than General Joffre, the most patient and the least typically French, according to conventional ideas of the Frenchman, of all the generals in the west. And all the time he gives the impression of being in full revolt against the domination of German ideas in the profession of arms, and of seeking to defeat the alien occupation of Northern France not by borrowing and adapting German military principles

and methods, but by developing a distinctively national and French military system. It was the copyists of German ideas of strategy that made the disaster in Lorraine early in the war, but the Marne was won through military tactics which are anathema to German military theorists.

THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL FRENCH STRATEGY.

History seems to teach that every nation must have its own national strategy if it is to achieve the greatest success in war of which it is capable. For years French military thought had been purely imitative of Germany; its preoccupation had been how best to adapt German ideas to French needs and conditions. Joffre broke with that tendency. Instead of offering a French copy to the German original, he was revealed developing a genuinely national system of strategy. In an earlier chapter of this work (Vol. I., page 111) passages were quoted from "L'Armée Nouvelle" of M. Jaurès, in which he pleaded for a modification of the prevailing German ideas for a scheme of defence more distinctively French in their inspiration, and prophesied failure if the plans of a bold offensive into Lorraine after the German model, which so filled the imagination of French military writers, were persisted in. His prophecy was mournfully fulfilled in the defeat of Morhange; but as the winter wore on it became clear that in Joffre had arisen a man whose military ideas were at any rate not borrowed from Germany, but had the smack of France, with her incomparable fecundity in idea. The long, dreary months of winter, uneventful as they seemed, may perhaps have been the gestation of new ideas which were destined to overthrow the military system of Germany as completely as Napoleon overthrew that of Frederick. The spring would show. But certain it is that after six months, which to many in France, as here, after the extravagant hopes aroused by the victory of the Marne must have seemed a military anti-climax, the faith in General Joffre was greater than at the beginning.



Arras: A view of the Cathedral. [*E N.A.*



The entrance to a French trench on the line Ypres–La Bassée. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



A party of French soldiers in one of the Flanders trenches. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



French soldiers returning from the trenches make a halt for refreshment. [*Central News.*

CHAPTER XVI.

IN THE FRENCH TRENCHES.

A TYPICAL FRENCH VILLAGE ON THE WESTERN FRONT—THE HORRORS OF LA BOISSELLE—THE JOYS OF NOYON—TRENCH DECORATIONS—THE SOIXANTE-QUINZE—THE SPIRIT OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

THE terrific nature of modern explosives and the astonishing accuracy which artillery has reached has driven modern armies under ground, and in many cases tends to bring them closer and closer together, so that we arrive at the paradox that safety from the deadliest form of attack can only be found at the closest quarters, when the lines are almost touching each other, and the artillery of either side dare not fire without great risk to its own men. Trench warfare, as we now understand it, at first was new to both the Germans and French, but the experience of the South African war had given the English some insight into its possibilities, and some practice in its operations. The English were probably first to make hasty use of trenches, the Germans were the first to be equipped with periscopes to facilitate this kind of warfare, but the modern trench fortification as it now exists was only developed after the German retreat to the Aisne, when the great deadlock of the war began. The whole of the four hundred and fifty miles, from Switzerland to the sea, is not defended by trenches, but the gaps between the entrenchments have been gradually narrowed down to points which afford naturally strong defensive positions. The entrenchments on the French western front from Arras to Compiègne are fairly typical of a large part of the country, covering, as they do, cultivated land, with many villages, wooded valleys, and open downs, quarries, river-courses, and well-kept estates with chateaux; and on this front Lihons may be taken as typical of the rest.

THE TRENCH MOUTH.

Lihons, a village some twenty miles from Amiens, has been bombarded into ruins, reminding one rather of the shanties at the pitmouths through which men descend into an under world quite different from the happy, work-a-day world of the upper earth. This village was held by the Germans after their retreat from Amiens before the French army of the west, and it was captured by the French after a "siege." Soldiers live in the cellars of the ruins and in dug-outs in the yards, protected by girders and stones from demolished bridges. Some of the houses are skeletons on one side, but whole on the other. In one of these, evidently a book and curio shop, the stock, fallen and tossed about, and white with mortar, is lying about in heaps, and dropping at intervals through a rent in the shutter on the ground outside

whenever a new explosion shakes its neighbourhood. The village green in the centre has tiers of barbed wire set up, and an undamaged crucifix remains in the middle. There is only one inhabitant left in the village with the soldiers. He is the village undertaker.

You enter the trenches quite suddenly. There is one in the main street which looks like a sewer being opened up. That is a communication trench, which is not now used. You go further along the village to the end where the ground slopes, and the incessant noise of firing rises and falls. You turn into a small yard, and then into the ruins of an outbuilding, and go down as into a cellar. It deepens, and everything else is shut out, and you trudge down through mud towards the firing-lines. These trenches have been in use for more than two months, and have been carefully improved for defence and comfort. The chief communication trench in the village is paved with bricks, with a slope leaving a gutter on one side. The other trenches are corduroyed with sticks from one to two inches thick, and in the firing trenches bushes, branches, and matting from the village houses have been trodden down into the soil. The village pump is used to pump the water out twice a day, and doors, window frames, cupboards, carpets, and all sorts of household things have been brought down from the village to make the life of the defenders a little more decent. The height of the parapet varies at different points. For the most part it is well overhead, and the men have to climb up a step or two to fire through the loophole. At some points, however, where the ground cannot be worked, the trench is so shallow that you have to stoop double, and as it winds along the side of a mound there has been much ingenious planning to prevent it being commanded or enfiladed. That danger, however, is less now since the Germans were driven from the mound and beyond the outskirts of the village. The extraordinary thing is that by planning of the lines the enemy is sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. It is impossible from the inside to conceive the real disposition of the entrenchment, and it is difficult enough to understand the ramifications of the warren, so many are the communications by which the reserves can be poured into any trench which is attacked, and so necessary is it to find accommodation for large bodies of men and stores. The observation posts, where the sentinels sit and watch, usually are on points jutting out on the highest ground available, and you discover the salient angles best by looking for them when you come upon a machine gun. Bomb-proof shelters, in which from twenty to forty men can be gathered, are placed at intervals. They are usually a widening of the trench, with logs placed over it and sand-bags piled above. These shelters have two or three openings, so that if one side is blown down men can get out round the other. The loopholes are made by wooden cases, broad enough at the inside for the head and shoulders of a rifleman, but narrowing to a slot at the outside, the sandbags and earth protecting the rest and keeping it rigid. The Germans often have an iron shield, with a large loophole, forming a strengthening and protection to the whole trench front, and giving these trenches an armoured appearance. The French have captured many of these, and are glad to have them for themselves.

IN THE FIRING TRENCHES.

In the firing-trenches close to the enemy there is usually a little dark curtain of cloth, sometimes torn from the coat of a soldier, hung over the loophole, so that the snipers cannot see anyone passing, and these curtains are always raised at the risk of a bullet. It has been discovered recently that the Germans have vices at some of the loopholes on which rifles are fixed trained on the opposite loopholes, and so set that while they will not move up or down, they can be swung to either side, so that without movement of more than an inch or two they can be fired instantly into any loophole on the other side. The sniper can thus watch by a periscope until he sees a movement of the loophole, and then, without showing himself, fire his whole magazine into it. In some cases anyone passing a loophole with his head up makes a darkening against the sky through the ground dropping at the back of the trench. Men speak at a whisper in these trenches. There is a steady percentage of loss day by day despite all precautions, and there are always "suicide corners" where, owing to the turn of the ground, you cannot help an instant's exposure. At first you are surprised to see so few men in the firing-trenches, but at a word they swarm out from dug-outs under your feet, or from the feeding trenches. These dug-outs provide rest-rooms, telephone-rooms, kitchens of sorts, and sleeping-rooms. The men at the observation posts sit on barrels or tubs, or piles of fodder. At this point the trenches approach one another as close as forty yards, and the barbed wire coils thrown out from both sides touch one another. One way of dealing with the enemy's entanglement is to throw out a grappling iron and pull down from the trench the whole erection. At certain places the earth is cut in steps, by which attacking parties can go out above. How the attacking parties get through their own barbed wire entanglements before crossing the zone to attack the German entanglements it is not permitted to say, but it is probably the same on both sides. At night the patrol goes out to guard against sudden attack, and to find out, if possible, what the Germans are doing, and especially to test and strengthen the barbed wire. There are usually half-a-dozen intrepid spirits from each company who voluntarily go out every favourable night working at the wire and sniping the enemy. It is perhaps the strangest of all the paradoxes of modern war that this simple agricultural protection of barbed wire to keep cows from straying should have become one of the most deadly of all defences in warfare, and that so far no effective way has been found to deal with it apart from continued and violent gun-fire. The wire-cutters have proved less and less useful as the quantity of wire was increased to meet them. Shutters, doors, logs, blankets, all sorts of objects are now carried in assaults to beat down and cover these hooks of death.

THE TRENCH GRAVES.

A strange circumstance of trench warfare is that the ground behind the trenches is for some distance quite as unsafe as the ground in front. There are instances where village cattle killed on the higher ground a few yards behind the firing-trenches have been lying for weeks poisoning the air, and it has been found too dangerous to remove them. There are even cases where bodies of soldiers who went out at night to do this work can be seen lying near the dead cattle. The dead are everywhere about the trenches. Often the French soldiers working in captured German trenches come on bodies or limbs of men buried in the floors and sides. The rain, working away sandy corners, discloses bodies, and even moves them into the trench. In a few cases the French dead are

buried beside the trench, and the men eat, fight, and work, with a little wooden cross almost at their elbow, and the cap and woollen gloves of a dead comrade fraying away in the weather. But usually the dead are buried in a cemetery behind the village, and you can tell how long and how hard the fighting has been at each spot by the size of the cemetery. In the open ground and in the forest the dead are usually buried in the shell holes that pit the soil everywhere. The name of the hero is generally inscribed on a cross, but sometimes you come upon little stone tablets telling of some particular deed that deserves commemoration. It is noticeable that if the dead soldier is an Alsatian that is always recorded. Sometimes the floods have filled the shell-holes where the grave is, and all you see is the top of the cross above the water. Often a little fence is made around the grave with empty German shell cases, in which spring flowers are kept—sometimes in the husk of the very shell that killed the soldier. In a few of the long-inhabited trenches an attempt has been made to cut a roll of honour on a stone, but this can be seen perfectly done in the great quarries that are used as rest rooms and stores.

It is strange to see how, when great fortresses have tumbled down and cities are deserted as impossible for defence, men's hopes for safety and persistence have turned again to the prehistoric strongholds of burrows and stone caves. Even the graveyards have been made into strongholds, and lines have been sapped from tomb to tomb. The village of La Boisselle, two miles from Albert, has a terrible fame through the conditions of warfare there. When the Germans retreated from Albert in January, they hung on tenaciously to this village, which lay hidden over a bend of the ground from the observation posts of Albert. The French are now entrenched in a half circle, with lines thrown out, breaking through a great road and falling down to the cemetery, where contact is almost established among the tombs. It is an ordinary village cemetery of a good class, with many heavily-built stone vaults and little temples. In this place trench warfare has reached the ultimate point of horror, and the bodies of the newly-killed soldiers and the dust of the quiet villagers, dead long ago, the fighting and the wounded living, are all mixed together in the semi-darkness of these stone catacombs. These trenches can only be reached at night, and only men of the very strongest nerve are selected to work there.

THE ENTRENCHMENTS IN THE WOODS.

Some of the pleasantest trenches are in the woods that lie between Noyon and Compiègne. The soil is mainly a sandy loam. The young trees and branches furnish material for corduroy paths through all the soft places, and the natural irregularities of the ground give opportunities for ingenious lines and shelters. The dug-outs with which all the young woods are thronged are hardly discernible, even when you are on the top of them. Drains have been sunk, and the underground rooms are wonderfully dry and full of comforts. There are bunks, shelves, mirrors, pictures, even little bookcases and wine cellars, all very shipshape and Bristol fashion, as seafaring folks say. In the shelter of the wood, fires could be lit with some impunity, and the appearance of the whole place in the spring is amazingly curious, with the soldiers coming and going like magic in and out of the earth, felling trees, preparing food, wrestling and playing cards, building all kinds of queer little devices—little arched shelters of foliage for the watch-dogs to lie on through the night down the valley to give warning of any movement in the German camp, and to smell out scouts ; contrivances made from old tin-cans for explosives, or for signalling, stuffing dummy soldiers to be placed up trees to delude the Germans, and the like.

There are many Algerian and Tunisian soldiers in this part, who are clearly having the pick of their lives. The odour of good coffee is constantly arising from strange places. Sometimes you kick a piece of bark standing in a mossy bank, and an indignant black head will shoot out of the earth a few yards away, and curse you in the name of Allah for spoiling his kitchen chimney. It is like war as Sir James Barrie might have conceived it. In the trenches there logs have been largely used, and there are strong block-houses at corners, heavily protected by sand-bags, that are real fortresses. Runnels and ditches have been used, with the water diverted and drained off elsewhere. Ruined farmhouses, whose huge stone structures have been tossed everywhere, are centres of armed forces who live in their tiers of cellars, and have tunnelled passages leading in many directions. The use of tunnels slightly below the surface, in most cases covered over with weeds and bushes, is extensively made to connect artillery with ruined houses where their billets are. The batteries themselves are masked with extraordinary ingenuity, and are constantly moved. As an instance of the elaborate character of the disguises, it may be mentioned that roofs are constructed partly over the guns, hiding them from the angle at which they could be seen by aeroplanes, earth is placed on top, and actually ploughed over, so that it is impossible from above to notice any difference in the ploughed field.


The comfort of a trench depends on the soil and the slope of the land. The happiest conditions are on sandy soil, which dries quickly, and provides the right material for the bags that are the chief protection of parapets and shelters. Clay soil—such as the British trenches were in opposite La Bassée—is, of course, hard for digging, at one place tough as india-rubber, at another mobile as porridge, requiring constant attention, always leaking, and providing the worst sort of material for bags, especially when it is dry and hard. In that condition even three bags will hardly stop a bullet. Sandy soil makes sanitary conditions much simpler. In the new conditions which established entrenchments with billets in reach have made possible, the conditions at the front are now in most cases very different from those at the beginning, when there were no sanitary corps and disinfectant supplies, and it was sufficient for the day if the soldier kept himself alive anyhow. In the Picardy sectors the trenches are noticeably free from smells and vermin, and the general health is very good.

DECORATIONS IN THE DUG-OUTS.

In the three or four months of trench warfare, extraordinary changes have taken place in the habits and even nature of the men, who have had to re-adjust their lives to meet the curious half-mole, half-monk existence into which the great war has driven them. But the French soldiers do not look nerve-shattered, or dulled, or hopeless, although they are men taken from every department of the complex French civilisation and riddled down—ploughman, painter, lawyer, vanman, musician, miner, seminarist, labourer, mechanic, sculptor, joiner, scavenger, boatman—to do the same work, eat the same food, lead the same life. The national gift for giving a domestic, bright look to the dreariest places comes out strongly here. The men in the trenches are always busy with oil and rags, working away with



A communication trench near Soissons cut through a church yard.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*



In the French trenches near Ypres. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*

bayonet and rifles, or cooking things in dark corners over little charcoal stoves, or decorating their cells in ingenious ways, such as neatly framing a portrait of an old woman, probably the soldier's mother, in a border of German bullets stuck in the soil round it. Every dug-out has its proper name, like a village in the suburbs. Most of them have a portrait presiding over the cell, sometimes of a popular actress. One large dug-out had the name the "*Salle des Pas Perdus*," and someone had altered it to "*Salle des Repas Perdus.*" The dug-outs in the rear are always called "village nègre," as they are supposed to look like Kaffir huts. The Frenchmen do not seem to have as many smokes as the English soldiers, and smoker's heart is a very uncommon complaint there. They talk endlessly about the English soldier's comforts, his bully beef and jam, and endless cigarettes, and pipes for every pocket, and sleeping helmets. Yet their food is good and plentiful, mainly soups, with meat and bread in it, and stews, and wine mixed with water is to be had everywhere. Their bread is good French bread, of which they are very proud. Sometimes they toss a piece of it to the Germans just to remind them what bread is. In normal conditions they have coffee, and in cases where the trenches are near great towns, such as Amiens, the food is varied, and the men are in constant touch with the town. A few of the soldiers at Lihons have relatives who have come down to Amiens to be near them, and they are often permitted to cycle down to the town.

But any intercourse like this is enjoyed by very few of the French soldiers. It was only in February that any system was arranged by which married men could get leave to visit their homes. In France the Territorials have been fighting since the beginning of the war. The vast majority of them are married men with families, and at first a very serious problem faced the staff. The separation from his family is to a French father as severe a trial as any of the physical hardships of the war. The men soon yearned for home, and pleaded in thousands for leave, which was, of course, refused. The spirits of the troops fell, and melancholia became common, particularly in the army of the Vosges. General Castelnau there showed his genius well in dealing with this problem. He set himself to create a family feeling in the army itself, and by many ingenious ways and great tact he encouraged the comradeship of all ranks that gives the French army so distinct a character of its own. Anyone who has gone through the French trenches and seen the exchanges between officers and men--the touch on the shoulder from the superior, the half-affectionate *mon colonel* or *mon capitain* from the man, the mixture of intimacy of eye and gesture and polite formality of phrase--beholds a community with a thousand tacit understandings and adjustments that make it so different from other great armies.

The Frenchmen in the trenches show their individuality in countless ways, especially in the attempts to hold fast to their old personality, which is fast being overlaid by the terrific immediacy of the war. Thus, in covered parts of the trenches you come on busts and reliefs of General Joffre, Castelnau, Foch, or other French heroes modelled in clay, often very well done, obviously by practised sculptors, carvers, and confectioners. There are many pungent reliefs of the Kaiser and his generals wreathed in little devils. In the great limestone quarries near Ribecourt the men in their rest time have had orgies of carving and scrawling cartoons with makeshift paint. One soldier has carved a beautiful altar out of the solid rock in an inner chamber of the Pyrenesian region, and adorned it with a regimental inscription. The place is used as a chapel. Books are to be found in most of the dug-outs, but a strange fact is the absence of newspapers. Musical instruments of the humbler kind are rarely seen at or near the front, and there is no singing.

THE MEN AND THE SOIXANTE-QUINZE.

The false glamour and emotionalism of war, of which one reads so much in the war correspondence of the Franco-Prussian war, have gone with its bright buttons and gold braid. In the terrible pressure of the first month of the war the old soldier came through the fire and became hard and tempered to the ultimate point of endurance, and the new soldiers have come under their influence and accepted their tradition. The silence of the trenches is noticeable. Even in the great stone farms behind the lines where transport work is always going on, and where the little cafés are open, there is not much talk. But a look at the faces of the men in trenches or villages reveals no signs of depression, although often you see in high-strung faces an expression of boredom, as one may expect where so many ingenious minds and hands have been torn away from their proper work to be soldiers and fight in warrens. War is a very earnest thing to the modern Frenchman. He sees that a noble tract of his country has been conquered and defiled by his enemy, and there can be no happiness until all France is free and the evil powers of Germany are broken. His attitude to *les Boches* is that of a man with memories and strong feelings, which in the last war he was not equipped to put into effective action. To-day he finds himself equipped, determined, hard trained, and well fed, and he believes himself to be, man for man, the master of the German.

They seem for the most part like men who have a disagreeable job to do and who are going through with it to the end, but who think much about the old life and look forward to its renewal. They do not seem to have the same simple absorption in the present as the English soldier, or to be able to imprison their minds and hearts in the custody of authority like the Germans. Their jests are more subtle, and the smile, not the laugh, is common. The ordinary soldier is much delighted with responsibility. The most important and joyful man in a French masked battery is always the trumpeter, who is on the look-out for aeroplanes, at the sight of which he blows his trumpet, and the whole force "plays rabbit," and nothing can be seen but stunted trees, bushes, or haystacks. But in all sections, from generals to buglers, the high feeling of confidence is the same. At one part, where the French and German trenches had been in almost the same position for three months, and the French, knowing how they have strengthened their own fortifications, must have guessed that the Germans were quite as formidable, it was remarkable to find that man after man showed the same serene confidence that they would toss the Germans out of their position whenever the time came. Two of them were asked by a journalist visiting the trenches how they expected to get over the difficulties. They only smiled, and said "You shall see. Whenever the order comes--out go the *Boches!* We can do it." This was not only the case with those magnificent picked troops, the Chasseurs Alpins, but with the territorials too--*les pères de famille*—who have lost many illusions, but in the strain of the eight months of war have found a new half-mocking faith in themselves and in France. Strongest of all is their faith in the French "*Soixante-quinze*," the wonderful 3·03-inch gun, which is held as the new Joan of Arc of France. With

this gun French artillery will fire on the enemies' trenches even when they are so close as fifty yards from their own. The Germans, it is believed, cannot risk a shell within, at least, a hundred yards of their own men. In cases where the front trenches are in telephonic communication with the artillery, and the men can be warned to take to their bomb-proof shelters, the French will sometimes fire within twenty-five yards of their own front. A good deal of the interest in the trenches during quiet spells is to identify the batteries firing three or four miles behind them, or the great guns in the rear, and in being first to spot the sound of new German batteries. Their ears become curiously expert while so many of their faculties are not required; living there week after week in their tunnels, they acquire a sort of sharpened sense, like an engineer in a modern turbine liner.

THE TRENCH APPROACHES.

Except when heavy fighting is taking place the losses among troops on their way to the trenches are as great as those in the trenches. In the present fighting in France and Flanders, where the Allies are occupying ground and in many cases actual trenches formerly possessed by the Germans, the actual conditions are well known and cannot be disguised from the calculations of the German artillery, who know the slopes and state of the ground and roads, and can guess the hours and method of the parties relieving and leaving the trenches. The roads, of course, are known, and are searched at intervals day and night by shell fire on the chance of catching troops, and especially ammunition. Consequently, new tracks are built and roundabout ways taken to communicate with the trench mouths. The main roads are little used within two or three miles of the enemy, and men moving within this zone do so in very open order. Yet it is curious to see how familiarity with danger becomes part of ordinary life, and it is found difficult to keep the men in long communication trenches when they are being relieved. Many men prefer to take the chances and get above ground to hurry to their billets or dug-outs. Going and coming from the trenches, you are always passing graves with little crosses, sometimes single, sometimes in groups, and men wounded in the approaches are always keeping the ambulance busy. But the soldiers plod on, or work on the side tracks, hardly looking up at the shrapnel bursting on the other side of the great road, even when it is only a hundred yards away. In the appalling conditions of modern war, men now accept murder falling upon them everywhere from the sky as a sort of wartime bad weather. You will see parties working together break into a sharp, dry laugh at something one of them has said about the shell fire that is demolishing a showman's caravan, left standing long ago in happier times. Three French soldiers, who had known intimately the horrors of La Boisselle graveyard fighting, have been seen talking agitatedly and sorrowfully together while one held in his hand a starling killed by the concussion of a shell.

A CHIVALRIC SCENE.

Amiens is about twenty-three miles from the firing line, and when the wind blows from the east the citizens can hear the big guns firing, but as you motor out towards the trenches there is little sign of war, apart from the constant challenging of the sentries and the villages brimming with soldiers, until you suddenly seem in the middle of it. The ground is pitted with shell holes ranging from those of about a yard and a half diameter, made by the German seventy-seven shell, to enormous excavations, that would hold a horse and cart, made by the "Jack Johnsons." Then you probably pass a wood with the trees blasted and scorched and smashed, as if it were at the mouth of hell. Soon you see the large shelter huts in which fifty men can sleep. They are built with logs and mud, and matted over with heather or mosses and dead leaves, so that it is impossible to see them from above. In countrysides where there are few villages there are always towns of these huts. Then you pass old trenches, whose only inhabitants are under the little white crosses. Four or five miles back from the firing trenches you may come on a little review, where a general is decorating officers and men for some brave deed done probably that very morning at dawn. To receive the Cross of the Legion of Honour thus on the very field of glory, with the applause of cannon rolling in your ears, and only your comrades who know what you've done to witness your reward, must be the greatest honour a soldier can have. It would seem a dangerous thing to have such an assembly so near the front, but the moral effect on the soldiers of the colours, the band, the high officers on their horses, and the splendid confidence of the event is considered worth the risk. It is characteristic of the brave and chivalric French nation that even in modern warfare, with its grey horrors and squalors, and awful secrecies, that they should, even if only for an instant, make it sparkle with martial beauty.



Lieutenant Leach, V.C., addressing a recruiting meeting in Manchester.

CHAPTER XVII.

SOME STORIES OF THE WAR.

ON THE BATTLEFIELD—V.C. STORIES—THE RED CROSS WORKERS—EXPLOITS AT SEA—AIRMEN'S FEATS.

"WHAT a pretty thing man is when he goes in his doublet and hose and leaves off his wit!" was Don Pedro's reflection when he saw Benedick lay his banter aside and make ready, at the bidding of Beatrice, to slay Claudio. And the finest thing about war, which is the complete denial of wit and the bankruptcy of mankind's political intelligence, is that it strips thousands of brave men to the doublet and hose of their native resolution and character, laying before them a directly simple task to which all the old manly virtues can be bent without reserve or qualification. It exhibits individual man, in Shakespeare's phrase, as a very pretty thing indeed, taking courage, fellowship, and determination into the very shadow of death, and redeeming a task dreadful in itself by the devotion with which it is accepted and fulfilled. This we can admit without any danger of falling into the German error of regarding war as the only school of such virtues. Peace, we know, can call them forth in ways that are in themselves wiser and more hopeful. But whatever the ends, the qualities that serve them are high and splendid ones, and the world may very well be humbly grateful that war, a hideous and unprofitable business in itself, turns them out as magnificent by-products on an unparalleled scale.

ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

And, as far as it can, war keeps the eyes of the world fixed on the instances of daring and resource and devotion that it has called forth. But it demands and receives them in such wonderful profusion that no man can know the tithe of what the battlefield alone, which is only one theatre for them, has produced. Even leaving out instances which are represented by the official list of decorations, the others that are gathered from soldiers' letters and tales are overwhelming. Now it is from the statement of a German prisoner that one learns of a Lancashire Fusilier cut off from his detachment, but declining to surrender to 200 of the enemy. He lay on the ground firing until his last cartridge was spent; and then rose from his scanty cover to face, with folded arms, the end and a sweeping deluge of bullets. Again from a German source, if it is ever to be forthcoming at all, will have to be received the account of the last moments of Captain McCuaig, of the Royal Highlanders of Montreal. He was severely wounded during the crisis of the fighting round Ypres at the end of April, and at a moment when it would still have been possible for him to have been removed to the rear without further harm. At his own command he was not removed; and when orders were given that his section of the line must withdraw at once, he still refused to hamper his men in the task which lay before them with a burden of a maimed man. In the account of "Eye-witness":—

> "He asked of them one thing only—that there should be given to him as he lay alone in the trenches two loaded Colt revolvers to add to his own, which was in his right hand as he made his last request. And so, with three revolvers ready to his hand for use, a very brave officer waited to sell his life, wounded and racked with pain, in an abandoned trench."

From an English surgeon comes the story of a private in the East Lancashire Regiment who, after his battalion had been desperately hard pressed all day, was borne into a field hospital with one side of his jaw blown away. Being unable to speak, he signed to the doctor for writing materials, and would not be treated until he had received them. But it was not for himself or for his friends at home that the message was intended. All that this terribly wounded man wrote upon the pad which was brought to him was, "My captain is a brave man and deserves the V.C."—an unofficial recommendation which was a decoration in itself, and which one trusts that the captain was spared to receive. Or if, in addition to the highest degree of fortitude, one would have—expressed in the queerest of fashions—that gay modesty which seems to be a characteristic of man in his doublet and hose, there is the story of "the worst slanging match I ever

heard," according to the wounded sergeant who described the incident. Three men of the Manchester Regiment were on patrol duty, when one was hit and wounded to the point of death. The second ran to his help, and was promptly wounded by the same sniper. By the time the third man had reached the pair the first was dead. The newcomer bore the wounded man back to safety, cursing him the while with the most appalling proficiency for the "folly" of the very endeavour which he himself was engaged on—the attempt to save another man's life at the risk of his own. And if one would have recorded an instance of the same brave and generous spirit in a foe, there is "Eye-witness's" account of the German officer who, during the engagement at Givenchy, paused to dig out a British officer who was partly buried below a trench parapet which had been blown in upon him, and to give the wounded man brandy from his flask. The German was in the firing line from the British troops while he did this, and a chance bullet from it killed him—a pitiable accident which, from the ease with which it might be misrepresented, should serve to warn English readers against a too easy credulity in stories of British rescuers of German wounded being fired upon by the men whose comrades they were endeavouring to save.



In the British trenches. [*Photopress.*

V.C. WINNERS AND THE NAMELESS OTHERS.

Stories like these could be multiplied endlessly without ever touching on the official records of V.C.'s and Military Crosses. And beyond them is a vast host of instances of individual heroism which will never be known to any but those who saw or played their part in them, instances the details of which in all too many cases have perished with the men who made them. It was to these that Mr. Balfour paid a fine tribute in April, when he spoke of the necessity for trying to realise "the individual courage and heroism of the man who doesn't know at the moment whether his side is winning or losing; who only knows that he has a job before him which he has to do at all risks, and does it." The modern army, which from one point of view looks like a great, inconscient machine, whose use for living flesh and spirit is in direct ratio to the success with which it can turn them into reliable parts of that machine, from another makes more demand upon individual courage and confidence than any army of the past did. It cannot fling itself into the field, as Napoleon flung his last, hasty levies, relying upon packed formation and pressure of numbers to carry it forward, whatever the mood of its component parts. With the modern army the machine is most in danger of disintegrating when it comes to its severest test; the parts are proved to be greater than the whole, and personal courage, determination, and skill shown to be still the decisive factors of the day when the battle comes at last to be joined over a league-long front, along which men, and companies of men, fight and die resolutely with no certain knowledge of whether their sacrifice means victory or defeat in the general fortunes of that day. The bravery of each man is then put to its own individual test. The splendid results of that test, even where the dust of a nameless grave has not closed over them for ever, will remain in the vast majority of cases untold and unrecognised in any individual reward.


Of the deeds which have been recognised and rewarded by the highest decoration which the British army has to offer, it is not possible to select more than one or two typical instances. In some cases the details of the heroism which won it are not generally known; for the brief particulars given in the official list of V.C.'s are better calculated to stimulate curiosity than to satisfy it, and need to be supplemented by the tale of the man who won the Cross or of those who saw him win it. For instance, the Victoria Cross was awarded to Sergeant Harlock, of the 113th Battery R.F.A., according to the official announcement, "For conspicuous gallantry when his battery was in action under a heavy shell fire, in that, although twice wounded, he persisted on each occasion in returning to lay his gun after his wounds had been dressed." Behind this lies a story of extraordinary spirit and determination. His gun was in action in an open field under heavy fire from the enemy's artillery. A shrapnel shell burst right underneath it, killed one of

the team and wounded Harlock in the right thigh, "just enough to keep him in hospital for two or three weeks, perhaps," in the words of the soldier who described the affair. He walked to the dressing station, had his wound dressed, and received instructions to get into the ambulance and go to the hospital. Instead of doing this he walked back to the battery and took his place at the gun. He had not been there ten minutes when he was wounded again, this time in the back. He returned to the dressing station, explaining to the doctor that he had been unable to find the ambulance, and had thought that he might just as well go back to his gun as down to the hospital. His fresh wound was dressed, and the doctor, holding that if he could walk to his battery he could walk to the hospital without the aid of the ambulance, handed him over to an orderly with instructions that he was to be marched down to the hospital without delay. Once away from the dressing station, Harlock persuaded the orderly that there was much more important work waiting for him than conducting to the hospital a man who could find his own way there perfectly well; and, having got rid of his guardian, he returned to the battery for the second time. Here, according to the artilleryman who told the story, he was slightly wounded again, and, "as he was afraid to go back to the doctor again, he just stayed there till we went out of action in the evening." The appropriate end of the story is that Harlock was first reprimanded for disobeying the doctor's orders and then promoted to sergeant and recommended for the V.C.

Another fine instance of a man grievously wounded and yet continuing to serve his gun was that for which Lieutenant Dimmer, of the King's Royal Rifles, received his V.C. Dimmer was in charge of four maxims during the attack made by the Prussian Guard on the British lines on November 12th. Three out of the four guns were put out of action by the German shell fire, and at the same time Lieutenant Dimmer received his first wound, which was from shrapnel bullets and in the face. In all, he was wounded three times by shrapnel and twice by rifle bullets, and by the time that the Prussian attack was fully launched all of his three men had been killed, and he was alone with the single maxim which it was still possible to keep in action. He succeeded in emptying three belts of 300 cartridges before collapsing unconscious; and when the proudest troops of the German army were ultimately swept back, this very brave officer was picked up by the English soldiers from the side of his gun and despatched to the hospital at Boulogne, where, as a convalescent, he afterwards learnt of the decoration which had been awarded him.

THE TWO WHO RECAPTURED A TRENCH.

But of daring successfully partnered by resourcefulness the records of the war have given no more impressive example than that which earned the V.C. for Lieutenant Leach and Sergeant Hogan, of the Manchester Regiment. Between them these two soldiers succeeded in retaking an advanced British trench which had been captured and was being held by the Germans. It sounds an almost impossible feat, but a glance at the sketch plan given in next column will assist in the explanation of it. The sharply-angled trench A B had been taken by the Germans in the morning of October 29th. About three o'clock in the afternoon Lieutenant Leach and Sergeant Hogan, taking with them ten men, left the British firing line, and crawling along the communicating trench C, established themselves at A. Here they left the ten men who had accompanied them. Leach and Hogan themselves then began to advance along the narrow trench, their plan being to drive the Germans back to the *cul-de-sac* B at the opposite end of it. Here the ten men left behind at A were to prove their use, for the organisers of the scheme believed that the Germans, if they were driven back into the blind end of the trench, would climb out and make a dash across exposed ground for their own main trenches, thereby giving the men at A an opportunity to account for them. But Leach and Hogan had underestimated the effect of their own exploit; by the time that they had reached the last angle of the trench the Germans were in no mood for dashes across the open, and surrendered without more ado. The story of how the two men gradually worked their way from one end of the trench to the other has been reconstructed from details supplied by Lieutenant Leach himself. They began at the corner D. Leach, who was armed with a revolver, could reach his hand round the corner and shoot along the section D E without exposing his body, but the German soldiers, who were armed only with rifles, could not return his fire without exposing part of their bodies. Whilst Leach was shooting along D E, Hogan was guarding the parapet F G to ward off surprise attacks, lest the Germans should crawl over from the section H I and take their two assailants in the rear, or shoot them down from above. When the Germans had been driven out of the section D E, the two men took up their stand at the corner G and repeated their manœuvre along the section G H. The risks of the adventure were not lessened by Leach's now having to fire with his left hand in order not to expose his body. As the two men advanced section by section, Hogan, raising his hat on the end of his rifle above the parapet of the trench, signalled the progress that had been made to the main English trench in order that the fire from it might not sweep those portions of the captured position which had now been retaken. Corner after corner was successfully negotiated in this way, and when the two men were approaching the blind end of the trench they heard one of their own men—who had been taken prisoner in the morning—call out, "Don't shoot, the



Germans wish to surrender." Sixteen surrendered, seven had been killed by Leach in his progress along the trench, and in addition to these there were twenty wounded Germans in the trench who were also made prisoners.

It was a very brilliantly-conceived and unusual exploit. And many others, displaying equal daring and determination, might be extracted from the official lists of V C awards—in all too many instances of men whose decoration has been bought at the price of their lives.

Before leaving these records it may be noted that what seems, after some newspaper correspondence on the subject, to be definitely established as a quite unprecedented honour has fallen to the Royal Army Medical Corps, on some of whose members, serving under fire, is laid the noblest and most beautiful task that war can offer. The honour in this case was a clasp to a V.C. already awarded to Lieutenant Arthur Martin Leake. Lieutenant Leake won the Victoria Cross in the South African War, and the clasp to it was granted him "for most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty throughout the campaign, especially during the period 29th October to 8th November, 1914, near Zonnebeke, in rescuing while exposed to constant fire a large number of the wounded who were lying close to the enemy's trenches."

AN HEROIC FRENCH DOCTOR.

For another example of things in the highest degree lovely and of good report which stand to the credit of this branch of the service—this time in an Ally's army—one may take the story of the French medical officer who was in charge of fifty-four German wounded in the Civil Hospital at Ypres when the first bombardment of that unhappy town was at its height. He had only volunteer assistants, and on November 9th reported that the hospital had been struck by six shells, one of them an incendiary shell. Bread was then failing, and his assistants were sharing their own with the wounded Germans. A more desperate situation, in which a man could only be supported by the highest ideals of duty, cannot be imagined. The position of the hospital, and the fact that it sheltered some of their own comrades, were known to the Germans; the doctor and his staff, regardless of their own peril, were trying to save men whose lives were being endangered by their own friends. To the inevitable suggestion that, as the Germans regarded these lives so lightly, there was no great call for the French to be concerned about them, the brave doctor returned the resolute reply that to abandon them would be to sink to the level of "the race of vandals" whose shells were striking the hospital. "So long as I remain here," he wrote in his report, "by your leave, I will continue to look after the wounded Germans, showing them that a French doctor laughs at their shells, and only knows his duty." His spirit infected his staff. Two nursing sisters who had abandoned their posts returned to the hospital weeping, driven back to their tasks by remorse and the force of example. In the last report that the gallant Frenchman ever wrote is included the following brief picture of that stricken hospital, with its material misery and desolation side by side with the greatest spiritual grandeur:—

> "I am continuing to dress the wounded. There are now only fifty-two. Two have just died. The others are in a very grave condition; their wounds are suppurating. All the men but one are in bed; one is suffering from tetanus."

Within the next three days the man who wrote it had been killed by a shell; faithful to the end, he had proved wonderfully that a French doctor "knows only his duty." And his sacrifice was not in vain. On the evening of November 14th it was possible to remove the surviving wounded from the care of the few nuns who were now their only guardians and take them to a place of greater safety.



The Military Cross, the new British decoration awarded for distinguished and meritorious service.

[*Sport and General.*

A FEAT FROM THE MERCANTILE MARINE.

Naturally, not all the memorable stories of the war are supplied by the armed forces on land or sea. The German submarine menace put the courage and seamanship of our mercantile marine to a severe test; and the stories of submarines rammed, or of attempts to ram them, by unarmed vessels, and of brave and successful attempts to elude these insidious raiders, show how promptly that test was accepted. But even before the advent of the submarine "blockade," there were some stirring instances of daring, resourcefulness, and skill from the captains of British merchantmen. Captain Kinneir, of the steamship *Ortega*, who brought his vessel down an uncharted channel without "even a scratch on her plates," was the author of a fine feat, and one which was recognised by the Admiralty. It was in the days when there were still German cruisers abroad in the Pacific, and the *Ortega*, which had sailed from Valparaiso with three hundred French reservists on board, fell in with one near the western entrance to the Straits of Magellan. The German cruiser gave chase. The *Ortega*, which is a vessel of 8,000 tons, had a normal speed of fourteen knots; the cruiser of at least twenty-one. Captain Kinneir was faced with the alternatives of surrendering straight away, or of getting the last ounce out of his engines for just long enough to let him reach the entrance to Nelson Strait, into which he was pretty confident that the German cruiser would fear to follow him. He chose to attempt the escape, and with firemen, engineers, and volunteers stoking the vessel as she had never been stoked before, her speed was got up from fourteen to eighteen knots. She reached the entrance to the Strait, hotly pursued by the cruiser, who was firing on her, luckily without effect, with two



The result of a single German shell on a dwelling-house at Ypres.

[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

heavy bow guns. Sure enough, the cruiser declined to follow, and then, with the pursuit at an end, began the passage of an entirely uncharted channel—in the words of the British Consul at Rio de Janeiro, "a narrow, tortuous passage, constituting a very nightmare for navigators, bristling, as it does, with reefs and pinnacle rocks, swept by fierce currents and tide rips, and with cliffs on either side sheer to the water without any anchorage." With a navigating officer ahead of the ship in a boat, taking soundings and semaphoring the results to the liner, and with the whole crew on duty in engine room or on deck, the *Ortega* adventured into these perilous waters, and by a miracle of skilful seamanship, pluck, and good fortune, worked her way safely into Smith's Channel and on to Punta Arenas, the most southerly town in the world. Either because the wish was father to the thought, or because they really felt confident that Nelson Strait would do to a vessel of the *Ortega's* size what they had been unable to do, the German cruiser sent out a wireless message that the *Ortega* had "sunk with all hands." And when he was safely in the Straits of Magellan Captain Kinneir met a Chilian warship which had been sent out to rescue "the survivors of the *Ortega*."

THE SEQUEL TO THE EMDEN'S CAREER.


Another interesting story of the sea is that provided by the remnant of the *Emden's* crew. There are large gaps in our knowledge of what did happen, but the points that are known are amply sufficient to indicate a very remarkable exploit. As most readers will remember, the full story of the famous German commerce raider did not end with the destruction of the vessel and the surrender of the greater part of her crew off Cocos Island in November, 1914. When the *Sydney* arrived off Cocos Island the *Emden* had still ashore a landing party of forty



men and three officers, who had been despatched to wreck the cable station, and the German ship put out to meet



H.M.S. Formidable. [*Topical Press.*



An armed British aeroplane landing at a base on the Continent after a flight over the German lines. [*Topical War Service*

the *Sydney* without ever taking on board again her landing party. Though she had very little chance against the *Sydney's* fire, the *Emden's* formal surrender was curiously delayed ; disabled by about eleven o'clock in the morning, it was not until late in the afternoon that she hauled down her flag. Rescue work occupied more of the *Sydney's* time until night was falling, and it was too late to get in touch with the cable station. All this time was not lost by the *Emden's* landing party, and when the *Sydney* did hear from the cable station on the following morning it was to learn the forty-three men had seized and provisioned the *Ayesha*, a seventy-ton schooner, and set sail in her the previous evening. It was the beginning of what was certainly a long and, in all probability, a hazardous voyage. According to the cable staff, the *Ayesha* was leaking when she was seized, and the pumps would have to be kept constantly at work—indeed, it was doubtful whether the remnant of the *Emden's* crew would get anywhere except to the bottom in her. The prophecy was not justified ; in three weeks the *Ayesha* was laying in stores at Padang, a straight 830 miles away on the coast of Sumatra. This was probably in anticipation of the attempt which was afterwards carried to a successful conclusion, as far as the seafaring portion of it went—the plan to make right across the Indian Ocean for Arabia, and the nearest centre of Germany's



Turkish allies. The voyage took four months. The *Ayesha* left Sumatra on November 28th and landed on the Red Sea coast below Hodeida on March 27th, a distance of at least 4,100 miles. The risk of capture or attack at sea over, the perils of the land began. On their march inland the little party was attacked by Arabs, who harassed them for three days, and were only driven off at the expense of several casualties. The story ends with the wounded in hospital at Jeddah, and a Berlin wireless message accusing the English of having incited the Arabs to attack the party—a singularly futile charge, for the Arabs of the Yemen need little enough inciting against the Turks, and cannot be expected to have any greater love for Turkey's German allies.

THE END OF THE FORMIDABLE.

Stories of heroism or self-sacrifice in the navy could be multiplied as endlessly as in the army. The story of the sinking of the *Formidable*, with a loss of 546 officers and men, has already been told in this volume (page 45), but some of the details not mentioned in that account may well be given as examples of the traditional discipline and bravery of the British navy. In the long wait of over two hours in the darkness of a bitterly cold winter morning there was no panic. All the men were assembled quietly on the upper deck, many of them in the slightest of clothing. All portable woodwork was brought above, and part of one of the decks pulled up to provide more floatable material. It was generally thought that the ship would float until dawn, and while the rest of the crew were waiting on the upper deck, each with some woodwork at his side, the turret crews endeavoured in vain to correct, by shifting the position of the guns, the terrible list which the ship had developed. At the end of another three-quarters of an hour it was evident that she would not float much longer—in addition to the list she was sinking by the head. Still there was no departure from discipline. With the vessel nearly flat on her side in the last ten minutes, some hundreds of men had climbed over the rails on to the side which was out of the water, and stood there in two ranks waiting for the order to move. It came at last in the captain's "Into the water with you, she's going!" and not until then did the men commit themselves to the darkness and the sea. One typical instance of individual heroism may be mentioned. Bugler S. C. Reed, of the Royal Marine Light Infantry, when he was advised to use his drum to keep himself afloat, replied that he had given it to one of the blue-jacket boys who seemed to have no very reliable support for the final plunge. This quiet little act of self-sacrifice—the bugler was not among the rescued—did not pass unnoticed. A war medal was sent to the boy's parents, as well as a letter from the Admiralty expressing their deep appreciation of the act.

ESCAPED PRISONERS.

Escaped prisoners have not provided many notable war stories. Barbed wire fencing is a more effective, if less picturesque, barrier than the dungeons of Bitche or Givet, and there are no stories of long tunnellings below rampart and palisade such as are provided by the record of Napoleon's prisoners. The two German officers who escaped at the beginning of April from the detention camp near Abergele, and wandered about the Welsh hills for a week before being recaptured, provide one instance of an escape ; but beyond securing for themselves a short term of hard labour, and giving Easter holiday makers in North Wales a little additional excitement by opportunities to assist in numerous wild-goose chases, there are few notable details about the exploit. Very much more extraordinary—and very nearly successful—was the attempt made by a German officer to escape from the internment camp at Dorchester. By some means, which never very clearly emerged, he equipped himself with a large wooden box, a blanket, a rubber pillow filled with oxygen, two champagne bottles full of water, a bottle of meat extract, and a dozen or so bananas. The box was about three feet six inches square, and in this, doubled up with the belongings mentioned, the German was locked in by some accomplice. The opportunity to get the box out of the country arose out of the release of a number of aliens, all over military age, from the Dorchester concentration camp. They were being sent back to Germany, and were taken down to Tilbury under military escort for shipment to Rotterdam. A quantity of baggage accompanied them, and amongst it was included the box containing the German officer. It was a pretty plan, and one that was only discovered by an accident to the box as it was being transferred from the ferry boat to the steamer leaving for Holland. On account of the weight of the box, it was being turned over and over along the ferry boat deck to the gangway of the liner. Under this rough treatment the side gave way, and to the

astonishment of the men handling it, a man's head and arm appeared. The plot had failed, and perhaps the designer of it was not sorry at the moment, for he had been cramped up within his hiding place for fifteen hours, and was weak and dazed by the villainous knocking about that he had received. He had prepared himself for his journey with some thoroughness, as the pillow of oxygen showed. In the two corners of the box, straps had been fixed for the occupant's arms in order to hold him as steady as possible ; and he claimed that he could have released himself from the box without outside aid at any time that he desired.

AIR FEATS AND THEIR PERFORMERS.

This was the first war to see the aeroplane established as a fighting arm, and the records of its services are full of instances of daring backed up by the highest degree of skill. The raid on Friedrichshafen, involving as it did a winter flight over the high hills separating German and French territory, was a particularly brilliant performance, quite apart from the military value of the damage done to the airship sheds. In reconnaissance work over the enemy's lines and artillery the superiority established at an early period of the war by English and French airmen over those of the Germans was proved in numerous daring feats. The French airman, Lieutenant Garros, had many to his credit. His resourcefulness was well illustrated in November, when he had an accident to his motor while pursuing a German aeroplane behind the German lines. Realising that he was bound to descend, he deliberately drove his machine to earth as violently as he dare, and after the crash lay as though dead. The German brought his Taube to earth, and ran up to what he took to be the dead or helpless pilot of the French machine. Thereupon Garros rose to his feet, shot the German with his revolver, climbed into the Taube, and in it got safely back to the French lines. On another similar occasion he was less fortunate, and, being forced to descend within the German lines near Roulers, he was taken prisoner on April 18th. He was the hero of many successful air duels, and only two days before his capture had brought down a German aeroplane near Dunkirk, shooting both pilot and observer in mid-air.

With too many of the airmen's exploits it is impossible to give the names of those who performed them, owing to official reticence over such particulars. The story of a French lieutenant observer and sergeant pilot who had been ordered to locate a German battery is one of these cases. They carried out their task and turned to fly for their base under a deadly shell fire. The pilot was blinded and the observer mortally wounded, yet, guided by the dying lieutenant, the blind pilot brought his machine safely back to the French lines. A very magnificent piece of fortitude on the part of an English airman would also have remained anonymous if it had been left in the form in which it was described by "Eye-witness." (It formed a starting point for some shrewd newspaper criticism of the curious attitude adopted by the British authorities, an attitude whereby feats of great gallantry on the part of men and regiments were frequently given out without any disclosure of the performer's identity.) Towards the end of April, Lieutenant Rhodes-Moorhouse, in one of a series of air raids on rail-heads behind the German lines, set out for the station at Courtrai in a biplane and alone. From a height of three hundred feet he dropped a large bomb on the railway junction, and, being the target for a great concentration of anti-aircraft weapons, was wounded. It was not a very serious wound, and he might have descended and so saved his life, even at the expense of his liberty. Instead, he turned for the British lines in order to deliver his report and save his machine from capture. Flying now at a height of only a hundred feet, in order to get up a greater speed, he was wounded again. He flew on back to his own base, landed without damage to his machine, and delivered his report before being taken to the hospital. There he died shortly afterwards, leaving as his memorial what the official chronicler of his deed—who yet withheld the name of its author—described as "one of the most heroic episodes of the war."

A lighter but by no means insignificant air exploit was that of the British airman who flew over the Lille aerodrome, where a number of German troops were quartered, on April 1st. From a great height he dropped down upon the Germans a football. Seeing it descending, the men below scattered in all directions, taking it for a large bomb. It hit the earth, bounced up again for a considerable distance—and still the Germans remained under cover, thinking that it was exploded by a time fuse. When they did venture forth to examine, with great caution the bomb that had failed, they found on it the inscription :—"April fool. Gott strafe England !" The incident is a very consoling example of the difference between the German and English tempers—it is not easy to think of a German risking his life in this way—for the airman was risking his life, and might just as easily have dropped a genuine bomb—for no more important end than to taunt his enemies. It was man in his doublet and hose without having put off any of his wit, and one cannot imagine a more stinging and satisfactory reply to the dull folly of the German "campaign of hate" against this country.

THE MOST MOVING TALES OF ALL.

Heroism, gaiety, and devotion to duty will never lack recognition in war, wherever the instances of them can be ascertained. But some of the most deeply-moving stories of all have had little to do with these qualities—they have been played out when these typical virtues of the soldier have served their end and left behind only some grievously wounded man waiting release. It is just as well to remember that this is a war in which, side by side with all the high spirits and gay determination, all the "Hymns of Hate," and all the just anger at the most ghastly excesses of "frightfulness," more generous and humane men than in any previous war have gone out to a task essentially abhorrent to them, supported in it only by the loftiest conception of duty. And having served that conception almost to the end, it is not very surprising to hear of the older faiths and charities asserting themselves in the little interval before the end arrived. Such instances have been gathered now and then from soldiers' letters. From one is gleaned the story of "one of our lads who was at the point of death" noticing a wounded German, and saying to the stretcher bearer, "Look in my haversack and you will find some grub. Give it to that German chap—he's half starved." The gift was taken by the German with gratitude, and the next day he begged to be allowed to have a last look at his benefactor before he was buried. Another strange, sad story—sadder, perhaps, than any other story of the war because of the realised hopelessness of the dying man's sacrifice—was told in the letter of an English sergeant :—

> "I stopped for a few seconds by the side of a German who was dying. He was in great pain, and when I asked what I could do for him he said, in a pathetic tone that went to my heart, 'Nothing, unless you would be so good as to hold my hand till all is over.' I gave him my hand and stayed to the end. It seemed to comfort that poor

chap a lot. He was able to speak good English, and we had quite a pleasant chat, considering the circumstances. He thought the war would last another year at least, but had no doubt that his own country would be beaten in the end."

In another case it was three mortally-wounded men of three nations who were thrown together by the hazard of battle. The facts were given in a letter written from hospital by a dying French officer to his betrothed. When on the field he first roused himself to consciousness after being wounded in a cavalry charge, he found two other wounded men endeavouring to bind up his wounds—an officer in a Scottish regiment and a German private. His letter continued :—

"The Highlander had one of his legs shattered, and the German had several pieces of shrapnel buried in his side. In spite of their own sufferings they were trying to help me, and when I was fully conscious again the German gave us a morphia injection and took one himself. His medical corps had provided him with the injection and the needle, together with printed instructions for its use.

"After the injection, feeling wonderfully at ease, we spoke of the lives we had lived before the war. We all spoke English, and we talked of the women we had left at home. Both the German and the Britisher had only been married a year. . . .

"I wondered, and I suppose the others did, why we had fought each other at all. I looked at the Highlander, who was falling asleep exhausted, and in spite of his drawn face and mudstained uniform he looked the embodiment of freedom. Then I thought of the Tricolour of France and all that France had done for liberty. Then I watched the German, who had ceased to speak. He had taken a Prayer-book from his knapsack and was trying to read a service for soldiers wounded in battle."

The French soldier answered his own question in the only way which could bring anything but irremediable sadness into this strange chance meeting :—

". . . while I watched him I realised what we were fighting for. . . . He was dying in vain, while the Britisher and myself, by our deaths, would probably contribute something toward the cause of civilisation and peace."

It is the only thought which can atone for such sacrifices as these.



French troops who have distinguished themselves receiving their decorations.
[*Wyndham, Paris* (*C.N.*).



The Guards in London in war time: Grenadier Guards leaving Buckingham Palace, with the Prince of Wales bearing the colours. [*Central News.*



The Guards on parade in peace time. [*Topical Press.*



The 1st Life Guards at mounted sword drill in Hyde Park. [*Sport and General.*

CHAPTER XVIII.

SOME REGIMENTAL RECORDS IN THE WAR.

A SOLDIERS' WAR—THE REGIMENT AS THE SOUL OF THE ARMY—THE SECOND MANCHESTERS IN THE RETREAT FROM MONS—THE FIRST MANCHESTERS AT GIVENCHY—THE WORCESTERS AND WILTSHIRES AT YPRES.


A CONNECTED record of the fighting done by individual regiments has been made extremely difficult from two separate causes. The refusal of the military authorities to allow accredited war correspondents to accompany the army in the field has deprived us of a detailed account of what the several regiments have done, and the exercise of a strict censorship has completed the dearth of news from the field of operations. The despatches of General Sir John French have told us of the coolness, courage, intrepidity, and determination of our troops as a whole, but what this or that regiment has done has to be gleaned from the letters of officers and the special army and divisional orders which have from time to time been issued. All that can be done here is to select one or two typical regiments, and as far as possible to recount their services. The regiments so treated are not to be taken as having done better than their fellows, for all branches of the service—combatant and non-combatant (Regulars and Territorials, and Colonials)—have displayed the greatest gallantry, and earned the highest praise from the officers placed over them.

"This war is essentially what is known as a soldier's war," Sir John French has said. That is to say, it is a regimental war. The higher formations of Divisions and Army Corps are necessary both for tactical and strategical reasons. But the men in the trenches, though they do not as a rule know to what corps or division they belong, never forget that they belong to a regiment famous in history and possessed of noble traditions. The regiment is one and indivisible; it is indestructible. It lives even though officers and men fall and are buried within sound of the guns. Its colours and appointments speak eloquently of the deeds of those who were of the regiment in the past, and the glory and honour which are won to-day will be shared by those to whom these great and noble achievements will be an encouragement and inspiration in the future. In war the personnel of a regiment changes rapidly. The regiments that faced the enemy in the early part of the fighting have already been completely transformed, and at the end of the war, when the regiments return bringing their honours with them, the majority of officers and men who have so heroically fought to maintain the honour and reputation of their regiment, and have thereby added further honours to the list, will not return to share in the triumphant welcome of a grateful country. But they will still have their place in the life of the regiment, and will be honoured, as they deserve to be honoured, in the regimental records.

In the following pages the Manchesters are selected as a typical regiment of the industrial North, and the Worcesters as typical of the regiments recruited from country districts.

THE MANCHESTERS IN THE RETREAT FROM MONS.

The Gallant Manchesters were among the first of our troops to meet the German attack. The Second Battalion, commanded by Colonel H. L. James, was at Curragh Camp when war broke out, and the First Battalion, commanded by Colonel Strickland, C.M.G., D.S.O., was in India. The Second Battalion left Ireland on August 13th, and reached Havre three days later. Le Cateau was the battalion's destination, and on August 18th Colonel James and his men had got within striking distance of the enemy's lines. The battalion at war strength totals 1,015 men, which for fighting purposes may be called 900. At the end of two months' desperately hard fighting thirty-five officers (the full complement is twenty-seven) had been lost in killed, wounded, or prisoners, and there were 800 casualties among the men.



The 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment photographed on parade at the Curragh at the beginning of August, 1914, just before leaving for the front.


After the battle of Mons, where the Manchesters held the ground to the south of the canal between Pommereul and Thun, they retired at nightfall in the direction of Dour, about four miles away. Most of the fighting in this initial action fell to two companies. When they reached Dour they bivouacked on some rough ground. For several hours they had been marching under the most trying conditions. Officers and men were tired and hungry, wanting rest and finding none. At dawn on August 24th shells were again dropping among them, and again they were driven from the trenches by the enemy's activity on their flank. His enfilading fire was very destructive, and eventually the battalion was allotted a position which offered better facilities for resistance. The Manchesters were at this time fighting what was to all intents and purposes a rearguard action—one of the most difficult and responsible operations in war—and for five hours they held back the pursuing army, two hours longer than they were expected to do, because the order to retire had miscarried. When the order to fall back did reach them they were in a most perilous position. They had held their ground at all costs, and at last a hurried flight was the one alternative to certain annihilation. This brave show of resistance heartened the men considerably. They had now begun to feel that the enemy would not be allowed to have his own way, and that, whilst they might be driven back a few miles, they were prepared seriously to contest the ground and thereby maintain the reputation they had gained in other fields. No troops had harder work to do than the Manchesters at this time, and none came out of it with a greater reputation. The next day the Manchesters and other troops fell back on Bavai, the rearguard being composed of two companies of the Second Manchesters (A and C) and a detachment of the East Surreys. The German advance was now pressed forward, and a constant shower of bullets from bursting shrapnel failed to break up their ranks.

AT LE CATEAU.

At nine o'clock at night the men were in bivouac at Le Cateau, and were supplied with rations—one of the two things they were most in need of. The other was sleep. They had just six hours in which to refresh themselves and to prepare for another desperate encounter, for Colonel James had received orders that the British rearguard must make a stand when next they got into touch with the enemy, and they knew he was close upon them. Notwithstanding the terribly anxious time through which they had passed, and the critical time which was to come, the men off duty slept soundly. They had a covering of straw to sleep upon—a great luxury, and although embarrassed by their heavy marching kit, they made themselves tolerably comfortable until three a.m. (August 26th), when the retirement was continued to Reanmont, the enemy pressing hard all the time. But a stand had to be made in order to allow the main body to get away and prepare a position for desperate defence. The Second Suffolks were appointed to hold a line from the Reanmont Road, facing north-east towards Le Cateau, and the Manchesters prepared for themselves a defensive position just in rear of the Suffolks, B Company acting as an advanced post on the left of the Suffolks, between their line and the road, and a platoon drawn from C Company, with a machine gun, supported the Suffolk's right flank. About seven o'clock these positions were swept by a heavy concentrated fire. The enemy had located this defensive position, and from the heavy bombardment which took place it would appear that they anticipated a stand. The Suffolks were in desperate straits. They could not reply to the enemy's fire because it was concealed, and their ranks were thinning rapidly. Colonel James grasped the situation, and accompanied by Captain Nisbet, the Adjutant of the Manchesters, he rushed forward with a detachment of his men to their support. But before the trenches were gained A Company had lost many men. Meanwhile, B Company drove from a hill an advance force of the enemy which threatened a flanking movement, and the casualties included Captain Nisbet, who was killed by a shot through the head while encouraging his men in the rush against the enemy's position. About one hundred men of C Company were struggling against a searching enfilade fire from machine guns. Captain Knox was with them, and he and many others fell. There was no cover for them, artificial or other; and the shower of bullets pumped from the machine gun, at the rate of four hundred rounds a minute, proved very deadly. Another company of the Manchesters covered the right flank, where some Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had already done some brilliant work. There were, therefore, something in the nature of three detached—although one and the same—fights. The ground was scattered with wounded officers and men, some of whom shouted words of encouragement to their comrades who were still able actively to engage the enemy. It was a series of despairing rallies and desperate assaults. But the position had to be held at all costs, and the Manchesters, of Cæsar's Camp fame, were the men to do it without flinching. They were practically offered as a sacrifice in order that the main army might extricate itself from a perilous position. The cost was not a trifling one. The battalion was broken and scattered. The field was strewn with brave men, some killed outright; others were dying; many suffering great pain; and those who were fortunate enough to escape with minor injuries tried, in vain, to raise their rifle to the shoulder in a last effort to save their comrades who were falling around them. But the fierce German attack defied anything to live above ground, and even the trenches were not immune. Colonel James had lost half his battalion, including many officers, in this fine fight. The time limit had been reached; the position had been held; the main army was for the moment out of danger; and now it remained for the Battalion Commander to gather up the fragments of his brave battalion. This he proceeded to do with great coolness, whilst the stretcher bearers performed their allotted task. It was a sad and yet glorious end to a day's fighting, for the German advance was checked so effectively by the magnificent stand of the rearguard that time was given for the preparation of a camp at Estrées, where the roll was called, scattered units re-formed, the loss of each estimated, arrangements made for much-needed reinforcements, food and rest obtained, and fresh orders issued for the continuance of the fight. What remained of the Second Manchesters continued bravely to assist the rearguard in its retirement. The battalion had lost by now 350 of all ranks. Captains Wymer and Morley, and Lieutenants Butler, Miller, Burrows, and Whyte were wounded and prisoners, and Captains Theobold and Knox and Lieutenants Thomas and Albrecht were severely wounded and sent to England. One of the officers, wounded in a later action, said: "Everybody did well. The position was held for about five hours The German machine guns and artillery did the damage. The latter outnumbered ours by about four



The Guards marching past at Aldershot in peace time. [*Topical Press.*




War recruits to the Coldstream Guards at rifle drill. [*Central News.*

to one, and their aeroplanes ("Dirty Dickies," the men called them) did great work. Harper did splendidly with his machine guns, and although he lost them and most of his men, he managed to smash the vital parts before they fell into the enemy's hands."

FROM THE MARNE TO FLANDERS.


From August 27th to September 3rd the troops were marching and bivouacking, and marching again, the monotony of these duties being varied by acting as a rearguard. Thus they reached the Marne, where a detachment of 93 men made good to that extent the earlier losses. On September 9th the Manchesters had been in the field twelve days. In that short time they had marched 200 miles, and had taken part in some of the fiercest fighting of any troops since the war began. On September 9th the battalion began the advance from Tournay, and perhaps by way of a compliment to their fighting spirit the Manchesters were the advanced guard. The Marne was crossed at Saareg without opposition, but just beyond the river the battalion were subjected to a heavy fire from the German batteries. The shells were bursting in front of the line and behind it. Fragments of shell mutilated and shattered limbs, and the bullets placed many more out of action. The time of this action was about four o'clock in the afternoon, and as little headway could be made in the face of the fire, the wounded could not be got to cover. Consequently, the fighting men were greatly handicapped in their movements. An officer, who was one of the victims, said the wounded spent a dreadful night. "It was about 4 p.m., and some of us weren't found till about 8-30 a.m. the next day. It was beastly cold during the night, and it came on to rain at daylight—a nice, wetting rain. The men had no overcoats, and my Burberry was on my saddle, unfortunately. The Germans let us have it if we moved at all, and I had to growl at the wounded men near me to lie still. We were between our own firing line, or part of it, and that of the Germans, and it was 'dirty work,' as we got the short ones (bullets) all round us for a bit; luckily none of us were touched again. They (the wounded men) were awfully plucky, and although badly injured, hardly uttered a groan." In an attack on a force holding a wood, Lieutenants Chittenden and Smith were killed, Captain Foord was severely wounded, and 105 non-commissioned officers and men were killed or wounded.

The Manchesters crossed the Aisne on a ponteen raft on September 13th, and on the following day Lieutenant Moore was wounded, and in an attempt to take Chivres village, under a heavy enfilade fire, the list of killed and wounded was added to. Night attacks, too, were frequent, and further losses in an already greatly depleted battalion were recorded. Chivres Wood, six miles easy of Soissons, was occupied by the Manchesters on September 16th. The Germans had been turned out of this wood three days before, and the Manchesters were holding the trenches against them. The wood was a swamp, and the trenches were several inches deep in water. An officer who joined the battalion on the Aisne (since wounded), describing the conditions in this part of the battlefield, said:—"The men sat on bully-beef tins, or anything else they could get, to keep them out of the water. The Germans were never more than 200 yards away in their trenches, and sniping went on all the time. Our men were relieved every three days. The men got reckless, and put up their heads to see what was going on, and every now and then a man got caught. Most of the men who got hit in the trenches were shot in the head, and usually they were killed. Food and relief could only be got at night, and it was under the cover of darkness that the wounded were removed and the dead were buried. We used to have a burial party nearly every night. I had a Prayer Book, and I used to read the Burial Service by the light of an electric torch."



The Guards leaving the Tower of London.
[Topical War Service.

The trenches near Soissons were held by the Manchesters for a week. Then Sir John French moved his army into Flanders. The position assigned to the Second Manchesters was in the neighbourhood of La Bassée, but the Germans would not allow them to take it. From October 11th to the end of the month the Manchesters were engaged constantly. During this trying time Colonel



Recruits to the Grenadier Guards at physical drill at Caterham, where the Brigade of Foot Guards depot is established. [*Central News.*



Scots Guards in training at Caterham. [*Central News.*

James fell sick and was invalided home. Late in October the Manchesters reached Lorgies, where they found that the Germans had billeted in the church there, for the nave was covered with straw and very dirty. Their horses were stabled in the houses of the villagers, the inhabitants being turned out to make room for them. For a day or two in this district the usual sniping proceeded without intermission. On October 20th there was a clash of steel. Less than 100 of the Manchesters dashed at the enemy. By sheer steel and sheer courage the Manchesters won their desperate way through the enemy's lines. These hundred men charged a German regiment, but in the heat of the battle they went too far, and suffered heavily from machine guns. This charge was led by Captain Tillard, and was a particularly gallant affair. Another fierce fight which showed the mettle of the Manchesters took place on October 29th. From early morning the Germans shelled their trenches, and they had to take refuge in the supporting trenches about fifty yards behind. The Germans tried to rush the supporting trench, but they were all shot down. Lieutenant Bentley was killed in the first rush, and Lieutenant Reade, who was acting as Adjutant since the death of Captain Nisbet, was killed in the second attack. "Learning this," writes a wounded officer, "I hurried to the trench, seized a rifle, and made more bull's-eyes than ever I made in my life. We stopped the rush. One man fired at me point-blank from a few yards' distance. Instead of hitting me, he hit the bank, and drove the dirt into my eye with such force as to blind me. Second-Lieutenant Leach and Sergeant Hogan made a gallant and successful effort to recapture the trench, which they did after hard fighting." (Both have since received the Victoria Cross, p. 163.) Leach had a marvellous escape, and both he and Hogan returned unwounded. The same night our line of trenches was taken over by the Second Battalion of the Eighth Gurkhas. They were busily adjusting the trenches to suit their size when they were attacked by the Germans. There was a desperate fight, in which the Gurkhas lost nine out of eleven officers and 320 men. The Gurkhas were driven out, but, with the assistance of a Sikh regiment, they gallantly attacked again, and before the morning the Indians had recaptured the trenches. The total Manchester losses up to the end of October were estimated at about 1,000 officers and men.

THE TWO BATTALIONS MEET.

The First Manchesters went to France with the Indian Expeditionary Army, and joined the Second Battalion in the trenches. This was the first time the two battalions of the regiment had met since they were in Egypt in 1882. The arrival of the foreign service battalion was heartily welcomed. The men could hardly bear the privation of a cheer; to have to stifle their emotions on such an occasion seemed to them to be one of the greatest hardships that could be suffered. But there are ways and means of welcoming comrades on the battlefield, and a reunion after a separation extending over thirty-two years was not allowed to take place without some outward and visible sign of rejoicing. The First Manchesters got into touch with the enemy on October 23rd (five days after their landing in France), near Laventie. The battalion had not at this time been brought from a peace to a war footing. It had only eight hundred officers and men, which is the normal peace footing. The armies had "gone to earth" when Colonel Strickland's men entered the war area, and under cover of darkness they crept stealthily to the trenches to share the hardships and endure the discomforts common to all soldiers engaged in siege warfare. They had to wait until December before they could distinguish themselves.

THE FIGHT AT GIVENCHY.

The Baluchis and the Gurkhas, as already has been related (p. 144), had been repulsed in the neighbourhood of Givenchy, and the trenches which they had held were now in the hands of the enemy. The village of Givenchy, it was reported, was still unoccupied, and Colonel Strickland ordered two companies to go forward and hold it, with Major Hitchins in command of the attacking line. No. 1 Company, commanded by Captain Tillard, was to be on the left of the line; No. 2 Company, commanded by Lieutenant Mair, on the right. As soon as the village was secure these two companies had orders to advance steadily towards the enemy's trenches beyond, and No. 3 Company (Captain Creagh) was to take up a position on the right of No. 2. The advance was begun at three o'clock in the afternoon, and it was immediately opposed by a heavy rifle fire. Lieutenant Lynch and about twelve men fell. But the line steadily advanced. The enemy had found effective cover, from which they rained lead on our men; but they showed no sign of wavering. Men fell, but the line just steadily advanced with that grim determination to accomplish the work in hand. Presently the village was reached, but it was not clear of the enemy, as had been reported. The opposition was overcome, and when night came on Captain Tillard's men had made good the ground through the left of the village, and had taken possession of some of our trenches in an orchard. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Mair's Company advanced up the right centre of the village, and No. 3 Company came up on the right, and then the whole line advanced to our old support trenches. No. 1 Company was well to the left of the other companies, and in advance of them. The Germans were in our old fire trenches, from which they poured a heavy fire on the movements of the Manchesters. Unfortunately, Captain Tillard's Company was the only one of the three able to give an effective reply. The other two companies were not able to define the enemy's trenches, and as the Germans concentrated their fire on No. 1 there was a fear that they would be annihilated, and the remaining companies left in a position from which it would be difficult to retire without heavy loss. The officers decided at once that Captain Tillard must be supported, and Nos. 2 and 3 made an attempt to crawl over the open ground to the trenches of No. 1. It was now dark, and as the Germans had set on fire two haystacks this movement to support Captain Tillard's men was clearly seen. The crawling men were for the time defenceless, and their comparatively slow movement across the open ground presented a good target for the German snipers. This supporting movement had failed. The men who essayed the task were left on the ground wounded, and Lieutenant Norman was killed. The position now was that No. 1 Company was unsupported from the trenches on the left which had been vacated by the Gurkhas, and Nos. 2 and 3 Companies could not get in touch with the Rifles, who maintained their original position on the right, between the village and the canal.


The extreme British right was held by the Connaught Rangers, south of the canal. Late at night an order was received that another attempt must be made to recapture the trenches still in the hands of the enemy. Accordingly, Nos. 2 and 3 Companies moved to the attack early on the Monday morning, but it did not develop, because No. 1 Company, being in such desperate straits, could not



Men of the North Midland Division of the Territorial Army cheering the King, who inspected them just before they left for the front. [*Central News.*



British Columbia Infantry marching past the King and Lord Kitchener at the inspection on Salisbury Plain before the Canadians left for France. [*Topical Press.*



The honours list of the Northumberland Fusiliers worked out in stone and flowers as part of the St. George's Day celebrations at Boldon Camp, Northumberland. [*Central News.*

advance, and the other companies re-established themselves in the old trenches that had just been vacated. In this attack Captain Creagh was killed, and Major Hitchins (since promoted) and Captain Rose were wounded. About eight o'clock Lieutenant Parminter brought up the last half company and joined Companies 2 and 3. The whole battalion, together with a company of the Fourth Suffolks (Territorials), was again in the old support trenches, and both their left and right flanks were still open. Since the fighting in the village only No. 1 Company had had the opportunity of firing a shot. At midday the enemy made a desperate attempt to turn the Manchesters out of their position. For one hour they continuously shelled their trenches, and then the left of the position was strongly attacked, and the occupants of the trenches here were forced to retire. This was the beginning of a general retirement, which was covered by No. 2 Company. This company fought on against odds, and suffered many losses. In the course of time the enemy advanced on the left, and were heavily enfiladed by Lieutenant Mair's Company, and compelled to retire. But this company could not hold out much longer. Numerically it had been greatly weakened, and individual exhaustion was telling its tale. The Battalion Commander was informed by messenger of the state of affairs, and he and Captain Heelis (Adjutant) rallied the battalion and established the line in the supporting trenches. No. 2 Company was reinforced, but the fierce onslaught of the Germans compelled a general retirement through the village to Le Pont Fixe. During the whole of this retirement the men were shelled by the enemy.



Canadian Field Artillery colours deposited in Westminster Abbey while the batteries are at the front. [*Record Press.*

The First Manchesters were continuously in action at Givenchy for above thirty hours. The casualties were heavy—five officers and 300 men—but the men had succeeded in holding an important position. The Commander of the Division, in a message to the Commander of the Brigade, said "Givenchy was the most important point in the whole line held by the division," and we had held it "against overwhelming odds and successive attacks by the enemy." The regiment was afterwards addressed on parade by the Commander of the Brigade, who thanked the officers and men for their "splendid behaviour at Givenchy," and for saving "what was becoming a very serious situation." The Commander of the Division also addressed the regiment, and referred to their "magnificent piece of work," about which, "in my report to higher authorities, I could only use the term 'Gallant Manchesters.'" He said that "at that period the village of Givenchy was the most important point in the whole British line," and told the regiment that they were "a very brave set of men." Subsequently the regiment was addressed by the Commander of the Indian Army. He said: "Colonel Strickland, officers, and men of the First Manchester Regiment, I want to thank you for your very fine bit of work in the last fight. You are a very gallant battalion. You were holding the most important point on the right of the British line, and by your gallant conduct in holding on to it you rendered greater service than you probably realised. I want to tell Colonel Strickland in front of you all what I think of him. He is a first-class soldier, and you are a brave lot of men. I shall not fail in my report to the Commander-in-Chief to bring to notice your conduct and that of those recommended for reward, and shall do my best to obtain some suitable reward for them."

THE IRISH GUARDS.

Not far from the Manchesters in the battle of Mons was the Brigade of Guards, with Brigadier General Scott-Kerr as its commander. This officer was wounded in the early stages of the retreat from Mons, and the Brigade command, since that time, has been held by Lord Cavan. The Grenadiers, the Coldstreams, and the Scots Guards date their existence from 1660. These regiments have won fame on many a hard-fought field, and in the present war each have suffered heavy loss, both in the commissioned and the non-commissioned ranks. The Irish Guards is the youngest of the King's Foot Guards. It was formed in 1902 as a mark of Queen Victoria's appreciation of the services rendered by the various Irish Regiments of the Line in the South African war, and in this their first campaign they have shown that, like their comrades

in the Brigade, they are soldiers possessing the highest fighting qualities and worthy to be associated with regiments that have already gained a reputation in the field. Although the Irish Guards cannot claim a long and glorious history, during the last eight months they have made regimental history which will inspire to great and heroic deeds those that come after them.

In the retreat from Mons the Irishmen fought bravely and tenaciously, and held their ground until compelled by a furious cannonade to evacuate it. As soon as a position became untenable they returned to another, and fought again until driven back by largely superior numbers.

It speaks well for the men that in the face of repulse they went into the battle as steadily as ever, using their bullets and their bayonets with deadly effect in the face of shrapnel and the devastation wrought by machine gun and rifle fire. In these earlier engagements the Irish Guards behaved splendidly, and although their comrades were falling thickly around them they never wavered. Brigadier-General Scott-Kerr was one of the first officers to fall wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morris and his second-in-command were killed. Major H. Herbert-Stepney succeeded to the command, and has since been killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Ardee, who was attached to the Irish Guards from the Grenadiers, held the command of the battalion for a short time only before he was added to the casualty list.

The following statement appeared in Regimental Orders later:—" On October 31st, November 1st and 6th, the Irish Guards lost sixteen officers and 597 other ranks in disputing 200 yards of ground with superior forces. On November 1st one platoon, under Lieutenant Woodroffe (since killed), remained all day at their posts, and only withdrew at nightfall. The battalion was splendidly reorganised by Captain Orr-Ewing and Captain Trefusis, and was very soon a fighting unit once more. While the battalion as a whole have thus done so well, individual members of it, both officers and men, have won for themselves distinguished honour. The President of the French Republic has conferred the Croix de Chevalier of the Legion of Honour on Lieutenant the Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander (now Captain Alexander), and the Medaille Militaire of the Legion of Honour on Company-Sergeant-Major J. Rodgers. The Distinguished Conduct Medal has been awarded by the King to Company-Sergeant-Major A. Munns, Lance-Sergeant P. McGoldrick, Lance-Corporal M. Riordan, Private W. G. Russell, and Private M. Glynn."

THE HEROES OF YPRES.

The " Vein-openers " is the nickname of the Worcesters. It was given to them by the inhabitants of Boston, America, because they are said to have been the first to draw blood at the beginning of the American War in 1770. " The Old and Bold " and " The Star of the Line " are other nicknames by which the Worcesters are known in the service. The regiment gained the former in the Peninsular war, and the latter is derived from the fact that the men wear an eight-pointed star on their pouches, a distinction which is peculiar to the Worcesters. The Twenty-ninth (or First Battalion) were permitted to retain the star, it is said, through the influence of Queen Charlotte. The regimental motto is " Firm." In the present war they have maintained their right to that motto, and their past records in all parts of the world, and the valour they have displayed in the last eight months on the Belgian frontier and in France, completely justifies their retention of the unofficial designation " Old and Bold."

The Worcesters and the Wiltshires, two typical rural regiments, are the heroes of Ypres. They behaved with coolness and consummate bravery in checking the German attack at Mons, and at Ypres their gallant conduct saved a critical situation. Although compelled to retreat by a numerically superior enemy, they were not defeated. Addressing the First Battalion on their great work at Ypres, Sir John French, on November 26th, 1914, said:— " Worcestershires, I am very glad to have this opportunity of addressing you. On October 31st we were in a very critical position. At Headquarters we received the report that the village of Gheluvelt, an extremely important strategic point, had been taken by the enemy. Matters looked most critical. Shortly after, I was informed that the village of Gheluvelt had been recaptured by a counter-attack. Since then I have made repeated enquiries as to what officer was responsible for the conduct of this counter-stroke, and have invariably received the reply that it was the Worcestershire Regiment who carried out this attack. I have, therefore, in my despatch to the Secretary of State so mentioned it, and said it was the Worcestershire Regiment who took the action in relieving this critical state. You bear on your colours the names of many famous victories, and in this war you have added lustre to your former reputation. No man can say what the future has in store for us, but I have every confidence that in the future you will conduct yourself with the same soldierly bearing as in the past."

The Wiltshires and the Royal Scots Fusiliers also fought gallantly, and lost heavily in saving the position at Ypres. Each unit when it reached Belgium was at full war strength, and at the end of four days' fighting had not more than two hundred men left. General Sir John Hart Dunne, Colonel of the Wiltshire Regiment, records that the Second Wiltshires took up an entrenched position five miles east of Ypres, and for six days the Division to which the Wiltshires and the Worcesters belonged (about 20,000 strong) held its ground against at least two army corps of 80,000 men. The Second Wiltshires were placed in what was regarded as the key of the position held by the brigade, with orders that under no circumstances were the men to retire from the trenches. After some days of continued firing, the Germans got the exact range of the trenches occupied by the Wiltshires and broke them completely. The enemy then made a general attack along the whole line, sending forward an enormous column against the Second Wiltshires, who in charging them became mixed up with the enemy, and practically the whole battalion were killed, wounded, or captured. The German object of turning the position was not attained, for within two hours a British Army Corps arrived and routed them. The remainder of the brigade suffered greatly, but it is agreed that if the Second Wiltshires had not held the position for four days the brigade would have been driven back into Ypres.



Belgians waiting to draw an allowance of soup. [*Photopress.*

CHAPTER XIX.

THE CONDITION OF BELGIUM.


THE PROBLEM—GERMAN REQUISITIONS—THE FORMING OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION—THE SCHEME IN BEING—SCENES AT THE CANTEENS—HOLLAND AND THE REFUGEES.

WHEN the German tide of conquest had rolled to its limit over Belgium in the early autumn, there remained in the country a population of some seven millions. Five hundred thousand had fled to throw themselves on the hospitality of Holland, France, and Britain, and the wastage of war accounted for some 200,000, but the great mass of the people clung to their homes, even when these were in ruins. After the first panic of invasion sixty to eighty per cent of the inhabitants returned to the chief towns, and, living often in cellars or behind charred, broken, and roofless walls, awaited the regeneration of their country. An American who visited the country districts of Belgium in the autumn reported that in many the peasantry had "no home in which to sleep, no seed to sow with, no implements to work with, no transport with which to reach a market, and no heart to struggle against the impossible." It soon became clear that to these horrors would be added that of actual starvation, not of the poorest, or in certain districts, but of the nation as a whole. Belgium was ringed with steel. She had no exports and no imports. Her industries were paralysed, for even the threat of shooting had not compelled the workers to give their labour for the benefit of their conquerors. In any case, the revival of an economic life was made impossible by the fact that the army of occupation monopolised the means of transport and supply. There was no postal service. Movement by the inhabitants was forbidden, and metallic currency had almost ceased. In normal times Belgium imported two-thirds of her foodstuffs. She consumed more wheat per head of her population than any European nation, and grew only twenty-two per cent of what she consumed. In peace she was essentially an industrial country, with five-sixths of her population dependent on mining, manufacturing, and allied industries. Her food supply was based on imports paid for by the exports of this labour. By the middle of August the levies of the Germans, the consumption of the population, and the stoppage of exports brought her face to face with a bread famine. There was enough meat and potatoes in the country to last, if carefully used, for several weeks, but without 80,000 tons of cereals per month the population could *not* face the winter.

Neutral opinion was not slow to point Germany's obligations in the matter. "Morally," said the *New York World*, "the Belgian people are as much a charge on the Imperial Government at Berlin as any of its prisoners of war." "The nation which is most liable" said the *New York Sun*, "should see to it that no man, woman, or child starves or freezes this winter because of the 'military necessity' that made desolation of a million homes." This warmth of feeling in America was soon to take shape in the most amazing charitable enterprise the world has ever known. Meanwhile, the German reply was that if the Belgians cared to work under German rule, and if the British navy ceased to bar trade with Antwerp, Belgium need not starve; but that Germany's resources would not be more than sufficient to feed her own people till the end of the war, and that she was not going to take on the burden of another seven million mouths. This was a monstrous enough violation of the canons of humanity and of international law, but it was



S.S. Industry at Antwerp discharging a cargo of foodstuffs provided by the Philadelphia Relief Committee.



In the hold of another American relief ship discharging at Antwerp.

coupled with a wholesale requisitioning both of money and of foodstuffs from the stricken nation that had no parallel in history. Belgium, as a whole, was condemned to pay a war "levy" of £14,000,000, and £1,600,000 a month till the end of the war, and from several towns sums were extorted varying from the £1,800,000 with which Brussels, after long bargaining, finally escaped, to the £10,000 taken from Ghent. These "levies" were made "to provide for the upkeep of the army of occupation," "to compensate the widows of German soldiers shot by Belgians," as the price of being spared bombardment, or as expiation for alleged acts of violence by the civil population. They contributed materially to the impoverishment of the Belgian people, and they were accompanied by food requisitions which definitely hastened the approach of famine. While grain was still obtainable in the country Germany bought up what supplies she could lay hands on, and resold them at three times their value. At the outbreak of war there had been established in Berlin a department of the Ministry of War with power to requisition any raw material that might be even indirectly useful for military purposes, irrespective of whether it was produced in Germany or imported. The materials were then divided among the factories, which were obliged to put the products at the disposal of the Minister of War. In addition to requisitions for the army of occupation allowed by the laws of war, Germany seized in Belgium large quantities of grain, maize, oats, malt and yeast for the Raw Material Department of the German War Ministry, fixing the prices at forty to ninety per cent below their real value, and paying by credit notes on German banks redeemable three months after peace. The Dutch Government very properly refused to allow goods so requisitioned to pass through its territory, and Germany found it necessary to give some colour of legality to her actions by arranging that the goods should be consigned to definite firms in German towns, so that the requisitions should have the appearance of free sales. In this way she exacted from Antwerp alone 40,000 tons of cheese, 18,000 tons of maize, and 40,000 tons of barley, worth in all £720,000. Her total exaction in food and other supplies from Antwerp in the early months of war were worth not less than £3,400,000, and for this she paid £800,000. The raw material taken out of Belgium in this way by February was estimated as worth £15,000,000.

This monstrous toll on Belgium made the position of the British Government as regards relief a very difficult one. Popular feeling would have welcomed any step Britain could have taken to assist as vigorously in the feeding of Belgium's civil population as she was already doing by her arms in the avenging of Belgium's honour. But as long as Germany battened on the food and money of the Belgians, any help the Allies gave them was a not indirect aid to the enemy, and Britain had to be reluctantly content with housing refugees and denying official aid to the Belgians in Belgium. As the winter approached their plight grew increasingly hopeless. Belgium lay under a pall of misery and bitterness, her fields ploughed by the enemy's shells, many of her finest buildings in ruins, thousands of her homes razed, her roads empty except for soldiers, her factories silent, and her people faced by famine. Here and there resorts to violence by people desperate with hunger showed what terrible results might follow famine.

Belgian Committees formed in August to help the victims of the war had done what they could. Belgian bankers, manufacturers, and men of business had dipped to the bottom of their pockets in the effort to save their country from a fate worse even than overrunning by Germany. The administrative machinery of the various communes into which the country is divided, and which survived the invasion, had been promptly directed to relief work. But the 20,000 francs a week which the wealthiest commune could afford was pitifully inadequate, and by the beginning of October whole districts were without supplies or the hope of securing them, and even Brussels was feeling the pinch.

AMERICA ACTS.

In the face of these circumstances the United States worked a miracle by creating in a week or two, from nothing, one of the biggest and most amazingly efficient business concerns the world has seen, and applying it to the feeding of the Belgian people. In September Mr. Walter Page, American Ambassador to Britain, was instructed by his Government to use his diplomatic efforts to secure from belligerents permission for the United States to aid Belgium with food. A prime condition of official British sanction of the proposal was that Germany should undertake that none of the food so imported was used for the German army, or to release native resources for their use. It was clearly to Germany's interest to agree, and she readily did so. This undertaking, though broken at first, was later scrupulously kept, even to the point of abandoning all requisitions of foodstuffs. In these circumstances the British Government felt able to guarantee immunity for any cargoes of food shipped by the Commission, and to contribute £100,000 in aid of the scheme. Mr. Brand Whitlock and the Marquis de Vilalobar, the American and Spanish Ministers at Brussels, in collaboration with eminent Belgians, laid in September the foundations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. A chairman of extraordinary energy and organising capacity was found in Mr. Herbert Hoover, an American mining engineer. He picked his executive committee mostly from men of his own profession, who agreed to give up the whole of their energies to the work. They were men, for the most part, without previous experience of charitable or relief work. They regarded the feeding of Belgium, not only as a work calling for the highest personal sacrifice, but as the biggest business venture on which they had ever engaged; and despite the appalling magnitude of their task, and the speed with which they had to organise, they applied to all the details of it a precision that is a model for all time. A weekly balance sheet detailed the work of the Commission, and when its organisation was complete it is no over-statement to say that a record was kept of the distribution of every penny received, and of the destination of every pound of provisions that entered Belgium.

It was at once decided to make the utmost possible use of the Belgian communal system for the purposes of relief, and for this purpose there was formed the Comité National de Secours et d' Alimentation, with its headquarters in Brussels, as well as the Commission proper, with its headquarters in London. To the Commission was to fall the work of negotiating for the passage of food, of soliciting from the world contributions in money and kind, and, since all movement of Belgian subjects from place to place in Belgium was prohibited, of superintending the passage of the supplies to the various centres. To the Comité fell the work of getting the food to the people, and for this purpose it enrolled over 50,000 voluntary workers. The problem of relief was twofold—to provide bread for those who could



The Messagerie Van Gand, where soup for 50,000 people is made every day.



Some of the cooks preparing the soup at the Messagerie Van Gand.

afford to pay for it, and to provide all means of subsistence for those who were destitute. Of the latter there were at Christmas some 1,500,000, and it was clear that another million would be added before the next harvest.

Belgium was accustomed to import 230,000 tons of cereals a month. Investigations by the Commission established the fact that if a supply of 80,000 tons a month could be secured, with proportionate quantities of bacon, rice, tinned milk, and other staples, famine could be warded off. The distress was too urgent to await full organisation before starting work. In a fortnight the Commission were enabled by their energy and credit to raise £250,000, and to despatch the first relief ship to Rotterdam with 33,500 tons of flour—enough to provide the population of Belgium with one and a half days' food. She was berthed at Rotterdam on a Saturday night. By Monday morning five hundred labourers, working over Sunday for the first time in the history of the port, had transhipped her precious cargo into barges for Belgium. From that time onwards the supply of food was constant.

THE SCHEME IN BEING.

The vast and complex organisation that made this possible was quickly established and singularly complete. The financial mainstay of the enterprise was the generosity of towns, trusts, and individuals in the United States, but splendid support was also given by the British Dominions and the Allied peoples. The necessary supplies were assembled in neutral countries and shipped on the Commission's own fleet of steamers, which grew in time to number over 120 vessels. These vessels displayed on a large white flag the name of the Commission, and were exempt from search by all belligerent Governments. Their destination was Rotterdam, where the palace of a Dutch merchant prince housed a cosmopolitan staff of American, Dutch, British, and Belgians, intent on expediting distribution. The railways were for the most part unavailable, but the Commission made a careful survey of the canal system of Belgium and acquired a large fleet of barges. The progress of these barges from point to point on their routes was checked with the regularity of a train service, and delays or obstacles were quickly dealt with by the Commission's agents, many of them Rhodes scholars, who had offered their services to the Commission on its formation.

The work of provisioning included, as we have seen, the entire population, but from the point of view of organisation the people could be divided into the middle and upper classes who were able to pay for their food, the workpeople of small means, and the destitute. For the feeding of those entirely without means communal canteens were established. A card index record was formed of the people whose circumstances entitled them to canteen rations, and free non-transferable tickets were issued to them, securing them a definite ration twice daily. The actual cost of the rations for which the tickets provided was about nine francs a month, and the ration consisted usually of 300 grammes of bread, a portion of potatoes, a little coffee, a litre of soup containing vegetables and meat, and salt. The fact that the Belgian communal system provides in normal times a relieving officer and a doctor for each commune was of great help. The doctors were especially useful in directing the supplementary canteens which were established for children. In accordance with their judgment, one of five different kinds of children's tickets was issued to each child, securing for it such variety of diet as was possible to meet its case.

The workpeople of small means received the same rations as the destitute, but had to pay cost price for their tickets. The supply of bread to those with means involved a more complex system. The Commission's imported foodstuffs were shipped to the various warehouses throughout the country under the control of the Commission. Thence they were delivered to the communal officers, and each commune was debited at prices determined by the Commission and the Comité upon a basis which allowed a small profit over the import value of the foods. The communes in turn sold the flour to accredited tradesmen. These were required to submit lists of customers to the communal officers, who then issued supplies at a fixed amount per head, the price being fixed. In the case of flour, for instance, the bakers were supplied with 250 grammes for each adult customer. From this amount the baker would produce 325 grammes of bread. The price of bread and of flour being about equal, the difference in weight allowed the baker to pay his working expenses. The prices so established were kept lower than the London prices, despite the difficulties of production.

By March the Commission was shipping monthly into Belgium 60,000 tons of wheat, 10,000 tons of rice, 5,000 tons of peas and beans, 1,200 tons of bacon and lard, and 300 tons of condensed milk, at a total cost of about £1,500,000 a month. That the miracle was worked none too soon was made terribly clear by the accounts which the American emissaries sent of what they found when they went about their work. On October 30th the Commission's representative at Rotterdam telegraphed to Mr. Hoover:—"The conditions at Charleroi, Liége, Brussels, Namur, and Dinant are desperate. They are feeding from Brussels in these districts over three million people. The rations for the last three weeks have consisted of three ounces of flour per day for each inhabitant and, for each marriage certificate presented, ten grammes of salt. These are the only supplies available. The flour now on hand is sufficient only for four days. . . . It is feared that in their desperation the hungry people may attack the authorities." As late as December, Mr. Edward B. Robbinette, a Philadelphia banker, who made a tour in Belgium, wrote:—

> "Before long, unless supplies of relief food keep pouring into the country, healthy Belgian men and women will die from actual starvation. Before that happens the pangs of hunger will probably drive them to measures futile but desperate, which will bring upon them the terrible retribution of an army of occupation.
>
> "As I watched the poor being fed in Brussels, and as I saw them standing in groups in the thickly-populated cities of Namur, Charleroi, and Mons, with hunger and despair haunting them, I pictured to myself what might happen if the flour and wheat and salt which the people of my own and other countries are supplying should give out. The appreciation of the Belgian people for what is being done for them is evident everywhere. But the problem confronting the Commission is staggering. It must be remembered that it is not only the poor and destitute who must be provided for—it is all Belgium. No one is working in Belgium to-day. Her wheels of industry are stopped, her trade has disappeared, her credit is smashed. Her Government has been broken up, her ports are closed, and there are no exports and no imports except such foodstuffs as the Commission get in through Rotterdam. Supposing we allow 2½d. a day for each Belgian for food, it will be readily seen that with 7,000,000 people still in the country the cost in supplying food will come close to £2,000,000 per month."



S.S. Harpalyce discharging a relief cargo given by New England.



A bread line in the Rue Blaes, Brussels, outside one of the twenty-one canteens to which 50,000 people come daily for their rations.

By the beginning of December Brussels had fourteen communal kitchens and 147 canteens for adults, and sixteen kitchens and thirty-four canteens for children under three. In the first week of December, out of a population of 650,000, 218,000 were dependent on the canteens, including 31,000 babies—a total of more than a third of the population. In the industrial districts, where the people naturally had less stores in hand than at the capital, the canteens supplied a much greater percentage of the population, amounting in some places to over 600 per cent.

We have already seen that Germany promised every help to the Commission in their work. The promise was observed. "The German occupying army," wrote Mr. Hoover, in January, "is giving us a great deal more actual assistance than could normally be expected from an army in time of war." Belgium was, he pointed out, occupied mainly by Landsturm men, and these, having been called up from private life, showed a more considerate disposition than was commonly found in the regular German soldier. Many of the officers helped strenuously in the moving of food supplies, the re-opening of canals, and similar work. The guarantee that no duties or taxes of any sort should be laid on the Commission's supplies was kept, and in November German Headquarters issued a general order throughout Belgium that no provisions of any kind which would in the ordinary course have to be replaced by the Relief Commission should be requisitioned. This was a notable change from the attitude in August and September; but at the same time she made no relaxation in her money levies.

A SCENE AT DISTRIBUTION.

The Belgian cities at the hour of food distribution presented a scene that no observer could forget. His attention would be drawn from the havoc caused by bombardment by a steady stream of people, mostly women, children, and old men, heading in one direction, with the little net bags with which in peace they were wont to go marketing in their hands. The stream would join other streams, till thousands of people converged in orderly fashion on the communal canteens. In a town of moderate size like Liége they would pass two-deep through the canteen courtyard from eleven a.m. till two, scarcely checking their pace to present their cards and receive their rations. On all sides of the courtyard were piled heaps, ten to fifteen feet high, of crisp, crusty bread, with about three slices to the loaf, ranged in bins according to the size of the loaves, and vast kettles of soup holding a hundred gallons each. This soup was made with extreme care by the best cooks available, and was extraordinarily nourishing and palatable for its cost, one cent a portion. The recipe for a ration at Verviers to feed about 50,000 people is typical. It consisted of

5,000 kilogrammes of potatoes,
900 kilogrammes of meat,
1,200 kilogrammes of carrots and celery,
500 kilogrammes of onions,
500 kilogrammes of rice,
500 kilogrammes of crusts,
70 kilogrammes of extra fat.

The delivery of these vast quantities of hot soup was no easy matter. It was carried, still boiling, from the communal kitchens to the canteens on steam wagons, and its distribution was helped by the tireless work of Belgian women and girls of good family, whose labour and sacrifice brought the warmest tributes from the American workers. They were struck, too, with the entire absence of any air of patronage or charity about the distribution, despite the care that had to be taken to obtain the fullest particulars of each individual case. At the end of a distribution the record would show at a glance who among the regular recipients had not come, and within an hour someone would visit the house to see what fresh trouble had befallen. "No race, not even the French," wrote one observer, "could have kept the air of charity so completely out of it. If they were at all conscious of our presence, they did not show it. I was sure they knew where the wheat came from to make the bread, but only a few said anything. They felt it would embarrass us. One old woman, holding up her loaf so that she could get the fragrance of it, remarked, 'You have good grain where you come from.' To which Mrs. Whitlock, wife of the American Minister, replied, 'You have good bakers.'" And so carefully was the supply and demand calculated that after a distribution to several thousands, not more than a few portions of soup and bread would be left.

The task of ensuring that none of the supplies should benefit German troops was a difficult one. There were on the average a quarter of a million men in the army of occupation, many of them of course billeted on houses whose occupants were in receipt of relief. The communes made a careful record of the number and allocation of the troops, and of the amount they consumed. The figures were submitted by Mr. Whitlock to German Headquarters, and Germany supplied foodstuffs to that amount. But the finest evidence of the wonderful efficiency of the combined Commission and Comité was in their care of the infants. An association composed in the main of young Belgian women, and calling itself the Little Bees, was formed expressly for this work. A writer in the *World's Work* gave a picture of their activities:—

> "The Little Bees do all their own cooking on the spot, and on the stoves were big kettles of chocolate and soup. On a counter were the accessories which go to make up a baby's diet, and close at hand were the cans of milk. As a mother or sister came in, usually carrying the child, she held a card in her hand, issued by the doctor who had examined and prescribed for the child. The cards were in six different colours, and frequently the applicant had more than one. I carried away a set of these cards. The yellow is for milk, green for half milk and half phosphatine, red for phosphatine, pink for half milk, orange for cocoa, and blue for soup and bread.
>
> "If the child thrives, it is examined only once in five months and its diet advanced. But the sickly are under constant attention. The girls at the counter never let a sickly child pass without enquiring into the circumstances, and frequently sending the mother directly off to the doctor."

Thus through the winter the Commission pursued its work, continually accepting and discharging greater responsibilities than it had dreamed of when it embarked on its great enterprise. It was as though the fury of the war had given birth to a new state—a state ruled by business men, who met kings and ambassadors on terms of equality, to whose requests belligerents deferred in the passion of their quarrel, whose fleet enjoyed a safety that even neutrals could not command, and whose members were free to come and go where no others might. It had no territory except in the appreciation of the world, but it stood very definitely between Belgium and ruin.

As the burden of Belgium grew heavier it became clear that this work could not be done without much greater help than was yet forthcoming. The price of foodstuffs had increased, and the number of the destitute




German soldiers distributing food. [*Photopress.*



German soldiers doling out bread at the Antwerp barracks. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*

in Belgium had increased with it. It was calculated that before the next harvest over two and a half millions would have no means. At no time had the Commission more than a week or two's supplies in hand, more often they had stores only for a few days, and sometimes the failure of a cargo would confront an outlying district with the old horror of famine.

A regular subvention from the British Government was applied for. Sir Edward Grey replied that though satisfied that none of the food was consumed by Germany, and that since December no requisitions of food had been made for the German army, the fact that the enemy continued to exact enormous money levies, culminating in the demand for forty million francs a month from Belgium as a whole, compelled the British Government to withhold official aid from the Commission. If Germany were willing to confine her taxation of Belgium to the amount allowed her by international law for the maintenance of her army of occupation, Britain would grant a monthly subvention to the Committee. Germany refused, and the Commission was forced still to rely on private effort. The formation, however, in April of one of the most influential committees ever formed in this country, to help in securing a steady flow of provisions to Belgium, gave a national colour to British support and a hope for the future.



The Germans in Belgium: Guns placed on the terrace of the Palace of Justice, Brussels, in order to overawe the city.
[*J. A. Wolf.*

THE FLIGHT TO HOLLAND.

If Belgium has the United States to thank for warding off famine from the great bulk of the population who did not quit the country, her debt to Holland is not less great. Even before the fall of Antwerp, on October 8th, the little Dutch nation of 5,000,000 people had given hospitality to as many refugees as it could well accommodate. When Antwerp fell its resources were at once hopelessly overtaxed. We have already seen (Vol. I., Chap. XXVII.) how the fury of the bombardment and the fear of German violence sent almost the whole population of the city and surrounding country in flight to the coast and to the Dutch frontier. By the middle of October not less than a million Belgians had taken refuge in Holland. In many parts they outnumbered the Dutch. The Province of Zeeland, with 300,000 inhabitants, had 400,000 refugees; Flushing, with a population of 20,000, had 30,000, and Sluis, with 1,500, had 8000. Every available shed, school, barge, and warehouse was filled with refugees, and still the terrible tide of the weary, destitute, and panic-stricken people flowed on from the frontier.

The burden rapidly became insupportable for Holland. Food ran short, the congestion was so great that sanitation was impossible, and the medical staff available could not hope to deal adequately with the disease that would almost certainly result from such conditions. Agencies for relief gave what help they could—notably the International Women's Relief Committee. The British Government offered financial help to Holland, but the Dutch Government felt compelled to refuse it lest Germany should regard it as a breach of neutrality; and throughout October Holland continued to bear her impossible load as best she could. Meanwhile, the Germans were giving band concerts in the dead city of Antwerp. "Nothing," wrote a lady who remained for some time after its fall, "could give one a more profound impression of the desolation of the place than the sinister gaiety of the Station Square and before the Athenée, which are but the centres of streets that are deserted, strewn with what the fugitives have abandoned, and filled with the barking and moaning of abandoned dogs." Back to Antwerp and its environs, however, as many of the refugees as possible had to be sent, and in November the stream began to ebb again as trainload after trainload returned to take up what life they could under German domination. But even when all who could, or would, go had left, Holland still housed nearly half a million Belgians, of whom 200,000 were destitute. Trade was bad, and to find employment for any considerable number of them was impossible. Holland patiently accepted the task of feeding and



Waiting for relief rations at Bruges. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*




All that remains of a peasant's home. [*Central News*

housing them, and, as far as possible, schooling the children, and won the gratitude of all Europe by her sacrifice. Some measure of the urgency of the problem can be got from the fact that it was found necessary to establish at Bergen op Zoom a special camp for young children. In it were three hundred babies born after the fall of Antwerp, eighty of them on the road to the frontier.

BRITAIN AND THE REFUGEES.

Beside the part Holland played, the little that Britain could do for the refugees seemed insignificant; but those who felt it a cause for shame that with all our resources we gave shelter only to some 200,000 should have remembered that when the great exodus occurred it was possible for thousands of Belgians to walk to Holland who could not take ship for England; that every available ship was crammed to the limit of her capacity; and that we did, in fact, relieve Holland of many of her refugees as soon as was practicable. More just is the criticism that the problem of dealing with the relatively small number that came under our care was approached with more enthusiasm than method. In the days after the fall of Antwerp, transports, channel steamers, fishing smacks, and pleasure boats landed thousands of refugees a day at Dover and Folkestone.



The Germans in Belgium: Troops quartered in the Palace of Justice, Brussels. [*J. A. Wolf.*

"The Ostend boats are so crowded," wrote an observer at Folkestone, "that you look from the pier on a mass of heads. Bedridden old men and women are carried down, then there may come a forlorn young woman with a shawl over her head quite destitute, a bevy of nuns stealing along with expressionless faces, a workman and his distraught family who immediately camp out among their bundles on the quay side. You would put many of them down as ordinary middle-class folk coming over for a holiday, but these are often the worst cases of destitution. From comfort they have come down to perhaps a hundred francs in the pocket and no prospect of more.

"A well-drilled army of helpers from the War Refugees Committee is ready to smooth the way. The interpreters—one is a Belgian Count—are endlessly resourceful and patient. Folkestone ladies carry round sandwiches and coffee before the train starts. Ambulances are ready for the sick and wounded."

London served as a clearing house for the refugees on arrival, and there they were dealt with by the War Refugees Committee which had been formed in August, acting with the Local Government Board. Huge buildings such as the Earl's Court Exhibition Hall and the Aldwych Skating Rink were commandeered for their reception in the first instance, and throughout the country over 1,400 committees were formed to provide homes and maintenance for them. Though the relationship between these committees was extremely loose, and the methods they employed widely different, they managed to keep pace with the demand for accommodation, At the end of January the War Refugees Committee reported that the Clothing Department had issued over 500,000 articles of clothing; at the Aldwych Skating Rink arrangements had been made for allocation, registration, and tracing missing relatives; left and lost luggage offices, a crèche, a shop for supplying cheap necessities labour and recruiting bureaux, and food and clothing departments had also been organised. As many refugees could pay the whole or part of their expenses if quarters were found, the committee organised a scheme at an extremely low cost for leasing and furnishing some hundreds of small flats for the accommodation of this class. The cost of this scheme was materially reduced by an arrangement with the officials of the National Food Fund to supply food daily without charge in cases recommended by the Committee. The Committee's Education Department also provided higher and primary education for the great majority of the children.

In the disposal of the refugees certain districts, notably on the east coast, were proscribed by military order, but the Belgians were distributed widely over both town and country, and there were few districts that had not this very real reminder of the war in their midst. Many a small village remote from the stream of news and events had its tea-parties and concerts for the

Belgians, and the sympathy and intercourse between the refugees and their hosts formed a link between the countries which will not soon be broken. In Scotland, which accounted for more than its share of refugees in proportion to population, a slight, but appreciable, community even of language was discovered by the Flemish and the Scottish peasantry, greatly to the satisfaction of both.

EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES.

The problem of finding employment for the visitors was less satisfactorily settled. Mr. Seebohm Rowntree had remarked on the demoralisation which threatened the refugees in Holland through the entire idleness in which they spent their days, and it was recognised that no effort be spared to find work for those in Britain. A Special Committee which was appointed, with Sir Ernest Hatch as chairman, estimated that some 21,000 might be absorbed in the industries of this country, and though the distrust which the trade unions felt for a step that offered such obvious temptations to the abuse of their rules handicapped progress on this line, and resulted in some friction, a certain number of Belgian workmen, skilled and unskilled, found their way into British factories. The Committee also recommended the establishment of special workshops where the Belgians could make goods for their own use, and several interesting experiments of this kind were made. In Bradford, a technical institute, manned as far as possible by Belgian teachers, formed a centre for the social life of the refugees of the district, and a place where they could learn certain trades which they could put in operation on the premises. In Hyde, a small cabinet-making factory was started, and the furniture stored till it could be taken back to Belgium; while in Leeds three or four industries were organised in one workshop on similar lines.

But in the main the care and maintenance of the refugees continued to be a matter of private generosity, which gave of money, houses, clothes, and even motor cars to the refugees. The help given by all classes, from the workers who set aside a bedroom to municipalities who housed hundreds, showed how readily the British people welcomed a chance of repaying some of their debt to Belgium.



Holland's share in the relief of Belgium: Belgian refugees over the Dutch frontier.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*



In the Russian reserve trenches, showing the wire entanglements. *[Topical Press.*

CHAPTER XX.

THE GERMAN ADVANCE FROM EAST PRUSSIA.

THE POSITION NORTH OF THE VISTULA—EAST PRUSSIA AND THE LINE OF THE RIVERS—NEW GERMAN CONCENTRATION—RUSSIANS OUTFLANKED—THEIR ARMY BROKEN UP—A SEVERE DEFEAT—THE ATTACK ON THE RIVER LINE—BATTLE AT PRZASNYSZ.

IN January, 1915, the Russians held a position which was on the whole favourable. They had descended through Bukowina to the frontier of Roumania and the passes leading into Hungary; in the Carpathians they had thrown back the Austrian attack and were making their preparations to advance towards the mountain crests; in Poland, south of the Vistula, they had brought the German advance on Warsaw to a standstill, and their line, after innumerable attacks made upon it, seemed now to be as unshakable as that of the Allies in the west. North of the Vistula they had pushed forward by a number of roads well up towards the southern borders of East Prussia; in the eastern section of that province they had advanced into the lake region and up to the line of the Angerapp river, so that a considerable strip of German territory was in their possession, although the Germans had utilised the lakes and marshes to form a line of defence which the Russians found they could not penetrate. In the far north of the province a Russian column was threatening Tilsit.

The German commanders, having made every effort to force the Russian front before Warsaw and having failed, after the heaviest losses which they had ever suffered on the eastern front, looked round for a better opportunity of dealing the Russians an effectual blow. From the Vistula southward the war had become an affair of trenches, but the long extended line north of the river might still give them the opportunity of either practising a successful flank movement or finding a weak point between the different Russian corps and breaking through the front. A special reason for attacking in the northern area lay in the Russian occupation of East Prussian territory—"Our beloved East Prussia," as the German Emperor called it in a telegram sent after the blow was struck. They determined, therefore, following the methods which had been so successful at the battle of Tannenberg in August and the later movement from Thorn, to concentrate great forces in East Prussia and to fall upon the invader and overwhelm him before he could secure his retreat across the region of marsh and lake between East Prussia and the Niemen river. This was only one-half of their plan. They decided also to advance from a number of points on the southern frontier of East Prussia, and to attack the line of the two rivers which, beside the Niemen, form the barrier to an invasion of Russia in this quarter, namely, the Narew and the Bobr.

THE GERMAN PLANS.

It has been much debated what the precise object of the Germans was in this campaign, which, it will be seen, falls into two parts—that directed against the invasion of East Prussia and the line of the Niemen, and that which threatened the Russian positions on the Narew and Bobr. There is no doubt at all about the object of the former movement. It was primarily to free East Prussia, and only incidentally to force the passage of the Niemen and by the same stroke to cut the trunk railway line from Warsaw to Petrograd, which crosses the Niemen at Grodno and for some distance northwards runs dangerously near the river. But whether the Germans in the southern half of this campaign intended, as is often said, to cross the Narew and the Bobr, to outflank Warsaw on the north-east, and thereby to bring about, as such a stroke certainly would have done, a withdrawal of the whole Russian line down to the borders of Galicia, must be held to be doubtful. A short consideration of




Russian infantry on the march through a frontier town. [*Photopress.*



German troops passing through a destroyed village on the East Prussian frontier. [*Sport and General.*

the character of the river line and the railway system behind it shows this to be so.


The Narew and Bobr, linked up with the Niemen by the Augusta Canal, form an unbroken screen to Warsaw on the north and north-east. At the junction of the Narew and the Vistula stands the powerful fortress of Nowo Georgiewsk, and before the junction with the Bobr is reached there are other fortified places, such as Pultusk, Ostrolenka, and Lomza. The Bobr, and in a slight degree also the Narew, are defended by a broad belt of marshes on either bank; the road and railway which cross the Bobr on their way into East Prussia are protected by the fortress of Ossowiec, on which the Germans had already, on a former occasion, failed to make any impression. The roads available for the use of an invading army seeking to cross these two rivers are few and far between, and the defence is correspondingly easy. Moreover, it is precisely in this area that the Russians have what they possess scarcely anywhere else—a good railway system. At the back of the rivers runs the Warsaw - Petrograd line, fed by a number of other railways from the interior. From this main avenue there spring six or seven railways built right up to the rivers, and able, therefore, to assist a rapid concentration of troops—the one thing which at the critical moments of this war the Russians have been unable to effect and which has been responsible for all their serious defeats. One line joins that from Warsaw to Nowo Georgiewsk, and runs northward to Mlawa, so that it strengthens the Russian advanced position in front of the Narew. Three lines springing from the Warsaw railway converge near Ostrolenka, and would quickly reinforce and supply the Russian army along almost the whole length of the Narew up to its junction with the Bobr. Not far beyond the northernmost of these three is the railway to Ossowiec. Three railways cross the Niemen at Grodno, Olita, and Kovno—all fortified places. It is clear, therefore, that the Germans, if their intention was to force the line of the three rivers, were attacking the Russians on ground which the defence could for once use to the best advantage, and where it was least likely to be taken by surprise. This does not, of course, apply to an attack on the Russian army engaged in invading East Prussia, but the defeat of that force was an operation quite distinct from an attempt to gain the line of the Niemen. It would seem likely, since the Germans put the bulk of their available forces into the East Prussian movement rather than into the advance on the Narew and the Bobr, that they did not hope to be so fortunate as to outflank the Warsaw position. They were to some extent compelled to advance from the southern borders of East Prussia by the very fact that the Russians were so far forward there as to be on the flank of a German army marching to the Niemen, and the probability is that they did not hope to do more than drive the Russians back on the rivers, and possibly divide and defeat some sections of their army while carrying out undisturbed the main stroke on the East Prussian and Niemen front. Towards the end of January they began to assemble large forces for the enterprise.



The map illustrates the methods of attack by which the Germans broke up and defeated the Tenth Russian Army.

RUSSIAN DISADVANTAGES.

The decisive factor in dealing with the Russian forces in East Prussia was that they were far removed from their bases, and, if surprised by a largely superior army, had no alternative but to beat a hasty retreat; there was no prospect of reinforcements reaching them in time to enable them to make an early stand. This was the first and, as it proved, the decisive advantage which the Germans held. The second was that the Russians, if compelled to retreat, would have to do so over most unfavourable country, which at this time was deep in snow, and was liable at any moment to be made even worse for the passage of an army by a sudden thaw. The most that can be said for the Russians was that the farther the Germans followed them towards the Niemen, the greater their difficulties would become, since they would be leaving the sources of their supply just as the Russians were drawing nearer to theirs, and the pursuit would therefore become more and more arduous. But



The remains of a railway station on the East Prussian frontier.

this disadvantage did not affect the ease and success with which the Germans dealt their first blow. They drew the army with which they now delivered the attack from four sources. Part of it was that which had been holding the lake region for many weeks against the Russian invasion. One corps, the Twenty-first, was drawn from the western front, which it left on January 27th, with the exception of one regiment belonging to it that remained behind in order to conceal from the enemy that the remainder of the corps had gone. (This did not, however, imply any weakening of the German army in the west, as an equivalent force was at once brought up from the interior of Germany.) The third portion of Marshal von Hindenburg's army consisted of two corps, the Thirty-eighth and the Fortieth, which had been trained during the autumn and winter, and were now put into the field for the first time. The fourth section was composed of troops withdrawn from the German army south of the Vistula. So long as Von Hindenburg had been attempting to break through to Warsaw he had no troops to spare for other purposes, but he had more than enough to maintain a pure defensive, and he now withdrew to the north of the Vistula the Twentieth Active Corps, a reserve corps of the Guard, one active brigade of the Guard, and one brigade of the Silesian Landwehr. He had thus at his disposal six new army corps, and was practising again the manœuvre by which he had already inflicted two severe reverses on the Russians. Whatever the faults of the Russian commandership may or may not have been, it was almost impossible that the handicap which they suffered in respect of railways should not on occasion be decisive against them. The railway system of East Prussia is unsurpassed for strategic purposes, and Von Hindenburg once more succeeded in collecting a largely superior force and throwing it against an enemy who was too weak to resist the attack with any hope of success, and could not avoid a serious defeat unless he obtained intelligence of the concentration against him in time to retreat before the blow was dealt.

THE TENTH RUSSIAN ARMY.


The invasion of East Prussia had been entrusted to the Tenth Russian Army, under General Baron Sievers. It consisted of four corps. One of these, forming the right wing of the army, lay to the north of the railway line which runs east and west across the province from Königsberg to Gumbinnen and on to Kovno; it held the ground between Gumbinnen and Tilsit on the Niemen, in extent about forty miles. The other three corps were south of the railway—one along the line of the Angerapp river, about Darkehmen and Goldapp; the others in the region of the Masurian Lakes on either side of Lyck. Half a dozen or more railways led towards the positions held by these corps from the line which runs through the centre of East Prussia, but the Russians had on this occasion advanced more carefully than in August of last year, and their corps were spread out so as to be in touch with each other, and prevent any repetition of the double envelopment to which General Samsonoff had fallen victim.

During the last days of January the German forces were gathering, and on February 4th the Russians first became aware that a great concentration against them was in progress. On February 7th the German offensive opened with a movement east of Tilsit against the extreme right wing of the Russian army. This flanking advance may be compared in its object and execution with the attack on the Franco-British army at the end of August, and with the Russian movement from Warsaw and Nowo Georgiewsk against the flank of the German army in its first advance on Warsaw. But in its result it was much more successful. Both the Western Allies and the Germans had succeeded in drawing off their armies as a whole, saving their wings from being surrounded and at the same time keeping all the corps in touch with one another. The Russians between Tilsit and Gumbinnen were not so fortunate. The German flanking force was thrown forward with great energy, and the Russians found themselves in serious danger of envelopment on their right wing. The situation might probably have been saved by a retreat of the whole Tenth Army, not due east as it had come, but in a pronounced south-easterly direction, so that the right wing was continually being withdrawn from the outflanking force. But its commander did not choose this course. The Gumbinnen Corps endeavoured continually to head off the outflanking Germans, stretching itself out farther and farther towards the north-east. In the haste of this manœuvre, seeking always to keep pace with each effort of the enemy, it drew away from the corps which lay immediately to the south of it, and soon lost touch with it altogether. A gap was opened up in the neighbourhood of the railway, of which the Germans at once availed themselves. They had, indeed, succeeded beyond what they might have hoped, for they had not only brought about a general Russian retreat, but they had broken through between the right wing and the centre.

THE 20th CORPS ENVELOPED.

The Germans have always shown themselves quick to seize an advantage and relentlessly pursue it. They came down in a torrent across the railway, pouring in a south-easterly direction into the country immediately behind the Russian corps which had been on the Angerapp river, and was now—too late—in full retreat, This was the Twentieth Corps, under Lieutenant-General Bulgakoff, composed of the Twenty-ninth Division and three reserve regiments of the active army. With the Germans already in its rear it could do nothing but seek a way of escape towards the south-east, in the direction of Suwalki, and the forest region of Augustowo. It was not, however, assailed only on the front, right flank and rear. Simultaneously with the German onslaught from the line of the railway, fierce attacks had been made on the left wing of the Twentieth Corps and on both flanks of the two corps to the south. The attack at these points was only less successful than that in the north. The Twentieth Corps, which had long ago been cut off from the right wing of the Tenth Army, now (February 13th) lost touch completely with the two southern corps, and retired fighting desperately on all four fronts. So long as its ammunition lasted it continued the struggle, and in the Augustowo forest some sections of it were fighting until February 22nd. It was believed at first that only a few individuals out of the whole corps had escaped, but eventually part of two regiments appeared at Sopockinie, in the south-eastern section of the Augustowo forest, having traversed sixty miles in twelve days, most of the time fighting. For all practical purposes the Twentieth Corps had been annihilated.


The two corps which formed the left wing of the Tenth Army were attacked both in front and at the southern point of their line, where large German forces advanced along the frontier railway and pressed forward into Russian territory to the south of Augustowo. At the same time they found themselves completely cut off from the unfortunate Twentieth Corps, and were themselves hard pressed on their right. They succeeded—



German transport waggons captured by the Russians. [*Photopress.*



A Polish road on which the mud lies so deeply that motors have to be hauled by horses. [*Universal.*



Map to illustrate the German attack on the line of the Narew and Bobr.

and to this they partly owe their safety—in maintaining their connection with each other, and, with the Germans pursuing and harassing them on both flanks, they beat a retreat towards Augustowo and the forest and marshes lying between it and the Niemen. It was a hurried but not a rapid retirement. The ground was deep in snow, to which the Germans attribute the escape of the two corps from complete destruction, while the Russians declared that the same cause was alone responsible for the heaviness of their losses. Nine days were taken in a retreat over ground which would normally have been covered in four; motor transport had become impossible, and the supply service sometimes failed completely. It was not until February 20th that the left wing reached the safety of the far side of the Niemen.

THE GERMAN SUCCESS.

The German claim that the whole of Baron Sievers's army had been annihilated was exaggerated, as no doubt were the reports which declared that a hundred thousand prisoners and 150 guns had been taken. But the Russians had undoubtedly suffered a disaster which, if only local in its consequences, was still of the first magnitude. The northern corps had saved itself by a hasty flight, in which it had suffered seriously; the Twenty-eighth had been annihilated; the remaining two had only extricated themselves after nine days' continuous fighting. The German victory was as creditable to the planning of the General Staff as anything which they had done in the war. The original movement from the direction of Tilsit had all the qualities of surprise and swiftness of execution which are essential to the success of any flanking scheme, and the Russians never recovered from it. The hope that the Northern Russian Corps would either fall back on and obstruct the communications of the rest of the army, or in avoiding this disaster would produce one even greater by losing touch with its neighbours and opening up a gap in the line, must have been present in the mind of the German leaders, and when it was fulfilled they took the greatest possible advantage of their opportunity. This was not the full extent of their success, for the three corps south of the Gumbinnen railway might still have succeeded in drawing off together; but the German blow at the point of junction between the Twentieth Corps and that adjoining it on the south was so shrewd and well-timed that it split up the Russian army still further and exposed the Twentieth Corps to complete encirclement. The Russian army, on the other hand, was badly handled, and it was perhaps the general admission of this which led to the story that the Grand Duke Nicholas afterwards summoned Baron Sievers to his headquarters and openly denounced him for incompetency. The cause of the great defeat in the Masurian Lakes in August had been that a large force ventured too far into a most difficult country, where it could obtain no trustworthy intelligence of the new forces that were forming against it, and was surrounded almost before it knew its danger. But in the present instance the Tenth Army covered a much greater extent of ground, and for many weeks it and the enemy had been facing one another in strongly-entrenched positions.



A heap of battle wreckage—equipment, ammunition, etc.—swept together after a fight on the Russian frontier. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Russian prisoners taken by the Germans. [*Topical Press.*

The initial error which led to the defeat, and which seems to have been due purely to bad generalship, was the movement of the right wing away from its centre; the second cause is only to be found in the strength and momentum of the attack which the Germans launched on the entrenched positions of the Russians at the point where the two central corps were in touch with each other. It was a plain case of success in breaking through the centre of a line which should have been almost unbreakable, and as the Russians elsewhere—as, for instance, in front of Warsaw—had defeated the most desperate efforts of the Germans to obtain success by similar methods, it must be supposed that the Russian forces on the Angerapp river were either unduly weak at critically important points, or that the Germans chose their points of attack with very great skill and concentrated exceptionally strong forces against them. At all events, the result was a notable victory for the generalship displayed both in planning and executing the attack; although the Russian soldier exhibited here, as he did throughout the war, qualities of courage and endurance which were not surpassed by any of the armies in the field. The operations had been carried out on the German side by General von Eichhorn, under the direction of Von Hindenburg, and the Kaiser was present in the field.



The remains of a bombarded town in East Prussia. [*Universal.*

THE NAREW AND THE BOBR.

In order that the Germans might be uninterrupted while they dealt with the Tenth Army it was necessary that they should occupy the attention of the Russians all along the line of the Narew and the Bobr. Especially they had to give attention to the strong Russian forces which had advanced north-westwards from the Narew towards the southern corner of East Prussia, and which might now, if left to themselves, have created a very disagreeable diversion. Accordingly, at the same time as General von Eichhorn began to attack the Tenth Army, German columns were set in motion on half-a-dozen roads leading to the points of strategic importance on the rivers. One column advanced to Ossowiec on the Bobr and brought up heavy artillery, which engaged in an ineffectual duel with the fortress guns. Ossowiec is not a first-class fortress, but on this, as on a former occasion, it had no difficulty in repelling the attack, which, indeed, was not pressed with any vigour. Other columns moved towards Lomza and Ostrolenka, the fortified places which guard the crossings on the upper Narew; but the Russians met them well in front of the river, and fighting took place for days in which neither side engaged large forces. On the right bank of the Vistula the Germans drove the Russians back to within about two days' march of the fortress of Nowo Georgiewsk, but there their advance stopped, as it was no doubt expected it would. All these operations were in the nature of demonstrations, designed to keep the Russians on the defensive, but no actual attempt to get across any one of the rivers was made except to the north-west of Grodno, where, after heavy and continuous fighting, some weak detachments succeeded in crossing the Niemen. They were quickly thrown back, and no further attempt was made. Only on one section of the river front, that which lay between Mlawa (close to the East Prussian frontier) and Ostrolenka, was there



A German Red Cross motor ambulance corps drawn up in the snow on the Eastern front.

[*Photopress.*

fighting on a great scale. Here the Russians were in strength, and it was proportionately necessary for the Germans to push them back. They employed two army corps for the purpose.

THE BATTLE OF PRZASNYSZ.

By February 18th the German army was concentrated along the East Prussian frontier on a line stretching about thirty miles north-east from Mlawa towards Chorzele. From each of these places a road runs to the village of Przasnysz, and from Chorzele, in a direction almost due north and south, runs the river Orzic, which is a tributary of the Narew, and passes a few miles east of Przasnysz. The Russian line lay along a ridge just south of the Mlawa-Przasnysz road, with its extreme right wing resting on Przasnysz. The Germans were well aware that there were no great Russian forces lying to the east of Przasnysz or beyond the Orzic, and connecting with the army of Mlawa, and that, if they advanced with sufficient speed along the valley of the Orzic, they might brush aside what small resistance they were likely to encounter and appear on the flank and rear of the Russian wing at Przasnysz. The manœuvre was about to be repeated which had already served them so well against the Tenth Army. If the Russians learned in time of the concentration on the frontier they might extend their right wing to the Orzic and present the enemy with a frontal battle, but if all went well with the German rush they would be driven into retreat, and perhaps cut off. At first all went excellently well. On February 20th the Germans, while making a demonstration in force against the Russian left flank near Mlawa, poured down beside the Orzic and flung their left flank right round Przasnysz until it reached a point about eight miles to the south of the village. The enveloping force then turned west and pressed on until Przasnysz was surrounded on all sides but one, and the Russian right wing, resting on Przasnysz, was attacked from both the north and south.

The Germans, while detaching forces to assail Przasnysz from the east and south, secured them from interruption in the attack by throwing out a strong screen of troops along the line of the Orzic, of which they seized the crossings so as to hold off the counter-attack which they expected would be delivered from the direction of the Narew. The counter-attack was duly delivered, but before it came Przasnysz was taken by assault. Simultaneously with its envelopment the Germans delivered a general attack on the Russian front, seven miles in extent, which lay between Przasnysz and the Mlawa railway; and as their frontal assault was supported by the advance of the wing which had come round the southern side of Przasnysz, the Russians were in imminent danger of destruction. The Germans claimed 10,000 prisoners and twenty guns as the fruit of this success. But the tables were soon to be turned. Early in the morning of February 24th—the day on which the Germans entered Przasnysz—the Russians began their counter-attack. The line from which they advanced faced the crossings of the Orzic, now held by the Germans, and, passing over the river, stretched across country so as to threaten the wing of the Germans which now lay to the south of Przasnysz. The crossings of the Orzic were held by the Thirty-sixth German Reserve Division, which was compelled to abandon them by the evening of the 24th. Throughout the whole of the 25th the battle continued to the south of Przasnysz, and in the evening of that day the Germans were at last driven back on Przasnysz itself. The Russians, swinging their right flank round to the north-east of the village, drove the Germans from it and re-took it in the evening of the 26th, only to be driven out of it again during the night, and it was not until the 27th that they gained final possession. With the loss of Przasnysz and the advance of the Russian right wing, the Germans fell back along the whole line up to the Mlawa railway, and throughout the 28th were retreating towards the frontier between Mlawa and Chorzele. When they regained their own territory about ten thousand prisoners remained in the hands of the Russians.

In the battle of Przasnysz the Russians had brilliantly retrieved a desperate situation. They had been taken once more unawares. They had occupied a position which

was in itself insecure, since there was between their right wing and the river Orzic a gap which an enemy might, and in fact did, utilise to very good effect. They had found the Germans turning their flank, appearing on their rear and threatening them with complete envelopment. But no amount of surprise avails to shake the stubbornness of the Russian soldier, and the resistance of the garrison of Przasnysz and of the main army beyond it was sufficiently prolonged to give time for the counter-attack to develop from the flank. This was one of the few opportunities which the Russians had had of delivering a counter-attack on a large scale, and they made good use of it.

The net effect of the German operations in February was that the Russians had suffered very heavy losses and had been cleared out of East Prussia for the second time, but that their strategic position had not been seriously damaged. Against Russia, Germany fights always with two hopes. The first is that she may divide and drive back the Russian armies along the whole front, herself taking up an impregnable position in front of the San, the Vistula, and the northern rivers. But if this is too much to achieve, then her hope is that she may deal Russia blow after blow, now on one part of the front, now on another, until at last Russia becomes exhausted and weary of the fruitless struggle. This East Prussian campaign carried her no further towards the achievement of the greater purpose, but it was another severe blow in the series of which the battle of Tannenberg was the first.



In the trenches on the Eastern Front. [*Topical Press.*



Warsaw: A view in Lazienki Park, showing the Summer Palace of the Polish Kings in the background. [E.N.A.



The front of the Summer Palace. [E.N.A.



Warsaw: The Palace of the Polish Kings. [*E.N.A.*

CHAPTER XXI.

THE TRAGEDY OF POLAND.

THE EARLY GRANDEUR OF POLAND--CAUSES OF THE DECLINE--THE PARTITIONS—POLISH NATIONALISM—THE WAR A CIVIL WAR FOR POLAND—RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AND AUSTRIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE POLES—THE BELGIUM OF THE EAST.

THE first glimpse of Poland reaches us in the pages of some German chronicles of the late tenth century. The Poles were then a pagan Slavonic tribe, driven apparently from the Danube and settled on the Warta, in what is now Posen. The Slavonic world in those days stretched much further to the west, and its frontier was the Elbe. At the moment when the Poles first loom out of the mist of time the Germans, under the Saxon emperors, were pressing eastward at the expense of the chaos of Slav tribes, and it is as a conquering State pressing westward from the Warta under a line of able kings, the Piasts, that Poland appears on the stage. Mieszko I. (962-992) adopted Greek Orthodox Christianity, and imposed it on Poland. His successor, Boleslaus I. (992-1025), carried his people over to the Roman Church.

The entrance of Poland into the Roman Church is a crucial point in the history of the country. It was effected as a political expedient—to obtain the protection of the Papacy and admission into the community of European nations as an aid in the struggle with the advancing Germans. But no people became in process of time more loyal and devoted sons of the Church, and it is one of the boasts of the Poles that they thereby assumed the high and difficult mission of bearing the message of Western Civilisation to Eastern Europe. Yet if we are to consider the measure as a strictly political one, in the long run Boleslaus I.'s calculation proved to be of doubtful wisdom. In 988 Vladimir, Prince of Kiev and ruler of the land of Rus, married the daughter of the Greek Emperor and entered the Greek Church. By this stroke Russia gained a kind of legendary succession to the Empire (a political fact of great value), and in the event all the remaining Slavs, except the Croats and the Slovenes, received their Christianity from the Greek Church. Poland, by adopting Roman Catholicism, lost her chance of acquiring the headship of the Slav world. That passed to Russia, and the wars of Russian expansion at the expense of Poland assumed the air of crusades. As it happened, the western neighbour of Poland, Prussia, whose destiny drove her against Poland, adopted a religion which was neither Catholic nor Orthodox. While Poland, after the coming of Luther, constituted herself the leader of the counter-Reformation and the sword and buckler of Catholicism, Russia turned Protestant. Protestant, too, were the Scandinavian States of the Baltic, who completed the chain of Poland's enemies. Politically, therefore, Poland's identification with Catholicism involved renunciation of Slav leadership and isolation. But all this lay in the future. Immediately, Boleslaus I.'s judgment was approved by events, and a Polish Empire was built up which stretched from the Elbe to the Bug, from the Baltic to the Carpathians. Then in the twelfth century came a king who divided his lands among his children, and the period of partition (1138 to 1305) was a time of weakness and disaster. The order of the Teutonic knights, with Brandenburg, the ancester of the Prussian kingdom, lodged itself in the north (1230) and imperilled Poland's hold on the Baltic. The Tartars (1224-1242) ravaged far and wide, and the towns of Poland had to be repeopled from German burghers and Jews. On the north and east a powerful pagan Lithuanian monarchy



Peasants mending their nets on the banks of a Polish stream. [*E.N.A.*



Poland in war time: A Polish village over which the war has passed. [*Topical Press.*

came into being, with territory stretching from Courland to Kiev and Chernigov. Poland was saved from utter disintegration by Wladislaus I. (1309-1339), who reunited the principalities, and by his son, Casimir the Great (1333-1370), the last of the Piasts and the most distinguished of all Polish sovereigns. Casimir rebuilt the towns, reorganised justice, founded Cracow University, and constituted Poland, now that the Levantine Seas were threatened by the Turks, one of the highways of commerce between Northern and Southern Europe. Under him, too, Galicia was recovered, and Volhynia was conquered from Lithuania, but the western provinces lost during the troubled years had to be abandoned.

THE POLISH CONSTITUTION.

For two centuries Poland was to be a great power as a result of the labours of Casimir; but to him there date back the seeds of decay. He left no son, and the consent of the nobles to the succession of his nephew, Louis of Hungary, was only obtained at the expense of concessions which transferred authority from the Crown to the nobles. The nobles had grown during the period of partition as the State decayed, and Casimir the Great organised the military class, the landowners, as a privileged order, the Szlachta, into whose hands subsequently all political power fell. The half century following the death of Casimir saw rooted in Poland those characteristic features of its polity to which historians are agreed in attributing its ruin. When Louis of Hungary died the Polish nobles elected Jadwiga, niece of Casimir, Queen of the Poles. They married her (1386) to Jagiello, Grand Duke of Lithuania, conveniently baptised for the occasion. By this device Lithuania and Poland were united, and when Jadwiga died childless a Jagiello prince, with no drop of Piast blood in his veins, was elected to the throne. The Jagiello dynasty kept the throne for two centuries, but had to pay a heavy price for the privilege. The principle of election to the throne was definitely established and every Jagiello king on his accession had to sign a contract with the nobility, *pacta conventa*, confirming its rights and privileges. These rights and privileges were extended with every new king, who had to buy his election with this currency.

In its full form the Constitution of the Polish Republic had the following characteristics. The king was chosen by the whole body of the gentry. He could neither legislate nor impose new taxes without the authority of the Diet. The Diet consisted of representatives of the gentry, bound by strict injunctions given to them by the local Diets, composed of the whole body of local gentry, a mob. The Diet was further crippled by the necessity that every decision should be unanimous, so that the Diet could be dissolved by a single negative vote (*Liberum Veto*). Even rebellion was legalised by the Constitution. In the words of a high authority: "There was no Treasury, no standing army, and, properly speaking, no central Government at all. The Polish Republic became in its essence a federation in which every landed property was a separate State, and every gentleman a sovereign at home."

THE CAUSES OF DECAY.


If we turn from the political machinery to the social reality of which it was the framework the picture is equally depressing. The gentry was a relatively numerous body, but its very numbers and its privileges made it the tool of the magnates, and later of foreign kings. Corrupt, ignorant, self-centred, without the sense of the State or of civic sacrifice, they were the prey of intrigue, demagogy, bribery, and flattery, and the great nobles who managed them and accroached all authority in the State came to pursue no higher interests than those of themselves or their families. The middle class, so far as it existed, was largely composed of Jews, but the expansion of Europe towards America and the discovery of the sea route to the Indies had hit the Polish towns very hard. The rural population was sunk in hopeless serfdom. Serfdom was fully established in Poland in the sixteenth century, when Poland became the granary from which the industrial cities of Northern Europe were fed, for the serf was convenient on large corn-growing estates.

The Diet of 1496 expressed the spirit of the Szlachta. It ruined the burghers by exempting the imports and exports of the nobles from all tolls and depriving the burghers of the right to hold land outside the cities; it enslaved the peasantry; and it monopolised the Church by enacting that henceforth all prelatures and canonries should be held only by descendants on both sides of noble families. Thus, precisely at the time when Western Europe was beginning to break with feudalism and to acquire strong centralised monarchies, Poland consecrated anarchy and slavery as the pillars of the State; and when Ziska, the Hussite leader, had revolutionised tactics, Poland pinned her military hopes to the tactically bankrupt feudal chivalry.

There were other grave elements of weakness in the Polish state. The union with Lithuania, fortified at Horodlo (1413) and completed at Lublin in 1569, tied Poland up with a State much larger than itself, only very partially catholic, different in race, on a lower stage of civilisation, and, if anything, more anarchic. It told heavily against the strengthening of the State. Again, the extension of Polish rule south and west over little Russian lands brought into the State people of a different race and faith, and in those march lands submission was alien to the Cossack temper. Poland in the sixteenth century had reached the height of apparent glory, but it was deeply infected with the germs of dissolution. Yet no State had greater need of strong government and patriotic administration. It was a border land beset on all sides by enemies. It had no naturally defined frontiers, and great rivers, traversing its territory from end to end, exposed its very heart to penetration by hostile armies. If, nevertheless, Poland was able for some time to hold its own, and even extend its authority, that was due to the series of happy chances which had weakened its neighbours. The Teutonic Order was exhausted, and when Prussia was formed the ruin of the Thirty Years' War held the new military monarchy in check. Russia was shattered politically and ravaged economically by the Tartar invasions, and, before the effects of Ivan the Terrible's work of restoration (1534-1584) could make themselves felt, there came that prolonged anarchy which Russia knows as the troublous years (1584-1613). The crisis arrived for Poland in the latter half of the seventeenth century, when strong despotisms, Prussia and Russia, were in being on either flank. The signal was given by the revolt of the Cossacks (1648), one of the most horrible outbursts of brute savagery in European history. Six years later, by the treaty of Pereyslavl, the Cossacks accepted the lordship of the Muscovite Tsar. That was the loss to Poland of Ukraine and the opening of war with Russia. Sweden joined in, and Poland, beaten to the knees, was only saved by a national uprising.



St. John's Cathedral, Warsaw. [E.N.A.



Warsaw: The Kerlicki Palace. [*E.N.A.*



The Market Square, Warsaw. [*E.N.A.*

It was the briefest gleam of light. John Casimir, the king, tried to drive the lessons of disaster home by persuading the Szlachta to reform the Constitution, but, as always, the nobles proved Poland's worst enemies. Not only did they refuse to strengthen the Crown, but they would not pay a farthing in taxation, and they crushed the poorest citizens under the burden of taxation. Even John Sobieski (1669-1696), who was to give Poland its last spasm of strength and, by driving back the Turks from Vienna, was to perform the last great service of the Polish State to Christian Europe, had many of the faults of his class. It would have been better if he had concentrated on the reform of his own country rather than headed a crusade. At the last Diet which he attended he was driven to cry :—

> "Posterity will be stupefied to learn that the only result of so many victories and triumphs, shedding an eternal glory on the Polish name throughout the world, was—God help us! irreparable ruin and damnation. Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed."

On his deathbed he announced the end of his country.

The nobles were utterly beyond redemption. The Constitution had reached the culminating point of futility when the *Liberum Veto's* principal use, to quote a historian, "was to shelter high-placed felons from the pursuit of justice." Meanwhile, the two-handed engine at the door was ready to strike.



A view in Danzig. *E.N.A.*


THE PARTITION OF POLAND.

Prussia under the Great Elector, and Russia under Peter the Great, had acquired a definite policy and an organisation adapted to it. Their policy was to grow, and both looked upon Poland as providential prey. From the close of the seventeenth century the partition of Poland is practical politics. The nibbling is begun, and the grand banquet is prepared by the systematic cultivation of anarchy within the Polish State. That is facilitated by the Polish Constitution and by the boundless corruptibility of the Polish nobility. From the death of John Sobieski until the electoin of Stanislaus Poniatowski (1697-1763) two Saxon Electors were kings of Poland. The State had practically ceased to exist. The king did not visit the country; there was no administration; everyone of the fifteen Diets under Augustus III. was exploded by the *Liberum Veto* before anything was done; the army was abolished because the gentry would not pay for it; for the same reason the diplomatic service had been swept away. Poland was treated as a no man's land by its neighbours, who marched their armies through at pleasure. In the words of one eminent Pole: "The Republic died long ago, only it has forgotten to tumble down." That the great nobles had accumulated princely estates and immense fortunes at the expense of their country was dubious compensation.

Stanislaus Poniatowski was the Russian candidate, and Russian policy at this time was to keep Poland alive as a client of Russia. It was Frederick II. who first proposed partition, and by diplomatic finesse induced Catherine II. to fall in with it. Austria required little persuasion, and, although Maria Theresa wept crocodile tears, it was chiefly because her pious soul was disturbed by the thought of uniting with two heretical States to despoil a Catholic State. The first partition (1772) deprived Poland of 214,000 square kilometres out of 751,000. Austria got 70,480, Prussia 34,741, and Russia 108,750. The conscience of Europe was not shocked. The transaction accorded with the two contemporary political principles—reason of state and the balance of power. In Poland it did awake among better men their dormant patriotism. The famous Four Years' Diet (1788-92) evolved the Constitution of 3rd May, 1791, which set up an hereditary monarchy, abolished the *Liberum Veto*, swept away class distinctions, established religious toleration, and extended the franchise. But the reform was the signal for foreign intervention, and, as always, the Polish magnates betrayed their country. Russian troops poured into Poland, and Prussians followed them. By the second partition treaty (4th January, 1793) Russia took 250,700 and Prussia 58,370 square kilometres. The rising of Kosciuszko was a gallant affair, and only the masses took part in it, but it ended with the blotting out of Poland from the map. In the third partition (3rd January, 1795) Prussia took 54,898 square kilometres, Austria a population of 1,000,000, and Russia 111,780

square kilometres. Rectifications made in 1815 gave Russia as her final share something like nine-tenths of the whole of the Republic's territory. Her part of the booty was much the largest, but the initiative in partition came from Prussia.

No impartial student can doubt that Poland fell more by the vices of the nobles, who should have been her rulers, than through any other single cause, and this curse of political ineptitude and of class prejudice on the part of her leaders she has not even now managed to shake off entirely. The history of Poland since the partitions has been the history of attempts, which have uniformly failed, to revive the Polish State, and of attempts, far more successful, to recreate, or rather to create, the Polish nation—for in the days of the Polish Republic there was no Polish nation. Meanwhile, the Poles have taken their revenge on conservative Europe for its cynical indifference to the destruction of their country by engaging prominently in every revolutionary movement since 1815. As Mr. H. A. L. Fisher puts it: — "The annihilation of the Polish nationality has probably done more to endanger the monarchies of Europe than any one political act since the monarchies of Europe were first founded. In all the Republican movements of the Continent the Poles have taken a leading part. They are to be found in the Saxon riots of '48; in the Berlin barricades; in the struggle for the Republic of Baden; in the Italian and Hungarian Wars of Liberation; in the Chartist movement; and in the French Commune. Homeless and fearless, schooled in war and made reckless by calamity, they have been the nerve of revolution wherever they have been scattered by the winds of misfortune." Certainly, there have been few more curious political changes than this transformation of a people the most feudal in Europe into one striding to the van of every democratic movement.



The Marienkirche. Danzig. [*E.N.A.*

THE POLISH REVIVAL.

Until the Revolution of 1863 the political energies of the Poles were concentrated not upon the recreation of the Polish nation, but upon the revival of the Polish State. They identified themselves with Napoleon, and he rewarded them by calling into being the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which, for a few brief years constituted a political centre for the Polish nation. It fell with the fall of Napoleon, but the Treaty of Vienna contained some food for Polish hopes. It set up the Congressional Kingdom of Poland, Poland without Lithuania or the Ukraine under the Tsar, and it founded the little Republic of Cracow, under the tutelage of its great neighbours. And the first article of the Treaty of Vienna laid it down that "The Poles, who are respective subjects of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, shall obtain a representation and national institutions regulated according to the degree of political consideration that each of the Governments to which they belong shall judge expedient and proper to grant to them." It was a promise which looked like something and amounted to nothing. At various times Russia, Austria, and Prussia had made concessions to Polish national sentiment, but always independently of the Treaty of Vienna, and in the light of the political interests of the moment.

The kingdom of Poland after 1815 revealed notable efforts at solid creative work, but the rulers of the State were hampered by the distrust of the Tsar and by two political errors of their own. They did not appreciate that a Polish State must be built upon a united nation, which implied that justice should be done to the peasants and to the non-Polish elements, Ruthenian and Jewish, in the State; and they had fixed their hopes upon the speedy adding to the Congressional Kingdom of Lithuania and the Ukraine those parts of old Poland in which the Poles were a minority. They were thinking too much in terms of political machinery and too little in terms of spirit; too much of extension and too little of intension. Again, the magnates had not lost their habit of seeing Poland through their own eyes, while the very abnormality of Poland's fortunes gave to romantic exiles and explosive young students an excessive and a fatal influence in her affairs. It was under such conditions that the Revolution of 1831 and the Revolution of 1863 happened. Both were



The ruins of a Polish village after the German bombardment. [*Universal.*



Polish peasants road repairing in the war area under German supervision.

[*Topical Press.*

sectional movements, in the sense that the peasantry, and even the townsmen for the most part, stood aside, and the nobility themselves were divided. They were gallant affairs, but hopeless, and they were grave misfortunes to Poland.

After the rising of 1831 the Tsar, Nicholas I., suppressed the Polish Constitution, while the Republic of Cracow was unostentatiously pocketed by Austria. The only States in which Poles could determine the political fortunes of Poles disappeared, and Poland was ruled as a Russian province. The Universities of Vilna, Krzemieriec, and Warsaw were suppressed, and the Russification of the Polish schools was taken in hand. The accession of Alexander II. raised hopes, and also was the signal for the revival of the revolutionary movement. In 1861 the Marquis Wielopolski, by far the broadest mind and most statesmanlike head in Poland, was appointed practically to rule the country. He had the misfortune to possess too dictatorial a temper, and to stand almost alone even against the hostility of the magnates and the revolutionaries. His idea was to work in harmony with Russia, to reduce political demands to the minimum, and to concentrate on the realities of national life. His programme was (1) administrative reforms leading up slowly to autonomy for the Congressional Kingdom; (2) judicial reforms; (3) agrarian reforms to convert the Polish serfs into peasant proprietors and a bulwark of Polish nationality; (4) the emancipation of the Jews and their assimilation as a middle class; (5) religious toleration and the subordination of the Church to the State; (6) a complete system of national education—university, secondary, and elementary. His programme found little support among the Polish leaders, who were megalomaniac, and insisted upon the return to Poland of Lithuania and Ukraine; anti-Semitic and against the emancipation of the Jews; aristocratic and indifferent to the welfare of the peasants; Messianic and impatient of slow and steady evolution. The Revolution of 1863 shattered everything. It was followed by a policy of Russification steadily pursued for half a century, and only varied in the last few months. Every Polish institution was suppressed, and Russian replaced Polish as the language of administration and the schools. Yet these fifty years have done more to create a real Polish nation than all the centuries which had gone before. There could be no more convincing evidence of the innate strength of the Polish nation.

THE AIMS OF POLISH NATIONALISTS.

Three problems faced the builders of the Polish nation: (1) The building of a Polish culture common to all sections of the nation, whatever their political subjection; (2) the uniting of the various elements within the borders of Poland—upper classes, middle classes, peasants, Jews, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians; (3) the maintenance of the union between the Poles of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, with a view where practicable to common action. These problems have been tackled with varying understanding, skill, and success. The building of a common Polish culture, in some ways the most important of all the tasks of Polish nationalism, has met with most good fortune. By a happy chance the Polish nation has since 1815 not been for any prolonged term without an organised centre of the higher intellectual life, though the centre has repeatedly shifted. From 1815 to 1831 it was in the Congressional Kingdom at Warsaw and Vilna. When Russian and Austrian Poland was given up to repression after 1831, it was transferred to the Grand Duchy of Posen, a most curious episode in the chronicles of Prussian policy towards the Poles. From 1867 Galicia, with the universities of Cracow and Lemberg, has been the home of Polish culture, which, partly as the result of the work of these universities and partly as a result of the work of the exiles, has assumed a worthy place in national culture. More difficult has been the task of carrying this message to all strata of society. In the days of the Congressional Kingdom there was much school activity, but it aimed chiefly at creating strategic positions in the "western provinces"—Lithuania and the Ukraine. Still, in spite of Russian and Prussian repression, the Polish language and the Polish spirit have been kept alive, and have struck roots even in Silesia, where they had long been forgotten.

The Poles never seriously grappled with the peasant question. The peasants, given personal freedom in 1807 by the Code Napoléon, still retained all the economic disabilities of serfdom, and this fact made them hostile to the nobles and indifferent to the national cause. It was the Russian Government which in 1863 emancipated the Polish serfs. This stroke was intended to break the back of the rebellion, in which it succeeded; and it was hoped that it would permanently attach the peasants to the Russian Government and alienate them from the nobles. It so happened that it had precisely the opposite effect, for it bridged the gap between peasants and gentry. When in recent years propaganda was started to win the peasants to the national cause, it found them thoroughly accessible, and to-day they are identified with it to a degree quite unknown in any previous age. A more partial success has met the efforts at winning the adhesion of the middle classes and the proletariat to the national cause. The middle classes in Poland were for many centuries constituted by the Jews. In the last twenty or thirty years the industrialisation of Poland, notably round Lodz, has brought the Poles into industry, and the movement has been accompanied by the deliberate adoption of anti-Semitism as a principle of the strongest Polish party, the National Democratic Party. There has long been an anti-Semitic tendency in Polish politics, but the most statesmanlike minds, Wielopolski and Swienotoehowski for example, fought against it. The National Democrats, however, whose programme was issued in Russia in 1896, have taken as their principle "the gradual acquisition by intellectual, cultural, and economic work, and by political effort and agitation, of the greatest possible national distinctiveness and independence." This formula is much more negative than positive, and it has more edge than haft, an edge directed against every element in Polish territory not Polish by blood or race.

The Jews have suffered, and along with them the Lithuanians and the Ukranians. Neither the Polish character nor the Polish society has gained, for among Jews, Lithuanians and Ukranians national movements have taken firm hold. These are perfectly compatible with the welfare of a tolerant Polish State which understands, with Lord Acton, that "the combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society"; and, indeed, the indispensable condition of the health of a Polish State is that the leaders of Polish nationalism should be purged of this latest variant of their traditional exclusiveness, narrowness, and intolerance.

The modern Polish nationalist movement has aimed at maintaining the union of all these parts of Poland. The cultural union has, on the whole, been sustained, but common political action has been extremely difficult. The immediate problems of the Poles in Russia, Austria,



A group of beggars in Warsaw. [E.N.A.



A typical cab, with its moujik driver, on the Polish plains [E.N.A.



The Governor-General's Palace, Warsaw. [E.N.A.

and Prussia have been very different. Economic influences make for disintegration. On the one hand, there are tariff barriers between Russia, Prussia, and Austria; and on the other, the abolition in 1850 of the tariff between the Congressional Kingdom and Russia identified the economic interests of the largest fraction of Poland with Russia. The political problem has been equally stubborn. Polish leaders have been slow to characterise the political settlement which they desire. They would probably be content with autonomy because they doubt the practicability of independence, but they would like the reunion of Poland. Autonomy implies a suzerain. Under which State is Poland to be united? The Russian Poles, for all their grievances against the Russian Government, incline to favour autonomy and reunion under the Tsar. The Austrian Poles, on the other hand, being far the most liberally treated of all sections of the Polish race, favour Austria; and while few Poles, save the inevitable handful of magnates, have any affection for Prussia, the close relations between Austria and Germany, and the extremely hazardous question which State would have the power to unite Poland, render it impossible for many Poles to exclude Prussia from their calculations. The net result, when war broke out, was that the Poles were not politically at one.

CIVIL WAR IN POLAND.

The war has been to Poles as to Jews a colossal tragedy, setting father against son and brother against brother. It is estimated that on a war footing there would be serving under the Russian flag 400,000 Poles, under the Austrian flag 82,000, and under the German flag 111,000. It was calculated that by the middle of March 400,000 Polish soldiers of the various armies had been killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. In the three sections of Poland there are some 20,000,000 of Poles, and the support of this great population was a thing of moment to all three belligerents in the Eastern theatre of war. A revolution in Russian Poland, or in Galicia or Posen, would have disorganised the campaign for Russia, Austria, and Germany respectively. All three States endeavoured to confirm the loyalty of their own Polish subjects, and to shake the loyalty of the Polish subjects of the enemy. Early in August the Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian forces which had entered Russian Poland issued a proclamation to the Poles, in which he said :—

> "We are bringing the Poles emancipation from the Muscovite yoke. Greet our banners with confidence. They are bringing you justice. They are not unknown to you and your brothers. . . . From the time of King Sobieski, who once effectively assisted the threatened house of the Hapsburgs, the glorious traditions of Poland have been intimately connected with those of the two Western States."

The Germans followed this up with proclamations in which they invited the Poles to rise against the hated Russians and join hands with the Germanic Powers, who bring freedom and culture and religious toleration with their victorious armies.

> "Away with Oriental barbarism. Victory for Western culture common to you and to us. Trust us, and with us let the united forces of culture fling back these Asiatic hordes from the frontiers of Poland."

The Austrian Poles, constituting a "National Council" at Kielce, backed up the appeal of the Austrian Government. They raised vast sums for the Austrian cause (Cracow alone gave £40,000), and 10,000 volunteers joined a Polish legion for the redemption of their brethren in Russia.

On 14th August, evidently in answer to the Austrian proclamation, the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, issued in Polish the following proclamation :—

> "Poles! The hour has struck in which the sacred dream of your fathers and forefathers may find fulfilment. A century and a half ago the living flesh of Poland was torn asunder; but her soul did not die. She lived in hope that there would come an hour for the resurrection of the Polish nation and for a brotherly reconciliation with Russia. The Russian army now brings you the joyful tidings of this reconciliation. May the boundaries be annihilated which cut the Polish nation into parts! May that nation reunite into one body under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor. Under this sceptre Poland shall be reborn, free in faith, in language, in self-government.
>
> "One thing only Russia expects of you, equal consideration for the rights of those nationalities to which history has linked you. With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched, Russia steps forward to meet you. She believes that the sword has not rusted which, at Grünwald, struck down the enemy. From the shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the Russian forces are on the march. The dawn of a new life is breaking for you. May there shine, resplendent above that dawn, the sign of the Cross, symbol of the Passion and resurrection of all nations."


This was followed on 16th August, 1914, by a declaration of the leaders of the middle-class Polish parties in Russia (National Democrats, Polish Progressives, Realists, Polish Progressive Union) in the following terms :—

> **"The representatives of the undersigned political parties, assembled in Warsaw on the 16th August, 1914, welcome the Proclamation issued to the Poles by His Imperial Highness the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces as an act of the foremost historical importance, and implicitly believe that upon the termination of the war the promises uttered in the Proclamation will be formally fulfilled, that the dreams of their fathers will be realised, that Poland's flesh, torn asunder a century and a half ago, will once again be made whole, that the frontiers severing the Polish nation will vanish. The blood of Poland's sons, shed in united combat against the Germans, will serve equally as a sacrifice offered upon the altar of her resurrection."**

As might be expected, the effect of all these conflicting appeals was chiefly negative. They sufficed to confirm the loyalty of the Poles in each State, but they failed to provoke a revolutionary movement in the enemy State. Nor can it be said that the various Governments have been over anxious to translate their promises into deeds. The Austrian Poles have for fifty years had no grievances. In the Prussian Budget the anti-Polish estimates have maintained their place, while Count Bobrinski, the Russian Governor of occupied Eastern Galicia, has informed the Poles that "the organisation of Galicia must be based on Russian principles," and that "he would introduce here the Russian tongue, Russian law, and Russian institutions." Accordingly, Eastern Galicia is being Russianised with equal indifference to the views of Poles, Ruthenians, and Jews. Against this must be set the enactment by Imperial decree of the law (rejected by the Imperial Council) establishing municipal government in Poland, and authorising the use of the Polish tongue by the new municipal bodies. It is also believed that the Duma in the approaching session will have before it a project extending self-government in Poland. For the Poles, however, there have been laid bare and accentuated their political disintegration and the impossibility of political action, under present conditions, common to the whole nation. Their leaders



In German Poland: A view of Posen, showing the old town. [E.N.A



The Kaiser's Castle at Posen. [E.N.A.

have aggravated their weakness and their difficulties by utilising the war for a particularly violent campaign against the Jews, upon whom they have endeavoured to fasten the odium of being spies and traitors to Russia. That has made the sufferings of the Jews in the war area even more bitter than those of the Poles, for while many have been hanged on false charges, whole communities have been expelled by order of the Grand Duke Nicholas and other Russian commanders.

THE BELGIUM OF THE EAST.

It is impossible to give even a faint idea of the ruin and devastation which the war has brought upon Poland. The eastern theatre of war is Poland, and German, Russian, and Austrian armies have repeatedly swept across it. Each movement of the tide has laid whole districts waste, and when Hindenburg retired from before Warsaw he destroyed all the means of communication and all supplies which could possibly help the Russians. It is estimated that 200 towns and 7,500 villages have been wrecked, and that the material damage amounts to £120,000,000. Mr. Sienkiewicz, in an appeal to the civilised nations, thus describes the condition of his unhappy people :—

> "An area seven times as vast as that of the realm of King Albert has been crushed and devastated by the iron heel of war. From the banks of the Niemen to the summits of the Carpathians fire has destroyed the towns and villages, and over the whole of this huge country the spectre of famine has spread out its wings. All labour and industry have been swept away. The ploughshare is rusted ; the peasant has neither grain nor cattle. The artisan is idle ; all works and factories have been destroyed. The tradesman cannot sell his wares ; there is no one to buy. The hearth is extinguished, and disease and misery prevail. The aged and infirm have no shelter from the cold and hardships of the winter weather. Little children, stretching out their arms to their mothers for bread, receive in answer but tears."

Lest the colours in this picture may be thought too gloomy, there may be quoted from the *Berner Tagwacht* (13th April, 1915) the testimony of a German Social Democrat :—

> "Since German troops have occupied a large part of Poland, the land is being systematically plundered. Not only does the army requisition for its needs, but vast supplies of raw material and foodstuffs have been taken from the owners and sent to Germany—minerals, wool, cotton, sugar, flour, wheat, potatoes, beet, vegetables. It is direct, shameless robbery. This systematic robbery threatens the population with the terrible catastrophe of starvation."

This writer goes on to describe the brutality of the soldiers, and says :—

> "When the troops leave their quarters they often destroy everything out of pure joy in destruction."

So the war has proved to Poland the latest, and not the least, terrible act in her tragedy.



Polish peasants on a wayside railway station. [*E.N.A.*



French troops passing over the sand dunes into the firing line. [*Alfieri Picture Service.*

CHAPTER XXII.

A SYNOPSIS.

ONE of the difficulties in following the war is to keep in mind the correspondence of events as they happened in the several campaigns. A war so vast in its area of necessity falls into a number of campaigns, which, as they never touch, it is natural to regard severally as though each were unconnected with the rest. Yet to read the war so is to obtain a very incomplete and misleading idea of its progress. The aim of this chapter is to present a synoptical view of the war, to correlate the happenings on the various fronts, and to exhibit the connection of events in the various campaigns so far as this exists or is discoverable.

In the following pages the events of the war are taken month by month, and shown for the sake of clearness in parallel columns. These tables are not, of course, to be taken as in any sense a complete diary of the war, for many happenings of very great importance are excluded. The sole object is to bring out the points of connection between the various campaigns, and to enable us to obtain a general view of the war as a whole, so far as the narrative of events in this History has yet progressed.

THE FIRST MONTH.

It will be seen that the Battle of Gumbinnen, in which the Russian General, Rennenkampf, defeated three German army corps in East Prussia, coincided in time with the German occupation of Brussels, the fall of Namur, and the heavy French defeats in Lorraine and at Charleroi; that the great Russian disaster in the Masurian Lakes came on the most critical day in the retreat from Mons, and coincided with the beginning of the Russian victories over the Austrians on the Lublin-Lemberg line; and, further, that the burning of Louvain came between the Battles of Gumbinnen and of the Masurian Lakes. All these facts have significance. At the beginning of the war the German plan was to put the whole strength of their offence against France, and, leaving the attack on Russia to Austria, to hold her eastern frontier with as few corps as possible. This plan was foiled by the unexpected rapidity of the Russian mobilisation and by the invasion of East Prussia by Rennenkampf. This movement, and the arrival at Berlin of crowds of refugees from East Prussia, had an immediate effect on German plans. A great number of troops, perhaps 250,000 in all, were rushed across to the east frontier, some of them arriving in time to take part in the battle of the Masurian Lakes. These corps seem to have been drawn not from the army invading France, but from the troops garrisoning Belgium. For a week or a fortnight, until they were replaced by Landwehr troops, Belgium was in consequence very weakly held, and this was the fortnight of the worst

German atrocities. The battle of the Masurian Lakes removed the danger in East Prussia, but the great Austrian defeats in Galicia made it unsafe to return the corps borrowed from the west. In spite, therefore, of the Masurian defeat, Russia's services to the Western Allies in this critical first month were very great indeed, if hardly so great as some Russian writers have maintained. The defeat of the Masurian Lakes was the penalty of Russian loyalty to her Western Allies. She deliberately ran risks as part of her duty to them.

commerce. Of direct connection between the campaigns there is no clear sign, but new plans for the conduct of the war begin to emerge. It is perhaps not fanciful to suspect that the sinking of the *Cressy* may have suggested to the Germans the desirability of gaining possession of the coast of Belgium and the Straits of Dover. The Germans had other motives too—the increasing boldness of the Belgian attacks from Antwerp, the necessity of covering their right flank and of prolonging their lines to the sea, whether as a protection against French attacks

FIRST MONTH.

Date.	Allies *v.* Germany.		Austria *v.*		Turkey and the East.	Naval.	Colonial.
	West.	East.	Russia.	Servia.			
Aug. 2...	Invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg.						
„ 12...					*Goeben* and *Breslau* take refuge in the Dardanelles (Vol. I., 95)		
„ 17...	British Expeditionary Force landed.						
„ 18...				Battle of Shabatz (Vol. I., 335).			
„ 20...		The Battle of Gumbinnen (Vol. I., 187)					
„ 21...	Germans enter Brussels.						
„ 22...	Battle in Lorraine						
„ 23...	Fall of Namur. Battles of Mons and Charleroi.				Japan declares war on Germany.		
„ 25...	Sack of Louvain.		Battle of Lemberg begins (Vol. I., 200).				
„ 26...	British army nearly surrounded makes good its retreat (Vol. I., 135).	Battle of Masurian Lakes begins.					
„ 28...		Battle of Masurian Lakes ends in great Russian disaster (Vol. I., 189-191).				British victory in Heligoland Bight (Vol. I., 213-222).	
„ 29...							Samoa captured.

THE SECOND MONTH.

On the whole, September was the worst month that the Germans had in the first six. They were defeated on the Marne and thrown back across the Aisne. They began an offensive movement in the Suwalki province of Russia. But it made slow progress. For the Austrians it was a month of heavy defeats. Against these reverses the Germans had to set the capture of St. Mihiel on the Heights of the Meuse, a notable success by one of their submarines, and the depredations of the *Emden* on

or as a means of turning the flank of the Allied armies. It is remarkable that the move on Antwerp should have begun about the same time as the breach was made in the defences of the Meuse Heights at the opposite end of the French line, as though the Germans were making ready when the time came for a double flanking movement against the Allied armies. But the sinking of the *Cressy* may well have suggested to them the important naval as well as the military advantage that the possession of the Straits would confer. These ideas are the first link

in the chain of events that led later to the submarine blockade.

THE THIRD MONTH.

This is the month of the great German recovery. They—or the heads of the army and navy who alone in Germany knew all the facts—must have begun the month with a feeling of depression. They ended it with Antwerp and the Belgian coast as far as the Yser river in their hands, and with what seemed to them good prospects of capturing Ypres and gaining possession of the Straits. They had gained in Turkey a new and exceedingly powerful ally, capable of menacing England in Egypt, and also Silesia, is threatened by the Russians, whose troops begin to raid over the Carpathian Passes. The fortunes of the Austrians are almost at their lowest in this month, and their weakness begins to be a danger to the security of the German frontiers. At the same time the enemy begins an attempt once for all to dispose of Servia. The third and greatest invasion of Servia begins immediately after Turkey has been dragged into the war, and there is an obvious connection between the two events. The natural answer to the success of the Germans in bringing Turkey into the war was for the Allies to bring in Bulgaria, and Austria hoped, by disposing of Servia, to deter Bulgaria from

SECOND MONTH.

Date.	Allies v. Germany.		Austria v.		Turkey and the East.	Naval.	Colonial.
	West.	East.	Russia.	Servia.			
Sept. 1...			Great Austrian defeat at Lemberg (Vol. I., 200).				
,, 2...	Furthest south reached of Allies' retreat.						
,, 6-10	Battle of the Marne (Vol. I., 149).	German advance from East Prussia towards Niemen begins (Vol. I., 313).		Second invasion of Servia begins (Vol. I., 339).			
,, 13...	The Battle of the Aisne begins (Vol. I., 153).						
,, 16...			Przemysl invested from the east.				
,, 22...			Fall of Jaroslav (Vol. I., 203).			*Hogue*, *Cressy*, and *Aboukir* sunk by submarine (Vol. I., 227). Madras bombarded (Vol. I., 207). Career of *Emden* begins.	
,, 25...	Capture of St. Mihiel (Vol. I., 269).						
,, 26...	Germans move towards Antwerp (Vol. I. 272).	Ossowiec bombarded (Vol. II., 57).					Maritz rebels (Vol. I., 233).
,, 27...							Tsing-Tau invested (Vol. II., 29).
,, 30...		Silesia threatened	Russians approach Cracow (Vol. I., 203).				

it was hoped of drawing off Russian corps from Austria. They had approached Warsaw, and the Austrians had driven the enemy back towards the San. The German faith in mines and submarines had received striking confirmation. In spite of the weakening of the Austrians on the San, the Germans were probably more confident this month than at any time since the war began. Both in England and Germany, but especially in Germany, the month brought a great acerbation of feeling.

THE FOURTH MONTH.

November marks the transference of military interest from the west to the east front. Cracow, the gate of committing herself to war with Turkey. The military policy of Germany is now to remain on the defensive in the west and to win some decisive victory against Russia, in the hope of being able, in the spring, to withdraw troops from the east and resume her offensive campaign against France on the same lines as those of the autumn preceding. The most signal success against Russia would have been the capture of Warsaw, which, if it could have been accomplished, would have put the Germans, despite the defeats of Austria, in a position to take up the plans for crushing France, which had perforce to be abandoned for the time being after the Battle of the Marne. While her land

attacks are directed against Russia, Germany consolidates her position on the Belgian coast, and extends the activity of her submarines. Lord Fisher, the new First Sea Lord, closes the North Sea, except for a narrow passage off Dover. This is the naval answer to the violent German attempts to find a way to the Straits through Ypres. The naval bombardment of Zeebrugge is another answer. But the British are not conspicuously successful at sea. Against the destruction of the *Emden* is to be set the bad defeat of Admiral Cradock off the coast of Chili, which was due mainly to faulty dispositions on the part of the Admiralty.

Although the Germans have suspended their offensive in the west and begun an ambitious move against Warsaw, there is no evidence of any transfer of troops from the west to the east.

THIRD MONTH.

Date.	Allies *v.* Germany.		Austria *v.*		Turkey and the East.	Naval.	Colonial.
	West.	East.	Russia.	Servia.			
Oct. 1...		Advance from Thorn on Warsaw (Vol. I., 315).					Bombardment of Tsing-Tau (Vol. II., 29).
„ 3...	Transference of British army from the Aisne to Flanders begins (Vol. I., 280).	German advance towards Niemen checked.					
„ 7...	Bombardment of Antwerp.						
„ 8...	Fall of Antwerp (Vol. I., 276).						
„ 11...	The fighting in Flanders begins.						
„ 13...		Russians fall back to Vistula (Vol. I., 317).					
„ 19...						British flotilla arrives off Belgian coast (Vol. II., 142).	
„ 20...			Russians retire to San river (Vol. I., 317).				
„ 23–24	Heavy fighting on the Yser (Vol. I., 287).						
„ 25...		Germans retreat from the line of the Vistula (Vol. I. 323).					
„ 26...			Austrian attacks on the San river lines definitely fail (Vol. I., 328).			German submarine sinks the Admiral Ganteaume.	Beyers and De Wet head a rebellion in South Africa (Vol. I., 239).
„ 28...						German minefield discovered off the North of Ireland (Vol. I., 231).	
„ 29...	Heavy fighting begins at Ypres (Vol. I., 289).				Turks begin hostilities against Russia in the Black Sea.	Prince Louis of Battenberg resigns.	
„ 30...					Italy occupies Saseno opposite Valona.	Lord Fisher appointed First Sea Lord (Vol. I., 231).	
„ 31...						*Hermes* sunk in the Straits (Vol. I., 229).	

THE FIFTH MONTH.

Notwithstanding very obstinate German attacks in Poland, the Russians, on the whole, hold their own on the eastern front. They lose Lodz, and are driven back from Cracow, but the Austrians, in spite of temporary successes, fail to dislodge them from the Carpathians. There is evidence in this month of withdrawals from one campaign to another. The

Austrian defeat in Servia, for example, was due, in part at any rate, to the withdrawal from Servia of troops to take part in the movement against the Russian progress in Galicia. The attack on the head of the Russian columns threatening Cracow was conducted by German troops, some of whom may have been withdrawn from the western front; and henceforth the distinction between German and Austrian conduct of the war becomes difficult to keep. The Austrian left in Poland and the right wing of the German east front had for some time been under a part of the German plans that the Russians should be kept busy in the Caucasus, so that they could not withdraw troops thence to Europe, but might rather be compelled to send reinforcements to meet attacks which, if they had been successful, would have caused widespread disturbance among the Mohammedan subjects of Russia in Asia.

It is to be observed that Germany's plan, carried into execution two months later, for a submarine war on shipping to the British Isles is already completely formed in the mind of Admiral von Tirpitz.

FOURTH MONTH.

Date.	Allies v. Germany.		Austria v.		Turkey and the East.	Naval.	Colonial.
	West.	East.	Russia.	Servia.			
Nov. 1...						*Monmouth* and *Good Hope* sunk off Chili (Vol. II., 36).	
„ 2...						North Sea closed (Vol. I., 231).	
„ 3...						Bombardment of Akaba.	
„ 4...			Russians cross the San (Vol. II., 57).	Third Austrian invasion of Servia (Vol. II., 77).			
„ 5...					England declares war on Turkey.		
„ 6...							Kiao-Chau surrenders (Vol. II., 30).
„ 8...					Fao occupied in Persian Gulf (Vol. I., 349).		
„ 9...						*Emden* sunk (Vol. I., 211).	
„ 11...	Prussian Guard defeated at Ypres (Vol. I., 301).						
„ 13...		German advance on Warsaw from Thorn begins (Vol. II., 57).					
„ 18...		Russian line pierced near Lodz (Vol. II., 59).					
„ 21...					Basra occupied (Vol. I., 351).		
„ 23...						Zeebrugge bombarded.	
„ 26...			Austrians defeated east of Cracow.			*Bulwark* blown up (Vol. II., 43).	

German command; but henceforth the German troops begin to operate regularly on Austrian soil, Germany regarding Austria as a bastion for the defence of Silesia, as Belgium was for the defence of Westphalia.

The Turkish attack, again, on the Russians in the Caucasus has an obvious connection with the German campaigns in Poland. In their own interests, the Turks were ill-advised in beginning an ambitious offensive in the Caucasus in mid-winter; but it was

SIXTH MONTH.

The revival of French activity, with General Joffre's proclamation of December 14th, is to be read in connection with the reports of withdrawal of German troops from the west to the east front. The small measure of success obtained by the French is proof that the withdrawals from the west were not considerable and had not weakened the strength of the German defensive positions. The chief interest of

FIFTH MONTH.

DATE.	ALLIES *v.* GERMANY.		AUSTRIA *v.*		TURKEY AND THE EAST.	NAVAL.	COLONIAL.
	WEST.	EAST.	RUSSIA.	SERVIA.			
Dec. 1...			Russians occupy Wiaticzka, near Cracow.				Capture of De Wet.
„ 2...						Admiral von Tirpitz threatens a "submarine blockade" in an interview with an American journalist.	
„ 3...			Russians at Bartfeld in the Carpathians.	Servians attack Austrians.			
„ 7...	French capture Vermelles (Vol. II., 145).	Russians evacuate Lodz (Vol. II., 62).					
„ 8...				Servian victory over Austrians (Vol. II., 81).			
„ 12...			Russian pressure on Cracow relieved. Austrians attack Russian communications through Galicia (Vol. II., 67).			British naval victory off the Falkland Islands (Vol. II., 39).	
„ 14...				Servians recapture Belgrade.			
„ 16...						Bombardment of Scarborough (Vol. I., 355).	
„ 17...	General Joffre issues order announcing that the time has come to clear France of the enemy.						
„ 18...	Indecisive fighting at Givenchy (Vol. II., 144).						
„ 22...			Russian success in the Carpathians (Vol. II., 74).				
„ 23...			Austrian attacks checked.		Roumania announces that she will not see Servia crushed.		
„ 25...					Turks attack Sarikamish in the Caucasus (Vol. II., 85).	British air raid on Cuxhaven (Vol I., 262).	
„ 27...			Austrians retire towards Dukla Pass.				
„ 29...			Russians cross the Nida.			American protest against British treatment of neutral shipping (Vol. II., 102).	


the month, however, is in the German preparations for the submarine campaign against shipping. The military position from this month remains virtually unaltered until the opening of the spring campaign.

THE ARITHMETIC OF THE WAR.

Much has been written about the numbers on the two frontiers, but the calculations, in spite of specious detail, have all been more or less guess-work, and it is safest and quite as instructive, to keep to very round numbers. The probabilities would seem to be these. At the beginning of the war the proportion of German troops in the west and east was nearer four to one than three to one—say, 2,750,000 men in the west to 750,000 in the east. At the beginning of September the preponderance of the west was diminished by the transference of perhaps 250,000 men to the east. The figures would then be 2,500,000 on the west and 1,000,000 on the east. Drafts and new corps—seven new army corps made their appearance on the west in October—would raise the total number to over 3,000,000 on the west and perhaps 1,500,000 on the east, though this last figure may be an over-estimate. From these totals must be subtracted the casualties, which, by the middle of January, had reached nearly 2,000,000 men. Making an allowance for recoveries and excluding losses from sickness, the figures on the two fronts at the end of the winter would be perhaps 2,600,000 on the west and 1,200,000 on the east. When all allowance is made for the troops that Austria had to keep in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Tyrol and watching the Italian frontiers, and against Servia, it may be doubted whether the combined Austro-German forces arrayed against Russia on the east front at any time exceeded, if they ever equalled, the strength of the German armies on the west.

SIXTH MONTH.

DATE.	ALLIES v. GERMANY.		AUSTRIA v.		TURKEY AND THE EAST.	NAVAL.	COLONIAL.
	WEST.	EAST.	RUSSIA.	SERVIA.			
Jan. . .						The *Formidable* torpedoed (Vol II., 45).	
,, 4...	French activity in the Vosges.		Russians occupy Bukowina (Vol. II., 74).		Russian victory in the Caucasus (Vol. II., 85).		
,, 8...	French advance opposite Soissons (Vol. II., 147).						
,, 13...	Defeat of the French near Soissons.		The Austrian Foreign Minister resigns.		Turks occupy Tabriz (Vol. II., 87).		
,, 16...		Russian advance on Lower Vistula.					
,, 17...	French attacks at Pont-à-Mousson.						
,, 24...						Battle of the Dogger Bank. The *Blücher* sunk (Vol. II., 53).	
,, 25...	Fighting at Givenchy (Vol. II., 143).						
,, 26...					Turkish force near El Kantara on the Suez Canal (Vol. II., 119).		
,, 28...						German Federal Council decides to nationalise supplies of corn and flour.	
,, 30..						Two British steamers torpedoed off Fleetwood (Vol. II., 107).	



A photograph of the Czar, taken among the workmen at the great Putiloff Munition and Engineering Works at Petrograd, on the occasion of a visit of inspection to the works. [*Central News.*

CHAPTER XXIII.


RUSSIA IN WAR TIME.

RUSSIAN UNITY IN FACE OF THE WAR—THE PROHIBITION OF VODKA—RUSSIA'S VIEW OF ENGLAND—RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC POSITION—THE SPIRIT OF THE ARMY.

AT the beginning of the war Russia was in a somewhat different position from England and France. From the first moment of the Austrian ultimatum the Russian people, although confident that a peaceful settlement would be found, realised at once the danger and the possibility of war. In 1908 the Teuton had been able to ride rough-shod over the Slav. This time it was felt that neither morally nor in her own interests could Russia allow Servia to be treated in the same way as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and therefore, contrary to all German expectations, the historic sitting of the Duma on the 8th August found all parties united to make common front in what was felt to be the cause of justice and their country.

If, then, the war came as less of a surprise to the Russian people than to the English and French, it must not be thought that Russia had in any way premeditated a war for which she neither wished nor was prepared. A glance at the railway-map of the Austro-Russian and Russo-German frontiers shows plainly which countries were the most ready for war. Nor was it merely in insufficiency of railways that Russia was handicapped. Like her Allies in this struggle she, too, was to suffer severely because her disbelief in Germany's warlike intentions had not provided for a Krupp and for the vast reserves of material necessary for modern warfare.

During the days following on the declaration of war the whole country was in a fever of excitement. It would be idle to pretend that during those first hours there was the same confidence in victory that now prevails throughout the country. Even although it was generally believed that the army had improved beyond all knowledge, people could not forget the Japanese war of 1904, or the vaunted invincibility of the foe they had to face. And so for some time there was a very natural anxiety to see how the Russian arms would fare. One thing alone was certain. The war was a popular war, in every sense of the word a national war. The wonderfully demonstrative send-off given to the Servian reservists at Petrograd and Moscow, where Servian



[E.N.A.

Petrograd: The Nicholas Bridge seen from the English Quay.

officers were passed down to the train shoulder-high through the cheering crowd, proved this beyond all doubt. Uncertainty, too, as to England's intentions kept the excitement at fever heat, and the one question on the lips of the manifestants who thronged the streets was "Will England join?" In Moscow a hundred brazen-lunged orators, haranguing vast crowds from the Skobeleff monument at every hour of the day, advanced a hundred reasons why she must do so. It is not too much to say that had England remained neutral the position of Englishmen in Russia would have been extremely uncomfortable. When finally the British declaration was made public, it was hailed by the whole of Russia with a great sigh of contented relief, and the *Russkiya Viedomosti*, perhaps the most dignified of the Russian newspapers, undoubtedly echoed the feelings of the empire when it said in the first lines of a memorable leader: "England has declared war on Germany. This is a fact of the most tremendous importance—a fact which may well be the decisive factor in the final issue of the war." In view of a tendency, which was assiduously developed later by German influences, to criticise the British for the small part they were playing in the war, it is only fair to give to this point the prominence it deserves.

RUSSIA BECOME A NATION.

England's declaration of war marked the high-tide in the sea of excitement. The first days of the war had been marked by wild scenes of patriotism, by endless manifestations, and even by some senseless hooliganism, such as the sacking of the German Embassy in Petrograd. When it was known that England was to take her stand with France and Russia, high feeling subsided, and the whole nation settled down to prepare for victory with calmness and determination. The traditional phlegm of the Russian character, after a fierce explosion of passion—with which it is by no means incompatible—had reasserted itself. In a week Russia, which the world had believed to be deeply divided, had become a united nation.

Much has already been said of the inability of the German mind to understand the psychology of other nations. And yet, as far as Russia was concerned, on paper everything seemed to justify the predictions of the German diplomats. Only a few days before the war there had been serious strikes in Petrograd, which seemed to promise an outbreak of discontent throughout the whole country. Numerous Russian subjects living abroad spoke openly of their dislike of the Russian Government, and hinted that another war would be of great advantage to the Radicals and the Socialists. It was only natural for the German, confident in his own power and in the superiority of his own institutions, to think that Russia, disrupted and discontented, would be an easy prey. And indeed it would have required a more far-seeing mind than the German to foresee that within a few hours the same workmen who had been singing the Marseillaise as a strikers' threat would be singing it with the deep-throated enthusiasm of patriotism before the doors of the French Embassy in Petrograd, or that the students of Moscow University would throw away their books on Socialism in order to drag officers from their cabs and toss them in the air outside the railway stations. War with Germany was a different thing from war in the unknown province of Manchuria. Had the war been with any other nation but Germany it is just possible that things might have been different. And the German calculations failed, because of Germany herself, because no one outside Germany could appreciate the benefits of German civilisation and German *Kultur*.

GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS.

The Germans had counted greatly on the sympathy of the Poles in Poland, in much the same way as they had counted on the sympathy of the Irish or the Boers. If the Russian Poles had perhaps little sympathy for Russia, there was nothing in the treatment of their brothers in Posen to tempt them to transfer their allegiance. Similarly, Liberal Russia, however great its aspirations for reform, saw nothing Liberal in the rule of Wilhelm II. In his memorable letter to the *Times*, Professor Vinogradoff, himself a Liberal who had suffered for his political opinions, was echoing the feelings of intellectual Russia when he wrote:—

> "It is a blessing in this decisive crisis that Russians should have a firmly-knit organisation and a traditional centre of authority in the power of the Tsar. The present Emperor stands as the national leader . . . . and his subjects will follow him to a man. We are sure he will remember in the hour of victory the unstinted devotion and sacrifices of all the nationalities and parties of his vast empire."

In the heart of every Russian there is at the bottom a wonderful love of country, which differs somewhat from the patriotism of other countries. It is partly a religious sentiment, due to the force which binds 120,000,000 souls in one faith, but it is also a love of the land itself, of the soil on which he lives. It is a sentiment which rises above all party dissensions and politics. One finds it in the works of all Russian writers, in Shevtchenko, for instance, the Little Russian poet, who wrote: "I asked such little things of God—a hut by the Dnieper, a plot of land to cultivate, two poplar trees of my own, and at the end to die by my dear river." It only needed some great occasion to reawaken this sentiment which circumstances had too long kept dormant. German arrogance, German world-dominion, German interference, and, above all, the sacrilege of a German invasion of Russian soil roused in a night all that was deepest in Russian patriotism.

That Russia realised the magnitude of the task that had been forced upon her may be seen from the stringent measures that were taken to prevent any repetition of the mistakes of 1904. The most important of these was the suppression of the sale of vodka, and this suppression was extended later to the sale of all alcoholic liquor, including beer and wine. There is nothing finer in the whole of Russian history, nothing more convincing as a proof of her determination, than this sudden sobering in the space of a single day of the Russian people. It would be difficult, too, to exaggerate the importance of this measure, but those who remember the mobilisation during the war with Japan will understand the difference between a mobilisation with vodka and a mobilisation without it. And the rapidity of the Russian mobilisation in 1914 has an importance which it would be hard to over-estimate. As a peasant wrote in one of the Russian papers:

> "If vodka had not been forbidden, our village would have suffered a dreadful loss. Every man called out by the mobilisation order would have spent at least ten roubles on this useless drink. In our village thirty-two men were called out. In this way they would have spent on drink not less than 320 roubles. Besides this, their relations would have spent from two to three roubles 'to drown the grief of parting.' And so our village would have spent not less than 800 roubles. This is an enormous sum for one village."



A general view of Petrograd. [*E.N.A.*



The Nevsky Prospect, Petrograd. [*E.N.A.*

Since the beginning of 1915 the regulations regarding the sale of red and white wines have been very slightly relaxed. There has been, too, a certain amount of illicit drinking and cases of poisoning from such obnoxious substitutes as "khanja" (spirits of wine rendered unfit for drinking), furniture polish, and children's balsam. This was almost inevitable in a country where drink has for generations had an abnormal hold on the masses. One may say, however, without exaggeration that from the first day of the war the vast majority of the Russian people have been leading a sober life, with excellent results both for those at the front and for those who remain behind, while the night-life for which the large cities were notorious has practically disappeared.

THE PEOPLE AND THE WAR.

An interesting feature of the commencement of the war was the intense desire of the people to live themselves into the spirit of the war. The theatres and the picture-palaces gave themselves up wholly to the patriotic play. Everyone who was not required for military service hastened to enrol himself or herself as a stretcher-bearer, hospital orderly, or Red Cross nurse. Lectures on the war succeeded one another with bewildering rapidity, and a whole series of new newspapers made a glorious but generally very ephemeral appearance. People spoke glibly of the war finishing in three months, and devoured the telegrams, true or untrue, with an appetite that could not be sated. Later, there came the inevitable reaction. People, realising that calmness and self-discipline were as necessary in the streets of Petrograd and Moscow as at the front, discovered that they were helping no one by crying over such neurotic fare as Leonid Andreeff's Belgian play "For King, For Law, and Liberty." The theatres went back to their old régime, and, in the big cities at any rate, by September life was more or less normal. Naturally, there was much that was changed. In almost every street the Red Cross Flag was flying over some hospital or improvised lazaretto. The number of wounded increased daily, and all Russia united to alleviate their suffering. This work has been admirably done. In Moscow, which has had to deal with about one-third of the total wounded, the whole town has worked splendidly together; and in spite of Russia's bad reputation as a practical organiser, the arrangements, which of necessity are on a very large scale, have been excellently carried out. In Russia there are no paupers such as one sees in London. The Russian people gives to its beggars as no nation in the world gives. Every week since the war there has been some new collection for such excellent purposes as 'Orphans' Day," "Polish Day," "Belgian Day," "Cossack Day," until one marvels at the generosity and giving-power of this great-hearted people. And here it is well to point out that in Russia it is not only the rich who give, but all classes, and even the poorest sempstress contributes ten per cent of her wages to the upkeep of some lazaretto. But apart from the wounded, who in winter were rarely to be seen in the streets, everything was normal and quiet. Russia had settled down, had gained her first wind in what she now realised was to be a long struggle. And the result was that when victory came it was not over-estimated, and there was no hysteria over reverses. If the first seven weeks' fighting in Galicia did much to inspire the Russians with a quiet confidence, it did not make them over-optimistic. It is certain that the Russians themselves never entertained the wild hopes of a rapid advance on Berlin which were so common in England at the beginning of the war. In this respect the Russian press has been of great service. From the very commencement of the campaign it has maintained a tone of firm dignity and determination, and in this it has done much to steady the character of the intellectual classes, who are somewhat inclined by nature to extremes of joy and despair. With a censorship which is apparently less severe than the censorship in France and England, the great Russian newspapers have given their public a clear and accurate picture of the fighting on all fronts, and, as far as the war is concerned, such papers as the *Novoe Vremya*, the *Russkoe Slovo*, and the *Russkiya Viedomosti* will stand comparison with the best papers of any country. They have received, too, an excellent lead from the Russian official communiqués, which, both in claiming victory and in acknowledging defeat, have shown a dignity and sincerity that have not always been found in the statements issued by the German General Staff.



In agricultural Russia: A priest takes a hand in the sowing. [*E.N.A.*


RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.

As regards England, the position has been somewhat curious. The two nations, which a somewhat unnatural antagonism, due largely to ignorance, had so long kept apart, have been drawn together as never before in history. Although Englishmen and Russians are still unfortunately ignorant of each other, there has been a very evident desire on the part of the English people to make friends



German and Austrian prisoners being marched through the streets of Petrograd. [*Record Press.*

with the nation that has played so large and so determining a part in this war. This movement, which had already started some two or three years before the war, is a most welcome one to Russians, and they are more than prepared to meet us half-way. It would be idle to deny, however, that at one stage of the war the Russian "man in the street" was a little disappointed at what he considered the small part that England was playing in the war, and was ever ready to lend an ear to the slanderers who maintained that England was letting Russia pull the chestnuts out of the fire for her. This was due to more than one reason. First, Russian merchants were inclined to blame England for the high rate of exchange which severely hampered the country's foreign trade. Secondly, owing to the strictness of the censor during the first four or five months of the war, people in Russia had really very little idea of the great work that England was doing, and were therefore the more inclined to accept the misleading suggestions of the German agents. The chief reason, however, was a simple one. If Russia was not over-confident as regards her own strength, she had a very exaggerated idea of the power of the English Fleet. Not a maritime nation herself, with a population ninety per cent of whom have never even seen the sea, there was nothing she thought the English fleet could not accomplish. So great were the hopes of the "man in the street" during those first days of the war that had the British navy come steaming up the Neva, or even the Moscow river, it would scarcely have exceeded his expectations. When during the first four months of the war our fleet scored no great theatrical success, and itself suffered some loss, hope gave way to disappointment, and even, as for instance after the loss of the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*, to lack of confidence. In the neutral press the Germans, too, had made the most of their successes, whilst the silent pressure of the English fleet had not yet fixed itself on the public imagination. Since Christmas, however, this feeling has vanished. The victories at the Falkland Islands and at the Dogger Bank, the bombardment of the Dardanelles, the driving of every German ship from the high seas, the good reports of Kitchener's army, and, above all, perhaps, the picture of the German fleet lying idle in its harbours, has completely restored Russian confidence.



A Russian peasant and his cart. [*E.N.A.*

It should be pointed out that educated opinion, as expressed by the leading newspapers, never wavered in ascribing an all-supreme importance to the work of the fleet—a work which everyone now realises is one of the chief guarantees of ultimate victory. The British army, too, which before the war the Russians had looked upon as a negligible quantity, has made a great reputation for itself, as may be seen from the following flattering estimate by a well-known Russian correspondent:—


> "The English excel in battle by their endurance and by their extraordinary coolness in the hour of danger They are never flurried, never in too great a hurry. In the face of the most hellish fire they act coldly, methodically, but with tremendous energy. Wilhelm's army has no more dangerous opponent than this 'contemptible rabble of traitors'—not because it is splendidly armed, but because the personal element in it is magnificent."

After this panegyric it is a matter for regret that so far the soldiers of the two countries have not had an opportunity of fighting side by side and learning to know each other better.

THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER.

It has been stated not infrequently that for the Russian this war is a Holy War. This statement must not be misunderstood. The Russian is not a fanatic like the Turk or the Arab. He has no lust to kill, none of the frenzy of religious hate and excess. In this sense the Russian is certainly not waging a "Holy War." But if to believe in the justice of your cause, to believe that God will help to repel the invader from the soil that is holy to you, to believe that the law of right is stronger than the law of might, to feel that faith will guide your arms, and that death in such a cause is not death but life—if these are the elements that constitute a Holy War, then Russia is indeed waging such a war: "For Faith, for Tsar, and Country," and of these Faith comes first. If, then, in one sense the spirit of the Crusades seems still to be present in Russia, it must not be thought that Russian religion is a Christianity of the Sword. Far rather is it a Christianity of Compassion and Infinite Pity. The Russian is not fighting because he is inflamed with the spirit of conquest. His patriotism is quite a different thing from the patriotism of the Englishman, the Frenchman, or the German. To the English mind it is almost lethargic, as though the Russian were indifferent to everything. It is indeed a kind of fatalism. The Russian soldier fights without asking questions, without any understanding of the fine points of politics, without reflecting how long the war will last or what will happen to him if he is defeated. Some knowledge he has certainly of the broad outlines of the war. He knows what Belgium and Servia have suffered, and, as is his nature, his sympathies are touched. But for him the one important fact is that his God and his Tsar have called him to defend his country, and so he goes without complaint to do his duty, ready for any sacrifice, even the greatest of all sacrifices when a man shall lay down his life for his country.

It is not unnatural that a people such as this should treat their prisoners with a kindness and consideration that are rare in any war—rarest of all in a war like this. At Kieff, where thousands and thousands of Austrian prisoners have been marched through the streets, the population has had many opportunities of seeing the men who have been perhaps the slayers of their nearest and



A general view of Moscow, showing the Kremlin. [E.N.A.

dearest. Yet not once has there been a jeer or a sound of indecent rejoicing. Russians do not hit a man when he is down, and countless acts of kindness, such as the giving of fruit and cigarettes to their captives, bear witness to the good heart of the Russian people and to their immeasurable sympathy for the sufferings of others. Indeed, the whole Russian attitude to victory is one of deep, fervent, religious feeling, in which the sentiment of thanksgiving is far stronger than the sentiment of exultation. In view of the repeated charges of savagery made against the Russians by the Germans, it is only fair that this should be set on record.

THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS.

As befits an intensely religious race, the Russians attribute success to personalities and not to scientific causes. That is why in the imagination of the Russian people the Grand Duke Nicholas has become an almost superhuman figure, to whom nothing can come amiss. Every great cause produces its great man, and one has only to hear with what affection the average Russian lingers over his name to realise the popularity in which the Russian people hold their great generalissimo. It is interesting to find how people of the most widely-opposed views worship the Grand Duke and look upon him as the champion of their own particular policy and theories. The man who can create such a state of feeling in Russia is no mere figure-head. If the war finishes with a great Russian victory, and no one in Russia doubts that it will finish in this way, the Grand Duke will take a place in Russian history second only to Peter the Great.




Moscow: The Spaski Gate. [*E.N.A.*

In this war the question of financial and economic resources must inevitably play a very important part in the final issue. In this respect Russia's position is a little difficult to judge. It has been represented as analogous with that of England, and to a certain extent this is true. If Poland be excluded, Russian territory has not suffered in the same way as Belgium, Servia, and North France have suffered. A casual visitor to Moscow or Petrograd would notice, perhaps, no great change in the life in the streets. Even at Kieff, which, after Warsaw, is the nearest of the large Russian towns to the seat of war, everything is quiet and business proceeds outwardly much as usual. There seems to be no lack of young men in the streets, and the cinemas and theatres are full.

This, however, would give a very unfair position of the real state of affairs. In the country districts and in the villages it is easy to see the thinning in the ranks of the men, and the shortage of labour is already making itself felt. More serious is the virtual cessation of foreign trade. At the beginning of the war the fate of Russian credit abroad and the sharp rise in the exchange upset the whole machinery of Russian payments abroad; and the closing of all communications with the rest of the world, except by the congested and unpractical routes via Sweden, Archangel, and Vladivostock, left Russia in the undesirable position of being unable to export or to import. In consequence, the prices of most manufactured articles have risen considerably. The cost of living will be further increased by the recent revision of the Customs Tariff, and by the new taxes which have been introduced to meet the loss on the vodka revenue. Russia is a country which is naturally able to feed its people from its own resources. Unfortunately, there has been a rise in food prices in some of the large towns which might perhaps have been avoided. The trouble is that although the supplies are in the country there is no rolling stock available for their transport. While the Russian railways have performed marvels in the transport of troops and of everything connected with the army, the organisation of the goods traffic in Russia itself leaves much to be desired. The question is an important one, and energetic steps have already been taken to deal with it. One can imagine nothing more harmful to the popularity of the war in Russia than a continued rise in the price of the first necessities of life.

THE DARDANELLES.

In these circumstances it is not difficult to understand the feverish desire of the Russian people to have the Dardanelles opened. The question is as much an economic




Moscow: The Place Rouge and Cathedral of St. Basil.

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Moscow: A general view of the Kremlin.

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A general view of Kieff. [*E.N.A.*


as a political one, and while a long-fostered national sentiment demands that Constantinople shall belong to Russia, common sense dictates that it is intolerable for a great power like Russia to be in the ignominious position of having one of her life-arteries closed at the will of a second-rate power like Turkey. While the opening of the Dardanelles will be of enormous service to the Russian Government, it is most unlikely that the benefit to private individuals will be as great as Russian business men seem to expect. The rolling-stock, already insufficient for present purposes, will be required for Government stores, and, just as at Archangel, private traders will have to wait until their needs are satisfied.

It is not meant to suggest that there is anything serious in the economic position of Russia. As far as trade is concerned, the general opinion is that she has suffered less than had been expected. There is no unemployment, and Government orders have kept most of the factories busy. At the same time, there is nothing in the present state of affairs which would induce the Russian merchants to support a long and protracted war with the same equanimity as, say, their English Allies. A feature of the economic campaign has been the desire to replace German goods by those of British manufacture. Owing partly to the difficulties of inter-communication, partly to the breakdown of the exchange between the two countries, and partly to the fact that English manufacturers have already more than they can do at home, this desire still remains to a great extent unfulfilled. Russians are inclined to blame the English manufacturer for this state of affairs, and point out that very little has been done with a view to capturing the German market after the war. Even when due allowance is made for all the difficulties enumerated above, it certainly seems as though English manufacturers and merchants have shown very little enterprise in their attempts to enter the Russian market, and it is greatly to be feared that after the war the great business that Germany formerly did with Russia will either revert to Germany herself or go to the less conservative Swedish, American, and Japanese firms, all of whom are already showing considerable activity.

The war has already lasted over ten months, and there were many people before the war who predicted that Russia would never endure the burden of a long war. Financial ruin, internal troubles, even revolution, were prophesied, and yet none of these things have come to pass. In a country like Russia it is at all times difficult to gauge public opinion, because in the English sense of the word public opinion scarcely exists. In war time the difficulty is doubly increased. The Russian character is a strange mixture of infinite patience and violent passion, which may often be ignited by a chance spark. It inclines easily to extremes either of joy or of despair, but on the whole it has come out of a long and trying ordeal with the greatest credit. Russia has borne great sacrifices. To-day, there is no reason to doubt that the war is still popular with the vast majority of the Russian people, and that, while no one looks forward with relish to a long war, there will be no talk of peace until these sacrifices have been atoned for and the enemy decisively crushed. If there is little feeling of hate gainst Austria, the resentment against Germany, whom Russia blames for the whole war, is very strong, and has not been diminished by the treatment of Russian prisoners in Germany, or by such stories as the torture of soldiers—like Porfiri Panasiuk—who refuse to betray their country. The speaking of German in the streets and in public places is forbidden, and German names and signboards have been changed or removed. The fate, too, of Belgium and Servia has excited the pity and sympathy of every class of Russian, and King Albert is as popular a figure in the moujik's cottage as he is in England or in France. Much has been done by the publication of popular pamphlets to make the war known to the masses, and in the large cities, at any rate, the "man in the street" is surprisingly well-informed about all phases of the war. The question of Constantinople appeals to all




Moscow: The Temple of the Saviour. [*E.N.A.*



The People's Theatre, Moscow. [*E.N.A.*

classes of Russians in a way that is perhaps hardly realised in England ; and while there are a few croakers who profess grave mistrust of England's intentions, the general belief is that Constantinople will be Russia's just reward for the sacrifices she has borne, and that this time England will not stand in the way.

The spirit of the army itself is magnificent. Foreign military critics, who had seen the work of the Russian army during the last decade, had borne witness to the great improvement that had been effected since the Japanese war. From the first mobilisation onward the Russian organisation, which has always been a weakness of the Russian army has astonished everyone by the speed with which it has overcome all the difficulties caused by long lines of communication and lack of railways. While this testifies to excellent work on the part of the Russian Headquarters, even greater credit is due to the wonderful powers of endurance of the Russian soldier. Never, perhaps, in the history of the world have soldiers been called upon to face such hardships as the Russian soldiers have undergone in Poland, in East Prussia, and, above all, in Galicia and the Carpathians. Even when one admits that the Russian soldier, who comes from the peasant classes and is therefore unaccustomed to the luxuries of modern life, is better fitted than any other to stand the strain of modern warfare, his achievements are no less matter for admiration. Before the war it was the common opinion—not only of Germany and Austria but of the rest of Europe, and even of many Russians—that the Russian army was little better than a vast horde of ill-clad, stupid barbarians. To-day this view has been profoundly altered. No one has ever denied courage to the Russian troops, and history has shown more than once that no soldiers are better able to stand punishment. But the world looked on this as the courage of the brute—a courage that went hand in hand with plunder and excess. Not the least gratifying feature of the Russian campaign has been the exemplary manner in which the Russian soldier has waged his war. Even the Germans have been forced to admit grudgingly what the Austrians acknowledge with due respect. Historians will doubtless seek to find a reason for the good behaviour of troops that had hitherto been looked upon as full of ferocity. They will tell us that Russia is on her best behaviour, that she considers she is on trial before the world, and that she is anxious to prove that Russian barbarism is a finer thing than German *Kultur*. To some extent this may be true. Russian soldiers, like other well-disciplined troops, will do whatever they are ordered. But no orders can so influence a man that after the heat of the battle he is prepared to share his bread and his tea with his captives. It is due, perhaps, as much to this natural good-heartedness as to anything else that the Russians can look back with pride on one of the fiercest campaigns history has ever known, and say that "We, the barbarians, have waged war like gentlemen, and you, the *Kulturists*, like evil beasts."




The Tsarina (holding the thermometer with which the patient's temperature has just been taken) and (directly behind her) the Grand Duchess Olga and the Grand Duchess Tatiana, in a Russian Red Cross Hospital.
[*Central News.*



The Carpathians: The Austrian railway which crosses the mountains through the Lupkow Pass. [E.N.A.



A view of the road at the entrance to the Uzsok Pass. [E.N.A.



In the Austrian trenches in the Carpathians. [*Topical Press.*

CHAPTER XXIV.

HUNGARY AND THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN.


THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON HUNGARY—RESIGNATION OF COUNT BERCHTOLD—HIS SUCCESSOR—FALL OF PRZEMYSL—STORY OF THE SIEGE—THE CARPATHIAN FIGHTING.

WITH the beginning of 1915 Hungary began to be the centre alike of military and of political interest on the eastern front. In August the chief event had been the Russian invasion of East Prussia and its repulse; in September interest had turned to the occupation of Galicia and the Austrian retreat; in October had come the German march through Poland and the attempt to confine the Russian armies behind the Vistula and the San; in November and December the Germans had devoted their most persistent efforts to the attack on Warsaw, and the Austrian attempt to drive the Russians out of Galicia had failed. At the beginning of January the Russian southern armies were once more moving slowly towards the crests of the Carpathian mountains, and the threat to Hungary, already twice removed, was renewed again.

This front now became of pre-eminent importance. The East Prussian campaign which ended in the destruction of the Tenth Russian Army was not more than an episode in the course of the war; and although the Germans in Poland persisted for some time in their furious attacks on the Russian lines before Warsaw, the Russian rôle here was defensive, and it was to Hungary that Russia now looked for really decisive results. From the Baltic down to the Vistula, and through Poland to the neighbourhood of Cracow and the Dukla Pass, the Russians were satisfied with maintaining their positions; while the whole of their left wing, stretching from the Dukla to the Roumanian border, moved forward upon Hungary. From the purely military point of view there was perhaps something to be said for the alternative plan, by which the Russians, merely holding the passes of the Carpathians against all attacks, would have pushed forward in the gap lying between Cracow and the mountains and advanced upon both Vienna and German Silesia. The advantage of such a plan would have been that the Carpathian passes were not difficult to hold, and the Russian army advancing through the gap would have been comparatively secure from an attack on its lines of communication in Galicia. On the other hand, the Germans were so far forward in Poland that they would have been on the right flank of the Russian advance, and it would have been impossible for the Russians to have marched on Silesia by way of Cracow unless they had first driven the Germans back in Poland. But what determined the Russians to direct all their energies on Hungary at this stage was the political situation, which had in it the possibilities of a great military advantage.

RUSSIAN HOPES OF ROUMANIA.

The Russian advance was therefore directed through Bukowina and towards all the Carpathian passes. Its general object was the occupation of Hungary—an achievement which would have deprived the Germanic powers of an indispensable source of supply, and would almost certainly have had the effect of bringing certain neutral powers into the field and breaking up the Austrian empire. In particular, the object of the Russian advance through Bukowina was to put an end to the hesitations of Roumania. Throughout the winter, expectation had been growing that with the spring Roumania would throw in her lot with the Allies. She was much



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN OF JANUARY–APRIL, 1915.

more likely to do so if she knew that in invading Transylvania she would have the support of a Russian army on her right flank. Without this support she was exposed to a sudden and separate attack by an overwhelming force, such as the Germans had from time to time assembled against the Russians whenever German territory was in danger. There was the further possibility that a Russian advance into Transylvania would arouse its Roumanian population to revolt. Rumours of such a movement had already sprung up from time to time, but disaffection, if there was any, had not taken an active form. Lastly, a Russian invasion of Hungary would put to the test the loyalty of the Magyars, the dominant Hungarian race, who would certainly either insist on Germany making every effort to prevent the occupation and disruption of their country or would take the business into their own hands, at whatever cost to the Austrian and German empires. There was no reason to doubt the loyalty of the Magyar leaders to the Germanic connection, but it was always understood that the price was the support of Magyar supremacy and territory to the uttermost limit. It was about this time that Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, was reported to have said that either Germany and Austria would secure the safety and integrity of Hungary or Hungary would discover a way to recall her sons, of whom nearly a million were believed to be fighting in the Austro-Hungarian army, to the defence of their own country.



Count Stephan Tisza, the Hungarian Premier. [*E.N.A.*



Baron Stephan de Burian. [*E.N.A.*

RUSSIA'S DISADVANTAGE.

In the forthcoming offensive against Hungary, Russia was exposed to one great disadvantage. While, on the one hand, whenever she approached close to the territory of her enemies, she was exposed to the possibility of a sudden concentration of superior numbers, she was unable to use a similar method of attack for her own advantage. Had she now been able to mass very large forces in Bukowina at the extreme left of her line she might have penetrated the passes and wheeled round into Transylvania, and so, perhaps, secured Roumania's support. She was prevented from doing so by difficulties of supply. The number of troops whom the Russians had in the fighting line was greatly exaggerated in the popular imagination during the early stages of the war. Her reserves, indeed, were almost inexhaustible; her difficulty lay in equipping them with the appliances of modern warfare, especially artillery, and in supplying them with all the necessities of a campaign—not merely munitions, but food and clothing also — when they were at the front. This was the real reason why the Russians, after having advanced to the Hungarian borders of Bukowina, were compelled forthwith to retreat when the Austrians marched against them. The railway organisation of Hungary, like that of Germany, enabled the German Staff (now in supreme control of the war) to pour into Bukowina and to maintain there a larger force than it was possible for the Russians on their side to handle and supply. This difficulty not only made the Russian reserves comparatively useless at the time, but was likely to last until, by a prolonged process of slaughtering down, the German and Austrian armies had become so greatly weakened that the balance of numbers began definitely to turn against them.

There was, however, not the slightest possibility that Count Tisza would have to carry out his threat. The aid of Austria was indispensable to Germany as a defence



After the fall of Przemysl: A Russian column passing through one of the main streets. [*Universal.*



Bringing up a shell for one of the great Austrian guns. [*Topical.*

to her right flank and a cover for Silesia, and Hungary was indispensable to Austria. The separatist influences which existed in Hungary, and which gave its name to the Independence Party, were no doubt still alive. They did not, however, carry much weight among the political leaders, although they could be used as a hint to Austria and Germany that Hungary, if neglected, was capable both of defending herself and of asserting her right to do so.

THE RESIGNATION OF COUNT BERCHTOLD.

About the same time as Hungary became the centre of strategical interest, she also took the front place in the political management of the empire. Count Berchtold, the Imperial Foreign Minister, resigned on January 13th, and was succeeded by Baron Burian, a Magyar and a friend and supporter of Count Tisza. The causes of Count Berchtold's fall were many, but they might be summed up in the complete failure of the schemes for which he had plunged Austria into war. The immediate cause and the climax of his misfortunes was the extreme humiliation which Austria had undergone in the second great defeat of her armies by Servia in the middle of December. Even if Count Tisza was the person ultimately responsible, as was said at the time, for the ultimatum to Servia of July, 1914, Count Berchtold was in supreme control of the policy of the empire. It was he, therefore, who had now to bear the shame of the disgrace attaching to defeat from the small and despised neighbour, a disgrace which was all the greater since it was clear that at present there was no way of punishing Servia; every effort was required now for the preservation of Austrian and Hungarian soil from the invader. It was said in Hungary that in the Council which was held after the Servian defeat the question was debated whether a fresh campaign should forthwith be undertaken, and that Count Berchtold pronounced against the proposal, and, being over-ruled, resigned. The story is of very doubtful origin, for the fact was that, however much Austria might have liked to send yet another expedition into Servia, she was no longer in a position to do so, and this in itself was sufficient to account for the fall of the statesman who was responsible for Austria's Servian policy.



Lieut.-General von Kusmanek, in command of the Austrian forces at Przemysl.
[*E.N.A.*

COUNT BERCHTOLD'S BALKAN POLICY.

The Servian defeat, however, was only the culminating point of Count Berchtold's long failure with regard to the Balkans. He had failed to prevent the formation of the Balkan League, which was so great a diplomatic success for Russia. As a natural consequence he had been unable to prevent the outbreak of war between the Balkan League and Turkey, the expulsion of the Turkish power from Macedonia, and the creation of a greater Servia. Then, the danger of an enlarged Servia being clear, Austria had encouraged Bulgaria to plunge into the second Balkan war which had resulted in her defeat; and when the Treaty of Bukharest formally recognised Servia's acquisition, Austria had allowed her dissatisfaction with it to be openly seen, and had thereby taken the first step towards alienating Roumania Count Berchtold decided to make the supreme effort to retrieve his earlier failures by a direct attack on Servia, and now his policy had ended in a great triumph of Servia and her patron. To add to his other misfortunes, the Italian Government had already, in December, given him to understand that an attack on Servia, whether successful or not, entitled Italy to compensation from Austria, and that she proposed to obtain it. Count Berchtold's measure was full, and his resignation followed.

Baron Burian, the new Austrian Chancellor, had had a considerable diplomatic experience in the Balkans, and had also gained a reputation as an administrator in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The importance of his appointment was that it seemed to mark the complete success of Count Tisza's policy of making Hungary the dominant political power in the Austrian empire. Whereas the ideal of the Independence Party was a Hungary cut off from all political and military connection with Austria, Count Tisza held the view that Hungarian interests were best served by the Dualist system of government, but that Hungary should protect her own interests by exercising, if possible, the direction not only of her own affairs, which she already had, but also of the Imperial policy. In the middle of January, therefore, the defence of Hungary opened under somewhat improved prospects. In the field the Hungarian troops had the support both of the Austrians and of several German corps, while their protection on the political side was in the powerful hands of Tisza and Burian.

PRZEMYSL.

The campaign in the Carpathians, which was waged for the most part not far from the ridge of the mountains, had the general purpose of driving the Russians back down the northern slopes and the particular object of clearing them out of Bukowina and of relieving the besieged fortress of Przemysl. At the beginning of the third week in January the Austrians were found to have gathered large forces on the borders of Bukowina, and they had little difficulty in recapturing the positions on the frontier, especially the Kirlibaba Pass, which were in the hands of the Russians, and in driving them back on Czernowitz. At the same time their attack developed in a northerly direction, and by the end of the month heavy fighting was in progress over more than a hundred miles from Dukla to the Wyszkow Pass. For the next two months the struggle was carried on with the utmost intensity, but without any great progress on either side. Often the general conditions were such, owing to the storms and frost and snow, that according to all ordinary conceptions of warfare campaigning would have been thought impossible; it was said by the wounded when they returned home that in some attacks the troops had had to advance waist-deep in snow, and when killed had

remained standing erect at the spot where they were shot. In this mountainous country it was not possible for either side easily to deploy large numbers of men. On the whole, the efforts of the Austrians and Germans to penetrate into the valley of the Upper San, to advance on Przemysl and to reach Sambor and Stryj in order to cross the Dniester and reach Lemberg and the great strategic railway running through it, were unsuccessful, and at several points the Russians succeeded gradually in pushing them back and in crossing the crests of the mountains. At the beginning of February the western section of the Russian army reached Mezo Laborcz at the extreme point of one of the Hungarian valleys, while towards the other end of the line a series of desperate battles was fought for the possession of the heights of Koziowa, lying about fifteen miles north-east of the mountain ridge. Here the attack was in the hands of German troops, and a succession of hand-to-hand combats took place which, although the character of the country was very different, were in their sustained fury as desperate as those which had marked the earlier fighting in Poland or the great German attack in Flanders. By the end of February the Russians were making slow but steady progress in the centre of their line, and were attempting again to advance against the Austrians in Bukowina.



A view of the Uzsok Pass. [*E.N.A.*

At the beginning of March the Austrians redoubled their efforts, especially in the neighbourhood of the Lupkow Pass, through which they hoped to penetrate to Przemysl. Their extreme activity at this time was due to the knowledge that the garrison of the fortress could not hold out many weeks; they were in no doubt as to its condition from day to day, for there was throughout the siege regular communication by aeroplane between the commander of the garrison and the Austrian headquarters. By the middle of March the siege was nearing its close. Nothing had been heard for many weeks of the siege operations, although it was known that there had been no attempt to storm the fortifications, and that the Russians—who were probably well informed of what was happening in the fortress—were content to proceed by the slow, but in this case certain, methods of investment. It was suddenly announced that they had captured an important position near the fortress, and had driven the enemy back to the inner ring of forts. On March 18th the forts began suddenly—and throughout the following night maintained—a tremendous bombardment which had, and, as it proved, was expected to have, no military effect. Its purpose was simply to consume all the remaining ammunition in order that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy when the now imminent surrender took place. On the 19th a portion of the garrison (it was said, but never confirmed, that the rest refused to obey orders) made a vigorous sortie to the east of the fortress. The Twenty-Third Honvèd Division was engaged in this attempt, and lost several thousand men. The sortie could have served no useful military purpose, and even the Austrian reports offered no better reason for it than that it was designed to discover the nature of the Russian entrenchments round the fortress in case the knowledge should be useful at some later date.

FALL OF THE FORTRESS.

On the 20th and 21st the bombardment continued, and on the latter day there was another sortie no less futile than the first. But throughout the 21st the Russians were given indications that surrender was at hand. Early on the morning of the 22nd the fortress was surrendered, but before the Russians entered tremendous explosions were heard from every quarter of the city; the Staff were blowing up the forts, the magazines, and bridges, in order that little of military value might fall to the Russians. According to the figures published by the Russians, 120,000 prisoners fell into their hands. The normal garrison would have been between fifty and sixty thousand, but it appeared that a certain portion of the army which was driven back in Galicia at the beginning of November, 1914, was left in Przemysl. If this were so, it was a masterpiece of bad management, for the surrender of the fortress was not due to the Russian attack, which for the most part was in the hands of five divisions of reservists, nor to lack of guns or ammunition—of

which there was plenty—but solely to the lack of food. In four and a half months the huge garrison had exhausted its food supplies; on March 22nd there was, according to one report, only "three days' maintenance" left in the place, and, according to another, none at all. There was, therefore, nothing to do but either to surrender or to march out the whole able-bodied garrison in a desperate effort to break through to the Austrian army in the Carpathians. This would have been the heroic course, but it would have ended in disaster. The Austrians preferred the path of greater safety and less glory, and surrendered.

A DIARY OF THE LAST DAYS.

A vivid account of the last days of the siege appears in a diary kept by a wounded Russian soldier, who was carefully tended in the fortress.* He says:—

"MARCH 15th. Severe frosts have set in. The cold is terrible. Food is getting scarcer and scarcer. The dinner ration is getting very small. The soldiers' dinner consists of a little white beetroot (cattle food) with a mixture of some sort of acid stuff.

"MARCH 17th. Four days ago they requisitioned the cows of all the inhabitants, in spite of the beseeching and crying of the women and children. The servants and orderlies have been warned that bread will be issued to-morrow for the last time. The day after to-morrow one ration for every four. Our wretched orderly imagines that by washing his stomach with hot water now and then during the day he loses the wish to eat.


"The Sisters of Mercy tell us that in the city they openly talk of the speedy surrender of the fortress. The Austrian administration have told us that we must have money to hand over on deposit. This, if you please, on the eve of surrender! Absurd! We have all agreed not to hand over a penny. All day yesterday the artillery crashed from the forts. They say that in two directions from the fortress a force of 70,000 men this morning advanced to try and break through towards the Carpathians. To-day all forts and bridges are to be blown up. There remain in the fortress 40,000 soldiers incapable of fighting. Medicines also have run out. For a long time there has been no soap or vaseline. Iodine for a couple of days only is left. The wounded even are not getting bread now; they are giving them the last of the biscuits. The Austrian officers are already arranging and packing for the journey into Russia.

"During the whole of to-night uninterrupted heavy artillery fire has been going on; all night long rockets have been lighting everything up from the forts. The Russians this morning began the bombardment of the town. Two shells burst close to the hospital; the windows were blown to bits. To-day we had no bread.

"MARCH 20th.—They say that the garrison has failed to break through! In the hospital, in spite of the tragedy being enacted, the men amuse themselves in drawing caricatures.

"MARCH 21st.—To-day is the third day we have had no bread. Our Mother Superior sold a cow for £140 and a three-day-old calf for £12 10s. A dog costs £2 10s. The recent gloomy weather has changed to sunny. The snow has thawed already. The River San is free of ice. They say the Austrians have burned twenty-one millions worth of paper money, four aeroplanes, and have destroyed as far as possible all stores and carriages. They have thrown the guns into the San river. Just before turning in they warned us that the forts and bridges in the town would be blown up at four in the morning.

"MARCH 22nd.—The fortress is surrendering. The artillery fired up to 5 a.m. At 5-30 a.m. explosions were heard, at first separately, but later a regular hell was let loose. We opened the windows so that they should not be broken. The sun had already risen, and the plumes of smoke, lit up by the sun, presented a beautiful scene. The thunder and crash of the explosions went on uninterruptedly. It was impossible to get near a window; one was flung backwards. The panic had become terrible. At every explosion the doors were blown open. Bridges, powder magazines, stores, everything was blown up in two hours. The Ruthenes were overjoyed at the Russian victory. We could no longer remain in the hospital, and for the first time we went out into the streets. Our soldiers were embracing the Austrian soldiers. In one place a ring had been formed, and our cavalrymen were dancing with the Ruthene women. All the footpaths were thronged with people."



A view towards the summit of the Dukla Pass. [*E.N.A.*

The surrender of so large a body of men naturally aroused criticism; we may compare the criticism of General Stössel for surrendering Port Arthur, whose garrison was much smaller. The Austrian General Staff therefore issued a long narrative of the siege and

* Published in *The Times*, April 29th, 1915.



Russian soldiers after a successful engagement with the Germans. [*Record Press.*

the reasons for surrender.* In the course of this they said :—

"The garrison of the fortress held Przemysl to the very last hour that human force could do so in the military sense of the word. General Kusmanek only surrendered when such a course was dictated by feelings of humanity and military consideration. On the day of the surrender there was not one morsel of food in the fortress, and no breakfast could be supplied to the men.

"Events have developed around Przemysl more quickly than was expected. The last sortie officially reported was directed towards the east, and was undertaken not with the view of effecting the relief of the fortress, but to find out if the surrounding Russian force was as strong towards Grodek and Lemberg as in the other directions, and whether the Russians had fortified their positions in the Grodek direction, as well as to the south and west of the fortress. It was ascertained during the sorties that this was the case. The Russians, in fact, built counter-fortifications all around the fortress, even in the direction of their own territory, preparing for all eventualities. In fact, the last reports coming from the fortress all confirmed the report that the Russians built a new fortress all around the besieged territory. The fortifications were so constructed as to constitute an impenetrable obstacle to inward attacks, just the counter-form of the fortifications and defensive works of the fortress itself. The Russian ring was constructed exclusively against Przemysl with unparalleled skill and rapidity, and with all available means of modern technique.

"On the west a well-fortified defending line and on the south a large Russian army stood in the way of any attempt to relieve Przemysl. In addition, the roads leading towards Russia were well fortified, as the last sortie proved. This was the military situation of the fortress during the last weeks.

"With regard to provisions the fortress was well supplied at the outset, but the stores were consumed at the time of the first investment, which lasted until October 11th. On that date the fortress was relieved, and General Borvevich entered the fortress with his army. The railway lines had been blown up by the retreating Russians. On the Galician roads it was impossible to transport anything at that time, and this fact obliged us to provision the army fighting to the east of Przemysl from the stores of the fortress, the army being cut off from all other points of supply.

"It was thus necessary to draw provisions from the ample stores of Przemysl in the hope that as soon as the railway line was reconstructed the stores could be replaced. The railway line was reconstructed, and on October 23rd the first trains began to move towards the fortress.

"At the end of ten days, however, and before the deficiencies could be made good, Przemysl was invested anew."

"At this period the situation in North Poland made it necessary for us to withdraw our flank in Galicia. During the ten days at our disposal the transport of ammunition took first place. The question of provisioning the fortress appearing at that time to be a secondary matter, when eventually food supplies were despatched to Przemysl it was too late.

"During the first days of the investment, in November, General Kusmanek took stock of the available quantity of foodstuffs, and drew up a scale of rations. He took great care that neither officers nor men should get more than the minimum of everything. For breakfast they had only tea, for their mid-day meal a small piece of meat and half a pound of bread, and in the evening tea again, with some bread. To add to the meat supply thousands of horses were slaughtered, which was all the more necessary on account of the shortage in fodder. Later on this minimum was further reduced, so that the men of the garrison were on almost starvation diet for the last two months of the siege.

"It has been said in some quarters that flying machines and dirigibles might have been used in bringing in supplies, but this idea was excluded from the beginning. Such flour or meat as could have been thus brought in would only have sufficed a few hundred men for a few days, and to have made any appreciable difference all the aeroplanes and dirigibles of the world would have had to have been employed daily. The commander of the fortress vetoed the idea that certain members of the garrison should receive food by this means whilst the rest put up with the rations available in the fortress. Even the game shot by some of the officers was not allowed to be brought in, but was cooked and eaten in the hunting field The aeroplanes only brought in letters, medicines, and material for the wireless telegraphy.

"The food supply grew daily more and more scanty, until on the morning of the 22nd there was not a particle of bread in the stores, not a pound of meat or flour available, so that the commander of the fortress decided to surrender.

"The sortie above referred to had no effect whatever, but soon after this the Russian besieging army began a violent attack from the north and east with the object of ascertaining what powers of resistance the famished and exhausted garrison still possessed. How our poor soldiers could bear the brunt of these attacks is a mystery, but General Tamàssy's Honvèds succeeded in repulsing them. These weak and famished soldiers had courage and enthusiasm enough to face the onslaught of the healthy well-fed Russians, and succeeded in repulsing them from beneath the fortress. True, this was their last effort.

"After this battle, which lasted seven hours, General Kusmanek and his staff saw that another sortie was impossible, the investing ring being too strong for even a well-fed army to break through."

AFTER THE FALL OF PRZEMYSL.

The fall of Przemysl had, as it proved, little or no effect on the campaign. Expectation had probably been

* Published in the *Morning Post*, March 30th, 1915.

misled by the recollection of what happened after the fall of Port Arthur, when General Nogi's army was rapidly transferred to the north of Manchuria and played a decisive part in the defeat of the Russians at the Battle of Mukden. The conditions of the Carpathian campaign were wholly different. At Mukden there was room for armies to manœuvre; in the Carpathians there was none. In their attempt to force a passage into Hungary the Russians had probably as many men engaged already as they could usefully employ, and in addition the troops of the besieging army were not of the best quality if they could have been used. The appearance of some of them was reported in the fighting of the next few weeks, but the rate of the Russian progress scarcely quickened.

At the end of March the Russians were south and south-west of the Dukla Pass, and their line then stretched eastwards over the crest and continued along the northern slopes. Their object was gradually to broaden out their front, and in a movement from west to east to seize the heads of the Hungarian valleys—they were already established in the valleys of the Ondawa and Laborcz—and so move down into the plains below. In the last week of March they captured a strong Austrian position on the mountain crest near the Lupkow Pass, and a fortnight later they seized the Rostok Pass, to the east of Lupkow. By the end of the first week in April the ridge was in their hands for a distance of 75 miles. But all their efforts, continued for many weeks, failed to capture the next most important pass to the east—the Uzsok—and they were still fighting fiercely, but unsuccessfully, for its possession at the end of April. The fighting on the whole of this front had, in the difficulties of the ground and the severities of nature, become similar to that which had taken place in the Caucasus. One of the reports published about this time described the attacking side as "wading through snow up to the loins, climbing almost perpendicular precipices, and stubbornly fighting their way through forests fortified with wire entanglements."

PROSPECT OF A GERMAN COUNTER-STROKE.

Still, towards the end of April the Russians had made a certain amount of progress; and although the Austrians were well equipped with a new series of positions along the southern slope of the mountains, it seemed likely that the Russians, if they could finally capture the Uzsok Pass, would be able to deploy their forces more successfully. At about this time, therefore, there were signs on the Russian side of an expectation that the German Staff, which had for many weeks rested content with the operations in the Carpathians, would deal a counter-blow either in Poland or in Western Galicia, which, if successful, would be likely to relieve Hungary from the threatened invasion. Rumour began to spread that Germany was re-grouping her forces, and that troops were being withdrawn from East Prussia and from Poland for an unknown quarter. The Russian Staff certainly must have had some knowledge that these movements were going on, and must have been prepared for the new movement of which they were a sign. Up to May 1st, however, there was not the slightest indication of the extent of the blow which the Germans were preparing, nor of the point at which it was to be delivered, nor yet of the precise means with which they intended to deliver it. On Sunday, May 2nd, they struck the Russian front between Cracow and the Carpathians, broke it at many points, and inflicted a defeat which was to prove much the worst that Russia had suffered since the war began.



German cavalry in the snow-clad Carpathians. [*Topical Press.*



Greek infantry on the march. [*Central News.*

CHAPTER XXV.

BALKAN POLITICS AND THE DARDANELLES.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE BALKAN LEAGUE—BULGARIA'S GRIEVANCES—FAILURE OF ATTEMPTS TO WIN HER OVER—THE POSITION OF ROUMANIA AND OF GREECE—THE STRATEGY OF THE ALLIES IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE—MR. CHURCHILL'S POLICY—BOMBARDMENT OF THE DARDANELLES FORTS—FALL OF M. VENIZELOS.

THE entry of Turkey into the war might, under favourable circumstances, have done the Allies more good than harm, for Turkey had many enemies and no true friends. Unfortunately, the circumstances were not favourable. The war between Turkey and the Balkan League of Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece had done very great service to the Allies in cutting off direct communication between Turkey and Austria; for had Turkey, when the war began, still been in possession of the province of Novi Bazar, it would have been out of the question for Servia to resist the combined attacks of Austria on the north and Turkey on the south. As it was, Bulgaria and Greece completely screened Servia from attack from the side of Turkey. But this gain was offset by the dissolution of the Balkan League, and by the immunity which it brought to Turkey from attack by her natural enemies, the Balkan States. But for Bulgaria's neutrality, Turkey could not have attacked Russia on the Caucasus or England in Egypt, and the only service that she could have rendered to Germany would have been to close the Dardanelles and to prevent the importation of arms and munitions into Russia through the Black Sea ports. That would have been a great service, but Turkey would never have risked it if she had not felt herself secure against attack from the side of Bulgaria. In a word, the entry of Turkey into the war, with all the embarrassments that it caused to the Allies, was due to the break-up of the Balkan League after the defeat of Turkey in the last war.


It followed that the reconstitution of the League should from the beginning of the war have become one of the principal objects of the Allies. But their diplomacy seems to have been somewhat slow to realise the urgency of the need. Between Russia and Turkey there was no possibility of reconcilement, but Great Britain, as the old friend and protector of Turkey, was in a much stronger position, and a more skilful diplomacy might have prevented Turkey from committing herself irretrievably to the side of Germany. The most effectual means to that end would undoubtedly have been the reconciliation of the Balkan Allies, and in this work Russia, as the old liberator of Bulgaria and the champion of the new Servia, might, had she chosen, have taken a decisive part. But the diplomacy of the Allies, neither then nor later, was equal to the emergency. It was indeed a difficult task that was required of it, and one not to be accomplished without a comprehensive policy in regard to future eventualities as well as to present conditions. The war found the Allies with no other equipment in their Balkan policy than that of mutual goodwill. Whereas the plans

of Germany and Austria in regard to the future had been thought out in advance, England and Russia had to begin reconstructing their policy out of the ruins of their rivalries, and this work of reconstruction presented so many delicate problems that it was natural that both parties should wish to postpone the beginning of it until the necessity was clearly demonstrated. The Allies, therefore, for some time after Germany declared war on Russia, not only had no common Balkan policy, but were still at the stage of hoping that Turkey would not put them under the necessity of having one. Valuable time was lost by improvidence and procrastination, for which the blame must be equally divided between them. If our diplomacy at Constantinople failed to make good use of our past history holding back Turkey, Russian diplomacy, too, failed no less signally to recover the affections of Bulgaria. Nor, so far as is known, did France show any greater prescience. When Turkey joined in, the problem of reconstructing the Balkan League was as far from solution as it was at the beginning of the war. Indeed, had any considerable progress been made it is safe to say that Turkey would never have joined in.



The King of Greece.

[*Russell and Sons.*



M. Venizelos. [*L.N.A.*

BULGARIA'S POSITION.

The key of the situation was in the hands of Bulgaria. Alone of the members of the Balkan League she had a land frontier with Turkey, and was therefore in a position to check immediately any attempts to make trouble for England and Russia outside Europe. Alone of the Balkan Powers she had definite grievances which war might set right. They were grievances against all her neighbours, Servia and Greece, Roumania and Turkey. Her principal grievance was against Servia, whom she regarded as the author of her misfortunes.

In February, 1912, Bulgaria and Servia had concluded a treaty of Alliance, to which there was a secret annexe defining the boundaries in Macedonia beyond which neither Power was to claim territory at the expense of the other. Servia, after the victories over Turkey, refused to abide by this understanding, on the ground apparently that the agreement had reference only to territories won by the joint efforts of the Servian and Bulgarian armies; whereas in fact not only had the district in question been won by Servia without Bulgarian assistance, but Servia had also assisted Bulgaria in her Thracian campaign. While Bulgaria appealed to the text of the Treaty and to the fact that the disputed territory was inhabited mainly by Bulgars, Servia relied on the logic of the stricken field. In an evil hour for herself Bulgaria attacked Servia. It was one of the worst blunders that any nation has ever committed. She was completely defeated, and lost not only the territory in dispute but a great deal besides, both to Greece and to Servia. Roumania, who intervened to stop what was to all intents and purposes a civil war, took the opportunity of extending her frontiers at Bulgaria's expense, and Turkey quietly re-occupied Adrianople. But of all these humiliations, the loss of Monastir to Servia was the one that rankled most. It put Servia in the position, so long occupied by Turkey, of oppressor of the Bulgars.

There is some reason to think that in attacking Servia Bulgaria was acting on the advice of Austria, who had most to gain by the enfeeblement of Servia. If that is so, then the refusal of the Entente Powers to do anything to save Bulgaria from the consequences of her folly was the less excusable. Servia could hardly be on terms of close friendship with Austria, by reason of her geographical position; but Bulgaria might. To leave Bulgaria with a grievance so bitter was to give Austrian intrigue an opportunity of making mischief, of which it would not be slow to take advantage.



Map showing the increases of territory gained in the Balkan Wars.

Moreover, the Treaty of London, which the Treaty of Bukharest set aside, was made with the sanction and assistance of the Powers. It is a sound principle that what the Powers had made only the Powers should unmake. The Entente Powers, therefore, had a double reason for restraining the aggrandisement of the other Balkan States at the expense of Bulgaria. Not only would such restraint have been just in itself, and in accordance with the principle of nationality, but it would have been in the permanent interest of the Entente Powers themselves. It is even conceivable that the great plague of this war might never have descended on Europe if the Concert had vindicated its regard for principle by insisting that, however criminal Bulgaria's attack on Servia had been, the Concert could not consent to have its authority flouted by a settlement which, leaving as it did many thousands of Bulgarians under the rule of alien governments, threatened to keep open the Balkan question as a focus of political disease and infection. For their neglect to revise the Treaty of Bukharest in the light of justice, the Entente Powers were to pay a terrible penalty.


PRESSURE ON SERVIA.

When Turkey joined in the war the Allies essayed a task which would have been best done before the Treaty of Bukharest was forced on Bulgaria. But even then, they did not immediately grasp the truth that of all the Balkan Powers Bulgaria was in much the strongest position to be of service to the Allies. Bulgarian diplomacy has the reputation of being excessively grasping, and it was obvious from the first that a very high price would have to be paid for her assistance in the war. The first condition, and the one to which she attached most importance, was the cession of the districts of Macedonia inhabited by Bulgars and under the rule of Servia, in defiance, as Bulgaria believed, of treaty and of justice. That meant that a great deal of pressure must be brought to bear on Servia, but this Russia was certainly in a position to apply. The war, it is true, was not on account of Servia, but she had applied the torch that set Europe ablaze, and without the help of Russia her case would have been quite hopeless from the first. Moreover, she stood to gain a great deal from the victory of the Allies. Bosnia and Herzegovina would certainly be hers, perhaps Croatia too, with a port on the Adriatic. Within ten years Servia might expect to rise from the bottom almost to the top of the second scale of European Powers. It would have been reasonable to ask her to make some sacrifice of territory for advancement so rapid and so great. Some pressure was brought to bear upon her, but it was not nearly enough to accomplish the desired end. The negotiations were through the Russian Minister at Sofia, but some failure left them in the main in the hands of Bulgaria and Servia themselves—an arrangement which contrasts with the action of Germany later in the Italian negotiations. Bulgaria asked for Macedonia up to and including the Monastir and Ochrida districts. Servia refused to yield more than the Radovisto and Ishtip districts, and even these not till the end of the war. That was the position in the middle of November, and further negotiations brought no better results. It soon became plain that, left to themselves, there was no chance of an agreement between Bulgaria and Servia.


ROUMANIA.

Both Roumania and Greece were more reasonable. To Roumania the great bribe could be offered of Transylvania, a portion of Hungary, in which there were 3,000,000 Roumanians. Roumania achieved her national independence in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, in which she gave Russia most valuable assistance. After the war, however, Russia insisted on annexing Bessarabia, in which there were 2,000,000 Roumanians, and, in consequence, Roumania began to lean on Austria. In 1898 Austria concluded with Roumania a military convention, by which Austria, in case of any alteration in the *status quo* in the Balkans, was to march on Salonica and annex a part of Macedonia, while Roumania was to seize the so-called Bulgarian quadrilateral, Silistria-Shumla, Rustchuk-Varna. This convention expired in 1910, but presently the Balkan War and the breakdown of Bulgaria gave Roumania her opportunity of aggrandisement, which she took. To everyone's surprise, Russia not only did not protest, but supported her; and it seemed at the beginning of the war as though Roumania was now in the orbit of Russian diplomacy, and was only waiting a suitable opportunity to throw in her lot with the Allies. In December and January the rumours that Roumania meant to join the Allies were very frequent and circumstantial. As early as the beginning of December, Dr. Take Jonescu, the Roumanian ex-Minster, declared his conviction that Roumanian interests were bound up with the victory of the Allies. "Neutrality no longer suffices. We must act, and act I am convinced we will." It was said that Roumania had settled her differences with Bulgaria, and was satisfied that if she went to war in Transylvania she would not be attacked by her. Just before Christmas Roumania issued a statement that if Austria again made a serious attack on Servia she would be compelled to take the field against her. Throughout January the rumours of intervention gathered body. Roumania obtained a loan of £5,000,000 from the Bank of England; she was known to be buying munitions of all kinds from the United States and elsewhere; she was negotiating with Bulgaria; and it looked as though the Russian advance into Bukovina was expressly planned to fit in with a joint attack on Hungary by Russian, Roumanian, and Servian armies. The probable date of the Roumanian intervention was bandied about. Roumanian ex-Ministers wrote articles and gave interviews which seemed to leave not a shadow of doubt of her intentions. Wrote one of them:—


> "The Roumanian race is widely spread beyond the kingdom. In Austro-Hungary, upon the territories which border Roumania, nearly four million of its members live in the country which was its birthplace when Trajan established there his Roman colonies. Among these Roumanians less than a million and a half strangers—Saxons, Hungarians, and others—live in scattered groups. The best soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian army, active and industrious, the Roumanians of Transylvania have been so oppressed by the Magyars that they look impatiently for union with their blood-brothers, towards whom their alert race conscience directs heir hopes. Both for them and for us national union is a vital necessity. Then only will we be able to make our full contribution to the world's progress. The war whereon Roumania is about to embark is one of right and restitution against the abuses of force and conquest.
>
> "Such being the circumstances, and the necessary aims of Roumanian policy being so determined, it is obvious that the country, to obtain the desired satisfaction, must oin in the war on the side of the Triple Entente. No one is foolish enough to think a nation numbering fewer than eight million persons able to annex without a great sacrifice of life new territories supporting five million and a half inhabitants. Roumanian blood must be spilt in floods to force national union from the world's most terrible crisis. Yet one may rest assured of Roumania's intention."



The 12-inch guns on a French battleship supporting the British Fleet in the Dardanelles.
[*Cribb, Southsea.*



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES.




The Dardanelles bombardment: Waiting on board a British man-of-war while the mine-sweepers clear a fresh part of the channel. [*Sport and General.*

Suddenly, early in February, the tune changed. "The Irredentist agitation," telegraphed *The Times* correspondent at Bukharest on February 3rd, "has subsided for the present. It appears that the Government entertain no intention of breaking neutrality at an early date, though military preparations continue. The British Military Attaché has gone to Sofia, and the Secretary of the British Legation has left on two months' leave." Perhaps the change of front was not so sudden as it appeared. A Liberal Government was in power in Roumania, and the ex-Ministers who were so confident that Roumania was about to intervene were not the best qualified to speak of the Government's policy. The whole truth about Roumanian politics in the winter and spring has not come out, but three causes would seem to have contributed to Roumania's decision not to intervene as soon as was expected. One was the slight set-back to the Russian arms in Galicia and in Bukowina, which made it clear that the acquisition of Transylvania would not be so easy an achievement as was thought. Another cause was the suspicion that arose in Roumania of Russia's intentions with regard to Constantinople. M. Viratela-Bratiano expressed the misgivings of the Government and of Parliament on this question with extreme candour:—

> "The time has come to reawaken the conscience of this interest, unhappily failing in the west. For some time the Western States have seemed not to concern themselves directly with the control established at Constantinople, and, instead, to consider it in the light of a compensation for changes elsewhere. The Straits are no longer the key to a sea where the commerce of seven States finds its ports, but a territory whose fate is discussed just as are the national claims advanced to any other territories. We have no ambition to possess the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles, but demand, in the interests of all the nations which trade in the Black Sea, freedom of passage.
>
> "Joined with Italy, we are given by the strategic situation a great influence on the war, while together with the same country, bound to us by her territorial claims and by her policy in the East and in the Mediterranean, we have national and economic rights which call us to a defensive part of the first importance. We cannot act in the first capacity while permitting the second to be endangered. We cannot join in the settlement of the conflict as simple champions of peace, but must also assist in deciding, for the benefit of Europe, questions which concern us and all the other States of Eastern Europe."

Nor should it be forgotten that though the larger part of unredeemed Roumania was under Hungary, there was a considerable part in Bessarabia of which she believed herself to have been unjustly deprived by Russia.

Yet a third cause was the uncertainty with regard to Bulgaria's intentions. Roumania was prepared to retrocede the territory which she acquired at Bulgaria's expense by the Treaty of Bukharest, but she would hardly be disposed to part with the territory of which she was in occupation before she had occupied the territory in Transylvania which was to compensate her, and she may well have thought that the only security for Bulgaria's action was the satisfaction which Servia refused of her demands in Macedonia. To these causes may be added the powerful commercial interest in Roumania, which was



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES.



The Dardanelles bombardment: Waiting on board a British man-of-war while the mine-sweepers clear a fresh part of the channel. [*Sport and General.*

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strongly pro-German and carried great weight with the Liberal Government. But the most important of all the causes was undoubtedly the fear of Bulgaria. Once again, Bulgaria was the stumbling-block.

GREECE AND INTERVENTION.

Near as Roumania came to intervention on the side of the Allies in the winter, Greece came nearer still. Greece had the good fortune of having for Premier probably the ablest and most forceful man that her modern political life has produced. Born in Crete, M. Venizelos left the island in 1910, because he realised that he could best serve from Athens the cause of its union with Greece. Having accomplished the union which had been the great passion of his life, as Prime Minister of Greece, he began a period of vigorous reform alike in the civil and in the naval and military services, and the results of his energy were seen in the war of 1912, when the Greek army, which the war of 1897 had made a byword of inefficiency, carried itself with distinction. To M. Venizelos it was, more than to anyone else, due that the seeming miracle of bringing about a union of Balkan Powers against Turkey was accomplished. He had the statesman's gift of seeing another point of view than his own, and he was able, temporarily at any rate, to reconcile the racial jealousies of the Balkan peoples and to unite them in pursuit of a common object. He knew, as so few of the leaders of men in the Balkans had ever known, that to insist on all rights may be to jeopardise them, that in business affairs no great advantage is to be had without some sacrifice, and that the whole art of politics is to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, and to achieve what matters most by rejecting what matters less. The diplomacy of M. Venizelos was supple without being crooked. He had historical imagination, and with it an intensely practical genius for getting things done.

In the middle of August, Germany relying on its connection with the Greek Royal House—the Queen of Greece was the sister of the Kaiser—sought the co-operation of Greece, desiring not so much to have the assistance of her army and navy as to prevent her from heading a combination of Balkan Powers against Turkey and so neutralising the effects of Turkey's intervention, which Germany had already determined to bring about. Greece rejected these overtures. Her first anxiety was to secure her position in Epirus, where her claims had been rejected by the Powers in favour of the new State of Albania which they wished to see established. In the third week of October she notified the Powers of her intention to re-occupy Epirus, in order to re-establish order. Germany might have objected, for it would have been very convenient to Austria to have a rebellion in Epirus and Albania directed against the Serbs, and there were rumours of Turkish plots to fit out an expedition in the hope of re-establishing their rule there. But she was too anxious for Greece's goodwill to thwart her in ambitions which she knew to be dear, and Greece accordingly obtained the consent of all the Powers in what was in effect a reversal of their Albanian policy. About the same time, an Italian squadron landed a large "sanitary mission" at Valona, and patrolled the coast of Albania to intercept cargoes of contraband. Greece and Italy were both determined to resist any attempts by Turkey to take advantage of the dissolution of the Concert to re-establish her rule in Albania, or to foment disorder among the Albanian clans. The moment for intervention was wisely chosen, and it was an achievement to secure the consent of Germany and Austria.

M. VENIZELOS AND THE KING.

In December and January the Allies were very busy in framing their case for Greek intervention. With Greece, as with Roumania, Bulgaria was the stumbling block. She was afraid that if the invasion of Servia made progress, Austria might incite Bulgaria to re-occupy the Macedonian provinces. In that case she would be bound to join in the war if only to protect Salonica. The threat of Roumania to intervene if Austria's attacks on Servia became serious relieved some of Greece's anxieties, but it was not till January 11th that M. Venizelos felt himself strong enough to commit Greece to the Allies. Up to then, he had even objected to the comparatively small concessions that Servia was willing to make to Bulgaria in Macedonia, because he was anxious that Bulgarian territory should not intervene between Servia and Greece's possessions in Macedonia. But on January 11th, the British Minister at Athens assured M. Venizelos that if Greece rendered assistance to Servia the Entente Powers would willingly agree to important territorial concessions to Greece in Asia Minor. On the same day, M. Venizelos wrote to the King urging intervention on the side of the Allies. "Greece," he wrote, "is to-day invited to participate in the war, not only in order to accomplish moral obligations but in exchange for compensations which, if realised, would create a great and powerful Greece." He was even willing to cede Kavalla in order that Bulgaria, by acquiring a good port on the Ægean, might have no motive to attack Greece. This proposal to cede Kavalla gave very great offence to the Greeks when news of it came out later, and M. Venizelos' own account of what he had in mind should be quoted.

> "In this letter (to the King) I said that if there was no other way of shielding ourselves against danger from the Bulgarian side, I should not hesitate to recommend the cession in Western Macedonia of an area of 2,000 square kilometres on the following conditions:—
>
> "1. That, in return for this cession in Macedonia, Greece should be ceded an area of 1,000 square kilometres in the Doiran-Ghevgheli district, which would close the gap existing to-day on our Northern Macedonian frontiers, to which we agreed when it was a question of an allied nation like the Servians, but could not tolerate if the Servians were replaced by the Bulgarians.
>
> "2. That Bulgaria should abandon her neutrality at the same time as Greece, as her ally and the ally of the Servians.
>
> "3. That the cession take place only after the end of the war, and if as a consequence of the war the sovereignty of Greece was assured in the western part of Asia Minor, in the manner detailed in my letter, over an area of about 140,000 square kilometres.
>
> "4. That Greece and Bulgaria should mutually agree to purchase the possessions of their nationals in the respective territories on a valuation made by an international commission."

In fact, no negotiations seem to have been opened with Bulgaria for the cession of Kavalla on these conditions. The reason given by M. Venizelos was that the news of a loan placed by Bulgaria with German banks convinced him that all effort towards common action would be vain, but that can hardly have been the true reason, for the loan contract was in fact made in July before the war, and it had previously been offered to English and French bankers, but declined. The true reason, no doubt, was that M. Venizelos saw that public opinion in Greece would not support him in the cession of Kavalla. But though he abandoned, temporarily at all events, his project for bringing in Bulgaria, he was prepared to enter the war even

without guarantees on her side. "Bulgaria," he said afterwards, "would not have dared to attack Greece had Greece decided to move, because in the event of the victory of the Triple Entente she would have risked losing even what she now possesses."

THE DARDANELLES.

It is necessary now to return to England to take note of a decision which was to have tremendous consequences. The motive of the Allies in their earlier attempts to induce the Balkan Powers to make common cause with them was defence rather than offence. They were anxious to make so much trouble for Turkey in Europe that she would have no energy or resources to spare for attacks in the Caucasus or on Egypt; they —or at any rate the Western Allies—had no thought of themselves taking aggressive operations in Turkey. Gradually, however, this view changed, and for several reasons. The closing of Archangel by ice, of the Baltic by Germany, and of the Black Sea by Turkey left Russia without a single port of her own through which she could obtain the supplies of munitions of war or export her own agricultural produce. She was absolutely dependent on the favour of Japan for what she could import through Port Arthur, and from Port Arthur to European Russia there was but a single line of railway. In the Japanese war, it had been regarded as a wonderful feat that she was able to supply an army of 500,000 men by a single line of railway; and now she had an army of five or six times that size in the field. The closing of the Dardanelles was a serious embarrassment to Russian provinces, and also to her power to equip and maintain in the field her millions. Further, these arguments for the opening of the Black Sea ports were reinforced by those of strategy. There seemed little hope of Russia's being able to force her way into East Prussia or through Posen, but against Austria the outlook was much more hopeful. A campaign against Hungary not only promised to cut off from Austria and Germany a very important source of food supply, but it would open up new lines of attack against Germany from the south. Germany was already embarrassed by having to fight on two fronts. Could not a third front be created? Did not the whole shape of the frontiers suggest a combined movement against Hungary between Russian troops pouring over the Carpathians from Galicia, Roumanian troops entering Transylvania, with the Servian armies on their left? These ideas governed the strategy of the Allies from the beginning of the New Year. Germany had bastions at her vulnerable points, Belgium in front of Westphalia, Cracow and Austria in front of Silesia, and Turkey in front of Hungary. Might not the Allies find the means of turning these defences by mobilising the old hatred of Turkey among the Balkan States?

Amongst others who were fascinated by this prospect of making war against Germany on a third front was Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty. The forcing of the Dardanelles and the occupation of Constantinople appealed with a particular attraction to a statesman of his temperament. It would be the most dramatic thing that the British navy had done since the Battle of the Nile, a splendidly eloquent vindication of the reality of our sea power that would echo down history for generations. The slow methods of diplomacy wearied him as they wearied others. There was no persuasiveness like that of accomplished fact, especially of such a fact as the forcing of the Dardanelles, or even a successful beginning of the operation. Would not all the Balkan Powers, now hesitating because they were not sure which was the winning side, come tumbling over each other in their eagerness to join the side which could force the Dardanelles?

The arguments on the other side were strong but colder. It was urged (by Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, amongst others) that the forcing of the Dardanelles was not a naval operation, that ships were not to be trusted alone against land fortifications in waters infested with mines, and that against fortresses of such tremendous natural strength as those of the Dardanelles the co-operation of an army was necessary. But could we spare the men for two such enterprises as the defence of Flanders and the forcing of the Dardanelles? Was not Flanders, after all, the main field of military operations? And even if the men could be found for the Dardanelles, would not the operations there, if prolonged—and who could fix a term?—weaken us in Flanders when the time came for us to strike there? Was it not playing the game of Germany to engage in a struggle with the famous army of Turkey, which if only we did not attack could do us no hurt? To which the advocates of action in the Dardanelles may be supposed to have replied as follows: Is it so certain that modern ships are powerless against land fortifications? Would not the experience of Antwerp and Namur seem to show that the strength of these fixed fortifications has been exaggerated? Further, if operations on land should turn out to be necessary, might not Greece supply the army? And was it to be supposed that any Balkan Power would stand idly by while the Dardanelles were forced and Constantinople occupied? Even if the fleet alone could not force the Narrows, it was sufficient for it to win some startling success at the entrance to bring the Balkan armies into the field. We might never persuade them by words; deeds would be more eloquent. Finally, if we did not succeed in bringing them in and had, after all, to use our own troops, was there any real rivalry between land operations in Flanders and in the Gallipoli Peninsula? The direct frontal attack on the German positions in Flanders seemed unpromising enough; might not a way round be found through Constantinople, a way easier than through La Bassée and Lille, and one which would gather up new sources of strength as it advanced?

THE ATTACK ORDERED.

These arguments prevailed with the British Cabinet, and an attack on the Dardanelles forts was ordered. The first attack was delivered on February 18th. The narrative of the operations must be deferred to a later chapter, when it can be given with its sequel; here it is sufficient to quote the Admiralty's account of the opening of the attack:—

> "Yesterday morning at eight o'clock a British fleet of battleships and battle-cruisers, accompanied by flotillas and aided by a strong French squadron, the whole under the command of Vice-Admiral Sackville H. Carden, began an attack upon the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles.
>
> "The forts at Cape Helles and Kum Kale were bombarded with deliberate long-range fire. Considerable effect was produced on two of the forts. Two others were frequently hit, but being open earthworks it was difficult to estimate the damage. The forts, being outranged, were not able to reply to the fire.
>
> "At 2-45 p.m. a portion of the battleship force was ordered to close and engage the forts at closer range with secondary

armament. The forts on both sides of the entrance then opened fire, and were engaged at moderate ranges by the *Vengeance*, *Cornwallis*, *Triumph*, *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, and *Bouvet*, supported by the *Inflexible* and *Agamemnon* at long range.

"The forts on the European side were apparently silenced. One fort on the Asiatic side was still firing when the operation was suspended owing to failing light.

"No ships of the Allied fleet were hit.

"The action has been renewed this morning after aerial reconnaissance.

"His Majesty's aeroplane ship *Ark Royal* is in attendance, with a number of seaplanes and aeroplanes of the naval wing."

If it was expected that the beginning of the attack on the Dardanelles forts would resolve all the doubts of the Balkan States, the hope was bitterly disappointed. When the operations began, the Allies "semi-officially" inquired whether Greece was disposed to intervene. The Crown Council was then summoned, and M. Venizelos proposed that 50,000 men should be sent to aid the Allies against Turkey, and that Greece should receive the vilayet of Smyrna in exchange. The General Staff objected, that to use so many would endanger the safety of Salonica, and M. Venizelos then reduced his proposal to the despatch of a small division of 15,000 men.

"The Council then asked whether M. Venizelos would guarantee the safety of the territory received in compensation in Asia Minor, and M. Venizelos in reply pointed to the fact that in recent times he had twice unconditionally engaged the whole forces of the kingdom and had obtained more than he had expected by them. The Council pointed to the impossibility of defending Smyrna against the Turks. But the ex-Premier showed that if the Allies were victorious Greece would be the neighbour of Russia and Italy in Asia Minor, and that these three Powers could assist each other against the Turks. M. Venizelos further affirmed that Germany would not wrest the mastery of the seas from Great Britain.*

"The Council rejected these reasons on the ground of the possibility of an invasion of Greece."


The decisive argument against M. Venizelos was that Bulgaria might attack Greece when she was engaged, and that Greece was in any case bound to go to the help of Servia should the Austrians threaten to break through her defences. Other things told against him—the influence of the Court, and (as in the case of Roumania also) suspicion of what Russia might do. Indeed, according to *Nea Hemera*, an Athens newspaper, which seems to have been in touch with the views of the Court, the Greek preparations for war brought from Petrograd "a categorical pronouncement that the entry of Greek troops into Constantinople would not be tolerated"—a statement, however, for which no confirmation has yet appeared.

On March 6th, M. Venizelos announced in the Chamber that as the King did not approve the policy of the Government the Cabinet had resigned.

* M. Venizelos in the *Corriere della Sera*, March 16.



The attack on the Dardanelles: Marines going ashore to take up guard duty. [*Central News.*



A financial conference of the Allies: Left, M. Bark; centre, M. Ribot; and right, Mr. Lloyd George, Ministers of Finance in Russia, France, and Britain respectively, in conference in Paris. [*Central News.*

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE FINANCE OF THE WAR.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF AUGUST LAST—THE COST OF THE WAR IN THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN THE FIRST YEAR—HOW THE COST IS BEING DEFRAYED—ESTIMATES OF THE COST SHOULD THE WAR BE PROLONGED INTO A THIRD YEAR—STATE FINANCE IN GERMANY.


THE outbreak of the war was accompanied by a financial crisis of the first magnitude in all the belligerent countries and in many countries in intimate relation with them. The provisional measures of the British Government at the beginning of the war have already been explained (Vol. I., Chapter VI.), but the policy in other countries was in many respects different, and it is interesting to take note of what they did.

In Germany there was no financial moratorium, but the Courts were given powers similar to those given to the British Courts (by the Courts Emergency Powers Act) to relieve in proper cases, and the Chambers of Commerce and other business corporations qualified the rigour of the law. The Germans had carefully thought out and prepared in advance the financial measures which would be necessitated by the outbreak of war. Ever since the Agadir crisis the gold reserve of the Reichsbank had been expanded. The average in 1911 was less than 41½ millions; in 1912 it had risen to 44 millions; in January, 1913, to 45 millions; in January, 1914, to 60 millions; on the eve of war it was 68 millions. After the Austrian declaration of war on Servia there was a run, but when Germany went to war it was quickly checked by a suspension of cash payments. The Government determined to accumulate all the gold in the country in the Reichsbank by substituting paper for gold coin, and by encouraging private citizens to bring to the Reichsbank gold of all kinds. These measures, coupled with the transfer of the war treasure at Spandau, were highly successful. In January, 1915, the Reichsbank held 106 millions in gold; in March, rather under 115 millions. As the total amount of gold in Germany was estimated in 1913 at £150,000,000, this was a very considerable achievement.

On this basis of gold a vastly increased note issue was made by the Reichsbank. To this must be added the notes put into circulation by the Treasury, and through the war loan banks, which were authorised to lend up to 75 millions on the security of stocks and commodities,



The Bank of France, Paris. [E.N.A.



The Bourse, Paris. [E.N.A.

These banks by the end of December had given loans to the amount of £65,350,000, but six weeks later this amount had fallen by one-half. The flood of paper money far exceeded the currency needs of Germany, and, as it was inconvertible, the paper mark depreciated some 12 per cent.

In Austria-Hungary very similar devices were adopted for the extension of paper currency and for the relief of the banks to those adopted in Germany. The gold reserve of the Austro-Hungarian Bank stood at some 50 millions on the outbreak of war, but it does not appear that it was increased. The position of the financial institutions here had been weakened by a prolonged commercial depression.

The Bank of France, with a gold reserve of over 165 millions (as well as a silver reserve of 25 millions), was in a strong position, but other French banks were unfortunately placed. They had tied up a good part of their deposits in unliquid investments of not too sound a character, and immediately before the war they and their clients had been indulging in a speculation in State funds. On the 7th of July a loan of 32 millions had been issued by the Government to meet the deficit on the year's Budget, and as the terms were very favourable, and the first instalments asked small, it was over-subscribed forty times for speculative purposes. As it happened, one of the instalments was due on 31st July, in the height of the war crisis.

All these circumstances made for panic. As early as the 25th of July a run on the banks began. On the 1st of August a moratorium was proclaimed, which lasted till March 1st, 1915. The banks exercised their rights in the most rigorous fashion, and this was the subject of bitter complaint. On August 29th, a decree compelled the banks to pay out of their deposits up to £10, and 5 per cent of sums above. Successive decrees raised these figures to £40 and 50 per cent and 75 per cent. From 1st January, 1915, the banks waived entirely their rights under the moratorium. The Bank of France behaved as well as the Joint Stock Banks behaved ill. It issued notes to the enormous amount of 450 millions for the relief of the market and the State, and yet maintained them at par. But as a result of these transactions the proportion of gold reserve to liabilities fell from 61·9 per cent to 36 per cent, and in order to finance foreign war purchases the gold reserve was somewhat lowered.

On the outbreak of war the Russian State Bank had in Russia gold reserves amounting to 160 millions, and gold credits abroad amounting to another 12 millions. Its notes were made inconvertible, and its power to issue such notes was greatly increased. These measures enabled it to retain its gold and finance the Government's war expenditure for some months, but they have also heavily depreciated the paper rouble. From the beginning of the war until March 21st, the Bank issued 163 millions in notes, and it can now issue up to a maximum of 444 millions.

THE FOREIGN EXCHANGES.

England is the greatest of all creditor nations, and when the apprehension of war became very strong the English banks called in very sharply the money due from abroad. At this time the only important country whose exchange with England was favourable to it was France. There was thus, therefore, an increased demand for bills in London to meet the demands of the English banks. Gold at the same time could not be shipped owing to fear as to its safety. Meanwhile, the banks refused to rediscount bills or issue new bills. As a result, the foreign exchanges went to pieces. But so long as the exchanges were in chaos and the bill-discounting business was crippled, foreign trade came almost to a standstill. The Government therefore intervened, as has already been stated (Vol. I., page 57). It guaranteed the Bank of England against loss in discounting approved pre-moratorium bills, the amount of which in existence was some 350 millions sterling. This immobilised existing bills, but the banks were still refusing to finance new bills. On September 5th the Bank of England undertook to advance the money to the acceptors of pre-moratorium bills, so as to enable them to meet them.

In France the exchanges were favourable until well on into the war, when the vast war purchases in the United States converted them. In Russia the impossibility of exporting the harvest, coupled with the need of making considerable imports and the excess of inconvertible paper currency, lowered the value of the rouble in exchange by nearly one-third. The efforts of France and England to assist her Ally have not appreciably relieved this situation. The rate of exchange was against Germany at the opening of the war, and the evidence is all against the suggestion that just previous to the war, and in preparation for it, the Germans were drawing in gold heavily. The excess of inconvertible paper currency, coupled with an unfavourable trade balance, kept the exchange against Germany; but the very strictness of the naval blockade, by forcing Germany back on her own resources, prevented the depreciation becoming as high as it otherwise would have been.

THE STOCK EXCHANGES.

Stock Exchange transactions are largely financed by short-term loans from the banks. The stockbroker deposits collateral security with the bank, and he is bound to increase the amount of this security as the market price falls. It is estimated that at the end of July the banks had advanced 80 millions in this fashion to stockbrokers, and some 250 millions to private customers. Prices were falling rapidly, and to make the position still more difficult the Stock Exchange could not hope to get payment from many of its foreign and domestic clients. If the Stock Exchange had been kept open and the banks had enforced their rights there would have been a cataclysmic decline in values, accompanied by innumerable bankruptcies. The Stock Exchange was therefore closed on July 31st, and the moratorium gave temporary relief; but it was necessary to enable the Stock Exchange to re-open, and also to ease the position of the banks. The Stock Exchange was opened on January 4th, under strict currency control, with minimum prices and regulations to prevent the sale of securities held in enemy countries; and the Bank of England (under Government guarantee) undertook to advance to lenders 60 per cent of the value of securities held against Stock Exchange loans at 1 per cent above Bank rate, with a minimum of 5 per cent, and the Bank undertook not to press for payment until twelve months after peace.

The Bourse at Paris was closed under circumstances similar to those in London, but the amount involved in committments was estimated at only 22 millions, and the constitution of the Bourse made it easier to handle. The Bank of France advanced 40 per cent of the value of the shares, and the Bourse was opened under restrictions on December 7th.

It is not known precisely how the crisis on the Stock Exchange was dealt with in Austria and Germany, but



The Bourse, Petrograd. [*E.N.A.*



The Imperial Bank, Moscow. [*E.N.A.*

in both cases there was in effect a moratorium and the fixing of minimum prices, and the Loan Banks lent freely on securities. The general moratorium was not to come to an end in Austria before August, 1915.

COMMERCE AND EMPLOYMENT.

Commerce was affected by the mobilisation, the difficulty of securing payment from abroad, the restriction of bank credit, and the collapse of the exchanges. As a result, unemployment in England rose in August to 7·1 per cent. The Government formed a committee representing the Treasury, the Bank of England, the Joint Stock Banks, and the Association of Chambers of Commerce, which was empowered to assist exporters. As a matter of fact the claims made upon it turned out to be small, and by February less than £900,000 had been advanced. The vast recruiting and the enormous war orders conspired to give speedy relief to the industrial market, and by September unemployment had fallen to 5·9 per cent, by November to 2·9 per cent, by February, 1915, to 1·9 per cent, and by April to 1·2 per cent.

In France the mobilisation was so extensive that most of the industry of the country was temporarily crippled. The occupation by the enemy of some of the chief industrial districts of France added to the economic distress, but in France, too, there has been a notable recovery.

In Russia the closing of the western frontier, the occupation by the enemy of the Polish provinces, and the restriction of transport crippled Russian export and domestic trade, and deranged considerably the industrial life. The moratorium, in one form or other, was extended to the end of March, 1915, and the State Bank lent much assistance to industry; but economic life in Russia has not yet returned to the normal.

In Germany the commercial crisis, owing to the more-extensive mobilisation and the blockade, was much more intense than in England. In August unemployment reached 22·7 per cent. From that point, however, it steadily declined, and by November had fallen to 8·2 per cent, and by April to 2·9 per cent. Conditions there are to-day similar to what they are in England—a factitious individual prosperity, side by side with an unprecedented outpouring of the resources of the State.

The damage done by a war to the material resources of a nation may be classified under the following heads:—

(1) Reduction of its liquid assets—stores, material, live stock, coin, bullion, &c.—consumed and not replaced.
(2) Sale of foreign investments and other assets realised abroad, the proceeds of which have been spent.
(3) Foreign indebtedness increased.
(4) Depreciation of the national plant and equipment through insufficient maintenance.
(5) Damage to property by warlike operations.
(6) Loss of labour force as a result of the war.

Much of this loss does not appear in the Budget of the Government, and it cannot be estimated except very roughly. In what follows, only that part of the cost which appears in the Budget of the Government will be discussed, but it should never be forgotten that in addition to this there is a margin of loss which varies from country to country, but is in all considerable.

THE MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS IN PARIS.

Early in the war it was realised by the Allies that there must be financial co-operation as well as military co-operation between them. All the Allies were compelled to make vast purchases abroad of war munitions, and, in addition to this, some of them could not finance the war from their own resources. This was clearly the case with Belgium and Servia. Russia has always been a borrowing country, and she was further hampered by the crippling of her export trade. France, though a very rich country, found her chief industrial areas in enemy occupation. It was inevitable that the chief financial burden should rest on this country. A conference was held in Paris in February between the Finance Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia. Russia seems to have proposed a joint war loan of the three Powers. This was whittled down to a joint loan for assisting Servia and Belgium; but even in this form the scheme has been abandoned because of the grave financial objections to it. Great Britain, however, undertook to finance the foreign purchases of all the Allies. Great Britain, by February, had advanced £40,000,000 to Russia for foreign purchases in return for the transfer of £8,000,000 in gold from Petrograd to London. France and Great Britain also undertook to put on the French and British markets loans of £50,000,000, and to increase that sum when necessary. France and Russia also undertook to replenish the gold reserve of the Bank of England should it fall below a certain amount, while the British money market was opened to French Treasury notes. It is understood that when Mr. McKenna conferred with the Italian Finance Minister at Nice in June, similar arrangements were made with that country. Very little is known of the real nature of these financial arrangements between the Allies—Mr. Lloyd George's account leaves many dark places unilluminated—but they have set this country a serious problem. It was expected that the Dardanelles expedition would quickly open the markets of the world to Russia, but that expectation was disappointed. The financing of the foreign purchases of the Allies, too, was heavily complicated, because, side by side with these importations, the normal means for paying them had contracted. These normal means are exports, services (freights, insurance, &c.), and the transfer of securities. Mr. Lloyd George, on May 4th, estimated the excess of imports into this country over exports during 1915-16 (exclusive of the purchases of our own and the Allied Governments abroad) at £448,000,000, and the total balance against us, inclusive of such purchases, at between £700,000,000 and £800,000,000. He put investments, freights, insurances, and other services which we render foreign countries, at the peace figure of £350,000,000, which is thought to be too favourable. That left a sum of £400,000,000 still to be found. It is highly improbable that the American market can absorb British or Allied owned securities to that full amount in a year. It is also clear that the difference cannot be met by exporting gold, for—apart from the fact that the exports of gold from this country during the war has been very small—there can be no question of draining so immense a quantity of gold away. The only course which remains is to obtain credits in foreign countries, chiefly the United States.

BRITISH WAR FINANCE.

In the eight war months (August to March 31st) of the financial year 1914-15 the Government obtained three votes of credit—August 6th, £100,000,000; November 15th, £225,000,000; March, £37,000,000—amounting to £362,000,000. To this must be added £60,000,000—two-thirds the normal peace expenditure on the Army and Navy. All this was exhausted except £5,000,000, so that



The Russian Minister of Finance in England: M. Bark on his way to the House of Commons, accompanied by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill. [*L.N.A.*

in the 240 war days of the 1914-15 financial year the total war expenditure was £417,000,000. This is an average of 1·7 millions a day. For the financial year 1915-16 no attempt was made to distinguish between normal expenditure on Army and Navy and abnormal war expenditure. On March 1st Parliament voted a credit for the financial year 1915-16 of £250,000,000, which was estimated to last 100 days. On June 15th Mr. Asquith, in asking for another vote of £250,000,000, explained that this estimate was rather too optimistic. In the 73 days from April 1st to June 12th the total war expenditure was £194,000,000, constituted as follows:—

Army	£121,000,000
Navy	36,000,000
Loans to Foreign and Colonial Governments	26,000,000
Foodstuffs	10,000,000
Other Services	1,000,000

This is an average of £2,660,000 a day. There was still in hand on June 12th £56,000,000, enough to last till the end of June. From July Mr. Asquith estimated the rate of expenditure at not less than £3,000,000 a day, and possibly more, of which £2,250,000 would be taken by the Army. The June vote of credit, therefore, could hardly carry the country on beyond the middle of September. From that date onward the rate of expenditure might rise to £3,500,000 a day during the third quarter of the financial year 1915-16, and possibly to £4,000,000 a day during the fourth quarter. On these assumptions the war expenditure during 1915-16 threatened in the spring of 1915 to be as follows:—

April 1st to June 30th	£250,000,000
July 1st to September 15th	250,000,000
September 15th to December 31st (say)	320,000,000
January 1st to March 31st (say)	360,000,000
Total	£1,180,000,000

To this (to obtain the total Government expenditure during the year) must be added the non-war expenditure, £158,000,000. Grand total, £1,338,000,000.

IF THE WAR LASTS INTO THE THIRD YEAR.

Mr. Lloyd George's estimate in May, based upon a lower rate of expenditure than experience has borne out, was £1,136,000,000; actually it seemed more likely to be £1,300,000,000. We may, therefore, estimate the *war* expenditure of this country, should the war last till March 31st, 1916, thus:—

August, 1914—March 31st, 1915	£417,000,000
Financial Year, 1915-16	1,180,000,000

Should it last another year after that—and some have talked of a three years' war—a further sum of £1,460,000,000 would have to be added; and in addition there is the peace expenditure, amounting for this period to, say, £400,000,000. That would make, in round numbers, a grand total of national expenditure during the war of £3,450,000,000.

It should be added that part of this expenditure is loans and payment for foodstuffs, and may be expected ultimately to return; but against this must be set the fact that after the war, in the words of Mr. Lloyd George, "There will be months of expenditure almost as heavy as the expenditure of the war whilst affairs are being wound up. The three or four months after the war may very well be more expensive to the Exchequer than the three or four months before the end of the war." The estimate here made—which, be it remembered, is an estimate only of *Government expenditure*, not of *total national loss*—must be considered as an under-estimate rather than an over-estimate. Nor has account been taken of the capitalised value of pensions and allowances, nor of the liability thrown upon the Government by its guarantees to commerce and finance. (Mr. Lloyd George estimates this last item at less than a week's cost of the war.) These two items together can hardly be less than £330,000,000, and they bring the cost of a war—apart from peace expenditure—lasting till April 1st, 1917, to over £3,400,000,000.

TAXATION AND LOAN.

If the national revenue were to remain in the condition at the time when Mr. Lloyd George made his Budget speech (May 4th, 1914), then there would be raised by taxation, &c.:—

August, 1914, to April 1st, 1915..	£160,000,000
April 1st, 1915 to April 1st, 1917..	554,000,000
Total.....	£714,000,000

This would leave £2,966,000,000 added to the National Debt, which, at 5 per cent for interest and sinking fund, would mean an annual charge of £148,000,000—a sum equal to the total State revenue of the country several years ago.

That, of course, is assuming that no extra war taxation were imposed. The practice in previous British wars has been to raise two-sevenths of the cost by taxation and the remaining five-sevenths by means of loans. This would mean an addition to the National Debt of £2,450,000,000, at an annual charge of £122,500,000. At the beginning of the war the National Debt stood at £708,000,000, and was an annual charge of £29,250,000. At the end of the war it would stand at £3,158,000,000, and be an annual charge of nearly £152,000,000. Up to June, 1915, the only additional war taxation which has been imposed was put on in November, 1914, by Mr. Lloyd George. The war taxes were a doubled super-tax and income tax, charged on only one-third the income in 1914-15, making a tax of 1s. 8d. for the year 1914-15, and 2s. 6d. for 1915-16 on unearned incomes, and 1s. and 1s. 6d. on earned incomes; 17s. 3d. on the barrel of beer and 3d. per lb. on tea. Mr. Lloyd George estimated the increased yield for 1914-15 and 1915-16 thus:—

	1914-15.	1915-16.
Income Tax	£11,000,000	£38,750,000
Super Tax	1,500,000	6,000,000
Beer Duty	2,500,000	17,600,000
Tea	950,000	3,200,000
	15,950,000	65,550,000
Less License Duty Concession	450,000	650,000
Total	£15,500,000	£65,000,000

The actual yield in 1914-15 of income tax and super-tax exceeded the estimate by £8,000,000, and the excess from other sources was also considerable.

It was estimated previously that the expenditure of the Government for 1915-16 would be some £1,300,000,000, and in 1916, if the war should last so long, some £1,600,000,000. From what sources can this sum be drawn? It can be drawn either from the national income or from the national capital, or by raising loans abroad. The national income of Great Britain consists of its current production of wealth in the form of usable or saleable articles; its earnings from other nations for services rendered; its revenue from foreign investments. The total is estimated at £2,400,000,000. Whether that total can be maintained when millions of workers are withdrawn from production may be doubted. The national capital consists of the whole mass of accumulated wealth, and includes fixed assets, such as land, buildings, machinery, railways, roads; live stock and stocks of raw material and manufactured goods, together with articles of art and luxury; gold and silver, coin and bullion; debts owed by foreign nations. The total capital of Great Britain is estimated at from £13,000,000,000 to £17,000,000,000. It is obvious that whereas a part of this capital could be consumed, the major part could be rendered liquid only by selling it to foreigners. Inasmuch as the United States is the only wealthy nation not at war, there is only a small margin which can thus be realised. The same difficulty arises with regard to foreign loans. The only country in which foreign loans could be placed is the United States, and that is not a big market. Of the £1,300,000,000 which the country must raise in 1915-16, perhaps £250,000,000 could be obtained by the sale of securities abroad. The remainder, amounting to over £1,000,000,000, will have to be taken out of its own resources, either the national income, or such part of the national capital as can be consumed. From the point of view of the Government the problem is to raise in the year over £1,000,000,000 over and above the £270,000,000 it estimates to raise from ordinary sources of revenue. For practical purposes the possibility of raising any appreciable part of this by means of a foreign loan may be neglected, although the Government will doubtless survey the ground.

If we set the ordinary tax revenue of the Government (£270,000,000) off against those capital resources which can be liquidated in the course of the year by selling securities abroad and the like, then the Government deficit of over £1,000,000,000 will have to be made good out of the national income, which cannot be more than £2,400,000,000, and may be no more than £2,000,000,000. In other words, the deficit can be met only by taking on the average something well over one-third and near to one-half of the income of every person in this country. Whether it be taken in the form of loan or in the form of tax makes no difference. The only source from which it can come must be the national income.

It has been calculated that at its severest the war taxation during the Napoleonic wars rose to two-sevenths of the national income. To raise the whole £1,300,000,000 needed during the year 1915-16 out of income by means of taxation would be to take from 13/24ths to 13/20ths of the national income, and in the year 1916-17 it would be 16/24ths to 16/20ths. Taxation on such a scale is impossible. On the other hand, to put £1,000,000,000 of war loan on the market in one year, with the prospect of an even larger amount in the following year, would be a loan operation beyond all precedent. Doubtless part of

the money needed will be raised by new taxation and part by loan. If the traditional proportion of two-sevenths taxation and five-sevenths loan were observed, the amount to be raised in 1915-16 would still be about £900,000,000. Some part of last year's loan of £325,000,000 is available to meet this, but the amount still to be raised would be so great that it would make a severe demand on the patriotism and self-sacrifice of the nation. In any case, whether the Government resorts to loan or tax, or a combination of loan or tax, the money needed can be obtained only by a drastic reduction of the amount of the nation's income devoted to private purposes. Money will not be available for repairs and replacements, so that there will be a heavy depreciation of the national plant; private expenditure will have to be cut down to bare necessaries; every possible new labour force for increasing the national income must be called up. While the Government is faced with the gravest financial problem in the history of this country, there is, owing to war orders, among the people a factitious appearance of prosperity which makes for extravagance instead of thrift.

Having stated the nature of the financial problem, we may now consider what steps were taken by the British Government up to the beginning of June to deal with it. The measures adopted have been taxation, the issue of a loan, the issue of paper money (in the form of Treasury notes), the issue of Treasury bonds, advances from the Bank of England, and Exchequer bonds. The new taxation has already been described. In November a War Loan of a nominal value of £350,000,000 was issued and oversubscribed. It was a 3½ per cent security, redeemable in March 1928, and issued at 95. The Government reserved the right to redeem after March 1st, 1925. The Bank of England undertook to lead in the War Loan at the issue price at 1 per cent under Bank rate for three years. It is the Government's intention to keep gold for every Treasury note issued, but the amount of notes in circulation still exceeds by over £10,000,000 the amount of gold in reserve. The difference is really a loan free of interest. As these notes are convertible on demand into gold, and as there is no evidence of a superfluity of currency, there is no reason to suppose that this transaction has had the disadvantage of sending prices up. The amount of the advances from the Bank of England to the Government—advances which in June the Government took power to pay off—has not been published. The amount of Exchequer bonds issued was £50,000,000 at 3⅝ per cent. Treasury bills to the amount of £72,500,000 were sold by public tender at rates varying from 3¾ per cent to 1⅝ per cent. The Treasury also adopted, in April, the new practice of selling Treasury Bills for three, six, nine, and twelve months at rates fixed each morning by the Bank, and by the middle of May £80,000,000 were disposed of in this way.

THE FRENCH WAR BUDGET.

On June 3rd M. Ribot, the French Finance Minister, estimated the ordinary expenditure on the war for the first fourteen months at nearly £884,000,000, but he explained that a large supplementary estimate would be necessary. On that basis the expenditure for a war of 32 months would be about £2,600,000,000. The difficulty of financing was accentuated by the fact that the £32,000,000 loan of July, 1914, was still under liquidation. On September 11th arrangements were made through the Bank of France to assist the subscribers to meet their liabilities. For war purposes it was felt impracticable at that stage to raise a public loan, and the burden of providing the sinews of war was assumed by the Bank of France. Under an agreement made in 1911 the Bank had undertaken to assist the Government in loan to the extent of £144,000,000. By an agreement made on September 21st, 1914, this was increased to £240,000,000. A later agreement increased the maximum to £360,000,000. In the middle of June the Bank's advances to the Government amounted to £236,000,000. M. Ribot also began to issue National Defence Bonds for three, six, or twelve months at 5 per cent, in sums of 100, 500 and 1,000 francs. The three-months bonds are exchangeable for bank notes, and on the others the Bank will lend readily. In December the interest was reduced to 4 per cent on the three-months bonds. In May M. Ribot was authorised to raise £240,000,000 in this way. These issues have been readily taken up, and have eased the strain on the bank. Great Britain also advanced £60,000,000 on French Treasury notes, redeemable a year after peace, in return for the transfer to London of £20,000,000 in gold. Relatively small amounts of French Treasury notes have also been placed in the United States.

In April, 1915, the cost of the war was £60,000,000, and was rapidly increasing. Mr. Lloyd George estimated French war expenditure at from 100 to 150 millions a year less than our own. To this must be added the peace expenditure, which in 1914 was £140,000,000. The total sum which France would have to provide in a war lasting till April 1st, 1917, would be at least £3,000,000,000. This takes no account of the great sums which are provided by the Communes. In the financial year 1915-16 the expenditure would probably be not less than between 900 and 1,000 millions, and might rise much higher. For some years the French Budget has had to be balanced by loans.

The capital value of France's wealth was estimated in 1913 at £11,400,000,000, and the wealth per head (£290) was greater than for any other people. We may plausibly guess the annual income at one-seventh the capital value, or £1,600,000,000. How far these figures have been affected by the occupation of much territory by the enemy, and by the mobilisation of so large a portion of the labouring population, it is difficult to say. Clearly, however, France will have to rely for the financing of the war much more on her capital accumulations and much less on her income than we. There is no people so thrifty as the French, and among no people is wealth so evenly distributed. It follows that the margin for saving for war purposes is very large.

THE RUSSIAN BUDGET.

Russia's war expenditure is probably about as high as that of France. The restriction of exports and the prohibition of the sale of vodka have complicated the financial problem. It is estimated that the ordinary revenue of 1915 will be some 400 million roubles less than for 1914, after allowing for the new taxation. The new taxation includes something like a 30 per cent all-round increase on the tariff, an additional tax on real estate (6 per cent to 8 per cent), inhabited house duty (50 per cent), merchant certificates, commercial undertakings, tobacco, beer, spirits, sugar, petroleum, matches, and practically every article of consumption, as well as on transportation insurance, &c. These new taxes should produce between 60 and 70 millions sterling. The Russian Government has also issued two internal loans, one for £50,000,000 and one for £100,000,000; obtained credits in England and France to the amount of £50,000,000,

put £10,000,000 of Treasury notes on the English and £5,000,000 on the American markets, and issued bank notes to the amount of £170,000,000.

GERMANY.

The German Government, unlike the British and French Governments, has thrown very little light on the cost of the war, and we are left to speculation. As Germany has to finance Austria to some extent, and Turkey very largely; as she is conducting a war on both fronts, and has a very large army with the colours and a large fleet fully mobilised, it is improbable that the war is costing her less than Great Britain, and she is doubtless spending not less than three millions a day, and perhaps much more. Her total expenditure, war and peace, for 1915-16 is hardly likely to be less than £1,400,000,000, and her total expenditure, war and peace, in a war of 32 months is not likely to be less than £4,000,000,000. She is able to requisition on occupied territory, and this may help her to keep her war expenditure down to the British level and give her a large taxable area.

The capital wealth of the German nation may be estimated at £15,000,000,000, and the national income at £2,000,000,000. It will be noticed that the national income of Germany is £400,000,000 less than that of England, although the population of Germany is some 22 or 23 millions greater. It is also probable that the war has reduced the German national income much more than the British. The shipping trade is cut off; the profits from foreign trade are heavily reduced; and there is a huge diversion of labour. It may be that the employment of women has helped to correct the reduction in production, but in April unemployment among trade unionists was still rather worse than with us last December. One may guess that Germany's national income during the current year is likely to be nearer £1,750,000,000 than £2,000,000,000, and the Government expenditure may well swallow up more than one-half of this. Inasmuch as the German Government will be taking at least as much out of a smaller national income, which is divided among a larger population, it follows that the financial pressure upon Germany will be far severer than upon us, and the depreciation of the national equipment much greater. On the other hand, the German Government and the German people have been much quicker to realise what is demanded of them, and to practise economy.

In one respect the problem before the German Government is simpler than with us. The crippling of Germany's foreign trade relieves it of the difficult obligation to finance foreign purchases and foreign imports on a large scale, and so renders it easier to maintain the gold reserve. On the other hand, this advantage should not be exaggerated. Germany is still importing and exporting, and her depreciated paper currency compels her to pay heavily. Still it should be remembered that she is requisitioning very heavily on the occupied territories.

The German Government has so far imposed no war taxation, except upon the occupied territory. Perhaps some £30,000,000 have been raised by the sale of securities in the United States, and that country has taken some £2,000,000 in Treasury notes. For the rest, Germany has been forced back on her own resources. She financed the early stages of the war by issuing through the Reichsbank and the War Loan Banks and other institutions an inconvertible paper currency, in the form of Imperial Bank notes, Treasury notes, and War Bank notes. The exact amount of these in circulation is not easy to estimate, but the issue of Imperial Bank notes alone rose to some £250,000,000. This excess of paper currency is equivalent to a forced loan without interest, and its effect has been to depreciate currency and send up prices. In September a war loan of 97½ and 5 per cent was issued, and £50,000,000 in Treasury bonds and £173,000,000 in Stock were subscribed. In February, 1915, a second war loan of 5 per cent at 98½ was issued, and £450,000,000 was subscribed. People were enabled by the War Loan Banks to subscribe by pledging stocks and goods, and for the second war loan the stock of the first war loan, but the extent to which this was done must not be exaggerated. According to an official report for the first payment on the second war loan, £26,000,000 was borrowed from the War Loan Banks as against £35,500,000 for the first payment of the first war loan. On April 15th the total advanced by these institutions on war stock was a little over 43 millions out of a total of 77 millions. It cannot be doubted that by far the greatest part of the German war loans is being met out of the resources of the people, and not out of paper manipulations.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND TURKEY.

Austria-Hungary's war expenditure is probably at least two millions a day, but it is even more difficult to gather confirmation as to how she is financing it than in the case of Germany. She has sold Treasury notes in Germany to the amount of at least £40,000,000. In November a domestic loan of £130,000,000 was successfully floated, and another loan in May. There has also been a heavy launching of paper money, but it is not known how much. The financial pressure of the war on Austria-Hungary, already very hard hit before the war, is now extremely severe, and will become much greater.

Turkey was bankrupt before the war, and nothing reliable is known of the financial devices to which she has resorted for financing the war.



German troops on their way to the trenches. [*Photopress.*



Franch soldiers in the trenches taken from the Germans at Les Eparges. [*Central News.*



A photograph, taken under fire, showing French troops advancing in rushes against a German position.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE—ALSACE AND CHAMPAGNE.


THE FRENCH PLANS AND THEIR EXECUTION—IN ALSACE—THE FIGHTING IN THE WOEVRE AND IN CHAMPAGNE—A WAR FOR RAILWAYS—JOFFRE'S SUBTLE STRATEGY.

IN a former chapter on the Winter Campaign in France (page 141), the battle front was divided into three main sections, each in three wings, and this division may usefully be kept up in noting the chief events of the French Spring Campaign. The west front in this division covered the line from the sea to Compiegne; the southern front from the junction of the Aisne and Oise to the Argonne; and the eastern front from Verdun to Belfort. At the end of the winter it was uncertain on which of these sections the great forward movement would be made, but few doubted that with the advent of spring General Joffre would concentrate on one and force his way through. Actually what happened was something very different, and though there were very strong local concentrations at several points along the frontier from time to time, spring came and gave place to summer, and it was still doubtful at which point the great thrust, the expectation of which had sustained hopes all through the winter, was to be made. But the weight of the fighting tended, as spring wore on, to shift to the west, and certainly it was here that the issues at the end of the spring had shaped themselves most clearly. It will be convenient therefore to begin the survey of the French front with the east, where events, though important in themselves, had no immediate consequence, and so come to the fighting on the west, which had immediate sequel, important alike in the history of the war and of our politics at home.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE VOSGES.

Alsace, which figured so prominently in the earliest news of the war, afterwards dropped out of sight almost completely, and about no considerable area of the war has so little information reached this country. The place had a very great and natural sentimental value for the French, but it ceased to have much strategic importance when the Germans succeeded in throwing the weight of their invasion on the west, and what little importance remained to it as a base of offensive operations was greatly diminished by the German occupation of the Woevre. Nevertheless, the French continued to exercise a steady pressure on the Germans all through the winter, for, though it was not a promising district in the military sense, it was important to detain as many German troops there as possible, and so relieve other parts of the front. The failure of the first invasion of Alsace had taught the French that no invasion of the Alsatian plains from the south had any chance of success unless they had first established themselves securely on the eastern slopes of the Vosges. Accordingly, while they retained the southern tip of Alsace (up to but not including Altkirch, south of Mulhouse) they made no attempt to advance north from

that point. Nor were winter and spring favourable seasons for operations on the slopes of the Vosges. The hills are of a considerable height, and covered with snow until well on in the spring. The country in appearance is not unlike Switzerland and the Austrian Tyrol, with steep hill sides and deep, very narrow valleys. The French had the greatest difficulty in victualling their troops in the Vosges during the winter and in providing adequate artillery support to the firing line. While there were few changes during the winter, such as there were, notably near Munster, were in favour of the Germans. The French thought it wise to withdraw some of their advance posts, which, isolated as they were, and far from villages, were cut off by any winter snowstorms from supplies and from the support of their main body. In spring, however, the French began a forward movement along the hills flanking the Fecht and the Lauch, two tributaries which feed the Ill from the Vosges, the Fecht flowing past Munster, the Lauch past Gebweiler to Colmar. The fighting in the Lauch district centred round Hartmannsweilerkopf, a conical hill about 3,000 feet high, in the Gebweiler group. This hill was held by the French through the winter until January 19th, when an advance guard posted in a redoubt on the top was surrounded by the Germans and starved into surrender, in spite of very persistent and costly attempts made by the main body to relieve it. The French then began a systematic siege of the hill, digging trenches and establishing positions for artillery. That took a month, up to February 26th, but when the attack was launched it only succeeded in driving back the Germans for a hundred yards. The French artillery fire had overlooked many of the German secondary defences, so skilfully were they concealed. Fog, too, which is common in the Vosges Hills in the winter, added to the difficulties of artillery preparation for the attack. The attack, however, was renewed on March 5th, and the line of the enemy's trenches, with the strongest of his blockhouses, was carried by the Chasseurs. Violent counter-attacks in the next two days broke down. For another fort night the French were unable to advance further, but in the last week in March they were reinforced. On March 23rd a general attack was delivered, which, on the 26th, was crowned with complete success.



Alsace and the Vosges.

THE CAPTURE OF HARTMANNS-WEILERKOPF.


The opening bombardment on March 23rd lasted four hours; and in order to secure perfect direction of fire, the French operators had honeycombed the hill with more than thirty miles of telephone wire.

"Observation officers were in the first line directing the fire. All the while could be seen hurtling among the trees fragments of dead Germans, arms, and sandbags from their defence works. When the infantry leapt forward from the trenches, preceded at a short distance by this wall of fire, the enemy was thrown into complete consternation. He fought, however, with courage. But our men pressed furiously forward. The infantry carried two lines of trenches and a redoubt, and captured over 200 prisoners. The Chasseurs debouched on their flank with equal dash. We were getting near the summit, but new lines appeared to view, and these had to be carried also. We repelled two counter-attacks and organised the ground we had won. On the following day at dawn our look-outs saw dark points stirring in the trenches which the enemy still held. Helmets and bayonets next appeared, and it was obvious that a big counter-attack was being prepared. Our artillery with appalling rapidity found the trenches with its fire, and, as on the day before, we saw hurtling in the air men and their equipments. The German losses must have been enormous, for there were no more counter-attacks and his artillery remained silent."

"The night of the 25th passed without incident, and when the day of the 26th broke it was noted with joy

that the fog, which so often during the last two months had come to the help of the Germans, had fallen to the first rays of the sun. All was ready, and from this point onwards the drama was to proceed with an automatic regularity, which was the fruit of long weeks of work. It was a supreme effort which should make us masters of the summit. Between us and our objective there were at least three lines of trenches, strengthened by blockhouses, containing machine-guns, and the trees still masked the defence of the enemy. Our artillery had yet a great deal to do. At 10-30 it came into action, and until half-past two without intermission it deluged the enemy's lines with its fire. Artillery of every description was employed. Huge pines fell with a crash, having been severed about the height of a man from the ground and toppled over into the craters formed by the explosion of the shells. The whole ground was a chaos of holes, branches, and trenches. Cries of agony were heard from the shelters of the Germans, whose resistance had now been broken. Ammunition stores exploded, and the work of destruction continued remorselessly until a quarter to three. The bombardment had lasted four hours and a quarter.

"At this moment our infantry in a magnificent rush dashed forward, and ten minutes later was on the summit; and on the crest, now cleared of trees, one of our men, scorning the German bullets, waved a large flag to our artillerymen, who were now sweeping the eastern slopes with their fire. At three o'clock an infantry regiment organised its position on the summit of the Hartmannsweiler-kopf. Companies belonging to the second battalion of the Chasseurs carried by means of hand grenades the trenches on the right, while two companies of another battalion made progress on the left. The whole body, joining forces, swept down the eastern slope in pursuit of the Germans, who were now completely demoralised. More than four hundred prisoners in our hands and the whole of the Hartmannsweilerkopf conquered—such is the statement of account for the two attacks of March 24th and 26th. Many brave men fell in those attacks, leaving to their comrades a splendid example. Among the survivors, whether wounded or not, how many might be mentioned! One case may be cited. A chasseur named Dumoulin, alone in a German trench, from which a machine-gun was sweeping down our attack, felled the gunner to the ground and stopped the fire."



French troops in one of the captured trenches on the Hartmannsweilerkopf.


[*Universal.*

Even then the French were not secure in their possession. A month later—on April 26th—they were driven out by a surprise attack from three sides at once, in which the Prussian Guards took part and poison gas was used. But in less than twenty-four hours the Guards were again driven off the summit. They fought, however, with great determination, and after losing the summit clung to trenches on the slopes. The Germans turned their lower position to profit both here and at other points in the Vosges by posting themselves in trees, from which they overlooked the trenches further up the hillside.

The advantage gained at this hill was not pressed, for the lesson of the early defeats was well learned. Later, it was hoped, Alsace might play an important part in the development of the French strategy of attack. There had at the beginning of the war been an idea that a bold attack here and in Lorraine might prevent the German concentration through Belgium. For the present, however, it was sufficient for the purpose of General Joffre to clear the hills and to put himself in a position from which he could occupy the plains whenever it was convenient for him to spare the men.

BETWEEN THE MEUSE AND MOSELLE.


Strategically the district between the Meuse and Moselle was perhaps the most important on the whole front, next to the section opposite La Bassée. It has already been suggested (Vol. II., p. 135) that had General Joffre had more numbers at his command he could have followed up the repulse of the German attack on Nancy, and so made an eastern counterpart of Sir John French's movement into Flanders. As it was, the German occupation of St. Mihiel was a standing threat to the French defence—a door ajar to the rear of the French armies in the Argonne and Champagne. The Germans early made it clear that having secured this advantage they had no intention of letting it slip. A railway ran from Metz across the plain of the Woevre as far as Thiaucourt at the beginning of the war, and the Germans were not slow to construct a field railway between the old terminus and their new



One of the famous French 75-millimetre field guns with its ammunition waggon. [*Photopress.*



Behind the French lines: Field kitchens attached to the French army.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*



The Woevre.

acquisition on the Heights of the Meuse. The existence of this railway made the southern German front in the plain of the Woevre, to which it ran parallel, extraordinarily strong, for it provided the Germans with lateral communications, and enabled them to concentrate an overwhelming force to meet an attack at any given point. The country through which the front ran was studded with forests, which assisted the defence. Near St. Mihiel is the Ailly Wood, and then (from west to east) the Forest of Apremont, Burntwood Forest (Bois Brulé), the Mortmare Wood, and Priest's Wood (Bois le Prêtre). North of St. Mihiel the front followed the crest of the Meuse Heights for some distance, and then bent east to the Heights of Combres on the east, and curled round Verdun in a generously wide circle. Early in April the French began a serious attack on these German positions in the Woevre. All through the month they attacked from south and west, and so made the famous pincers of which so much was heard, one prong pressing on the Combres Heights, the other against the German entrenchments protecting the railway to St. Mihiel. The pincers obstinately refused to pinch, but the two prongs were brought very much closer together.

On the southern front the French, after hard fighting, occupied Flirey and Regniéville, but it was June before the Ailly Wood at the western end of the plain, and Priest's Wood at the eastern end, were wholly in French occupation. The fighting on the hills facing the Meuse Heights was shorter and sharper. In the first week of April the French attacked the whole line of German positions north of St. Mihiel, and on April 9th they carried and held against all counter-attacks the plateau of Eparges. It was an important victory, for more reasons than one. The plateau of Eparges, and Combres at the eastern edge of it, projecting as they do into the Woevre plain, make an excellent post of observation from which to direct the fire of artillery concealed in the woods behind, and are, therefore, a good jumping-off place for attacks on the St. Mihiel railway from the north-west. From the prong of the pincers at Eparges to the other prong south of the St. Mihiel railway is no more than sixteen miles. Another reason that gave importance to these operations in the Woevre was that the Prussian Crown Prince was in command at this point. His ill-luck in the field still pursued him. When Eparges fell he had just returned to the field from a long holiday, after his by no means brilliant campaign in the Argonne (Vol. I., p. 267).


In April, too, the French considerably enlarged the radius of the German positions round Verdun. Invested, but never besieged in a military sense, the garrison of Verdun in April threw back the German investing lines almost to Etain, on the railway from Metz. The possession of the Woevre and of the country between Verdun and the Luxembourg frontier was of incalculable service to the Germans. It gave the army in France two additional lines of railway communication, besides those through Belgium, namely, the lines from Metz and through Luxembourg, and the loss of the Woevre would have menaced both these lines, and thrown on the Belgian lines a strain to which they were quite unequal. Moreover, a drive north from the Woevre would have exposed the flank of the armies in Champagne to a dangerous attack, which, if it had been timed with a strong attack in Flanders, might have driven the two German wings in on their centre. That would have meant not defeat, but annihilation. The issues of the fighting in the Woevre were therefore vital to the Germans. There was no place in the whole of their lines to which they attached more importance



A French soldier hurling a hand bomb into the German trenches. [*Topical Press.*



Men of the famous Chasseurs Alpins of the French army in billet after a spell in the trenches.
[*Photopress.*




From Rheims to Varennes in Argonne.

than the Woevre and St. Mihiel, and the fact that they claimed the April campaign in this district as a success for themselves, in spite of the French victories at Eparges and in the woods from the Bois Ailly to Priest's Wood and Pont-à-Mousson, shows how genuinely alarmed they had been by this spring campaign.

IN CHAMPAGNE AND THE ARGONNE.

The general character of the fighting in Champagne has been described already (Vol. II., p. 149) in the chapter on the winter campaign. It continued well into spring without materially changing the situation. The advance was painfully slow and the losses on both sides extremely heavy, but such progress as was made was in favour of the French. Here, as in the Woevre, the object of the French attacks was the railway communications of the enemy. The lateral communications in this north-eastern corner of France are exceedingly bad, a fact which was one of the many causes that made Germany prefer Belgium as the main route of invasion. The routes from the east into France are crossed by a succession of natural obstacles, of which the Heights of the Meuse and the Argonne Hills are the chief. There are still few good roads and no railways across the Argonne Range, and the main railway from Metz to the west is blocked by the great fortress of Verdun. A glance at the inset in the map of Champagne above will show that (apart from lateral field railways like that from Thiaucourt to St. Mihiel, which the Germans may have constructed during their occupation) the Northern Argonne district



French gunners in training: A lecture on heavy artillery. [*Wyndham, Paris (C.N.).*

is served by only two railway systems. One running through Verdun was, of course, closed to the Germans. The other system runs north from Metz, parallel to the Luxembourg frontier, almost to Sedan, and there breaks into two branches, one ascending the Meuse to Verdun, the other describing a large arc through Champagne to Apremont, which it reaches from the west, and there stops. The course of the railways determined the whole plan of the French operations in the central section of their line. Direct advance through the wooded Argonne was hopeless; the rate of progress, elsewhere measured in yards, was here measured in feet. The most hopeful plan was to turn the right of the Germans in the Argonne by an advance in Champagne The French objective in the terribly heavy fighting north of Perthes and Beauséjour was to cut the railway to Apremont, and so isolate the Germans in the Argonne and force them to retreat north. Such a retreat would not only relieve Verdun from investment, but it would give the French an opportunity of beginning a campaign in the valley of the Meuse against the German communications through Luxembourg. (Compare the observations already made (Vol. I., p. 107) on the French railway system between Verdun and Luxembourg. It is there described as the strategical idea of Napoleon III. before Sedan put on wheels.)



Chasseurs Alpins on the snow-covered slopes of the Vosges.
[*Central News.*

HOW THE SPRING CAMPAIGN DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATION.

The course of the French spring campaign surprised the general expectation. The system of railway communications behind the German lines was very much superior to that behind the French, and therefore it was not reasonable to hope for any imitation of the strategy followed so successfully by Von Hindenberg of a sudden concentration in great force now at this, now at another point of the enemy's lines. What people had imagined General Joffre would do was to concentrate an overwhelming force at some one point of the German lines which was to be left secret to the last possible moment, and so force his way through, in the assurance that the strength of the whole line could be no more than that of its weakest link. The constant shifting of the point of attack from one section of the frontier to another, and the long periods of rest in each section which followed the gaining of a success in it, tended to puzzle onlookers. Would it not have been possible, people asked, to break the German line at some one point at a less cost than the sum of all the casualties in the attacks in half-a-dozen sections, which, though they might be successful, always stopped short of piercing the enemy's main defences? That this was not the plan of General Joffre was in itself a sufficient answer to such criticisms, for General Joffre, by his victory on the Marne, had shown himself one of the great strategists in the world's military history, and he neither did nor left undone anything without good reason. But they were natural, and it may be helpful to try to divine the ideas which governed General Joffre's policy in this somewhat discursive and perplexing spring campaign.

There were many local or sectional concentrations of the French troops against the German lines during the spring campaign, but there was no general concentration at any one point. Among General Joffre's reasons were probably these. First, on the greater part of the front the Germans had the better railway communications, and could concentrate the faster. Before a general French concentration could force its way through, it was more likely that the Germans would themselves concentrate against some point of the French lines that had been weakened and break down the defence first. The breakers of lines such as these always stood a chance of being themselves broken first. Further, as Von Mackensen's experience in breaking the Russian lines near Lodz showed, the force which breaks through may be itself in danger of being cut off. (See diagrams, Vol. II., p. 61.) For tactics of this kind to be successful, a greater superiority in numbers and equipment is necessary than General Joffre believed his army to possess over the enemy. Lastly, even if this plan had been tried and succeeded, it would only have forced the Germans back from their first lines of defence to shorter lines behind,

when the same work would have to be done over again.

JOFFRE'S SUBTLE STRATEGY.

General Joffre's strategy was much subtler and incalculable than that of the Germans, who recognised him as a dangerous man, precisely because he possessed military gifts different in kind as well as in degree from that of their own generals, and because his plans were individual, and not cast in the dominant mould of military thought. General Joffre attached very great importance to persistent but discursive attacks, partly because he saw in them the best security against a resumption of the German offensive, but also because he seems to have believed that it was on the whole better under the circumstances to make as many vulnerable points as possible than to break through at one with the vigour of the defence unshaken at all the other points. His notion was not to break at one point, but to wear the defence thin at many points. That done to his satisfaction, he might concentrate at one point and break through ; and the breakage at one point might then be expected to lead to a breakage at the other weakened points too. A breakage at one point might be relieved by retreat ; a breakage at several simultaneously would be disaster, perhaps irretrievable. The Battle of the Marne showed General Joffre employing with brilliant success a distinctively French, or at any rate non-German, scheme of defence. The very discursiveness and apparent discontinuity of the French attacks in the spring encouraged the hope that General Joffre was working out for himself an equally original scheme of attack.

In the meantime, his immediate objects were unmistakably clear. In Alsace, they were to master the Vosges Heights and dominate the plain, so that if and when the French were again in a position to attack from Lorraine they might have the support of a powerful French army on the right flank. Between the Meuse and Moselle they were to recover St. Mihiel and the Southern Woevre, and by thrusting back the German lines north of Verdun to menace the railway communications with Metz. In Champagne they were to interrupt the railway communications with Germans in the Argonne, and so make the German invading armies in France entirely dependent on their communications through Belgium.

The campaign on the west front cannot be dismissed at the end of a chapter, but must have several chapters to itself.



Ruins of dwelling-houses in one of the principal streets in Arras leading to the railway station.
[*Photo Service of the French Armies.*



Life behind the firing line: British reserve troops entering their billet in the loft of a French farm. [*Photopress.*



A sergeants' mess in a ruined farmhouse near the trenches. The walls are strengthened with sandbags. [*Photopress.*

The attack which we are about to undertake is of the first importance to the Allied Cause. The Army and the Nation are watching the result, and Sir John French is confident that every individual in the IV. Corps will do his duty and inflict a crushing defeat on the German VII. Corps which is opposed to us.

H. RAWLINSON, Lieut.-General,
Commanding IV. Corps.

Headquarters, IV. Corps,
9-8-15.

The official message to the men of the 4th Army Corps before the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. The slip from which the photograph was taken was carried all through the battle, and brought to England by its wounded owner. [*Central News.*

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE.

THE PLANS OF ATTACK AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES—THE OPENING BOMBARDMENT—CAPTURE OF THE VILLAGE—THE DISASTER TO THE CAMERONIANS—DELAYS IN RESUMPTION OF THE ADVANCE—THE FAILURE TO CARRY PIETRE—THE REPULSE OF THE GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACK—THE END OF THE BATTLE—OBSERVATIONS AND CRITICISMS.

ALL through the winter our troops in the neighbourhood of La Bassée had occupied the low fen country south of the River Lys, while the Germans had enjoyed dry quarters on the higher ground which protected the industrial districts of Lille, Tourcoing, and Roubaix from attack on the west. The advent of March, with its drying winds and spells of sunshine, brought hope of deliverance from conditions which would have broken the spirit of any other army. Sir John French himself had at times been anxious about the effect which the inactivity of a long and depressing winter might have had on the spirit of the troops. It is not good for an army to remain too long in the same place; and even had there been no other reason for movement, the need of the tonic of action would have been sufficient in itself. But there were many other reasons. In February the German attacks on the Russian positions in Poland (Chapter XX.) were at their height, and it was necessary to give to our Allies what assistance was possible. There were many who at this time saw in Eastern Europe the best prospect of a solution of the military problem, and in this hope, encouraged by Russian successes over Austria in the Carpathians, an attack had been begun on the fortifications in the Dardanelles. These hopes, however, depended on the maintenance of a steady pressure on the German forces in the west. The French, as the last chapter has shown, were doing their part; and the time had now arrived for the British army to emulate their energy. Sir John French, therefore, determined to strike. There had been little fighting for a month, but such as there was had gone in our favour On February 25th, near St. Eloi (south of Ypres), the Germans had carried a portion of our trenches, but our counter-attacks had recovered the lost ground, and in the fighting the Canadian contingent, which had begun to arrive five days before, showed itself equal to the best regular troops. We had been particularly successful in the night reconnaissance work of our patrols; in fact, in every enterprise which required individual skill and resource, our men had always come off best. They felt themselves, man for man, superior to the enemy. "A moral superiority," in Sir John French's phrase, had been established. It remained to be seen whether this greater individual virtue would give the victory over an enemy whose superiority on the mechanical side of war was suspected, but not as yet generally admitted.

The choice of the point of attack was dictated by the activity of the French on his right flank. There were broadly two directions in which the British army might seek to break through the German defence. So long as Antwerp was in the hands of the Belgians, the extreme left flank was the more attractive; and even when Antwerp had fallen, it was still a conceivable strategic scheme to roll up the German right by an encircling movement pivoting on Ypres and following the line of the coast. The heavy fortification of the coast line by the Germans and the capture by the Germans east of Ypres of the Zandvoorde ridge, which would have been the natural pivot of such a movement, in the fighting of October and November, robbed this plan of its attractions, but there were still some who favoured it until quite late in the spring. Had such a movement been attempted, it would have aimed first at the capture of Menin, the most important of the positions in the railway communications between the German armies in Belgium and in France, and the outer rim of the wheel would have moved under the protection of the guns of the fleet, with the possible assistance of a fresh British army landed at some point on the Belgian coast, such as Zeebrugge. This plan was—on good ground surely—rejected, and thereafter the district south of the Lys, where the right wing of the British army was stationed, became the more important. The policy of both German and British armies was to attack with the right and parry with the left. The Germans wanted Ypres in order to obtain command of the Straits and cut the sea communications of




Off to the trenches: General French (marked with an x over his head) and members of his staff watching a fresh draft of British troops march past on their way to the firing line. [*Universal.*

the British army. The British wanted Lille in order to cut direct communications between the German armies of France and Belgium, and to force them to retreat from their outer lines to their inner lines, which would have kept Northern France and a great deal of Belgium free of the invader. It was not the first time that Sir John French had cast longing eyes at Lille. In the previous October General Smith-Dorrien's Corps had had most desperate fighting between Laventie and Lille; and in the middle of the month both Aubers and Illies, on the ridge of low hills that overlook Lille from the south-west, had been in their possession. (Vol. I., p. 290, and map on the same page). They had not, however, been able to hold their positions on the ridge.

THE BRITISH FRONT.

The general direction of the British front from Festubert (nearly opposite La Bassée) to the Lys was now north-east. The line would have been straight but for a westerly indentation made by the German occupation of the village of Neuve Chapelle. Opposite Neuve Chapelle, as Givenchy is opposite La Bassée, is Richebourg-St. Vaast, and between them is the main road from Estaires to La Bassée. The possession of this road had been much disputed, but at the beginning of March the Estaires end and the stretch between Richebourg-St. Vaast was in ours. From Petit Logy on this road, just past the bend made by the Neuve Chapelle position, the British front ran due north-east along the main road to Armentières, through Fauquissart and Tilleloy. The general direction of the roads may be carried in the mind by figuring them as a capital X, with Estaires, Armentières, Givenchy, and La Bassée at the ends of the strokes, Petit Logy at the point of intersection, and Richebourg and Neuve Chapelle at each side; thus:—



The further east we could establish ourselves beyond the point of intersection of the two main roads the better our chance of turning the German position of La Bassée, which now, as in October last, was the object of the British army. Two miles south-west of Lille is a ridge which runs to Fournes and then divides, one spur going to Aubers, the other to Illies. Between these ridges the land slopes down through Neuve Chapelle to the main roads. The possession of Neuve Chapelle was thus a

step to the occupation of the ridge overlooking Lille. The object of the attack which was now to be delivered was the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle and "the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east of that place."

The plans of the attack had been carefully prepared. Sir John French knew how strong the German positions had been found last autumn, and that the enemy had been working at their improvement all through the winter. He saw that there were two conditions of success. First, there must be an overwhelming superiority of artillery fire, which should literally blast a way through the enemy's lines, and secondly, it was desirable that there should be some element of surprise. Without that it was doubtful whether we should be able to obtain artillery supremacy at the point of attack. The Allies had started the war greatly inferior to the Germans in the numbers of heavy guns and machine guns, and as future developments were to show, whatever France had done, we had not made up that inferiority in the number of guns, and still less in high explosive shells. The superiority in artillery fire which we had in the Neuve Chapelle engagement was the result of preparations which were carefully concealed. The massing of our artillery on the Neuve Chapelle front must have been the work of a fortnight or more. Yet the enemy seems to have remained in ignorance of what was preparing. By what means Sir John French kept the secret has not been told, but some part of the credit must have been due to our air service, in preventing the enemy's aeroplanes from making a too curious inspection of what was going on behind our lines.

THE CONCENTRATION.

On the evening of March 9th the troops for the attack were concentrated near Laventie and Richebourg-St. Vaast. At least six brigades (or twenty-four battalions) of British troops took part in the attack, besides the Indian troops, and it is possible in this engagement to give the names of many of the regiments which took part in the attack.* On the extreme right of the attacking line was the Indian Corps, whose direction of advance on Neuve Chapelle was almost due north, crossing the Estaires road near Port Arthur. To their left was the Twenty-fifth Brigade, and to the left again the Twenty-third Brigade, then the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-first, and Twenty-second Brigades. There were other troops in reserve, some of which came into action quite early, but these are the only brigades that have been mentioned by name. A comparison of the official and the chief unofficial accounts of the battle gives the following list of the regiments composing some of the brigades :—

Twenty-fifth Brigade—

Lincolns.
Berkshires.
Royal Irish Rifles.
The Rifle Brigade.

Twenty-third Brigade—

Scottish Rifles (Second Cameronians).
Middlesex.
Devons.
West Yorks.

Twenty-fourth Brigade—

Worcesters.
East Lancashires.
Sherwood Foresters.
Northants.

Twenty-first Brigade—

Second Scots Guards.
First Grenadiers.
South Wales Borderers.
Second Gordon Highlanders.


The Twenty-third Brigade was opposite Petit Logy, and the other brigades were along the Armentières road, as far as the junction of the Pietre road. Most of the British troops belonged to the Fourth Army Corps, under General Rawlinson. The Germans opposing were Westphalians, of the Seventh Corps, which was the first to invade Belgium.

THE BOMBARDMENT AND THE CAPTURE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE.

At 7·30 in the morning of March 10th there suddenly began the greatest bombardment that had been heard in the war up to that time. The infantry lay in the trenches, crouched for the spring. They had had hot coffee, but no breakfast. Not until the bombardment began did the Germans suspect that anything unusual was afoot. According to a story told by a prisoner, an officer in the German advanced line did report that the British trenches were full of men, and requested a battery commander to open fire, but received the reply that he had instructions—issued, no doubt, in consequence of the waste of ammunition earlier in the war—only to fire under express orders of the Corps Commander. Certain it is that the British concentration was absolutely unmolested by enemy fire. When the bombardment began no effective reply was possible. The report of the guns was, in the words of an officer of the Manchesters who was in the reserve line, and therefore nearer the artillery, "a repeated banging which shook the earth." Another officer, who put his ear to the ground, said that it was "as though the earth was being smitten great blows with a Titan's hammer." For thirty-five minutes the bombardment lasted. To the infantry, waiting in its trenches, it seemed as though the time would never end.

The whistles blew for the infantry attack at five minutes past eight. The bombardment still continued, but as our men passed over the 250 yards that separated their trenches from the German it was "lifted" from the trenches on to the village of Neuve Chapelle. The attack by the Twenty-fifth Brigade in the centre was immediately successful. The Berkshires on the left of this brigade's advance, and the Lincolns on the right, rushed the trenches and then opened out to allow the other regiments of the brigade to pass through them to the attack on the village The resistance of the Germans was not obstinate. Here and there a group held out obstinately ; in particular, the Berkshires had trouble with a couple of German officers, who remained alone working a machine gun after the other occupants of the trenches had been killed or captured. But for the most part the Germans in the first line of the trenches were demoralised by the violence of the bombardment, as was natural enough. "When we reached the trenches the Germans were nearly hysterical As soon as they saw us they put up their hands and cried for mercy. We were amazed at the condition of the trenches ; there were scores of dead, lying with only

* Thanks to a very spirited narrative which appeared in most of the morning papers on April 19th, and by an unusual indulgence of the censor, the press was allowed to mention the names of many individual regiments.



PHASES IN THE BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE.

heads or feet sticking out of the heaps of earth which had buried them." While the Berkshires and Lincolns were making prisoners, the Irish Rifles and the Rifle Brigade passed between them on towards the village, on which the bombardment had now been turned. The Rifle Brigade, which was the first to enter the village, found it a heap of ruins.

> "It looked as if an earthquake had struck it. Into this scene of desolation the Rifle Brigade—the first regiment to enter the village, I believe—raced headlong. Of the church, only the bare shell remained. The little churchyard was devastated, the very dead plucked from their graves, broken coffins and ancient bones scattered about amid the fresher dead—grey-green forms athwart the tombs. Of all that once fair village but two things remained intact—the great crucifixes reared aloft, one in the churchyard, the other against the chateau.
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> "The din and confusion were indescribable. Through the thick pall of shell smoke Germans were seen on all sides, some emerging half-dazed from cellars and dug-outs, their hands above their heads, others dodging round the shattered houses, others firing from the windows, from behind carts, even from behind the overturned tombstones. Machine guns were firing from the houses on the outskirts, rapping out their nerve-racking note above the noise of the rifles.
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> "Many strange incidents were observed. In one cellar a portly German was found dancing about in an agony of fear, screaming in a high-pitched voice in English, 'Mercy, mercy! I am married!' 'Your missus won't thank us for sending you home, retorted one of the men who took him prisoner, and his life was spared. A Rifle Brigade subaltern, falling over a sandbag into a German trench, came upon two officers, hardly more than boys, their hands above their heads. Their faces were ashen grey; they were trembling. One said gravely in good English: 'Don't shoot! I am from London also!' They, too, were mercifully used."



Rifle inspection before leaving billets for the trenches.
[*Photopress.*

The Rifle Brigade entered the village from the west side. Very shortly afterwards arrived one of the regiments of the Garwhal Brigade from the south. They, too, had had easy work with the enemy's trenches. They found the wire entanglements destroyed by the artillery bombardment, and the Germans too shattered to offer a stout resistance. At 8-30 the Rifle Brigade and the Indian Corps met outside the village and shouted themselves hoarse with cheers for the victory.

HEAVY LOSSES OF SCOTTISH AND LONDON REGIMENTS.

Meanwhile, other regiments had had a very different experience. One of the regiments in the Garwhal Brigade on the right found the wire entanglements in its line of advance untouched by the bombardment for a distance of 200 yards, came under a heavy German fire, and had to retire to their own trenches. They were relieved by the Leicesters, who carried the German trench from which the trouble came. But they lost twenty officers and 350 men. Even worse was the experience of the Twenty-third Brigade, to the left of the now triumphant Twenty-fifth. The Cameronians lost every one of their officers but one, and 750 men. Again the cause was the same. Opposite their right-hand company the entanglements had been destroyed, but they had been "unaccountably missed" opposite the left-hand company. The men had no wire cutters. They tore at the wire with their hands, stamped on it, jabbed it with their rifles—all the time under a heavy fire. The Middlesex Regiment was in like case. In spite of fire from machine guns, they got as far as the wire. "They hacked at it, tore at it, till their hands were raw and bleeding and their uniforms in tatters. From their starting point right up to the wire they left a deep lane of their dead and dying, 120 yards long, a sight so poignant that men, coming suddenly on that bloody trail, broke down and wept at the sheer pity, at the undying glory, of it."* Had it been possible to communicate with the batteries, they could soon have destroyed the entanglements, but unfortunately at this point of the line the telephone wires had been destroyed. A hundred times repaired, the wires were broken before the repairer had time to reach his operating machine. One message, however, reached the batteries, and the Middlesex soon

* From the account, obviously semi-official, published in the papers on April 19—the only intelligible account of the battle, and much the best description of any battle in this war that has been printed in English.



Bringing up one of the great British guns which demolished the German trenches at Neuve1 Chapelle.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Getting British heavy artillery into position. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*

had a path made for them. The Cameronians, though they were nearly annihilated, managed to deliver themselves by working their way round the Germans through the place where the entanglements had been destroyed.

SIR JOHN FRENCH ON THE DELAYS.

Time was now getting on. The Rifle Brigade had entered Neuve Chapelle at 8-30; and it was now 11-30. The holding up of the advance of part of the line by the wire entanglements had cost us three hours and more than 2,000 casualties. It had prevented the Twenty-fifth Brigade from pressing its advantage after the early capture of Neuve Chapelle when the Germans were demoralised, and had involved it in fighting on the flank of its direct advance. It had further delayed the development of the attack by our extreme left, which was the most important part of the plan, for the capture of Neuve Chapelle was useful mainly as a step to the capture of the Aubers ridge. Soon after 11-30, however, to the left of the Twenty-third, the Twenty-fourth Brigade was able to move forward, and it joined with the Middlesex and two regiments of the Twenty-third Brigade, the Devons and the West Yorks., which had not suffered, in clearing the large demesne north of Neuve Chapelle, covered with orchards, gardens, and large houses, from which the German fire had been very destructive. By the time the orchard was clear it was 1-30; five hours had passed, and even then our troops were still not ready for the further advance. It took two more hours before the alignment of the attack broken by the wire entanglements was restored.

> "The infantry was greatly disorganised by the violent nature of the attack, and by its passage through the enemy's trenches and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to get units to some extent together before pushing on. The telephonic communication being cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between front and rear most difficult. The fact of the left of the Twenty-third Brigade having been held up had kept back the Eighth Division, and had involved a portion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade in fighting to the north out of its proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment. An orchard held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened the flank of an advance towards the Aubers ridge.
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> "I am of opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the General Officer Commanding First Army been more carefully observed.
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> "The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome at an earlier period of the day if the General Officer Commanding Fourth Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action."

The disorganisation of the Germans, in spite of the very obstinate resistance at a few points, had been complete; and when the Twenty-first Brigade came into action, as it did soon after mid-day, it was able to form up in the open without a shot being fired at it. Later in the afternoon, however, they began to rally. Between the ground now won and the rising ground of the Aubers ridge to the east there runs a small stream, the des Layes, flowing round its base. Upstream, and on the eastern bank, there is a wood, the Bois du Biez, which clothes the hillside almost to the top of the ridge at Haut Pommereau. Between Haut Pommereau and Aubers the ridge dips, and in this saddle is the little village of Pietre. A road leads across the low land from the Rue Tilleloy to Pietre, and crosses the des Layes near a mill known as Pietre Mill. The object of the fresh attack, which began late in the afternoon, was to establish a footing on the ridge which commands Lille. The possession of Pietre would probably have given us Aubers.

THE FIRST ATTACK ON PIETRE.

The attack began well, but was presently in difficulties. The Germans were posted very strongly on the Pietre road and in the Biez Wood, and the bridge over the River des Layes was held by a most determined detachment with machine guns. The Twenty-fourth Brigade was held up by the fire of the Germans from houses at cross-roads 600 yards north-west of Pietre, and on its right the Twenty-fifth Brigade was in similar difficulties from the machine-guns on the bridge. Nor had the Indian Corps any better fortune. It attacked the Bois du Biez, and some companies of Gurkhas penetrated it, but were unable to debouch from it owing to the cross-fire from the bridge. Night came on soon, and no appreciable advance had been made. The troops could do no more that day than entrench themselves where they were, and make their positions secure for the night.

The German reinforcements were slow in arriving, and for that thanks were due to our airmen, who attacked the railway junctions at Menin and Courtrai, and also Don and Douai. Much damage was done, for the airmen dropped their bombs from as low as 100 and even 50 feet. As the day wore on the brightness of the early morning was succeeded by local mists, and unless the airmen had taken great risks in flying low they could not have seen what to attack. Very useful assistance, moreover, was given by attacks further along the line near Armentières by the Third Corps. Very little progress was made on the 10th at this point, but the fighting prevented the enemy from detaching men to the assistance of the defeated corps at Neuve Chapelle.

THE SECOND DAY.

Towards the morning of the next day the Germans delivered their first counter-attack, but it was not made in very great force, and was driven off with heavy loss. But our own attacks towards Pietre had no better fortune than on the preceding day. The weather conditions were very unfavourable. There was a thick mist, and aerial reconnaissance was impossible. Moreover, the telephone wires were cut, and it was impossible to communicate properly from the fighting line to the batteries. The enemy were still holding the same buildings as on the previous day, and only a well-directed artillery fire gave any chance of turning them out, and artillery support was impossible under the circumstances. "Even," writes Sir John French, "when our troops which were pressing forward occupied a house here and there, it was not possible to stop our artillery fire, and our troops had to be withdrawn"—a sentence which certainly illustrates the dangers of artillery fire under such conditions, and perhaps implies that those dangers were not wholly avoided. Our artillery fire on the Biez Wood, however, seems to have been very effective, and inflicted heavy losses on the Germans who occupied it. The German field artillery, which had done little on the day previous began to be very troublesome on the 11th, especially towards the evening. In the night the Germans received heavy reinforcements, and just before dawn on the following day—the 12th—the first really serious counter-attack was delivered. The new troops were Bavarians and Saxons, who had been resting at Tourcoing.

THE THIRD DAY.

The German attack was mismanaged. The gravity of the defeat on the 10th had been concealed not only from the men but also from their officers. At any rate, opposite the Worcesters the enemy advanced in column



The result of the British concentration of artillery: Photographs of the ruined village of Neuve Chapelle taken after the battle.

[Central News.

of route, a mounted officer in their midst. Or, perhaps, the explanation was that the mist which had done us so much injury on the previous day, had also done us a service in preventing the Germans from determining our precise positions. Their staff work may have been at fault. Whatever the cause, it is clear that they did not suspect that we were as far forward as we in fact were. The results were like Magersfontein over again, but on a larger scale.

"The slaughter was sickening. In front of one of the brigades the Bavarians, coming along at the ambling trot adopted by the German infantry at the assault, and bawling 'Hourra!' in the approved fashion, blundered into the fire of no less than twenty-one machine guns. The files of men did not recede or stagger. They were just swept away. One moment one had the shouting, ambling crowd before one's eyes; the next moment where it had been lay a writhing, convulsed pile of bodies heaped up on the brown earth. When day broke, amid the rattle of machine gun and rifle fire, the German corpses were seen to make ramparts behind which the wounded took cover. In one case at least the Germans, feverishly digging themselves in, were actually seen to use the corpse of one of their comrades to finish off the parapet of their trench."



The remains of one of the houses outside Neuve Chapelle in which German machine guns had been mounted.

[*Central News.*

Encouraged by the breakdown of the German attack, our troops made a further attempt to carry the positions on the Pietre road and the bridge over the river. The attack was made with a gallantry conspicuous even in this war, for again adequate artillery support was impossible owing to the mist and the closeness of the fighting. But it was unavailing. The mill was reached, thanks to work with grenades and bayonets. In this fighting the Territorial Battalion of the Second Gordons greatly distinguished itself. Its colonel fell mortally wounded. He was in great pain, and a subaltern brought him morphia, which relieved him. "Thank you," he said, "and now, my boy, your place is not here. Go about your duty." And a few minutes later he died. The Rifle Brigade, which had done so well on the first day of the battle, again distinguished itself, and shortly after midday almost carried the German trench. It could get no further, and all attempts later in the afternoon to get as far failed. At nightfall the troops fell back to their positions of the morning, and the three days' battle of Neuve Chapelle was over.

THE LOSSES.

The enthusiasm in the army at being again on the move after the dreary inaction of the winter knew no bounds. The soldiers went into battle like children rushing out of school; even the wounded on the way to the hospital were gay, and made a jest of their sufferings. No army was ever so wearied of sitting still, or more overjoyed at the idea of attacking the enemy. Something of the same feeling took possession of this country when the first news came of the capture of Neuve Chapelle. It was thought that at last the great advance to which people had been looking forward all the winter had begun, and speculation was rife as to the exact nature of the strategy that would be adopted. These early expectations were disappointed by the pause which followed the battle, and later there came into circulation alarming rumours about our losses, and versions of what happened in the battle, which dashed the first enthusiasm over the victory. Sir John French's full despatch was published a month after the battle. There was much in it to reassure after the rumours which had been in circulation. But it confirmed the report of the heaviness of our losses. One hundred and ninety officers and 2,337 other ranks were killed, 359 officers and 8,174 men wounded, and twenty-three officers and 1,728 men were returned as missing—a total casualty list of 572 officers and 12,239 men. Our casualties at Waterloo were under 6,000. The German losses were very much heavier. "Several thousand," which should mean at least three thousand, were left dead by the enemy on the field and there counted; more than 12,000 wounded were removed by train, and in addition thirty officers and 1,657 other ranks were taken prisoners. It was a quite unequivocal victory, yet it raised more doubts than it satisfied, and criticism—wholesome for the most part and helpful in its spirit—began after the battle to make itself heard,



Some of the cheerful wounded from the Neuve Chapelle fighting, wearing captured German helmets. [*L.N.A.*



A batch of Neuve Chapelle wounded on a French railway station. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*

OBSERVATIONS AND CRITICISMS.

The general impression left by the early telegraphic despatches of a brilliant opening, followed by an anti-climax, was confirmed in the detailed report of Sir John French. Neuve Chapelle was in our hands by 8-30, but it was not until 3-30 that the army was in a position to move forward again. This delay did irreparable injury to our hopes of achieving a decisive victory. The plan of the battle was well-conceived, and it had been worked out with exceeding care. Everything depended on our being able to follow up the initial success promptly. We had achieved a surprise at the outset which most people had come to believe was impossible in modern war. Until well on in the afternoon the enemy, except for small parties here and there, was demoralised, and the Germans were unable to bring very heavy reinforcements into action until the third day. On the 10th, certainly, and except for the weather on the 11th, too, all the conditions were in our favour for achieving a decisive victory. Magnificent as Neuve Chapelle was in many respects, it also brought with it disappointments which Sir John French did not attempt to conceal. It was a great victory, but a greater victory missed.

Sir John French lays the blame for the failure to achieve decisive results on the delay in the resumption of the attack after the capture of Neuve Chapelle. The sentence of censure in his despatch has already been quoted. His view is natural in a commander-in-chief, whose concern is with strategy and the higher tactics of a battle. Yet it is clear that an attack made under such circumstances against defences which the enemy had been elaborating for months must raise many problems of minor tactics which are both novel and difficult, and can only be satisfactorily solved by experience. All the difficulties in the earlier part of the day arose at points where the bombardment had missed—the evidently semi-official account, from which several quotations have already been made, says "unaccountably missed"—destroying the wire entanglements; and the cutting of the telephone wires prevented the omission from being made good promptly. Evidently the artillery was at fault in some sections; or, if it is inevitable that such failures should take place, the arrangements for avoiding such misfortunes as befel the Cameronians and the Middlesex Regiment obviously need to be much more accident-proof than they seem to have been. It seems doubtful whether before this battle the power of a few resolute men with machine guns to hold up a whole attack was fully appreciated. Sir John French thinks that there was undue delay in bringing the reserves into action, meaning, presumably, that if the Twenty-fourth Brigade had been brought up sooner to the assistance of the Cameronians and the Middlesex Regiment the heavy losses of men and the delay would have been reduced, and the diversion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade from its direct line of advance, which resulted in a great deal of confusion, that took time to straighten out, would thereby have been avoided. The Twenty-fourth Brigade does not seem to have come into action till 11-30, by which time the Twenty-third Brigade must have been in difficulties for two and a half hours, or perhaps longer. Sir John French's judgments on such a matter are conclusive. Yet much the same difficulty seems to have arisen later in the day when the advance was resumed. The Germans had rallied when this attack was delivered, but at this time the numbers defending the Pietre road and the bridge over the river cannot have been very great, and the main work of holding up the attack must have fallen on machine guns worked by comparatively few men. The course of the engagement on the first day suggests that the supremacy of the rifle in defence may be passing to the machine gun. The ability of the Germans to deliver strong counter-attacks on points where they had lost ground seems to depend on their practice of holding the first line with a comparatively few men liberally supplied with machine guns, and concentrating their infantry in the second and third lines. We may have to revise the conceptions that were current after the Boer war about the enormous defensive power of the rifle, and substitute the machine gun for what was then said about the rifle.

There are many difficulties about this battle which are still unsolved, and will probably remain so until the end of the war. The battle opened with the heaviest bombardment of the war up to that time, and in spite of its failure at some points in the line it decided the battle in our favour. By 8-30—an hour after the bombardment began—we had won on the south and west side, at any rate, of Neuve Chapelle as much ground as we had at the end of three days' hard fighting. How comes it that so little is heard of the artillery after the first thirty-five minutes artillery fury with which the battle opened? Why did not the plan which was so successful against Neuve Chapelle and the entrenchments in front of the village work later in the battle against Pietre? It is very remarkable how little we know of the second stage of the battle which began on the afternoon of the 10th and lasted until nightfall of the 12th. On the second day there was mist, and artillery fire might have been dangerous with the armies so close and no aeroplane reconnaissance possible—Sir John French indeed seems to hint, what rumour asserted with great circumstantiality, that some of our casualties were due to our own artillery fire. But that does not explain why our artillery on the first day so suddenly lost the supremacy which it asserted so triumphantly at the beginning of the battle. What sufficed to destroy Neuve Chapelle and its trenches should have destroyed the buildings round Pietre. Yet, so far as the published accounts go, our artillery would seem to have lapsed into a silence almost as loud as its opening bombardment. Clearly, there is still much to explain. Either our supplies of shells ran out, or something happened in the afternoon of the first day or on the second day about which all the published accounts of the battle are silent. Another feature of the battle on which the accounts throw no light is the large number of missing. Some of these may have been dead, left on the field in the closing stages of the battle, whose bodies it was impossible to recover. But it would seem with 1,750 men missing as though many of them must have been taken prisoners, wounded or unwounded. There is no stage of the battle as we know it to which so large a number of enemy captures can be related with certainty, unless possibly sections of the Cameronians and Middlesex were cut off and made prisoners.

LESSONS OF THE BATTLE.

Neuve Chapelle is one of the great British battles, and its details are extraordinarily interesting. For about no other modern British battle do we know at once so much and so little. Great as its perplexities are, and disappointing as were some of its results, it was still the first great battle of the war in which a British attack had broken down an elaborately prepared German defence. We were attacking on the Marne, but it was in the open,

and the strategic scheme was not ours, but General Joffre's. In the Battle of the Aisne the Germans had not established themselves firmly when we carried the passage of the river. Our other battles had been victories of the defence. All through the winter the thought of how we should hew our way through the elaborate field fortifications in Belgium had haunted people's minds. Neuve Chapelle showed that the problem was not nearly so simple as the unreflecting had imagined it would be, nor so insoluble as many feared. It showed that there would be many complications to straighten out before the great advance could be undertaken with reasonable certainty of success; it also showed that success could be made reasonably certain, and also, at any rate on broad lines, how. Above all it showed that the British army had not suffered by its terrible winter in the trenches, and that, wisely directed, it could be as potent in attack as it was unconquerable in defence.

Sir John French, in a section of his despatch on Neuve Chapelle, drew the practical moral in very simple and direct words.

> "I can well understand how deeply these casualties are felt by the nation at large, but each daily report shows clearly that they are being endured on at least an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends and foes alike.
>
> "In war as it is to-day between civilised nations, armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine-gun, heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted.
>
> "The power of defence conferred by modern weapons is the main cause of the long duration of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life.
>
> "Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported by the most efficient and powerful force of artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to the artillery commanders.
>
> "I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss."

The events of the next three months, both at home and in Flanders, were to be an insistent underlining of these words.



German prisoners taken by the British being marched down to the base. [*Photopress.*



British wounded on a French railway station during a halt on the way to a base hospital. [*L.N.A.*


CHAPTER XXIX.

THE SECOND ATTACK ON YPRES.

THE LINES IN FRONT OF YPRES AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK—THE CAPTURE OF HILL 60—THE GERMAN CONCENTRATION IN THE SPRING—THE ATTACK BY POISONOUS GAS—THE VALOUR OF THE CANADIANS—THE FIGHTING FOR ST. JULIEN AND FOR THE YSER CANAL—THE NEW LINES

THE first attack on Ypres in October and November, 1914 (Vol. I., 295-301), cost the Germans more lives than any other single operation in the war. Of all the passions aroused in the Germans by the war, none was so strong as their desire to reach Calais. Calais was a symbol of the Anglo-French alliance which had defeated their early scheme of a short, sharp campaign in France, followed by a concentration against Russia. But its possession would have had real as well as sentimental value for Germany. It would have been followed, as a matter of course, by the seizure of the southern shores of the Channel; for if the Allies were not able to defend the much shorter line through Flanders, they certainly could not defend a longer line through Normandy. That would have been a grave embarrassment to the transport of reinforcements and supplies to the British army in Flanders. But there is reason to believe that the German Admiralty had already in last autumn conceived its plan of the submarine blockade, and it was reasonably hoped that the Straits and the French coasts would make ideal bases for submarine operations against the British fleet. Calais became an obsession of the Germans; but there was method in their madness, and it was not to be expected that they would acknowledge the defeat of the autumn of 1914 as final. This country, of all the Western Allies, was the most directly interested in defeating the German projects on the Straits, and to Sir John French belongs the credit of first seeing the strategic importance of Flanders and urging the transference of the British army from the Aisne to the north. But for this transference, the French right would undoubtedly have been turned. But it is just to add that but for the assistance of the Belgians and of the French Ypres could not have been held. Some of the heaviest losses of the Germans were in front of the line of the Yser which was held by the Belgians; and the French reinforcements secured our left flank at Ypres and saved us from almost certain defeat.

The autumn campaign in Flanders, which began with the siege of Antwerp and came to a standstill before Ypres, was no part of the original German plan. It



THE SUCCESSIVE BATTLE-FRONTS ROUND YPRES.

was an afterthought, suggested by the unexpected vigour of the British military policy, and, as it turned out, an exceedingly expensive one. The Germans must have spent a quarter of a million men in the autumn to fail in getting what they might have had for the asking in the summer. The prompt intervention of the British army on the Continent upset the plans of the General Staff, and the readjustment of plans to meet the new circumstances was not made with sufficient promptitude, and led to the worst rebuffs of the war. The dissatisfaction caused by these failures led in the New Year to the resignation of Von Moltke, the son of the great Moltke, as the Chief of Staff. General von Falkenhayn took his place.

THE YPRES BASTION.

Badly as the German attacks on Ypres had failed to achieve their main object, they made a sensible impression on its defences. In the middle of October, General Rawlinson, with the Seventh Division, was in front of Roulers (Vol. I., p. 293, and Map on p. 290). A week later Passchendaele, half way between Ypres and Roulers, was the centre of the battlefront in Flanders. When the great attack began at the end of the month our troops were holding the line from Zonnebeke, on the Roulers road, through Gheluvelt, on the Menin road, and thence along the Zandvoorde ridge to Messines. At the end of the three days' attack Messines and Zandvoorde ridge had been lost, and a great indentation had been made in our lines on the south-east side of Ypres. The loss of ground was serious, for the Zandvoorde ridge dominated the plain. In our possession it enabled us to overlook the low land towards the Lys, and gave a basis of attack against the German lines north-west of Lille; in German possession these hills not only screened the movements of troops through Menin, but greatly weakened the defence of Ypres, and forced us to keep a larger number of men on the south-eastern section of the bastion than we otherwise need have done. This line was maintained without further loss all through the winter, and at St. Eloi there was even a slight gain.

It has already been noted that the idea of a turning movement through Flanders had occurred almost simultaneously to Sir John French and the German command in the autumn, and that at any given moment in October it was difficult to say which army was turning which (Vol. I., p. 280). In the spring, too, both armies began their forward movement simultaneously. The Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March, which was the first stirring of the spring in Flanders, was followed by another month of immobility. But in the middle of April the spring campaign of both sides began in earnest. The Allies' plan, in its broad outlines at any rate, had evidently been concerted. The British reinforcements had now begun to arrive, and it was possible for us to extend our lines. It was arranged that we should take over the northern segment of the Ypres defences which all through the winter had been held by the French. We were further to extend the advantage which had been gained at Neuve Chapelle, and to win our way through towards Lille. To cover this movement an attempt was to be made to capture the Zandvoorde ridge. The French on their side having gained ground on the hill of Notre Dame de Lorette, near Arras, were to drive in the direction of Lens, and, having established themselves there, to connect with the British in an attack on Lille. Such were the plans which, though they may not have worked out in all their details, and were necessarily provisional, governed the Allies' spring campaign in Flanders.

THE FIGHTING ON HILL 60.

The first movement on the British side was on the south-east side of Ypres, along the road and railway to Comines. Some six miles out of Ypres the railway meets the foothills of the Zandvoorde ridge, and crosses them in a deep cutting. The highest of these foothills, and nearest the railway cutting, is known as Hill 60, which is an undulation in the ground rather than a hill. It had changed hands several times in the winter when the French held this portion of the Ypres lines, but in February, when we took over the French trenches, it was in the possession of the Germans. All through March there was mining and counter-mining by both armies on the hillside, and in the evening of April 17th some mines were fired simultaneously under the German trenches. The hillside was shattered by the explosion, and in place of the trenches which had faced our men thirty or forty yards away there were now large craters and mounds of debris. The Germans in the first trench were imprisoned in the ruin of their own mines, and were never seen again. As our infantry rushed to the attack of the trenches beyond they saw through the clouds of dust men in their shirt sleeves—they had been mining—rushing about wildly and fighting with each other to escape into the communication trenches. They charged them with the bayonet, and poured down the communication trenches, but were stopped at the end by barricades. The enemy quickly recovered from his surprise, and when night fell the hill was being bombarded from three sides, for it made a salient in the enemy's lines. For the next four days the enemy attacked incessantly, and the only relief that the men on the hill had came from the fact that the fighting was at such close quarters that when the infantry attacked the bombardment had perforce to cease. The infantry attacks were directed along the communication trenches, and the fighting resolved itself into dozens of isolated encounters in the maze of half-obliterated old trenches and the new trenches that our men had built under artillery fire. The whole area of the fighting was less than 250 yards square, and at no point was it possible to see the ground more than a few yards distant, so numerous and deep were the great holes torn in the ground by the mine explosion and the bombardment which followed. The worst day was the second—a Sunday—when the enemy delivered two massed attacks which were beaten off, thanks mainly to the fire of our machine-guns rushed into action on side-cars. Towards nightfall on Sunday our men were driven back from the southern edge of the hill until the arrival of reinforcements enabled them to counter-attack and recover the lost ground. Another terrible time was the sixteen hours that began at nine o'clock on Tuesday night and continued until early afternoon of Wednesday. There were moments in the attack when it seemed as though Hill 60 was to be another—and a worse—Spion Kop; but our men held their ground through all, and by Wednesday evening their hold on the hill was firmly established.

The soldiers' letters on this engagement agree that it was perhaps the worst fighting that the war had seen up to that time. The psychology of soldiers in action is often difficult; and it will be noted as a curious fact that our army found the violent bombardments of the German artillery less demoralising, though more destructive, than the dropping inconstant fire of the few Boer guns on Spion Kop; and the violence of the massed attacks of the Germans, with their hand-to-hand group fighting, like nothing so much in our military history as Inkerman, easier to resist than the stealthy stalking of the Boer



A ruined village on the outskirts of Ypres. [*Photopress.*



British troops taking shelter behind a barricaded house in the Ypres neighbourhood.
[*Photopress.*

attacks. The explanation may be that the passion of hand-to-hand fighting is after all, for all its carnage, the easier strain to endure, or perhaps our army was by now so seasoned that no horrors could shake its resolution. Our losses, though heavy, were less than the German, and the fury of their attempts to recover the hill shows how much importance they attached to the possession of even the foothills to the ridge south-east of Ypres which they had won in the autumn. Among the regiments which won distinction on Hill 60, the King's Own Scottish Borderers was conspicuous.

Hill 60 would doubtless have been put to good use, but on the day after the repulse of the last of these attacks on the hill the Germans opened an attack on the north-east of Ypres, a section which had almost entirely escaped in the attacks of the autumn.

There had been fighting on the Yser early in the month, in which the Germans, after an initial success in crossing the river near Driegrachten, were afterwards driven back by the Belgians with heavy loss, but nothing had happened to indicate that the Germans were massing for attack on the north side of Ypres. We had been for some time past gradually taking over trenches on the left from the French, and on Thursday, April 22nd, the Canadian Division occupied the section from Langhemarck to Gheluvelt, with the French immediately to their left. During the fighting for Hill 60 the enemy had not confined his attention to the lost hill, but had bombarded the whole of our front. No particular importance was attached to the bombardment, which was thought to be for the purpose of preventing us from sending reinforcements there. Suddenly, at five o'clock in the evening, the Canadians on the north-east side of the city found their left flank exposed. The French had fallen back in great confusion for some two miles to the bank of the Yser, and there was a wide gap in the Ypres defences between the river and the beginning of the Canadian trenches.

THE GAS APPARATUS.

The Germans had begun an attack for which they had long been making elaborate preparations. At the Hague Convention of 1907, Germany (with other powers) agreed to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The clause does not prohibit projectiles which, on exploding, emit poisonous gas as a bye-product, so to speak, of their energy; almost all shells do that, and lyddite not less than others. A shell that suffocated by its fumes as well as shattered by its explosion would not come within the prohibition; but if it only suffocated it would. The logic of such a rule, as of many of the prohibitions in the Hague Conventions, is certainly not clear, and both France and the United States refused to sign. Admiral Mahan said that, in his opinion, asphyxiating shells might be less inhuman and cruel than the employment of submarines. Our delegates signed, but on the condition that the practice of the Powers was unanimous. Germany signed apparently without reserve, so that she was certainly bound by the provision for what it was worth. She seems, however, to have decided quite early that it was worth nothing at all, and in 1909 the German army began to experiment in apparatus for the diffusion of poisonous or asphyxiating gas. A machine was invented consisting of a gas cylinder and a drum attached by a tube.

> There is a closable orifice in the drum or reservoir through which liquid fuel is inserted. To the liquid fuel is added the substance required for generation of the poisonous gas. A cock mounted on the drum's upper cover at the end of the tube connecting the cylinder controls the supply of the liquid or gas under pressure which is used to expel with force the poison mixture. Near the bottom of the drum there is another cock joined to a long pipe or bore which may be carried underground by means of a tunnel or over the ground surface as near as possible to the trenches. The mixture liberated by the opening of the cock is forced from the drum through the pipe at a pressure capable of carrying it, under favourable circumstances, a considerable distance in the form of poison gas, ignition having taken place by means of an inflammable liquid contained in a small receptacle near the nozzle at the end of the tube. Various ignition drums are employed, according to the length of the tube and whether it is underground or otherwise.*

This apparatus seems to have been the type which was varied according to the nature of the poison gas which it was meant to use. Its use in any form was a violation of Germany's undertaking at the Hague Conference. Whether it was also a violation of the laws of humanity would depend on the nature of the gas used. At Ypres the gas used was chlorine, and its effects were harrowing in their cruelty. They will be described later in the History. This chapter is concerned with its effects on the fortunes of the campaign, and with the purely military motives for its use at this time.

The Germans had not up to this stage of the war used this apparatus, though both sides had charged each other with using projectiles which generated poisonous gas. The British who were engaged on Hill 60 complained particularly about the gases given off by the German shells in the bombardment. There were, however, particular reasons for the use of the gas apparatus by the Germans at this particular juncture. True to their policy of getting in the first blow, they early decided that their attack on the Allied lines in France should be delivered before the British were in full strength. The 1915, 1916, and 1917 classes of conscripts had already been called up for training in 1914, and it was known that by April the Germans would have another half million men sufficiently trained to be fit for service. But the progress of the Russian campaign against them must, long before spring, have decided the Germans to make their main offensive movement in the East, thus reversing their policy of the previous summer. There was, therefore, no hope of breaking through on the French front by weight of numbers; nor did it seem obvious, unless entirely new methods were employed, how they were to anticipate the expected offensive of the Western Allies in the spring. They had lost in the autumn fighting between Ypres and the sea perhaps 250,000 men; the British army had proved its remarkable quality in the defence of entrenched positions, and Neuve Chapelle, though not the great success that had been hoped for, had given the Germans qualms for the security of Lille. All these facts decided the Germans, or confirmed them, in their intention to resort to exceptional measures. They had made up their minds, and rightly, that the British attack would be delivered on Lille by way of the Aubers ridge, and they could not feel certain of their power to resist a concentrated movement by the British, now presumably in greatly increased strength. Nor was it in their military nature to employ the tactics of purely passive defence. They determined to meet the British attack south of the Lys by an attack on Ypres. They had had some reinforcements from the winter-trained

* *The Poison-War* (Messrs. Heinemann.) By A. A. Roberts, pp. 26-27.



The use by the Germans of poisonous gas added "respirator parade" to the routine of the British soldier. The photograph shows an officer inspecting his men's respirators, and their method of wearing them.
[Universal.



Wounded British soldiers wearing the respirators by the aid of which they were able to withstand the German gas attacks.
[L.N.A.

men; but they were used largely to replace regiments drawn away for the projected campaign in Galicia, and the Germans were on the whole French front in a numerical inferiority. If any attack on Ypres was to have any chance of success, it must have the elements of novelty and surprise. All these things had been carefully thought out during the winter, and it was early decided that the use of asphyxiating gas on a large scale offered the best prospects of success. Throughout the winter the apparatus for producing and distributing the gas was made in great quantities, and no doubt the troops were exercised in its use.

These calculations, though they were a violation of their promises at the Hague, need not have been so barbarously cruel if another gas had been used. But the Germans decided in favour of chlorine for several reasons. Their chemists had discovered a method for producing liquid chlorine in large quantities; but, a more important reason still, chlorine was heavier than air, and therefore would not rise much higher from the ground than a man's height. Further, it was less easily dissipated by wind. Mere pressure alone might not have driven gas as far as the enemy's trenches. A favourable wind was necessary, and they wanted the north-east wind which prevails in the spring to carry it to the enemy trenches. And, as luck would have it, rarely has the wind blown with such persistency from the north and east as in the spring and early summer of 1915. The Germans were very successful in keeping their intentions secret. Yet there had not been wanting warnings. "It has been reported," wrote "Eye-witness," on April 6th, "that in the Argonne, where the trenches are very close, the Germans have on several occasions pumped blazing oil and pitch on to the French; but, according to our prisoners, they are preparing a more novel reception for us in front of parts of our lines. They propose to asphyxiate our men, if they advance, by means of poisonous gas. The gas is contained under pressure in steel cylinders, and being of heavy nature will spread along the ground without being dissipated quickly." It is strange that in spite of this warning, of which note had duly been taken in official quarters, no preparations had been made on our side to counter the danger; nor is this the only instance of lack of responsiveness between brain and hand, between our Intelligence and Munitions Departments.


THE ATTACK ON THE CANADIANS.

The device was at first shamefully successful, for, as has already been noted, the French were taken completely by surprise and retired in the utmost confusion to the Yser. Our men in the trenches saw the French retiring away to the west, followed by a cloud of greenish vapour rolling along the ground behind them.

The Canadians were in three brigades, the Third on the left, joining up with the trenches that the French had just evacuated, the Second to its right, and the First in reserve. At five o'clock in the afternoon of April 22nd, the position was as shown in the diagram in the next column.

After the discharge of the gas, the dotted line became a gap, through which the Germans poured, following close behind the wall of green vapour. They wore pads over their mouths and noses soaked in a solution of bicarbonate of soda. Their advance was exceedingly rapid, and as they made for the gap, their formation all broken by the obstacles encountered in their path, they looked more like a mob pouring out of a football ground after a match than an army. Near Ypres, which being on low ground did not command a wide view, our reserves were conscious only that something unusual had happened. They were questioning some bodies of excited Turcos who had made their appearance, when suddenly a Staff officer rode up and shouted "Stand to your arms," and in three minutes the troops had fallen in and were marching north to the gap, meeting as they went swarms of panic-stricken fugitives.

The gas reached the Canadian trenches, though not in very great quantities, but their position was immediately one of great peril. By seven o'clock the Germans had reached the wood behind the old French trenches, and there captured four naval guns. The Canadians' Third Brigade had very skilfully extended to the left, in the hope of stopping the gap left by the French, but were unable to occupy the wood in time to save the guns. In the evening the Canadian Scottish and two other battalions attacked the wood and captured it, after a fierce struggle,



by the light of a misty moon, and reached the captured guns, which, however, had been blown up. The recapture of the wood, in which the Third Brigade had the assistance of two fresh battalions from the First Brigade, was one of the fine exploits of the war.

> "Some 2,500 of us had to attack the wood, where there were, I suppose, some 7,000 Germans, and the place was full of Maxim guns, though before our attack some shells had been thrown into the wood, but not many.
>
> "We drove them from the trenches in front of the wood, and went right through, about 500 yards, to the other side. Then we got surrounded, and had to retire to the trenches which we had taken, and here we dug ourselves in, remaining till next (Friday) morning, the enemy shelling us all the time with shrapnel. Then we had to file out on the Saturday morning to make room for reinforcements. I might say here that in our advance we were enfiladed by heavy fire on both sides, but in spite of this we moved them before us, and recovered three howitzers which the French had left behind in the wood. These we blew up, and then we succeeded in recapturing our own four 4·7 guns which the enemy had taken. At this point we surrounded sixty Germans and bayoneted forty-five of them. One officer just in front of me blew out his brains. We could not estimate the number of Germans slain, but we saw their searchlights at work the whole night through looking for the dead."

In the early morning of the 23rd (Friday), the position of the Canadian troops was roughly as shown in diagram, page 297.*

They had been heavily attacked all through the night by artillery bombardment, and their position in the morning, with the Germans still trying to work through

* The diagrams are from a capital account of the fighting by the Canadian Record Officer.




British engineers with the Expeditionary Force making hand grenades out of tobacco tins. [*L.N.A.*



British soldiers practicing throwing hand grenades. [*Photopress.*

the gap was perilous. By this time they were more than two miles south of the old French trenches. It was decided to make a counter-attack, and this was brilliantly carried out by the First Brigade, with the assistance of an English brigade, in which were the Worcesters, once more the saviours of Ypres.

> "It is safe to say that the youngest private in the rank, as he set his teeth for the advance, knew the task in front of him, and the youngest subaltern knew all that rested upon its success. It did not seem that any human being could live in the shower of shot and shell which began to play upon the advancing troops. They suffered terrible casualties. For a short time every other man seemed to fall, but the attack was pressed ever closer and closer.
>
> "The Fourth Canadian Battalion at one moment came under a particularly withering fire. For a moment—not more—it wavered. Its most gallant commanding officer, Lieut.-Col. Burchill, carrying, after an old fashion, a light cane, coolly and cheerfully rallied his men and, at the very moment when his example had infected them, fell dead at the head of his battalion. With a hoarse cry of anger they sprang forward (for, indeed, they loved him), as if to avenge his death. The astonishing attack which followed—pushed home in the face of direct frontal fire made in broad daylight by battalions whose names should live for ever in the memories of soldiers—was carried to the first line of German trenches. After a hand-to-hand struggle the last German who resisted was bayoneted, and the trench was won."



The result of this success was to force back the wedge which the Germans had thrust through the gap on the Canadian left; and though the gap was not completely stopped, the enemy were never able to work through in force.

THE RETIREMENT FROM ST. JULIEN.

Meanwhile, the Third Brigade in the wood was in serious difficulties. A gas attack was made upon it at four in the morning, which was withstood with great fortitude, though it caused heavy losses. The wood could not be held, and the attack developed such fierceness that, in spite of the arrival of several British battalions on its left, the brigade was ordered to fall back on St. Julien. This it did with sullen obstinacy, disputing every yard of the ground. Later St. Julien, too, had to be abandoned, for the line was fast being drawn in on both right and left flanks, and to have stayed would have been to run the risk of being cut off entirely. As it was, it was impossible to extricate two Montreal regiments, which had to be abandoned in the village, fighting a rear-guard action. The Brigade left these only with heavy hearts. "The German tide rolled indeed over the deserted village, but for several hours after the enemy had become masters of the village the sullen and persistent rifle fire which survived showed that they were not yet masters of the Canadian rearguard. If they died, they died worthy of Canada." The losses of the Canadians in the Ypres fighting was over 5,000.

The evacuation of St. Julien by the Third Brigade had exposed the First Brigade on its right to the same dangers as the withdrawal of the French had exposed the Third Brigade. Fortunately, however, the pressure of the German infantry attacks was not so great on this section of the line as it was to the left, and they succeeded in not only withdrawing their left south so as to keep in touch with their other brigade, but also in holding their original trenches against a tremendous bombardment and many gas attacks. Only for an hour—on the morning of Friday—was there any yielding; a bayonet-charge recovered the lost ground, and the Second Brigade maintained their original positions until Sunday.

THE FIGHTING ON THE YSER.

Meanwhile, there had been heavy fighting on the extreme left. The Germans, after crossing the old French trenches, had opened fanwise, some going south, where, as the narrative has told, they encountered the reserves from Ypres and the Canadians, the others pursuing the French to the Yser. These occupied Steenstraete, and crossed the river at Het Sas and several other points to the south. It was an exceedingly dangerous movement, for it threatened to separate the Franco-British from the Belgian lines and to open a passage to the coast. In the night of Thursday the Germans pushed on and rushed the village of Lizerne. The Belgians, although they were themselves occupied with strong German demonstrations on the Yser front, rendered very valuable assistance in this crisis, and early next morning Lizerne was stormed by the French and the Germans forced back to the river. In this work the French received much assistance from the counter-attack of the Worcesters and the Canadians, which, as has already been described, broke the end of the German wedge. But neither the French nor the British were able to press their advance very far. Pilkelm was reached by the British, but not carried; and the Germans obstinately held the bridge head opposite Lizerne. Towards evening they again stormed Lizerne, and, though they lost it again, all the efforts of the Allies failed to dislodge them completely from the west bank of the Yser. On Monday, the German front north of Ypres ran between Lizerne and the Yser, crossed the Yser north of Het Sas, which the French had retaken, ran parallel to the river to a point opposite Boesinghe, and thence in front of Pilkelm and St. Julien to a point half-way between Passchendaele and Zonnebeke. The ground gained was in shape a triangle, with a base two or three miles broad towards the Yser, and its apex was Broodseinde. Fortunately, the apex was immovable, in spite of very heavy artillery attacks. Nor had the enemy made any advance on the south-east side of Ypres, where he seems to have been content to keep up the furious bombardment which had begun on the day after the capture of Hill 60 and never stopped since. Ypres was ablaze in many places, and was now little better than a heap of ruins.

THE STATE OF YPRES.

A motor ambulance driver, writing home, has given a terrible description of Ypres at this time:—

> "The sights going through the town were awful. To me now it all seems like a horrid nightmare. I cannot

realise yet that I witnessed such horrible sights. Everywhere are great holes in the ground caused by shells. Here you see the front of a house blown away, on the ground-floor tables and chairs standing, coffee pot on the stove, glasses and cups on the table; upstairs you can see a bed standing with the clothes thrown back—everything just as the people left it when they fled for safety. There you try to drive your car over what was once a house, but now a mass of ruins scattered over the street.

"Getting into the Square, where the Cathedral and Cloth Hall stand (or rather what is left of them), you see a hole 50 or 60 feet wide, exposing to view one of the main sewers; that was caused by a 'Jack Johnson.' Close by it stands an ambulance car, one wheel off and the body of the car riddled with pieces of shell. I heard afterwards that all they found of the driver was his legs. On the other side of the street is the churchyard. Scattered about are broken pieces of coffins and human bones blown up by the bursting shells. Of the Cathedral itself little was left, only the spire standing; the same with the Cloth Hall.

"Lying about everywhere are dead horses and men in various stages of decomposition. They cannot get them moved, as the place is under a continual shell fire. It is terrible to see our poor fellows lying there stretched out in death. Further on lies a motor-cycle, the driver (I expect he had been a despatch rider—one of the most dangerous jobs in this war), with his head blown clean off, lying close by.

"A little further on you come to the bridge leading over the Canal. This part is the worst in the whole town, as they keep on sending in shells, trying to blow up the bridge. We never let the grass grow under our wheels going over that bridge, but this morning we were just about to get on the bridge when a battery of artillery came galloping down the road and reached the bridge first. We had to wait nearly five minutes until they had passed. I think that was the worst five minutes I spent in my life; how we got through it without being smashed up I don't know."

The German attacks on Ypres did not cease with the closing of the gap along the Ypres, but the enemy's position was never so favourable afterwards, nor ours so critical. The closing of the gap converted what in the terrible days following the breaking of the line was a flank attack into a frontal attack. Moreover, the Germans were in constant difficulties in maintaining their position at the bridge head over the Yser against the French pressure, which was steadily increasing in the last days of April. Yet the bombardment and the gas discharges were kept up until the third week in May.

THE ATTACKS IN MAY.

On May 1st, England and France were astonished by the announcement that Dunkirk had been bombarded by the Germans. It was thought here at first that the bombardment must have come from some German cruiser that had sallied out of its harbours, but it presently appeared that the Germans had stationed a great gun near Dixmude, where desultory fighting had been going on throughout the month, and had bombarded Dunkirk from there. The distance from Dunkirk to Dixmude is twenty-three miles. Some twenty-three shells were thrown into the town, and fifty people killed and injured. This exploit had no military significance except as a somewhat childish advertisement of what the Germans could do if and when they reached Calais. It merely repeated in mangled human bodies the German boast that they could bombard Dover from Calais.

When May came in, the attacks showed a tendency to shift from the north to the east and the south-east side of Ypres. The reason was the German dislike of fighting on parallel fronts. They preferred best of all the enveloping tactics, such as the gap left by the French retirement gave them an opportunity of indulging in; and next to the exposed flank they preferred the attack on a salient, which gave them an opportunity of approach from two directions. After the withdrawal from St. Julien there was neither gap nor salient on this north side of the town. There was, however, a fairly-pronounced salient on the east side, where the line from St. Julien curves round through Zonnebeke and Gheluvelt. The German attacks at this section were very strongly pressed, and it was decided that the salient was too dangerous to hold. The new line to which the British retired early in May curved round north of Wieltje and Eksternest, to the east of Hooge. This involved a sacrifice of ground which had a great sentimental value to the British army, because it had been the scene of its hard-won victories in the previous autumn. Headquarters were then at Hooge; and at Gheluvelt, which had to be abandoned, the Worcesters had won undying fame. The French, moreover, had pleaded hard that we should hold on. On the 23rd, before the withdrawal to St. Julien, and again on the 29th, General Foch had urged Sir John French not to retire until his attacks had matured, and it was therefore doubly hard for the British Commander-in-Chief to have to issue the order for the concentration of the British line. But needs must, and the retirement was very skilfully carried out by General Sir Herbert Plumer, who was now in charge of the Ypres defences on this front.

A very fierce attack was made on May 5th in the direction followed by the enemy's attacks of the autumn, namely, on the south-east side. On that day he broke through our line near Hill 60 and reached as far as our support trenches, but was afterwards dislodged. On the following day he succeeded in establishing himself on the top of the hill. From the 8th to the 10th there was desperate fighting on the curve through Frezenberg and Verlorenhoek. "The enemy's bombardment," writes Sir John French, "completely obliterated the trenches, and caused enormous losses in the Fifth Corps, which was holding this section. It was followed by an infantry attack which temporarily broke our line." The following passage from General Plumer's report covers these most critical passages in the defence of Ypres:—

> "The right of one brigade was broken about 10-15 a.m.; then its centre, and then part of the left of the brigade in the next section to the south. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, however, although suffering very heavily, stuck to their fire or support trenches throughout the day. At this time two battalions were moved to General Headquarters second line astride the Menin road to support and cover the left of their division.
>
> "At 12-25 p.m. the centre of a brigade further to the left also broke; its right battalion, however, the 1st Suffolks, which had been refused to cover a gap, still held on and were apparently surrounded and overwhelmed. Meanwhile three more battalions had been moved up to reinforce, two other battalions were moved up in support to General Headquarters line, and an infantry brigade came up to the grounds of Vlamartinghe Château in corps reserve.
>
> "At 11-30 a.m. a small party of Germans attempted to advance against the left of the British line, but were destroyed by the Second Essex Regiment.
>
> "A counter-attack was launched at 3-30 p.m. by the First York and Lancaster Regiment, Third Middlesex Regiment, Second East Surrey Regiment, Second Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and the First Royal Warwickshire Regiment. The counter-attack reached Frezenberg, but was eventually driven back and held up on a line running about north and south through Verlorenhoek, despite repeated efforts to advance.

The Twelfth London Regiment on the left succeeded at great cost in reaching the original trench line, and did considerable execution with their machine gun.

"The Seventh Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the First East Lancashire Regiment attacked in a north-easterly direction towards Wieltje, and connected the old trench line with the ground gained by the counter-attack, the line being consolidated during the night.

"During the night orders were received that two cavalry divisions would be moved up and placed at the disposal of the Fifth Corps, and a Territorial division would be moved up to be used if required.

"On the 9th the Germans again repeated their bombardment. Very heavy shell fire was concentrated for two hours on the trenches of the Second Gloucestershire Regiment and Second Cameron Highlanders, followed by an infantry attack, which was successfully repulsed. The Germans again bombarded the salient, and a further attack in the afternoon succeeded in occupying 150 yards of trench. The Gloucesters counter-attacked, but suffered heavily, and the attack failed. The salient being very exposed to shell fire from both flanks, as well as in front, it was deemed advisable not to attempt to retake the trench at night, and a retrenchment was therefore dug across it.

"At 3 p.m. the enemy started to shell the whole front of the centre division, and it was reported that the right brigade of this division was being heavily punished, but continued to maintain its line.

"The trenches of the brigades on the left centre were also heavily shelled during the day and attacked by infantry. Both attacks were repulsed."

On May 16th, the French forced the Germans to evacuate the bridge head near Steenstraete, and developed a strong attack on Steenstraete itself, where there was house-to-house fighting. By the third week of May the attacks on Ypres seemed to have ceased, but they broke out afresh on May 24th, when there was an unusually copious discharge of gas against the section between Wieltje and Hooge. The advance was stopped, but as a result of the fighting there was a slight contraction of our line near Wieltje. At the end of May and the beginning of June there was very heavy fighting round Hooge, in which the Third Dragoon Guards distinguished themselves.

The accounts of the second Battle of Ypres are still very incomplete, but the old policy of suppressing the names of the regiments engaged has been to some extent relaxed, and opportunity was allowed to unofficial reporters of mentioning the names of some of the regiments that distinguished themselves. At the beginning of the battle the Canadians bore the brunt, and no praise of their achievements could be too high. But other regiments contributed to the repulse of the German attacks, and there would seem to have been no failures. Among the regiments mentioned in an unofficial despatch of March 25th are the Rifle Brigade, the Welsh Regiment, the Durham Territorials, the Lancashire Fusiliers, and the Essex Regiment. A message sent by the Colonel of the Welsh Regiment will, no doubt, become classical. "My right flank is enfiladed, but I am quite comfortable; machine-guns are operating on our left, but we can carry on all right." A grimly humorous story, the type of many, is that of the men who had been subject to a shelling for several hours, and when they saw the enemy's infantry attack beginning were so overjoyed that they mounted the parapets of their trenches and shouted, "Come on, you blighters, fight it out." The Germans were allowed to come within fifty yards, and were then annihilated by machine-gun and rifle fire. Magnificent and yet terrible was the valour of Private Lynn, of the Lancashire Fusiliers.

"Private Lynn, of the Lancashire Fusiliers, particularly distinguished himself during the gas attack. As soon as he saw the greenish cloud rolling towards the British trenches he put on his respirator and turned his machine-gun on the advancing gas, and also on to the German trenches beyond it. Even when the gas reached him he would not stop, but kept up a fierce fire. When the Germans began to leave their trenches to attack the half-unconscious but still determined British line, Lynn with a superhuman effort—for he was coughing badly by this time—lifted his gun right on to the parapet in the trench, and from there continued to play upon the advancing enemy, who, unable to stand up against such withering fire, finally turned and sought cover behind their own line. Even then Lynn was not satisfied, and he had to be literally dragged away from his gun. He was removed on an ambulance and died the same day."

A collection of the regimental records in this second Battle of Ypres would make as fine a monument of soldierly conduct as is to be found in our military history. But the higher the praise that is given to the men the greater become the doubts about other matters no less important in war than individual courage and regimental efficiency. This second Battle of Ypres was fought after seven months of comparative rest, in which there had been ample time to organise everything and ample opportnnity to provide for every emergency. It came at the beginning of what was expected to be a great offensive movement. It should have been a victory, and the beginning of decisive success. It was in fact—and all the valour of the troops cannot alter the fact—a defeat, happily not decisive, but still grave.





Two photographs of French heavy guns in action.
[*Photographic Service of the French Armies.*



French troops in the trenches. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*

CHAPTER XXX.

THE MOVEMENT ON LILLE.

THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF LILLE—THE BRITISH ATTACKS ON THE AUBERS RIDGE—REASONS FOR THE FAILURE—THE FIGHTING NEAR FESTUBERT—THE FRENCH FORWARD MOVEMENT FROM ARRAS—CAPTURE OF CARENCY—BREAKDOWN OF THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE—COMMENTS.

THE second Battle of Ypres (if battle it can be called that contained much more fighting than most campaigns) was part of a still larger battle which extended from the sea to beyond Arras. This battle began with fighting at Driegrachten, on the Yser; it entered on a sharper phase with the capture by the British of Hill 60; its centre of gravity was shifted further north by the gas attacks on Ypres, only to be brought south of the Lys again by the operations which are the subject of this chapter. It is misleading to think of the fighting on the Yser, the defence of Ypres, the attacks on the Aubers ridge, and the great French advance from Arras as separate military operations. They are all part of one great battle, lasting for two months and more, which fluctuated from one end to the other, not by accident but by design. Both sides were anxious to put their weight on their right, the Germans by way of Ypres, in pursuit of their plan of winning through to Calais and the French coasts, the Allies by way of Lille. The gas attack on Ypres was an interruption of the Allies' plans of attack on Lille, which had probably been formed at the time of the attack on Hill 60. After the April attacks on Ypres had been checked—though at a heavy sacrifice of life and land—the Allies were free to resume their designs on Lille.

Some degree of confidence, however, had been lost. It is a great shock to the command of an army which has prepared plans of attack to be faced with the necessity, as Sir John French was, of meeting an enemy attack at the opposite end of the line just when they were about to be put into execution. Even if the enemy's attack under such circumstances is entirely unsuccessful, it can hardly fail to disconcert. But the German attack on Ypres, though it failed in its main object, materially weakened the defence and brought the attackers' trenches, which were virtually siege lines, to within two miles at some points from the centre of the city. If the enemy could make so formidable an attack before the British attack began, might not his attacks from the vantage-ground gained be more dangerous later, if delivered when we were committed to an offensive movement for which immediate success could certainly not be predicted with confidence? The importance of the enemy's gas attacks on Ypres tended to be under-estimated in this country,

which regarded them more as atrocities than as part of a military plan, and was satisfied that they had not succeeded in depriving us of Ypres. We lost, however, very heavily in their repulse, and, what is more, they left us with a certain amount of anxiety for the security of our left wing. Sir John French did not feel himself justified in beginning his forward movement towards Lille until the second week of May, when the German attacks, though still continuing, were less dangerous. Had all gone well at the outset of the movement, Ypres would have ceased to trouble him. As it was, he began his movement with many backward glances towards Ypres, and with the fear that if he involved himself very deeply in prolonged and doubtful operations the penalty of failure might be not only a reverse in front of Lille but the jeopardy of Ypres and of all those vital British interests for which it stood. His task in making his decisions was not by any means an enviable one. Had the Ypres attacks not taken place, he would have been comparatively light-hearted.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LILLE.

But the fascination of Lille was not to be resisted. The British army had sat down for six months in the next valley to that in which Lille stood, separated at Bois Grenier, the nearest point in the British lines, by not more than ten miles, and even at Festubert by not more than fifteen miles, from the greatest victory that the war had to promise in the west. Lille was the greatest railway centre in France after Paris. A glance at the map of the railway system of Northern France (page 310) will show that the line through Lille is the most westerly of all the railway communications between Germany, Belgium, and France. The railway connections behind the Allied lines on the western front are singularly poor; the Germans, on the other hand, have the command of a number of railway systems connecting with the various points on their front. It was a great advantage to the Germans to hold the line through Lille, because its possession by the Allies would have redressed one of the disadvantages under which they laboured. It would, moreover, have forced the Germans to fall back to the next railway system, that through Valenciennes, which would have meant the abandonment of a not inconsiderable area of Artois and Picardy. That, however, was not all. On the maintenance of Lille depended the possession of all Flanders, for the main railway communications between Flanders and France pass through it. Its loss would have separated the German armies in Flanders from their armies in France, and have forced them to fall back from before Ypres and to abandon their project for the possession of the Straits. It was, lastly, a great manufacturing centre. In a word, it was, after Antwerp and Liége, strategically the most important town in the whole western campaign. This was the town on which the Allied commanders were now determined to move. In front of Lille there is the great bastion of La Bassée, which is impregnable by direct attack. It was necessary to go round, the British by the north, the French by the south. The French on the right wing had already opened their attacks. The British attack was delivered on Sunday, May 9th.



French soldiers in action with a mitrailleuse.
[*Photographic Service of the French Armies.*

THE ATTACK ON THE AUBERS RIDGE.

It was one of the most important battles of the war, but our whole official knowledge of it is contained in a few sentences in Sir John French's despatches. The first, published in the newspapers on the following morning, ran as follows:—

> "This morning our First Army attacked the enemy's line between Bois Grenier and Festubert, and gained ground south-east towards Fromelles. The fighting in this area still continues.
>
> "Our airmen made successful attacks on St. Andrè railway junction north of Lille, and on the canal bridge at Don. Fournes, Herlies, Marquillies, and La Bassée were also bombarded."

The long mailed despatch from Sir John French published two months later added very little, except that the enemy's position was stronger than was expected and that a more extensive artillery preparation was necessary to crush the resistance of the enemy's numerous fortified posts. This was an echo of the need on which

he had already insisted in his Neuve Chapelle despatch for unlimited supplies of ammunition. Nor was any reference made to it in the French or the German official bulletins as published in this country, Nor have any full unofficial accounts appeared of the battle except from the special correspondent of *The Times*, who is understood to have been Colonel Repington. In a telegram dated May 12th, he gave the following account of the action :—

"Sufficient details of the action have now filtered through to give an idea in broad outline of the course of the battle. Our attack began on Saturday with a terrific bombardment of the German trenches on the hills. Then our whole line advanced, from Festubert and Neuve Chapelle to the Bois Grenier, with its centre on Laventie.

"The right and the centre stormed the Aubers ridge; the left made a direct advance on Haubourdin, the south-western suburb of Lille. The right and the centre carried the first line of the enemy's trenches without serious opposition. They had been pounded to a shapeless mass by our artillery fire and practically abandoned by the enemy.

"The villages of Fromelles and Aubers fell into our hands.


Our troops, among whom were the Indians, pressed on to the second line. They came under a withering fire from rifles and machine-guns.

"The enemy's infantry was massed in great force on their second line, and had suffered little from our shells. These trenches were deep and reinforced with concrete, with underground galleries, giving almost complete immunity from shell fire. When our bombardment ceased and our infantry began the advance, the enemy issued from these subterranean shelters, manned their battered surface trenches, and turned upon our advancing troops the concentrated fire of massed machine guns.

"Our men fought like heroes in face of tremendous odds.

"On the left our troops were successful. They almost reached Haubourdin. Then the enemy's counter-attack was launched upon them. A fresh force in great numbers debouched from Lille and stayed their progress. Slowly, and fighting hard, we were driven back.

"But we retained a footing on the Aubers ridge and hold it still. Yesterday there was nothing but artillery fire."



A French soldier in a dug-out in one of the trenches in Flanders.
[*Photographic Service of the French Armies.*

THE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE.


Obviously, this attack was of the very highest importance, and equally obviously it ended in a defeat, though one that reflected more distinction on the troops engaged than some victories. In the wide area of the advance, covering almost the whole of our front south of the Lys, it was quite the most ambitious effort that our army had yet made. Moreover, it began by gaining a very remarkable initial success. Aubers we had tried to reach in the fighting at Neuve Chapelle, but had failed, in spite of efforts lasting into the third day. In this attack it fell into our hands in a few hours, and the advance from Bois Grenier on our left wing made such rapid progress that it almost reached Haubourdin, a suburb of Lille on its southern side.* From Bois Grenier to Haubourdin must be from seven to eight miles, and this distance must have been covered by soon after noon, for by evening the men were back almost in their original positions, and the retirement had been sullen and slow. The rate of advance on this left wing must have been rapid almost without precedent in this war since the field war had ceased and the trench war began. What, then, was the explanation of this rapid advance, followed by retirement? Something of the same kind had happened at Neuve Chapelle, for there almost all the ground, at any rate at the south end of our line, had been won in the first half hour of the battle, and the remaining seventy hours failed to make any appreciable advance. No detailed explanation has ever been given, but general statements have been made of the cause which undoubtedly reflected the opinion of Headquarters. Compare, for example, the sentences from Sir John French's despatch on Neuve Chapelle, already quoted (page 288), with the following passages from a telegram of the same special correspondent of *The Times*, who has told us practically all that is known of this second attack on the hills outside Lille.

"The results of our attacks on Sunday last in the districts of Fromelles and Richebourg were disappointing.

* It is strange that Sir John French's despatch does not mention Haubourdin, but its details are too meagre to justify any inference against the positive statement that we have quoted.




A barricade taken from the Germans at Neuville St. Vaast.
[*Photographic Service of the French Armies.*



A French heavy gun being fired from its concealed position in a wood.
[*Photographic Service of the French Armies.*

> We found the enemy much more strongly posted than we expected. We had not sufficient high-explosive to level his parapets to the ground after the French practice, and when our infantry gallantly stormed the trenches, as they did in both attacks, they found a garrison undismayed, many entanglements still intact, and maxims on all sides ready to pour in streams of bullets. We could not maintain ourselves in the trenches won, and our reserves were not thrown in because the conditions for success in an assault were not present.
>
> "The attacks were well planned and valiantly conducted. The infantry did splendidly, but the conditions were too hard. The want of an unlimited supply of high-explosive was a fatal bar to our success."

This explanation is itself in need of some further explanation. The lack of high-explosive shells had not prevented our left wing from making an amazingly rapid advance, which carried it to the suburbs of Lille. Many lines of trenches must have been carried to advance this distance, and, in fact, the advance was beaten back on this wing not by the failure to carry trenches, but by the failure to keep them against a powerful counter-attack, which, one would think, would have been more effectually stopped by shrapnel than by high-explosives. Against troops advancing in the open there can be no doubt that shrapnel—and British shrapnel fire is the best in the world—is more effective than high-explosive shells. The advantage of high-explosives is against troops in trenches The high-explosive shell breaks up trenches, whereas shrapnel is a man-killer, not a work-destroyer. The lack of high-explosive shells would therefore at first sight seem to be adequate as an explanation of the failure of the troops to make progress against the enemy's trenches—which was not the trouble on our left wing, at any rate—but not of the failure to hold our ground against counter-attack. What, however, seems to have happened is this. The left wing was able to make a rapid advance because its advance was in the nature of a surprise, and the enemy (who, as will be seen presently, had an attack of the French to deal with at the same time) was numerically very weak on this section of his front. When he saw, however, how serious his position at the northern end of his line was becoming, he was able to mass his troops for a counter-attack on this wing. That he would not have been able to do if the British right wing had been able to develop its attack. But it never made any real progress. The Germans, behind their elaborate entrenchments, were able to hold it back, while concentrating their main strength against our left flank, which, when it had crossed the Aubers ridge, found itself in air without supports, owing to the failure of the right to break down the defences opposite to it and come into alignment. It was this failure on the right that was due to the lack of the explosive shells necessary to break up the opposing entrenchments. The story of this battle is thus one of a brilliant tactical success on our left which was entirely thrown away and turned into defeat by the failure of its right wing to come into line. And that failure was due to lack of a sufficient number of high-explosive shells.



The approaches to Lille.

THE CAPTURE OF CARENCY.

The fighting on the Aubers ridge was the left wing of the attack on Lille. To the right of the British were the French under General Foch—the ablest of General Joffre's lieutenants. Between La Bassée and Arras, the German front bulged to the west in front of Lens, and even crossed the road from Béthune to take in Ablain and Carency. The citadel of this bastion is the hill Notre Dame de Lorette, near Ablain, which was to the French lines what La Bassée was to ours. On the same day as our attack on the Aubers ridge the French attacked north of Arras, and carried three lines of trenches near Carency. Pursuing their advantage, they crossed the road from Souchez, and stormed half the village of Neuville St. Vaast. The width of the front captured was more than four miles, and its depth in some places as much as two miles and a half. More than 3,000 prisoners and some fifty machine-guns were taken. The British attack on the Aubers ridge, though it did not establish itself, must have been

How, in the meantime, had the attack fared at the other end of the line?

a very great embarrassment to the Germans in resisting the French, and an excellent prospect now seemed to open up of skilful co-operation between the Allies. Unfortunately, the British were unable to do anything more for a week. The French, however, steadily pressed their gains. On Tuesday, May 11th, the French, attacking with great skill and dash, captured the chapel on Notre Dame de Lorette which had been stubbornly defended by the Germans for months. On the north of Notre Dame de Lorette they carried the whole system of trenches between Loos and Vermelles. The effect of the operations since Sunday had been to bring the French columns well round the flanks, both north and south of Carency, and on the following day Carency surrendered. The number of the prisoners taken by the French was now well over 5,000. These successes had been secured by the same methods of massed artillery fire as had won for the British their early successes at Neuve Chapelle, but the bombardment was more prolonged. More than 20,000 projectiles of all calibres were thrown on Carency. Even then, although the garrison had been reduced to perhaps a couple of thousand, it was not an easy task to take possession. For the final attack, which was directed from the east and the west sides of the town, the enemy had prepared elaborate defences. A large quarry, eighty yards deep, had been organised as a complete fort, with casemates and underground shelters, and the French lost heavily in the storming. The defenders, when they surrendered towards evening, numbered a thousand. They were the remnants of all the regiments who had been cut up in the fighting since the French attack had begun four days before—Bavarians, Saxons, and Badeners.



One of the communicating trenches to the French firing line.
[*Photographic Service of the French Armies.*

These were the best four days that the French had had since autumn, and they raised very great hopes. The French had bettered our example at Neuve Chapelle, thanks to a larger supply of high-explosive shells. Yet these victories had their dark side. That the losses of the French should be heavy was to be expected, for they were attacking positions which had been elaborated for many months. More serious was the evidence that the comparatively small number of the captured at Carency afforded of the great trouble that a garrison could give to an attack many times its superior in numbers. The lesson of the attack on Pietre was being repeated. Everything that it was customary to say fifteen years ago of the defensive power of the modern rifle was now doubly and trebly true of the machine-gun. The practice of the Germans—and this was the great advantage which they derived from the long elaboration of their field fortifications—was to hold their advanced positions with a mere handful of men, trusting to their defences to protect them from artillery fire, or to their machine-guns from infantry attack, and to keep their masses in reserve in the rear, ready to counter-attack if the position should be carried. This method had the further advantage of reducing the loss of life during the bombardment and of bringing the masses into action when it was at such close quarters that bombardment, at any rate by field and heavy artillery, was dangerous. It was new tactics, combining the advantages of open order and of massed attacks.

THE BATTLE OF FESTUBERT.


Late on Saturday night, May 15th, the British were again on the move, this time south of Neuve Chapelle, between Richebourg and Festubert. Here a German salient projected into the British lines and the object of the new movement (apart from the desire to help the French by engaging the enemy on our own front) was to straighten out our lines. Sir John French had decided on a night attack, although the dangers of these incursions in the dark into a maze of unfamiliar trenches was not overlooked. Fortunately, the enterprise was successful, and our gain on Sunday night and on the following days was nearly a mile. The operations were exceedingly difficult from the nature of the country, which was intersected by numerous ditches, but it was well managed and there were few mishaps. One of these was moving in its incident. It happened on Monday, in a night of pitch darkness. The Fourth Camerons—a battalion recruited in Skye and Inverness, and containing probably a greater number of men speaking Gaelic than any other battalion

in the army—moved out on the right wing to capture a trench. They found their way crossed by a ditch too wide to jump Under heavy shell fire they crossed, swimming or on planks. One company lost its direction, another was wiped out, but a third struggled on and captured the trench—a communication trench—down which the occupants bolted to the rear. The Highlanders strengthened the trench, and sent for bombers to go down the enemy's communication, and for a machine-gun. Later, a lieutenant, with two deerstalkers, volunteered to communicate with headquarters about their position. After a perilous journey they reached the connecting telephone, to find that it was out of order, and on their return a German attack was in full swing. It was decided to retire. Some slid over the parapet of the trench, which was a high one. Most escaped by pulling up the flooring boards, which are put down in wet weather, and crawling out through the space underneath. This has been described as the most difficult withdrawal ever made by British soldiers. The operations near Festubert were memorable for the terrible fate of a battalion of Saxons.

"The remains of a battalion of Saxons, having decided to surrender *en bloc*, advanced towards our line. Not knowing what the movement of this mass of men implied, our infantry poured a hail of bullets into them, whereupon the survivors, some hundreds strong, halted, threw down their rifles and held up their hands, and one of their number waved a white rag tied to a stick.

"Our guns continued to fire from the rear; and as soon as the Prussian infantry on the north of this point realised what their Saxon comrades were trying to do, they opened rapid fire from the flank, enfilading the mass. It appears also that the news of what was happening must have been telephoned back to the German artillery further east—which was also probably Prussian—since its guns suddenly opened on the Saxon infantry, and under this combined fire most of the latter were very soon accounted for.

"Amongst the many scenes of the war there has probably been no more strange spectacle than that of the masses of grey-coated soldiers standing out in the open, hands raised, amidst the dead and dying, being butchered by their own comrades before the eyes of the British infantry. The fact that the victims of this slaughter were Saxons was a source of regret to us, since the Saxons have always proved themselves more chivalrous and less brutal than either the Prussians or the Bavarians; in fact, cleaner fighters in every way."



A trench cut through one of the ruined buildings of a French town.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

Festubert was a battle of the Celtic regiments. Not only the Camerons, but the Welsh Fusiliers, won great distinction, and some days afterwards there were found eighty men of a company of Scots Guards, which had been missing, lying dead on grass which had been torn up by the fury of the fight, and surrounded by a heap of enemy corpses.

The French attacks continued until the middle of June, and in the course of them the French army did some of the finest work that was done in the war. The fighting at Souchez, Notre Dame de Lorette, and in the "Labyrinth," however, would seem to call for fuller treatment later. Here it is enough to say that the attacks stopped some three miles short of Lens, which was the objective of the French attacks, and that they obtained little active support from us.

THE BREAKDOWN AND ITS CAUSES.

The failure of the offensive, so far as the British army was concerned, was a bitter disappointment, for all through the winter hopes had been centred on what would happen in spring, and the remarkable success at the opening of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, though it had its dark side in the later stages of the battle, had encouraged these hopes. The circumstances of the failure made it the more disappointing. The Russians by this time were in very great difficulties, and the great German offensive in Galicia (to be described later), coupled with the beginning of the arrival of heavy British reinforcements, seemed to offer a better opportunity for decisive movements in the west than we had yet had, or were likely to have later in the year, if, as seemed not unlikely at the beginning of June, the Russians were to be so heavily defeated that the Germans would be able to transfer troops to the west and leave to the Austrians the task of guarding their frontiers and maintaining the ground won. At the beginning of May it



The entrance to a village on the French front captured from the Germans after desperate fighting. In the foreground is seen a stone barricade made by the Germans.

[*Photographic Service of the French Armies.*



Children playing among the ruins at Mont St. Eloi.

[*Photographic Service of the French Armies.*

seemed for the Western Allies that it must be then or not for many months if the German lines were to be broken and Lille recovered. The French, moreover, had been encouraged by Neuve Chapelle, and had built great hopes on the prospects of successful co-operation with the British in the direction of Lille. When the joint attack began on May 9th, the British and French were to all intents left and right wings of the same army. When, therefore, we were unable to continue our attacks it was a check, not only to our own but to the French offensive too, and it forced the French to choose between the disagreeable alternatives of suspending their attacks until we were sufficiently prepared to be able to take a decisive and continuous part in the plan, or else proceeding with their truncated plan and continuing their attack without our active assistance. For the first time we were not in a position to justify the hopes that our Allies had reposed in us, and which the great achievements of the British army in the earlier stages of the war had encouraged them to indulge. That our failure to play a continuous part in the offensive was not due to any lack of zeal on our side, but to circumstances over which the army in the field had very little control, did not alter the fact that at one of the critical moments of the war we were not able to second the efforts of the French as we could have wished. One gets the impression that Sir John French hardly expected to win through, and that his first general attack on the Aubers ridge, and the local movement near Festubert later, were made not in any confidence of decisive success, but in discharge of a duty that he felt was owing to our Allies.




A photograph taken during the capture of Neuville St. Vaast, showing the French soldiers engaged in house-to-house fighting.
[Topical Press.

The cause of the paralysis of the British power of offence—temporary, no doubt, but singularly unfortunate in the moment of its manifestation—is usually summed up in the phrase, "lack of high-explosive shells." And the summary gives, if not a complete, at any rate a convenient and not misleading idea of its causes. This is not the time or place to attempt to fix the responsibility for that shortage; the overt facts are summarised in the next chapter. But this greatest disappointment of the war—the failure of the operations in May and early June—is not to be left even in a History which is concerned to explore the facts of the war, and not the uncertain frontier lines between politics and military operations, without some attempt to obtain a general view of the causes of this disappointment. The causes would seem to be these:

First, and very important, was the surprise attack on Ypres, and the heavy losses of men and of ground that it caused. The loss of ground was particularly embarrassing to the attack further south, because it left the Germans in a position from which they could suddenly menace the security of our lines there. It is evident that Ypres was the source of constant anxiety to the British, and prevented us from risking as much as we might otherwise have done south of the Lys. Unless success was reasonably likely further south, Sir John French must have felt that he was taking risks which might imperil the safety of the British defences at Ypres. With the enemy so close to the Yser there, he knew that if he committed himself to dangerous operations of attack south of the Lys the fate of Ypres might be decided before he had time to draw off his attack and bring up the reinforcements that Ypres might badly need. He was not—with the responsibility of Ypres upon him—free to take risks that he might otherwise have done, and his standard of the likeliness of victory in attack was not unnaturally a high one. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence which the unfortunate turn of events at Ypres exercised on our offensive plans.

It is possible that if we had had enough high-explosives at the Battle of Aubers our right wing would have been able to demolish the German trenches and to support the remarkable advance of our left wing. But the problem of munitions that began to present itself to the country at this time was a much wider one than the provision of high-explosive shells. The French had high-explosive shells in unlimited quantities, and they materially contributed to their success, though perhaps to a less extent than is commonly supposed. But they




The Railway System of Northern France.

did not break the main German line, or even bring them quite level with the position that the British had acquired further north without these advantages. What is meant by the problem of munitions is more broadly the whole of the mechanical side of war. When every allowance is made for the extreme thoroughness with which the Germans had thought out the war beforehand, the fact remains that a great deal was left to be discovered in the course of the war. On the whole, the Germans learned the lessons of the war more readily than the Allies, and were quicker to adapt them. The Englishman prides himself on his adaptability to circumstances, and what he likes to call his bull-dog tenacity. Of the second quality the Frenchman gave an exhibition in this war that surpassed what was expected of him even by those who knew how false were the current ideas of his levity and impressionableness; in the first quality the German excelled, and quite belied the generally accepted idea of him as an obstinate conservative in matters military. The German started the war with singularly few military ideas that were not already common property. But they picked up ideas at an alarming rate as the war went on. The submarine blockade and gas bombardment, whatever may be thought of their immorality and cruelty, were at any rate notable examples of German adaptability to circumstances in war; but, apart from these, there are a sufficient number of more reputable instances. The whole art of trench warfare was elaborated in the most amazing ways. New tactics of defence were devised which were both effectual and economical of life. The capacity of the machine-gun, only half suspected at the beginning of the war, was realised early, and developed to a remarkable degree, comparable only to the remarkable use made of his rifle by the Boer. Instances might be multiplied almost indefinitely, but perhaps the most remarkable was the employment of massed artillery to break a strong defensive line at a particular point. The first use of this method in the war was by the British at Neuve Chapelle; yet, although we were the first to use the plan, the Germans were the first to apply it in Galicia on an extended scale, whereas we at the same time were still unequipped with the means of executing it. With the Germans, ideas materialised more promptly, and there was a quicker correspondence between thought and its execution. Yet the Germans neither in war nor in peace have been the great originators. In their whole


conduct of the war there was not visible a stroke of genius to compare with the strategy of General Joffre before the Battle of the Marne.

The problem of munitions was therefore an exceedingly wide one. The provision of heavy guns and of high-explosive shells was only one of its departments. The multipl cation of machine guns was a second, and the mobilisation of inventions another. Yet other departments were the development of new tactics of offence to correspond with the new weapons, for it is hardly conceivable that faults of leading did not contribute to our unsuccess as well as lack of materials, and a readier communication between the Intelligence and the Munitions Departments, such as would have made the surprise by gas attack impossible.


It was an enormous problem this, of suddenly adapting ourselves after generations of an entirely different school of national strategy to the methods of Europe in military affairs—a feat, if it could be accomplished in time, comparable to the substitution by Japan within a generation of a Western for her Eastern civilisation. Such a revolution was not for soldiers alone or mainly, but called for a statesman with imagination, in close touch with the people, and with power to harness their enthusiasm.



The ruined towers at Mont St. Eloi.
[Photographic Service of the French Armies.



Girl munition workers at their lathes in a Scottish mill. [*Central News.*



Students of the London Polytechnic employed on the manufacture of munitions.
[*Topical Press.*



Girl workers at the Ministry of Munitions, temporarily accommodated in a large tent at the back of the building. [*L.N.A.*

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE WAR CRISIS AT HOME.

THE PROBLEM OF MUNITIONS—EARLY FAILURES TO SOLVE—MR. LLOYD GEORGE ON THE HANDICAP OF DRINK—THE COALITION GOVERNMENT—THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS.

BETWEEN the beginning of March and the end of May, 1915, the war broke through the surface of politics. A series of controversies arose in the Press and in Parliament which culminated in the formation of a Coalition Government and the creation of a special Ministry of Munitions.

How far the political events were the result of a shortage of munitions is still a matter of secret history. In rapid outline the series of incidents as publicly known was as follows. At the end of February Mr. Lloyd George made a speech at Bangor, in which he referred to the effect of the lure of drink on a small minority of munition workers. There followed a controversy about the drink habits of working men. For many weeks there were inspired reports of a drastic scheme contemplated by the Government for the control of the liquor trade; then certain much milder proposals for dealing with the evil were put before Parliament, and in fact carried. A few days later *The Times* published a sensational despatch from its Military Correspondent at the front, declaring that operations were being hampered and lives lost by deficiency of high-explosive shells, and followed it up by an attack on Lord Kitchener as the responsible minister; almost at the same time Lord Fisher resigned from the Admiralty, and in a few days Mr. Asquith announced the formation of a Coalition Ministry.

To interpret these facts we must consider what was certainly going on underneath. The war became a siege war—a war of positions—in November, 1914. The importance of attacking entrenched positions by high-explosive shells, as distinct from shrapnel, was first realised about Christmas; and at the beginning of 1915 arrangements were put in hand by the War Office for producing much larger supplies. These arrangements necessarily took time for the adaptation of plant, and it is very evident that the output was not so rapid as was expected—manufacturers did not fulfil their contracts, and no doubt justly or unjustly, or half-justly, put the blame on the slackness and the drinking habits of their workpeople. But in a detailed consideration of the events of March, April, and May, one must remember that the War Office had already at the beginning of the year made its arrangements for the production of high-explosive shells, and that for one reason or another those arrangements had practically failed.

EARLY WARNINGS.

Mr. Lloyd George made his Bangor speech referring to the lure of drink on February 28th, and no doubt it reflected one of the explanations given by manufacturers who were failing to fulfil their contracts. On March 9th a Defence of the Realm Bill was introduced, giving the Government power to control and close any factory in order to expedite the production of war materials. The Bill provided that the Government should have power to require any work in any workshop to be done in accordance with the directions of the Admiralty or Army Council; to close any factory, or remove the plant from it, in order to increase the production of war material in other workshops; and to take possession of any unoccupied premises for the storage or the housing of workmen. An undertaking was given that compensation should be paid. Evidently this Bill was drafted to meet complaints from manufacturers of munitions about difficulties in obtaining plant and workmen in competition with firms engaged on commercial work. In introducing the Bill Mr. Lloyd George made the statement, very significant at this early stage, that "It is vitally important that we should increase the output and every facility for the output of munitions of war. The duration of the war depends upon it, and I think the success of the war depends upon it." At the same time, Mr. Lloyd George announced that the Government intended to create a Central Munitions Committee to organise the whole of the engineering community in order to increase the output. At the head of the Committee was to be "a good, strong business man, with some go in him, who will be able to push the thing through"—ever after referred to by the popular Press as "The man of push and go."



The Cabinet crisis: Lord Kitchener arriving at the War Office.
[Sport and General.


On March 15th Lord Kitchener made a frank statement to the House of Lords of the difficulty over the production of munitions. He said: "The output is not only not equal to our necessities, but does not fulfil our expectations, for a very large number of our orders have not been completed by the dates on which they were promised." He added that the armament firms had willingly undertaken orders of vast magnitude, that the great majority of their employees were working overtime and on night-shifts. The difficulty was in the failure to obtain sufficient labour, and delays in the production of the necessary plant. At the same time, Lord Kitchener referred to labour difficulties, which afterwards became matters of acute controversy. There were instances, he said, where absence, irregular timekeeping, and slack work had led to a marked diminution in the output of war factories; and he mentioned other difficulties caused by Trade Union restrictions, and invited the Trade Unions to waive their rules for the period of the war. "The supply of war material at the present moment and for the next two or three months," he concluded, "is causing me very serious anxiety." These difficulties and disappointments over output and the fulfilment of contracts must have been very largely concerned with the production of high-explosive shells.

Two days later, on March 17th, Mr. Lloyd George, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Runciman, as President of the Board of Trade, called a conference of Trade Union representatives at the Treasury. They invited the Trade Unionists to co-operate in solving the labour difficulties, at the same time pointing out the coercive powers already taken for dealing with factory owners.

The conference sat for three days, and the outcome of it was the issue of the series of "Recommendations to Workmen," signed by Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Runciman, Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. William Mosses (the chairman and secretary of the workmen's representatives). The recommendations were: No strikes for munition workers, arbitration on labour disputes, and relaxation of Trade Union rules and trade practices as to the use of unskilled and female labour.

THE HANDICAP OF STRONG DRINK.


All this time, since Mr. Lloyd George's Bangor speech at the end of February, desultory discussion was going on about the drinking habits of workmen and their effect on output. On March 29th a deputation of shipbuilding



Lord Lansdowne, Minister without Portfolio.
[*Lafayette, London.*



Lord Curzon, Lord Privy Seal.
[*L.N.A.*



Mr. Bonar Law, Colonial Secretary.
[*Bassano.*

employers waited on Mr. Lloyd George and urged the closing of public-houses and clubs in areas where munitions of war were being produced. The deputation was received in private, but in the official report issued it was stated that less than the normal number of hours per week was being worked in almost all the shipyards, and in spite of working night and day, seven days a week, less work was being turned out. The deputation declared that this was chiefly due to drink, and gave some figures of the takings of public-houses and instances of work delayed in support of their contention. Mr. Lloyd George, in reply to the deputation, said that he had a growing conviction, based on accumulating evidence, that nothing but root and branch methods would be of the slightest avail in dealing with this evil. "We are fighting Germany, Austria, and drink," he said, "and so far as I can see the greatest of these three deadly foes is drink. Success in war is now purely a question of munitions. I say that not on my own authority, but on the authority of our great General, Sir John French. He has made it quite clear what his conviction is on the subject."

These quotations show that already, early in March, the importance of munitions was being urged by General French, and was fully realised by Lord Kitchener and by Mr. Lloyd George, and that strenuous efforts were being made to increase the output. In his speech in the House of Lords, on March 15th, already quoted, Lord Kitchener definitely said: "The supply of war material at the present moment and for the next two or three months is causing me very serious anxiety . . . the output of every round of ammunition is of the utmost importance, and has a large influence on our operations in the field." It is important to remember these dates and warnings in view of the sensational despatch of *The Times* Military Correspondent exactly two months later.


At the time popular interest in Mr. Lloyd George's address to the shipbuilding employers concentrated entirely on the strong statements made about the effect of drink. There was immediately a violent controversy as to the justice of the charge brought by the employers and admitted by Mr. Lloyd George. Representatives of Labour denied the charges, and declared on the other hand that men employed on munitions were often working themselves to a standstill, and breaking down from overstrain. It was stated that there was a considerable increase in the sickness rate of the Trade Unions concerned, and that this was found among teetotal members as well as among the general body. This controversy continued for the next month, when Mr. Lloyd George brought forward in the House of Commons his proposals for dealing with the drink evil. On the day that Mr. Lloyd George met the shipbuilding employers he had an audience with the King, and was permitted to say that the King was very deeply concerned on this question. The following day (March 30th) Lord Stamfordham, writing for the King, addressed a letter to Mr. Lloyd George stating that from the evidence "it is without doubt largely due to drink that we are unable to secure the output of war material indispensable to meet the requirements of our army in the field." The letter concluded: "If it be deemed advisable, the King will be prepared to set the example by giving up all alcoholic liquor himself and issuing orders against its consumption in the Royal household, so that no difference shall be made, so far as His Majesty is concerned, between the treatment of rich and poor in this question." It was afterwards announced that this undertaking was to be carried out.

THE PROBLEM OF MUNITIONS NOT NEW.

In the meantime, while the drink controversy went on and proposals were being worked out by Mr. Lloyd George for dealing with the evil, other efforts were being made to organise the production of munitions, and other evidences were being published of the urgency of the need. Early in April a Departmental Committee of the War Office was appointed, with Lord Kitchener as chairman, and Mr. G. M. Booth, of the great Liverpool shipowning firm, as secretary. The work of this committee was to assist in expediting the supply of munitions of war. Mr. Booth was immediately identified by the popular Press as Mr. Lloyd George's "Man of push and go." In a somewhat vague relationship to this committee was a larger "Munitions of War Committee," which was appointed



Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Secretary for India.
[*Basanno.*



Mr. Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty.
[*J. Russell & Sons.*



Mr. Walter Long, President of the Local Government Board.
[*Lafayette, London.*

in March, and announced in the House of Commons by Mr. Asquith on April 15th. This committee was apparently intended to be in general control. Its chairman was Mr. Lloyd George, and its members, some of whom were Parliamentary and some technical experts, were Mr. Balfour, Mr. Montagu, Mr. G. M. Booth, Major-General von Donop, Mr. H. Baker (Financial Secretary to the War Office), Sir Frederick Black, Admiral Tudor, Mr. A. Henderson, M.P., and Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, with power to add to their number. It was explained that the functions of this committee were "to ensure the promptest and most efficient application of all the available productive resources of the country to the manufacture and supply of munitions of war for the navy and army."

The significant reference to the munitions difficulty in Sir John French's despatch on the battle of Neuve Chapelle has already been quoted. In dealing with the terribly heavy casualties, he said: "an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and the most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to the artillery commanders. I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss." This despatch was published on April 14th. On April 21st Mr. Lloyd George made an important speech in the House of Commons on the subject of our shell output. He stated that orders were placed in this country involving the employment of 2,500 to 3,000 firms on contracts and sub-contracts. The result had been an immense increase in output. Taking the figure 20 as representing our output of artillery ammunition in September, the output in the following months was in the ratio of—October, 90; November, 90; December, 156; January, 186; February, 256; March, 388. He admitted that there was need for still more, but said that the concern of the Government is "not any deficiency at the moment, but to supply the necessary amount of ammunition for the inevitable war policy of our generals." In the same speech Mr. Lloyd George declared that our production of high-explosives had been put on a footing which relieved us of all anxiety and enabled us to supply our Allies. Mr. Bonar Law, Leader of the Opposition, said that he was quite satisfied with this speech, and was inclined to think that the Government were doing everything that could be done.

THE LIQUOR PROPOSALS.

In the meantime, the question of a scheme for dealing with the Liquor Traffic was engaging the attention of Mr. Lloyd George and the Cabinet. It became known, and indeed inspired announcements were published, that Mr. Lloyd George contemplated no less a measure than the State purchase of the whole of the breweries and with them of the public-houses of the country—that is, of the whole machinery both of production (so far at least as regards beer) and of distribution of the Liquor Trade—with a view to bringing the whole problem of reform under the direct control of the Government. Temperance experts and trade experts were consulted, and brought more or less willingly to an agreement. The Leaders of the Opposition and the representatives of the Liquor Trade agreed to the measure on the understanding that the Trade should be fairly treated in the terms of purchase. There was, however, a great deal of opposition to the scheme on various grounds in the House of Commons, and it presently became evident that Mr. Lloyd George had not succeeded in persuading the Cabinet.


On April 20th, Mr. Asquith went to Newcastle, on a Trade Union invitation, to address the munitions workers of the Tyneside. "You may tell Lord Kitchener," the invitation added, "that we shall deliver the goods." Mr. Asquith summarised the measures that needed to be taken to increase output under three heads: "(1) Limitation of profits, (2) temporary suspension of restrictive rules and customs, and (3) the provision of reasonable compensation in cases of proved injury or loss." He denied that our army, or those of our Allies, were being hampered by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition. He denied also that there had been anything in the nature of general slackness on the part of either employers or employed. It was noted that he made no reference to the drink question, and the inference was drawn that he did not support any heroic measures for dealing with it. It must be remembered,



Mr. Arthur Henderson, Board of Education.
[*L.N.A.*



Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
[*Lafayette, London.*



Sir Edward Carson, Attorney-General.
[*J. Russell & Sons.*

however, that the occasion was hardly an appropriate one for reproaches.

Mr. Lloyd George at last introduced his drink proposals in the House of Commons on April 29th, in the form of a Defence of the Realm Amendment to No. 3 Bill, and a series of resolutions for heavy fresh taxation on liquor in this year's Budget. The duty on spirits was to be doubled; there was to be a graded surtax on beer of from 12s. to 26s. a barrel, according to the specific gravity (that is, roughly, in proportion to alcoholic strength); the duty on wines was to be quadrupled, and the tax on sparkling wines raised to 15s. a gallon. The Bill proposed that the Government should have power to proclaim any area a Munitions Area, and in that area to exercise unlimited control of the Liquor Traffic. The measure was to be administered by a Central Control Board, and it was to have the power of closing, or controlling, or taking over any public-house, of opening public-houses or canteens, without the formality of applying for a licence, and, if necessary, of taking over the whole business of supplying liquor to public-houses, clubs, or shops. In other words, a State liquor monopoly was to be created in the munitions areas, but without taking over the actual manufacture of drink. The proposals in the Defence of the Realm Bill were obviously the salvage of the original scheme of State purchase.

It was at once seen that the taxation proposals had no chance of being carried. It was scarcely believed that they were even intended to be carried. When Mr. Lloyd George made his Budget speech, on May 4th, he made no reference to the drink question. But Mr. Chamberlain took the occasion to attack them as "penal and crushing."

Both the official Opposition and the Irish Party were irreconcilably opposed to the taxes. On May 6th, Mr. Lloyd George introduced the Second Reading of the Defence of the Realm Bill, embodying his proposals for State control of the Liquor Traffic in prescribed areas. Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Redmond united in refusing to consent to the Second Reading of this Bill until the House was given assurances that the taxation proposals would be abandoned. To make sure, Mr. Redmond moved the adjournment of the debate until the question of the taxes had been settled. The Prime Minister accepted the motion, and the debate was adjourned.

This incident was regarded in Parliament as a severe blow to the Government, and it was taken by some members as bringing appreciably nearer the project of a Coalition Government, which had already been mooted in the Press. Twenty-four hours later the liquor taxes were completely abandoned, when it was announced that the only general measure taken outside the munitions areas would be to prohibit the sale of spirits under three years of age. This was to meet the supposed evil of raw spirit drinking by workmen in certain districts, especially in Scotland. The Bill enacting this was afterwards carried, with an understanding that compensation should be paid to distillers injured by its operation. The Bill for State control of the Liquor Traffic in prescribed munitions areas was carried on May 12th, and a Central Control Board was created to administer it. This ended the whole public discussion of the drinking habits of munitions workers. In the next few days a sensational series of political events took place.

THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

The Coalition Ministry came with startling suddenness. It was a complete surprise to the general public, and even in the House of Commons the first reports were received by most members with incredulity. The idea of a Coalition Government had, it is true, been advocated in a portion of the Unionist Press, with hints that it was a scheme under consideration. But on May 12th Mr. Asquith was asked in the House of Commons by Mr. Handel Booth, a Liberal member, whether he would "consider the desirability of admitting into the ranks of Ministers leading members of the various political parties." Mr. Asquith replied: "The step suggested by my right honourable friend *is not in contemplation*, and I am not aware that it would meet with general assent." Five days later, at most, the Coalition Government was in process of formation.

The intervening events have been generally taken to be the cause of the reconstruction of the Government,

but it is possible that they were rather the convenient occasion for it than the cause. They must, however, be recorded in connection with it.

On May 14th, *The Times* published a despatch from its military correspondent, Colonel Repington, describing the recent fighting about Ypres, and attributing the failure of certain British attacks and the heaviness of the casualties to "the want of an unlimited supply of high-explosives." The despatch created a great sensation. Colonel Repington was at the British Headquarters as the guest of General French when he sent it, though war correspondents were supposed to be barred from any place in or near the line of battle. It was generally supposed that the message reflected General French's views. Lord Kitchener referred to this despatch in the House of Lords the following day. "High-explosive shells for field-guns," he said, "have recently been brought into prominence by comments in the Press. *At an early stage in the war* we took the preliminary steps to manufacture these new projectiles; and though the introduction of any new departure in munitions of war naturally causes delay and difficulty to manufacturers, I am confident that in the very near future we shall be in a satisfactory position with regard to the supply of these shells to the army at the front." *The Times* followed this up by a leading article, putting some of the blame for the shortage of high-explosives on the Secretary for War. "Men died in heaps," it said, "on the Aubers ridge ten days ago because the field-guns were short, and gravely short, of high-explosive shells . . . . Lord Kitchener must bear his share of responsibility." The attack on Lord Kitchener as the minister responsible for the shortage of high-explosive shells was pursued for the next few days in *The Times* and other of the Northcliffe group of papers.



The entrance to the new Munitions Offices in Whitehall.
[*Sport and General.*

On May 18th, a still more sensational thing happened. It was announced in the Press that Lord Fisher had insisted on resigning from the post of First Sea Lord on account of differences with Mr. Churchill, the First Lord. On the same day the first newspaper report appeared of the formation of a Coalition Government, and the next day Mr. Asquith announced it in the House of Commons.

The remarkable thing about this announcement was that Mr. Asquith did not give even a hint of the reasons for the Coalition. He merely informed the House of the reconstruction of the Government "on a broader personal and political basis," adding that there would be no change in the head of the Government or in the Foreign Secretaryship, and that the reconstruction would be for the purposes of the war alone, and was not to be taken as indicating any surrender or compromise on anybody's part of political purposes and ideals.


Mr. Bonar Law, in his brief reply on behalf of the Opposition, threw no more light on the matter. He merely reiterated the assurance that the Coalition was for the prosecution of the war only, and that party causes would all be taken up again when the war was over. Immediately afterwards the House of Commons adjourned for a fortnight. The process of Cabinet making went on in the meantime, and occupied some two or three weeks, as far as the chief offices were concerned. The Cabinet, when completed, consisted of twenty-two members: twelve Liberals, eight Unionists, one Labour member, and Lord Kitchener. The Unionists added to the Cabinet were Lord Curzon, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Walter Long, Lord Selborne, and Sir Edward Carson. The eight Liberal members who retired from the Cabinet were Lord Haldane, Earl Beauchamp, Mr. E. S. Montagu, Mr. H. Samuel, Lord Lucas, Mr. J. A. Pease, Lord Emmott and Mr. C. E. Hobhouse.

There was also added to the Cabinet Mr. Arthur Henderson, chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, who became President of the Board of Education, with the duty besides of assisting the Government in labour matters. The co-operation of the Labour Party was not easily secured, and the decision to permit Mr. Henderson to take office was only carried by the votes of the executive of the party outside the House. A majority, though a very small one, of the Labour members in Parliament, was against it. The Irish Nationalists declined to accept

any share of office. Mr. John Redmond was pressed to take a seat in the Cabinet, but his decision and the decision of the party was against it. This was in accordance with the fixed policy of the Nationalist Party to take neither office nor emolument under the British Government until Home Rule is an accomplished fact. The Nationalists, however, promised the new Government the same loyal support in the prosecution of the war which they had given to the late Government. In several significant allusions to the abstention of the Nationalists, the Prime Minister showed that it was a deep disappointment to the Government, and that great importance had been attached to the absorption of all parties into the Administration.

In the course of filling up the minor offices of the Administration the Government caused serious offence to the Nationalists by nominating an extreme Orangeman, Mr. J. H. Campbell, to the Lord Chancellorship of Ireland. The Nationalists strongly protested against the appointment, and after a few days' "crisis" the Government gave way.

Two personal changes in the Administration call for notice—Lord Haldane's retirement and the transfer of Mr. Churchill from the post of First Lord of the Admiralty to a minor Cabinet office. The removal of Mr. Churchill from the Admiralty was evidently a result of the breach with Lord Fisher. But Mr. Churchill was succeeded by Mr. Balfour, who was understood to have been working very closely and sympathetically with him in all matters of policy. The dropping of Lord Haldane is difficult to explain. He was one of the strongest members of the late Government, and he belonged to the innermost circle of the Cabinet. Lord Haldane had done a great work in reorganising the War Office and creating the Territorial Force. The complete readiness and efficiency of the Expeditionary Force in the first days of the war was his doing. The only thing against him was that a loud clamour had been raised in a certain section of the newspapers about his German education, his studies in German philosophy, and his interesting but not important confession, long before the war, that Germany was his spiritual home. Liberal partisans believe that the Unionist leaders identified themselves with this vulgar and uneducated prejudice, and insisted that Lord Haldane should go. It is not unlikely that the Unionists insisted on Lord Haldane's retirement, but it is impossible to believe that they adopted the vulgar prejudice, though they may have thought it desirable to placate it.



Organising the War Industries: Mr. Lloyd George arriving at the Houldsworth Hall, Manchester, where he addressed a meeting on the Government's scheme. ["*Manchester Guardian*" *Copyright.*

THE REASONS FOR THE COALITION.

The reasons for the formation of the Coalition Government have never been adequately explained, and will only be fully known when the secret history of the period comes to be written, but two main facts stand out. On the one hand, the Liberal Cabinet was not so fully united as a Cabinet should be which is responsible for the conduct of a great war. The fiasco of the National Purchase Scheme proves it. On the other hand, whatever the cause, there had been a great and glaring failure in the supply of certain essential munitions. The personal responsibility for this failure has yet to be determined, but the ultimate responsibility could only rest on the Government, and the leaders of the Opposition might well say that unless the whole matter was to be gone into publicly in Parliament they must have a share at once in the control of the Administration. The first course was clearly undesirable, at such a time, in the public interest, and the second was adopted. But there is a broader aspect of the whole matter which suggests a more complete explanation.

In his letter to Mr. Bonar Law inviting the Unionists to enter the Ministry, Mr. Asquith wrote: "After long and careful consideration I have definitely come to the conclusion that *the conduct of the war to a successful and decisive issue cannot be effectively carried on* except by a Cabinet which represents all parties of the State. I need not enter into the reasons, sufficiently obvious, which point to this as the best solution, in the interests of the country, *of the problems which the war now presents.*" In agreeing to enter the Government Mr. Bonar Law replied: "The considerations to which you refer *have*

for some time been present to the mind of Lord Lansdowne and myself." These statements, obviously mutually understood by the two leaders, can hardly be read as referring to a munitions crisis, or to the resignation of a great permanent official. It would be an adequate explanation of the phrases used by both leaders if we suppose that they had come to the conviction that, in order to carry the war to a decisive conclusion, sacrifices of life and treasure must be exacted from the nation which only a Government of all parties, a ministry of national concentration, would have sufficient authority to enforce.

Mr. Asquith's public justification of the Coalition Ministry was given to the House of Commons on June 15th. In his speech he went out of his way to contradict all the current explanations of the Coalition. "Let me say at once, in the plainest possible terms," he said, "that I should not have been justified in doing what I have done under the pressure of any outside influence, or any temporary embarrassment, or any transient Parliamentary exigency." He declared that "no body of men could have done more, or could have done better," than the late Government. He stated very strongly all the reasons, political and historical, against coalition, and declared that there was not even anything gained in the substitution of A for B in this office or that. The justification of the Coalition was "a unique national exigency," a situation which made a demand "upon the energy and patriotism of the nation," and upon the confidence of the nation in the Government, which "could not be measured by any precedent." In a later speech in the same debate he dismissed as unfounded every criticism of the policy of the late Government.

A very important incident of the Coalition was the creation of a new ministry, the Ministry of Munitions, to which Mr. Lloyd George was appointed. The function of the new ministry was to organise the manufacturing resources of the country for the production of munitions of war—a task which had grown beyond the powers of any existing department. It was to gather up and solve all the problems which had been matters of such anxious discussion and effort since the beginning of the year. The drink evil had already been dealt with. The first act of the new Department was to introduce a Bill for dealing with labour difficulties. The Bill provided for compulsory arbitration in all labour disputes, and for the suspension of trade union rules and practices which tended to restrict output. It also put munition workers under certain restrictions as to leaving their employment. It was agreed that miners, who strongly resisted compulsory arbitration, should be exempted from the operation of the Bill. The Bill has only just become law, and no judgment is yet possible as to its efficacy. More important, however, than the details of any particular legislation was the thorough and efficient ventilation of the question that might be expected to follow the intervention of a man of such ebullient energy and remarkable power of working up popular enthusiasm.



The Cabinet crisis: Sir Edward Grey (wearing blue glasses) and Sir John Simon leaving Whitehall. [*Sport and General.*



A demonstration in support of Italian intervention in Rome. [*Topical Press.*

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE INTERVENTION OF ITALY.

THE ANOMALY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE—ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH AUSTRIA—CLAUSE VII. OF THE ALLIANCE—THE MEANING OF AUSTRIA'S ATTACK ON SERVIA—ITALY'S TITLE TO COMPENSATION—HER PROTEST AND DEMANDS—AUSTRIA'S REPLIES—DENUNCIATION OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE—SIGNOR GIOLITTI'S INTERVENTION—RESIGNATION OF THE MINISTRY—A POPULAR OUTBURST—TRIUMPH OF THE MINISTRY—THE SPIRIT OF ITALY—DECLARATION OF WAR

ITALY entered into the Triple Alliance in 1882; she formally denounced it on May 4th, 1912. The Alliance is one of the curiosities of history. It was essentially a compact not of peoples but of politicians; but the same might be said of many other famous international instruments. It was the result of the isolation of Italy after the Franco-Prussian war, and her fear of attack from France on the one hand and Austria on the other. Her original idea was to secure the support of Germany against both her rivals, but Bismarck's fixed determination to go hand in hand with Austria eventually compelled the Italian Ministers to accept an alliance which had a point only against France. Even here the hopes of Italy were disappointed. While Bismarck lived he did indeed give Italy what diplomatic support he could in Mediterranean questions, but he never had the least intention of running the risk of war simply in order to forward Italian ambitions on the north coast of Africa. His successors bettered his policy; France got her way; Italy became more and more discontented, and eventually made an accommodation with France, supported her against her own Allies—Germany and Austria—at the Conference of Algeciras, and was clearly gravitating towards the Triple Entente and away from the Triple Alliance.

That Italy entered the Alliance from a sense of fear and a dread of isolation did not make it remarkable. What was strange was that for over thirty years this Alliance existed between two Powers which had been bitter enemies in the past, were present rivals, and almost certainly the antagonists in a future war. The Alliance always suffered from the weakness that it had no root in the sympathies of the two peoples. "Berlin," wrote Crispi, the Italian statesman who had discussed with Bismarck the beginnings of this Alliance, "cannot be ignorant of the strength that diplomatic compacts derive in our day from the support of the masses, this being even more the case when those compacts imply brotherhood in arms and in the shedding of blood. The efficacy of alliances to-day is proportionate indeed to the degree of popularity they enjoy, and they cannot be popular unless their utility be manifest." So far, however, was there from being any community of interest or bond of sympathy between Austria and Italy, that even their rulers could not at times conceal the latent but deep hostility. The most striking instance of this had occurred



Popular feeling before the outbreak of war: Police barring streets of Rome in order to prevent disorder among the demonstrators on behalf of intervention. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Troops held in reserve in case of serious rioting. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*


in 1907, when the Austrian Chief of the General Staff had let it be known that in his opinion Austria should seize the opportunity to fall upon her Ally while she was engaged in the Tripolitan Expedition.

THE GROUNDS OF HOSTILITY.

The fact was that the future of Italy—all the hopes and ambitions which she cherished on her eastern frontiers both by land and sea—could only be realised at Austria's expense. Signor Salandra, who was Prime Minister of Italy at this period, defined the objects of his country as three, and there was none of them that did not involve a large surrender by Austria of her present rights or her ambitions for the future. "Italy," he said, "must defend the interests of the Italian race." She must, that was to say, recover for Italy those Italian regions which the War of Liberation had left within the Austrian Empire—Trent, the Italian-speaking lands of the Isonzo district, the Italian communities of the Istrian coast, and if not also Trieste, yet a large measure of independence for its Italian population, so that their Italian traditions and habit of mind should not be forced by Austria into an alien mould. The second ambition of Italy was to secure a better strategic frontier. Again, only Austria could give what was sought, holding, as she did, the gates of the mountains by which to send her armies down into the plains of Northern Italy. Third, but not least, Italy was concerned to make herself secure in the Adriatic. Her position there is one which an Englishman can well appreciate. Her eastern coast is a long and weakly-defended line, already exposed to attack from the Austrian bases at the head of the Adriatic, and certain to be endangered still more if at any time the Albanian coast fell into Austrian hands.



Signor Salandra. [*Stanleys Press Agency.*



Signor Giolitti. [*Record Press.*

It was largely the Adriatic question which gave the Balkans their importance in the eyes of Italy. The aim which Austria had for many years kept before her was to penetrate through Servia to Salonica and the Ægean Sea. If she came through Servia it was unlikely that she would not seek to absorb Albania and its coast, including Valona—the most valuable base still unoccupied in the Adriatic, and the possession of which by a hostile Power might easily close the whole sea to Italy. Italian policy, therefore, was designed, if possible, to acquire Valona and other bases on the eastern side of the sea, lest they should fall into possibly hostile hands; but, in any case, not to allow Austria to move one single step forward in the north without acquiring immediate and complete compensation for herself. To this end, agreements had been entered into between Austria and Italy on the subject of Albania, and a special clause was inserted in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance in order to deal with any change of conditions which one of the two Powers might bring about in the Balkans or on the neighbouring coasts. The careful and precise wording of this clause shows clearly the developments which each country feared, and how accurately they had foreshadowed the actual course of events. Never did two more jealous Powers enter into an alliance; never did Allies watch each other more jealously. Clause VII. of the Alliance ran as follows:—*

> "Austria-Hungary and Italy who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they will

* The extracts from the Triple Alliance appeared in the *Vossische Zeitung*, and were translated in *The Times* of June 1st.



After the Declaration of War: German beer being run away at an Italian Customs store.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Anti-German rioting in Milan: Burning the furniture from a German shop in one of the public squares.
[*Sport and General.*



Italy and her Neighbours.

give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the Ægean Seas become impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the *status quo* for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing *status quo*, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties."

AUSTRIA AND THE BALKAN WARS.

If Clause VII. had been drawn up entirely by the Italian Government it could scarcely have been better designed to meet the situation which arose after the Balkan Wars. The result of the first Balkan War was to dash all the plans of Austria. A strong and enlarged Servia now stood in her path, closely allied with Greece, which had come into possession of Salonica and the adjoining coast. Albania, indeed, had been rescued from Servia, and given an independent position, but Austria was not minded to accept even the partial aggrandisement of Servia. A statement which was made by Signor Giolitti in the Italian Chamber early in December, 1914, made it clear that even at the time of the Balkan Wars Austria had decided that she would not consent to the expulsion of the Turks from Macedonia, and the substitution for their rotten rule of a growing and ambitious Power. "In the summer of 1913," said Giolitti, "Austria had announced to her Allies, Germany and Italy, that she intended to take action against Servia, that she nevertheless regarded her policy as defensive, and considered that under the Triple Alliance she had a *casus fœderis*, and could call on her Allies to assist her." The Italian Government were agreed that the *casus fœderis* did not exist. "It is not a case of defence," Giolitti said to his Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, "because no one thinks of attacking Austria. It is necessary that Austria should be informed of this in the most formal manner, and Germany must be urged to take action to turn Austria from this very dangerous adventure."

The object of Austria in taking this course must have been to test the attitude of the Italian Government; it could scarcely have maintained seriously that it was the object of attack, present or intended, by Servia. Clauses III. and IV. of the Alliance, which also have been published in the German Press, show that Austria had no title to make any claim on the active help of her Allies, and that at the most she might only have attempted to argue that the expansion and the designs of Servia were so great a danger to her that she was compelled in self-defence to make war, and proposed, therefore,



Italian infantry on the march. [*Central News.*




Italian Bluejackets and transport waggons. [*Central News.*

to claim the "benevolent neutrality" of her Allies. These clauses were as follows :—

"CLAUSE III.—In case one or two of the high contracting parties, without direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one or more Great Powers not signatory of the present Treaty, and should become involved in a war with them, the *casus fœderis* would arise simultaneously for all the high contracting parties.

"CLAUSE IV.—In case a Great Power not signatory of the present Treaty should threaten the State security of one of the high contracting parties, and in case the threatened party should thereby be compelled to declare war against that Great Power, the two other contracting parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality towards their Ally. Each of them reserves its right in this case, to take part in the war if it thinks fit in order to make common cause with its Ally."



Baron Sonnino. [*Central News.*

THE POSITION IN 1914.

From the summer of 1913, therefore, the statesmen of the Triple Alliance must have known clearly where they stood. Austria had discovered that Italy would not support or countenance an unprovoked attack on Servia; Italy knew that this was a design which Austria had in mind, and which might at any moment be carried out with incalculable results to her interests in the Balkans and the Adriatic. When Austria, in the following year, made the assassination of the Archduke the pretext for her war on Servia, she showed that she had understood the lesson of the previous year. She came to no agreement with Italy, offered no compensation, did not consult with her, and did not even announce to her the steps which she was about to take. It was perfectly clear, therefore, that the provisions of the Triple Alliance—that is to say of Clause VII.—had been broken by the ultimatum of July 23rd, and two days later the Italian Government formally intimated to Austria that they were of that opinion.

The Marquis Di San Guiliano sent a despatch to the Duke of Avarna, the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, in which he stated that he and the Premier had pointed out to the Austrian Ambassador in Rome that "Austria had no right, according to the spirit of the Triple Alliance, to make a *démarche* like that made in Belgrade without coming to an agreement beforehand with her Allies." This was the formal protest made by Italy, who, while proclaiming her neutrality, thus indicated that in her own good time she might take up with Austria the question of Clause VII.



Gabriele d'Annunzio (on the left) as an officer of an Italian cavalry regiment. [*Record Press.*

OCCUPATION OF VALONA BY ITALY.


It was not until December that Italy came directly to the question of compensation with Austria, but at the end of October she took a step which indicated clearly what manner of course it was that she had marked out for herself. She occupied the island of Saseno and Valona, in front of which it lies, on the Albanian coast. The seizure of Valona gave Italy the control of both coasts at the mouth of the Adriatic. Italy now held the neck of the bottle, and Austria, with her fleet and commerce alike, was cooped up at the far end of the sea, and her access to the wider waters of the Mediterranean and beyond made dependent on the grace of her chief rival. In normal times Italy could not have gained Valona without drawing her sword against her Ally; if she took it now she was well aware that she would probably have to fight to retain possession of it against an Austria which emerged victorious from the war. It was a fair inference, therefore—since no one at this stage could say that Germany and



Reservists arriving in Rome for mobilisation. [*Central News.*



Italian infantry marching to the frontier after mobilisation. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*



Austrian offers and Italy's demands.

Austria were likely to be beaten—that the Italian Government had made up its mind to realise the interests of Italy to the full, and, unless the wholly unexpected should happen, to enter into the war on the side of the Allies. There were, as will be seen, other powerful reasons which impelled them to this end, besides the desire to attain the three objects described by Signor Salandra—the unity of the Italian race, a better frontier, and security in the Adriatic.

THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

Early in December the Italian Ministry entered on the negotiations which were to lead to war in May. They instructed the Duke of Avarna to make a formal demand on Austria for compensation, and they pointed out that Clause VII. of the Triple Alliance laid it down that compensation might have to be granted if advantages were obtained in the Balkans which were not of a territorial kind. This despatch, which was one of the most important published in the Italian Green Book on the negotiations, was as follows :—


> "The actual military advance of Austria-Hungary in Servia constitutes a fact which must be the object of examination on the part of the Italian and Austro-Hungarian Governments on the basis of the stipulations expressed in Article VII. of the Triple Alliance. According to this article it is the duty of the Austro-Hungarian Government to consult Italy even as regards a temporary occupation, and to come to an understanding in regard to compensations. The Imperial and Royal Government ought hence to have come to an agreement with us before the Austro-Hungarian army was ordered to cross the Servian frontier.
>
> "To make our attitude clearer we must remind the Imperial and Royal Government that during our war with Turkey it forbade us certain military operations which would have certainly shortened the duration of the war. Our operations against the Dardanelles also gave occasion for formal reservations on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government.
>
> "Italy has great interest in the maintenance of the full integrity as well as the political and economic independence of Servia. The Austro-Hungarian Government has declared on various occasions that it did not aim at territorial acquisitions at the expense of Servia, but such a declaration does not constitute a formal undertaking, and the very assurances which the Imperial and Royal Government gave us when Turkey entered the field suggest the possibility of further political modifications in the Balkan peninsula. It must also be noted that in accordance with the said Article VII. Italy may claim compensation for advantages not necessarily territorial which the Austro-Hungarian Government may obtain in the Balkan peninsula.
>
> "Signs of restlessness are noticeable in Parliament and in Italian public opinion which clearly show the tendency of the national aspirations of Italy. This restlessness, these aspirations, the Italian Government is bound serioualy to consider."

The Austrian Chancellor was still at this time Count Berchtold, whose policy had led to the war, and he

replied that such a momentary occupation as the Servian campaign was likely to entail could not be held to come within the scope of Clause VII. There was an unconscious irony about this answer, which was clearly inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Triple Alliance, for just about the time when it was made Austria was suffering her greatest and most humiliating defeat in the mountains of Servia. Possibly it was the knowledge of the extent of the reverses in Servia which led more completely to a change of mind in Count Berchtold, himself shortly to be thrown from power. At all events, before the end of the month he had admitted that any territorial occupation of Servia whatever gave Italy ground for a demand for compensation, and that an agreement with her ought to have been reached before Austria went to war.

PRINCE VON BÜLOW GOES TO ROME.

With the beginning of 1915 two new personages came on the scene. Count Berchtold had fallen, and the Hungarian statesman, Baron Burian, had taken his place. Prince von Bülow, the former German Chancellor, and, before that, German Ambassador in Rome, had been sent to Italy in order to sustain the wavering Ally in her neutrality. The rôle of Germany was two-fold. Headquarters in Berlin was to put pressure on Vienna in order to persuade her to satisfy Italian ambitions, and in Rome Von Bülow—who had numerous and powerful connections among the Italian nobility, to whom his wife belonged—was to impress the virtues of moderation on the Salandra Ministry, and, if it showed itself inclined to a warlike policy, to mobilise against it the whole of that extensive influence—political, commercial, financial—which Germany had for many years commanded in Italy.



An Austrian sentry on duty on a railway bridge near the Austro-Italian frontier. [*Photopress.*

Von Bülow opened his campaign by saying that Italy should have the purely Italian district of Trent after the war. The Austrian Minister in Rome, when sounded on the subject, had nothing to say about Trent, but desired to turn the attentions of Italy towards Albania, which, if it was there to be taken, was at any rate not Austria's to give away. Baron Sonnino, who had succeeded San Guiliano as Italian Foreign Minister, replied to these overtures by the remark that Italy's hopes might be said, in brief, to include both Trent and Trieste, to which Von Bülow rejoined that Austria would sooner fight than surrender Trieste. With February came a new stage. Since her last great defeat Austria had made no movement against Servia, nor did it seem likely that she would be able to do so, since all her fresh troops were tied up in the great Carpathian campaign. At the same time there were now and again rumours that a new expedition, possibly with German support, was preparing against Servia, and at any rate the unfortunate condition of that country, which was now stricken with a terrible epidemic of typhus, was such as to threaten a collapse if a fresh invasion in great force had to be met. The Italian Government apparently thought that a renewed invasion was not impossible, and they, therefore, warned Austria that she must not take any fresh action in the Balkans until she had made a definite agreement with Italy on the basis of Clause VII. of the Alliance. That there might be no possibility of misunderstanding, Baron Sonnino declared that his warning had "the precise significance of a veto" on any further advance by Austria. There was so far no indication that Austria took the situation seriously, or that she thought it would be necessary to cede any of her own territories. Baron Sonnino, therefore, on the 4th of March, summed up the Italian position as it stood at that moment. "First," he said, "there must be no further Austrian military action in the Balkans without an agreement as to compensation. Secondly, if this condition were broken, Italy would regain full liberty of action, and would take her own course. Thirdly, no agreement could be reached unless it were based on the surrender of land already in the possession of Austria. Fourthly, Italy must be compensated for what Austria had already done against Servia, even if she did nothing more; but if the advantage gained by Austria proved to be more than at present seemed likely, Italy's compensation must be proportionately increased. Fifthly, whatever territorial compensation was granted must be publicly announced,

and Italy must be allowed to enter into occupation at once."

This statement convinced the Austrian Chancellor that the situation was more critical than he had supposed, and he promptly agreed to accept the principle that Austria would have to surrender some of her own territory. But he refused entirely to allow Italy to enter into immediate occupation, and at this point Von Bülow intervened to save the situation. "Austria," he said, could not consent to surrender territory at once, but Germany herself would guarantee that Austria would fully execute all her promises when the war came to an end." On this basis, although it was not for one moment accepted by the Italian Government, Austria proceeded to frame her offer. First of all, however, Baron Burian drew up a list of pledges which Italy was to give in return for what she received. She must concede to Austria full liberty of action in the Balkans—Albania excluded; she must renounce the idea of any further compensation, whatever course the war might afterwards take in favour of Austria; she must pledge herself to benevolent neutrality of every kind for the duration of the war; and, finally, she must agree to carry out the existing agreement by which the two Powers undertook not to gain any advantage over each other in Albania. In return for these promises, Baron Burian undertook that Austria would surrender part of the Trentino, and he asked for counter proposals from Italy. These he received at the end of the first week in April, and they proved to be very much larger than anything which had yet been discussed. Italy demanded that she should receive the Trentino; that on the eastern frontier her boundaries should be advanced to the Isonzo river; and that she should occupy the strong and strategic positions of Tolmino, Gorizia, Gradisca, Plezzo, Monfalcone, and Malborghetto. Trieste was to be formed into a State independent of Austria. A number of the Dalmatian islands were to be surrendered. Italian sovereignty over Valona was to be recognised, and Austria was to declare herself disinterested in Albania.



Italian engineers fortifying a position on the frontier.
[*Topical Press.*

About this time there were rumours that Austria and Russia were likely to conclude a separate peace. Possibly they were put about in the hope of persuading Italy to be more lenient in her terms. The result, at any rate, was that the Italian Government pressed for a definite answer to its proposals. But it received no satisfaction, and at the end of the month the Duke of Avarna declared that Austria did not believe that Italy would really go to war, that she was merely procrastinating, and that an agreement could not be reached. On May 4th, Baron Sonnino denounced the Triple Alliance, and proclaimed that Italy had regained complete freedom of action. Meanwhile, the Italian Ministry, seeing that the rupture with Austria had become inevitable, had entered into negotiations with the Allies, and an agreement had been reached in principle. Its terms were kept secret; but apparently, besides giving to Italy the concessions which she had demanded from Austria on her northern and eastern fronts, it had assigned to her also Northern Dalmatia and the islands off the coast. The report of this last undertaking, which, if carried into effect, would involve the transference to Italy of a large Serbo-Croat population, led to some expressions of discontent in Servia.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI.

It now appeared that war was certain and imminent. Germany and Austria were faced with a fresh enemy, and with the knowledge that their diplomacy had suffered yet another disaster, and that when the war was done they, who were to have had the assistance of Italy against France and Russia, would not only have lost her aid for good, but had thrown her definitely into the ranks of their enemies. But Germany did not abandon the struggle. Von Bülow had certain resources to fall back upon, and he received a welcome and perhaps not unexpected ally, who, for a moment, seemed likely to turn Italy back from the path on which the Ministry had set her. Signor Giolitti came to Rome.

Signor Giolitti had for many years been virtually dictator of Italian politics. An astute manager of men, and an unrivalled manipulator of the political machine, he had gradually surrounded himself with a powerful



A demonstration of Italian residents, before the Italian Embassy in London, on the Declaration of War.
[*Central Press.*

corps of politicians and officials who could be depended on at any time to do his bidding. His career as Prime Minister had more than once been interrupted by failure and political scandal, and it had been his habit when the storm broke, or as soon as he thought it was about to break, to retire from office in favour of a partisan of his own, who would form a temporary "caretaker" Ministry, or an opponent who would hold office at his pleasure. In retirement, Signor Giolitti would await the moment when he could give the word to his followers and return to power once more. Already since the beginning of the war he had made it known through one of his senator friends that he thought Italy could and should settle her differences with Austria by process of bargaining, and it was discovered now when he came to Rome at the height of the political crisis that his opinions had not changed. On the precise nature of his motives it is only possible to speculate. He had once been regarded as the Italian representative of *Realpolitik*, which, eschewing sentiment, guides itself only by considerations of material interest. But even these principles do not entirely explain Giolitti's attitude. What was to be the future for Italy after the war? If the German Powers were beaten, what would be the standing of his country with the Allies, from whom in this great struggle she had stood aloof? And how, when the fate of Turkey, of the Near East, and of the Ægean was being settled, would Italy be able to make her views heard and secure her future? On the other hand, if Germany and Austria emerged victorious from the war, how would they deal with Italy—Austria having had wrenched from her a long list of concessions by the threat of war, and Germany triumphing over Europe and resentful of the Ally of whom before she had only been contemptuous?

These things at least, it might have been supposed, would have appealed to Signor Giolitti, although the larger vision which inspired the Italian Government and the great masses of the people—the idea of an Italy taking her stand on the side of the free nations, and making for herself a larger and more independent sphere of national action—awakened in him no response. At all events, his coming fell in aptly with the campaign which Germany entered on at the eleventh hour in order to overthrow Salandra. Von Bülow had reported to his Government that four-fifths of the Italian Senate and two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies were in favour of neutrality. To work upon their feelings, and especially on the inclinations of the Clericals, Herr Erzberger, the leader of the German Clerical party, was brought to Rome. While Prince von Bülow worked his hardest among his senatorial and noble friends, while Signor Giolitti made it known to all his adherents that he was on the side of the foreign Powers so busily intriguing against his own Government, and while Herr Erzberger co-operated with the Vatican in urging that Italy should make a peaceful agreement with the greatest Catholic Power, circulars were being distributed containing a list of the greatly extended concessions which Austria was at last prepared to make in order to avert war. It will be seen that these concessions went beyond anything

that Austria had hitherto taken into consideration. They were read to the Reichstag on May 18th by the German Chancellor, and that he read them was a formal indication to the world that the breaking point had then been reached. They were these, he said :—

"(1) The part of the Tyrol inhabited by the Italians to be ceded to Italy.

"(2) Likewise the western bank of the Isonzo, in so far as the population is purely Italian, and the town of Gradisca.

"(3) Trieste to be made an Imperial free city, receiving an administration giving an Italian character to the city, and to have an Italian university.

"(4) The recognition of Italian sovereignty over Valona and the sphere of interests belonging thereto.

"(5) Austria-Hungary declares her political disinterestedness regarding Albania.

"(6) The national interests of Italian nationals in Austria-Hungary to be particularly respected.

"(7) Austria-Hungary grants an amnesty for political or military criminals who are natives of the ceded territories.

"(8) The further wishes of Italy regarding general questions to be assured of every consideration.

"(9) Austria-Hungary after the conclusion of the agreement to give a solemn declaration concerning the concessions.

"(10) Mixed commissions for the regulation of details of the concessions to be appointed.

"(11) After the conclusion of the agreement Austro-Hungarian soldiers, natives of the occupied territories, shall not further participate in the war."

There was one detail that was even yet to be added. On the next day the Austrian Embassy added a further clause. The Commissions, it said, which were to settle the boundaries of the territorial concessions, would begin their work immediately the agreement was concluded, and as soon as they had reached a decision the territories surrendered would be assigned to Italy. But the moment had long passed for a promise of this kind to have effect.

DEFEAT OF THE INTRIGUERS.

Faced by the combined manœuvres of Giolitti, Von Bülow, Herr Erzberger, and all their train, the Salandra Ministry resigned on May 13th. For a moment it seemed possible that Italy would turn back. But Signor Giolitti's political acuteness had for once completely failed him. He was unable to read the temper of his own people, or to see that there was something afoot now which was bigger than a mere rivalry between Austria and Italy, to be settled by give-and-take, by haggling for patches of frontier, or bargaining about the neutrality of Albania. Even the three-fold programme of Italian aspirations which the Salandra Ministry had set before itself in the winter no longer expressed the hopes and fears which possessed the minds of the Italian people. Their sympathies, which from the beginning had been almost entirely with France and England, had been intensified, like those of every freedom-loving people, by the spirit and temper in which Germany had entered on and waged the war. They had sometimes said to themselves in earlier years that they were the vassal of Germany and the Alliance ; they saw now in earnest that nothing less would be their future if they bargained with Austria and the German Powers triumphed in the war. "Suppose," said Signor Salandra, a few days later, "that Austria had refused at the end of the war to carry out her promises—



Italian reservists leaving Charing Cross Station after the outbreak of war. [*Sport and General.*

to whom should we address ourselves? To our common superior, to Germany?" In some degree the Italian people felt as M. Venizelos felt when he addressed to the King of Greece his memorandum declaring that the future of the small and weak States was bound up with the defeat of Germany and the success of the Allies. Italy was not a small and weak State like one of those in the Balkans. She was a great Power, proud and ambitious, but she was much weaker both in a military and an economic sense than Germany, and for her no less than for smaller States the triumph of her German Allies meant a future of dependence. There was, too, a strong popular feeling that Italy was too much regarded as an appendage of the Germans. The poet D'Annunzio, who came to Rome at this time and played no small part in rousing the people by his impassioned appeals that they should play a worthy and generous part in a war of liberation, made this one of his most telling points. "We are not," he said, "and we will not be, a museum, an inn, a village summer resort, a sky painted with Prussian blue for international honeymoon couples, a delightful market for buying and selling, fraud and barter."

It was precisely at this moment that the Italians found that the diplomatic machinery of Germany and Austria, official and unofficial, was being used to step in between the Government which represented Italy and the wishes of the people. Then a storm broke which few had foreseen. Throughout Italy there were passionate demonstrations of anger against the intriguers, both Italian and German, who had overthrown the Ministry. Some months before, an acute observer had said that eventually those who guided the policy of Italy would have to choose between war with Austria and revolution. The saying was not so exaggerated as it had seemed to be at the time. The adherents of Signor Giolitti were attacked in the streets. German institutions and those which favoured Germany were assailed. Giolitti himself was the object of bitter and almost universal execration. "An immense outburst of indignation," said Salandra, summing up the history of these days, "was kindled through Italy, and not among the populace only, but among the noblest and most educated classes, and among all the youth of the country, which is ready to shed its blood for the nation." The politicians were quick to read such signs as these. The statesmen whom the King consulted declined to make any attempt to form a Ministry. The reports that Giolitti would become Premier, or take a seat in someone else's Cabinet, died away. It was found that three hundred Conservative and Clerical deputies, who had been regarded as neutralists, were, after all, quite open to conviction. Neutralist editors saw the light with the suddenness and certitude of an evangelical conversion. Every obstacle was consumed in the flame of popular passion. On May 16th the King intimated to Signor Salandra that he should remain in office with his Ministry. Signor Giolitti withdrew from Rome. The neutralists were heard no longer. Parliament met and gave the Ministry an overwhelming vote of confidence. On May 23rd war was declared on Austria.



Windhoek, the capital of South-West Africa. [*Topical Press.*

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

DIFFICULTIES OF THE INVASION—THE END OF MARITZ—MACKENZIE'S ADVANCE—THE ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH—THE NORTHERN FORCE—THE POISONING OF WELLS—WINDHOEK AND AFTER.

BEFORE Christmas, 1914, General Botha had sufficiently completed his brilliant rounding-up of the rebels in the Free State and Transvaal to allow the attack on German South-West Africa, suspended for three months, to be energetically renewed. The plan of the attack was rigorously determined by the physical features of the colony. The fertile centre of South-West Africa, in which the capital and chief settlements are situated, lies on a tableland surrounded on all sides by a girdle of desert, rising in parts into bare and forbidding mountains, baked by an intolerable sun, and swept by violent sandstorms. Inside this belt of wilderness a railway system, some 900 miles in length, runs from end to end of the agricultural part of the colony, linking Grootfontein, on the extreme north, with Kalkfontein, near the Union frontier, on the south, and touching Windhoek, the capital, Keetmanshoop, and most of the other important settlements. From this backbone of railway two branches stretch westward across the desert to the colony's only ports, Luderitz Bay and Swakopmund. A little to the south of Swakopmund lies the little British possession, Walfish Bay, which, in spite of its enclosure by German territory and its lack of railway communication with the interior, we had retained because of its excellent harbour and its value as a whaling station. It was now to prove of the first value.

To the north of the Germans lay the invertebrate and badly-administered Portuguese territory of Angola. Advance from the east was blocked by the Great Kalahari Desert in Bechuanaland; on the south, approach had to be made through the difficult and sparsely-populated part of the North-West Cape, which had given us so much trouble in the South African war, and where the scarcity of roads and railways made advance doubly difficult. The Germans were not content with the great natural defences of their colony. They meditated aggression, and prepared for it with characteristic thoroughness. For years three-fourths of the money voted for the colony by the Reichstag had been put to military uses. We have already seen (Vol. I., Chap. XXV.) that they had concentrated, as near Union territory as their railways would allow, a force of troops, artillery, and aeroplanes quite disproportionate to their defensive needs. Their intention was, when the disaffection which their agents



A detachment of the German Camel Corps on the march in South-West Africa.
[*Underwood & Underwood.*



German cavalry in South-West Africa. [*Underwood & Underwood.*

had encouraged among the Dutch in the Union, and which Maritz assured them would be widespread, came to a head, to take command of the rebels, supply them with the arms they lacked, and march on Pretoria. Whether they would, if successful, have fulfilled their promise to the Boers by establishing the old Republics may be left to conjecture. In the face of any considerable German-cum-rebel invasion of the Union, General Botha could not, of course, have spared sufficient men to attack the German colony. The failure of the rebellion, the speed of the Union's recovery, and the force of her reply, paralysed the enemy. German South-West Africa went down in reality before a characteristic mistake of the Wilhelmstrasse, to which the ready treachery of Maritz and the open discontent of a few Boer irreconcilables lent colour.

It is curious now to reflect that had we taken Bismarck's early advice we might have had the colony as a gift. When the enterprising Bremen merchant, Luderitz, landed at the bay named after him, Germany had not yet embarked upon a colonial policy, and Bismarck believed that if she were wise she never would. He consulted us before he gave the Imperial blessing to Luderitz, and asked us if we would extend our protection to the new settlement. We had our hands full at the time, and declined. In 1884 Bismarck annexed Damaraland and Namaqualand, and soon a sanguinary war with its native population gave the colony an excuse for a bloated military expenditure. With the Boer War came the idea of shaping racial differences in South Africa to German ends, and thenceforward the Imperial Government seems to have counted less on the likelihood of having to defend the colony than on the chances of using it for a successful attack on its southern neighbour.

THE END OF MARITZ.

The danger to the Union of invasion was not quite ended with the breaking of the rebellion. Maritz and Kemp were still menacing the frontier with a force of mixed rebels and Germans. On December 22nd, with 800 men, they attacked a Union force half their size at Nous, near Schuit Drift, on the Orange River. Beaten off, they turned north and then east, and on January 24th, 1,200 strong, with four field guns and two pom-poms, they penetrated some seventy-five miles into the Union, and fell unexpectedly on the town of Upington, which was defended by commandoes under Colonel Van Deventer. They bombarded the town for three hours from the north bank of the river, but Van Deventer was then able to take the offensive and pursue them for fifteen miles. This was the last serious attempt of Maritz to justify himself to the Germans. It took what spirit was left out of the rebels under him, and completed his disgrace with his Allies, to whom he had promised the immediate support of at least 10,000, whereas he brought them at the most no more than 1,500. His burghers realised that they had been duped with the story of the restoration of the Republics, and told him so. Kemp and his commando, including the troublesome "prophet" Van Rensburg, surrendered at once, and the rest of the 1,200 or so rebels still with the Germans came in soon after. Hot on their heels, and designed perhaps to head them off, came a purely German attack on Kakamas, between Upington and the border. The enemy again bombarded from across the Orange River, with no better result than before. The defenders forced the river and routed them, and henceforth the frontier was safe. The chief fords of the Orange River were held and kept by us, and were soon made bases for an advance. Maritz, suspected by the Germans of double-dealing in the matter of the surrender of his men, took no further part in hostilities, and fled, it was said, towards Central Africa. The history of his rebellion proved him a man of as little judgment as honour. He fell an easy prey to the promises the Germans held out in the preposterous "treaty" which he signed with the Governor of South-West Africa; he deluded them in turn into believing that they could march on Pretoria with the Transvaal and Free State at their backs; and he failed utterly to gauge the light in which the great mass of Dutch South Africans would regard his treachery.

The Union was now secure from invasion, and the attack on South-West Africa could be resumed. The troops used in the suppression of the rebellion were insufficient for so arduous a campaign, and commandeering was resorted to. In view of the recent troubles, the experiment might seem to British eyes a dangerous one. The South African point of view was well explained in an announcement made by the Union Government on January 1st:—

> "There is a very large section of the Dutch-speaking community, with the most excellent military qualifications and war experience, who are perfectly ready to give their services in freeing South Africa from the menace of German militarism, but who have a fundamental prejudice against the principle of volunteering. Shortly, their attitude is that if the Government require their services they should commandeer them. A Proclamation, therefore, is being issued to-day providing the legal machinery to meet this feeling.
>
> "While maintaining its undoubted constitutional right to demand the personal service of all able-bodied citizens, the Government desires to avoid imposing avoidable hardship. The Proclamation therefore calls upon certain areas to contribute a reasonable quota of the men required, leaving the local officers to make the most suitable selections, retaining, however, the right of legal compulsion."

Some 500 men advanced to their local commandants reasons why they should not serve, while professing willingness to do so if these reasons were duly considered and met. Local boards, consisting of a magistrate, a district staff officer, and a local commandant were appointed to weigh these cases, with good results. Seventy-one men refused point-blank to serve, and these were court-martialled. The backbone of General Botha's armies was thus composed of commandoes organised on the old territorial lines, together with units of the Defence Force, such as the Cape Field Artillery, the South African Mounted Riflemen, and the Rand Light Infantry, and regiments with some special sentimental bond, such as Major Naude's Scouts, the South African Irish, and the Transvaal Scottish. A striking picture of the variety and toughness of the army that resulted from these means of recruiting was given in a letter from a correspondent with the Northern Force:—

> "We are an odd assortment of humanity in the Northern Force. There are men from Delagoa, men from Rhodesia, others from the malarial swamps of Central Africa, one hard-bitten warrior from Lake N'gami, and a wiry contingent of Swazies (all quite white, but occasionally heard to discourse in wild and wonderful languages). Then there are men who call a 'dixie' a 'billy,' and prate of the 'swag' and 'humping the bluey,' while others, from the rugged Rockies 'guess and calc'late' as to the duration of the campaign, in company with the bronzed, bearded, and 'happy-go-lucky' denizens of the illimitable veld. Intermingled with these woolly veterans are lawyers, doctors, magistrates, bankers, editors, farmers, and a whole 'Empire' full of actors and songsters, from whom the material for our concerts is drawn. Such, for the most



General Smuts (marked x) reviewing some of the troops returned from South-West Africa at Johannesburg. [*I..N.A.*



General Botha and his Staff in the field. [*Underwood & Underwood.*

part, is our composition, and a more formidable force it would be hard to find. With the majority, campaigning comes as naturally and gracefully as (to use a colloquialism) 'falling off a log,' and a camp on the unutterable sand dunes, or the luxury of being billeted in a furnished domicile in Swakopmund, is all one and the same to the old stager. Nothing comes amiss."

The plan of invasion consisted in an attack from four points. General Botha himself, using Walfish Bay as a base, was to capture the port and railway terminus of Swakopmund, which adjoins it, and, taking the line of the railway inland from that point, descend on Windhoek from the north. Sir Duncan Mackenzie and his men had been in possession of the other port, Luderitz Bay, since September, and awaited only a combined effort to advance along the railway which crosses the desert from Luderitz. Colonel Van Deventer, advancing from the Orange River, was to round up the enemy in the south of the colony, while a small force under Colonel Berrange would drive in his outposts on the east. As the campaign developed, the Central Force under Mackenzie, the Southern under Van Deventer, and the Eastern under Berrange were to join and advance on Windhoek from the south to meet the Northern Force under Botha.

MACKENZIE'S ADVANCE.

The Central Force, operating from Luderitz, was the first to move. A Lancashire man serving with it gave, in a letter home, a vivid description of Luderitz and the country beyond :—

"Luderitz is a barren-looking spot on the coast. Not a drop of fresh water nor a blade of grass or any other vegetation is to be seen. All the water used by the inhabitants has to be condensed from sea water.

"The houses are exceptionally well built, though the streets and roads are very bad, being about two feet deep in soft sand, which no doubt accounts for our failing to find any vehicles, motor-cars, motor-cycles, or cycles here. Not a sign of any plant life—nothing but rock and sand, sand and rock. One thing I noticed, and that was that there were no poor people in Luderitz, all the houses being splendidly furnished.

"From the coast to the fertile country inland there extends a sand belt, eighty to a hundred miles in width, and until this is crossed not a well, spring, stream, or a speck of vegetation is to be found, even though one searched with a microscope.


"The heat at our present camping-place is terrific, being about 120 in the shade, and to make matters worse the wind rises about ten a.m. daily and blows a gale until eight p.m., the result being a continual sandstorm, at times so severe that it is impossible for one to see a foot ahead. All the troops have had sand goggles issued to them, and they are really necessary. What with wind and dust and the scarcity of water, this is really the worst stretch of country I've ever struck."

The Germans retired by the railway, blowing it up behind them. Mackenzie had therefore to repair the line as he went, transport all his water from Luderitz Bay, guard his line of communication, and maintain the spirit of his men against continuous German rearguard actions and aeroplane attacks. His first objective was Chaukaib, forty-five miles inland. He moved forward at an average rate of two days to the mile, taking ninety days to reach Chaukaib. He fought continuous outpost actions, and all the while his men, in the words of one of them, were "daily swallowing huge mouthfuls of the astringent iron-laden dust, which is fashioned by ever-recurring winds into the most infernal fog, and daily burning perceptibly under a sun which shows its limitations only by not blistering the metallic water bottles." On the way to Chaukaib a diversion was made to take possession of the colony's diamond mine, discovered in 1898. The stones are easily got, as one or two lucky troopers discovered, and the annual value of its output is about £1,000,000.

Chaukaib differed little from the rest of the desert except that a few shanties marked it as a railway halt, but here a base was made for some weeks, and here on February 8th General Botha inspected the troops. He approached in an open truck along the repaired railway which the Union forces had built a foot above the desert, and which had to be constantly guarded from disappearance in the sand, and he had a warm greeting from the scores of blockhouses along the line. "It was an event to be remembered," wrote a correspondent with the force, "this review in the heart of the desert, in sight of the enemy's outposts, under a blazing African sun, and amid an apparently illimitable expanse of sand save on the east, where by now the ridges of the verdant interior rise high above the horizon. There was something unique in such a setting, in the stirring skirl of the pipes as the Highlanders, men of magnificent physique, swung by, and in the drums and fifes and bugles playing the other units past this Dutch Commander-in-Chief, who, attended by a mixed Dutch and English staff, stood under a great Union Jack—the only splash of colour in this drab patchwork of sand and khaki—taking the salute, and, when all was over, doffing his helmet and calling for three cheers for His Majesty the King."

The next move was to Garub, twenty miles further on. The railway had been blown up wherever the Germans could conveniently attach a charge of dynamite, but the whole stretch of it was repaired in a fortnight. Garub was found to consist of a ruined station house and refreshment room, and the rusty odds and ends of what had been pumping plant all concealed behind a giant sand dune. For some days, until a new water supply could be tapped, water for the army had still to be condensed at Luderitz and brought seventy-five miles across the desert. The enemy at this time made constant use of a biplane, which visited the Union lines almost daily, dropping shells and dart-bombs, but doing little damage.

If Chaukaib had been hot, Garub was hotter. "Some years ago," wrote a trooper in his diary, "I substituted Mombasa for Colombo as the Place of Heat. I am now deposing Mombasa in favour of Garub. I don't expect to have to make another alteration." It was, moreover, subject to frightful sandstorms, which blew tents from their places, buried baggage and utensils, half suffocated the men with sand "about the consistency of oatmeal," and even altered the topography of the district. Garub brought the troops within sight of the important military post of Aus, some twenty miles further on. Here the desert ends in a range of bare hills, some four thousand feet high, across which lies the fertile tableland which gives the colony its value. Through two neks in these hills lay the approach to Aus, and in the advance through these neks it became fully apparent for the first time how entirely the strength and perseverance of the attack had upset the German plans. The approaches to Aus were defended by deep, well-designed trenches, with a telephonic system involving thirty miles of wire, and they bristled with gun emplacements, wire entanglements, and land mines. Yet the enemy made no serious attempt at defence. They destroyed the railway, taking the lines with them, filled up or poisoned the water-holes, and offered a few rearguard actions, but Mackenzie was



THE LINES OF ADVANCE IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

able to occupy the settlement on April 2nd with few casualties.

The forces had some narrow escapes from land mines. A mule exploded one in Aus Nek, and four mules were blown to fragments. The mine was composed of over a hundred sticks of gelatine and thirty pom-pom shells. The wheels of a gun carriage passed eighteen inches from another mine, a horse exploded a third in a stable at Aus, and many were discovered by the engineers and destroyed without damage.

THE ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH.

The Germans had not expected Mackenzie to bring so large a force almost intact through the desert, but they would no doubt have made a stand at Aus had they not had news from the south of their colony which the Windhoek paper described as "the most depressing they had yet received." It was on operations in the south, extending, with Boer assistance, into the Union, that they had chiefly counted for their success. We have seen how quickly and thoroughly the rebellion was ended, and how entirely the German-rebel attacks on Upington and Kakamas failed. Colonel Van Deventer lost no time in carrying the war into the enemy's country. He was reinforced by troops shipped to Port Nolloth (see map, p. 340), railed to Steinkop, and thence marched *via* Raman's Drift across the Orange River to advance on Warmbad. This town, the chief military post in the southern part of the colony, and the base at the beginning of the war for the enemy's operations against the Union, was occupied on April 4th. Meanwhile, Van Deventer had pushed his right flank across the Orange River at Schuit Drift, about a hundred miles east of Raman's Drift, and by a skilful enveloping advance had occupied, in rapid succession, Jerusalem, Ukamas, Nabas, Davignab, and other posts. Several of these were military posts, strongly prepared for defence, and had to be rushed from the open by the Union Commandoes after being shelled by the Cape Field Artillery.

North of Warmbad, Van Deventer united the flanks of his advance on the main railway line, and occupied the railway stations of Kalkfontein and Kanus on April 5th. Mackenzie and he were now each about 100 miles from the junction of Seeheim, the one approaching from the west, the other from the south. Meanwhile, on Seeheim there was also converging a small flying column from Bechuanaland, due east, which, under Colonel Berrange, had dislodged the enemy from Rietfontein, on the Bechuanaland border, and then from Hasuur. The Germans had now to choose between dealing with these various advances in detail or permitting them to become the closely-linked units of a Southern army, which would pursue a united plan of advance from the south to meet the Northern army under General Botha. Whatever may have been the German plan, the rapidity of the Union armies' movements gave them no time to carry it out. With the knowledge that every mile brought him nearer reinforcements, Mackenzie pushed the bulk of his force rapidly towards Seeheim. At the same time, with rare foresight, he used mounted troops for a flanking movement which was to prove one of the most effective points in the whole attack. From the map it will be seen that some twenty miles to the north of Seeheim lies the town of Keetmanshoop. It was strongly fortified, but experience of the enemy's Fabian tactics made Mackenzie suspicious that they would not defend even this position, but would prefer to retreat rapidly northwards and unite with the force preparing to resist Botha at Windhoek. He therefore detached a mounted column from his westward advance, with instructions to push north-westward across the 200 miles of difficult land that lies between Aus and Gibeon and cut off the German retreat. The step was quite unexpected by the enemy, who offered no resistance. Indeed, the only Germans seen in the important settlement of Bethany, which was occupied on the way, were a couple of policemen retreating in pyjamas.

The wisdom of the movement was soon apparent. Van Deventer's men were the first to reach Keetmanshoop. They found the town deserted, except for natives and a white civilian population of under a hundred. Berrange, who from the east had struck the railway at Kabus, a little north of Keetmanshoop, was in time to hinder the retreat of the enemy and pursue them northwards. They aimed at reaching Gibeon and there entraining for Windhoek. Meanwhile, Mackenzie's cavalry had reached Gibeon. He despatched a small party to destroy the line north of the enemy, and himself attacked from the south, dispersed and pursued them for twenty miles, taking seven officers, 200 men, two field guns, and several maxims. By the cutting of the line a train in good order, with many transport waggons and much live stock, was captured. The Germans retreated by road, and, thanks to the difficulty of the country, were able to save themselves from being surrounded. But Mackenzie's strategy had succeeded in its object of demoralising their plans for an ordered retreat, and the greatest credit is due to his troops for their forced march of 200 miles over arid country, bereft of transport facilities, and for the spirit with which they engaged the enemy at the end of it. By June 1st the railway from Luderitz Bay to Keetmanshoop had been put in working order, and the Keetmanshoop-Kalkfontein portion had been continued across the border and linked with the Cape railways at Upington. Meanwhile, the chief importance of the campaign had shifted to the victorious advance of General Botha upon Windhoek.

THE NORTHERN FORCE'S ADVANCE.

Walfish Bay, the isolated little British possession which lay midway between the northern and southern boundaries of the German colony, had been occupied by the enemy at the beginning of the war. On Christmas Day, 1914, a Union force landed and reoccupied it. Britain had clung to this tiny settlement in the midst of arid sand dunes because of the excellence of its harbour—one of the finest on the African coast—but the township itself had never been developed, and the Union troops found it a ramshackle array of wooden shanties, mostly in the last stages of decay, and fighting an unending battle with the sand for their existence. A few days saw the original settlement hidden by a vast city of canvas, the surrounding country carefully reconnoitred, and preparations completed for the capture of the German port Swakopmund, a few miles to the north. Like Mackenzie, at Luderitz, Botha found the Germans quite unprepared for the advent so soon of so large an invading force. Except by the explosion of land mines, they offered little opposition to the landing, which was made at Swakopmund early in January. The use of the mines, however, showed a certain resourcefulness. The operator at Swakopmund was concealed in a large packing-case let into the sand on the beach, close to high-water mark, with an entrance through a small manhole cunningly concealed with seaweed and scrub. He remained in hid ng throughout the day of the landing, while Union troops tramped over his head, and decamped at nightfall,



The German retreat before General Botha's forces: Preparing to evacuate Warmbad.
[*Topical Press.*



A general view of Swakopmund.

leaving in his cabin a mattress, a candle, some literature, and a partly-consumed bottle of peppermint liquor.

Swakopmund was a striking contrast to Walfish. The Germans had made the most of its much inferior natural resources, and built an impressive town. Handsome and well-furnished houses, prosperous shops, displaying a good quality of wares, hotels, picture houses, a music hall, beer gardens, and streets with well-paved sidewalks and trolley lines—all gave evidence of a wealthy and ambitious settlement. It had been entirely deserted, and in some haste, for in many houses coffee and rolls still lay on the breakfast tables.

The railway from Swakopmund to Windhoek, after travelling east for upwards of a hundred miles, takes a wide bend to the north before descending upon the capital. It was Botha's plan to leave the railway before this bend, and with a portion of his force march straight upon the capital, leaving on the line sufficient men to secure his flank. Careful reconnaissances and a few skilful affairs of outposts secured him the first twenty miles of the line without much difficulty. Here, as in the south, the German defences consisted mainly of land mines, constructed with great ingenuity, but fortunately almost always discovered or rendered inoperative by an accident.

The Union forces had indeed some extraordinary strokes of luck, in which General Botha's earnest burghers could be forgiven for seeing the direct interposition of Providence. On one occasion, when a whole commando had gathered round a welcome water-hole, they found that they had been standing over a charge of dynamite that would have blown them to pieces, while a German in a cave pulled wires that either fouled or broke for their salvation. At Swakopmund, too, a volcanic disturbance at sea, which once in a score of years or so strews the beach with dead fish, occurred just in time to give the Union camp a bounteous variation on their regulation diet.

THE POISONING OF WELLS.

Both the Central and the Northern forces discovered before they had advanced far that the enemy would not be content with the use of mines in their desperate attempts to redress their inferiority in numbers and strategy. On the occupation of Swakopmund it was found that six wells had been poisoned with arsenical cattle dip, and already Mackenzie and Van Deventer reported that at Aus and Warmbad the water supplies had been systematically poisoned by the Germans as they retreated. General Botha addressed to Colonel Franks, who commanded the German forces, a protest, in which he pointed out that this was a direct violation of Article XXIII. of the Hague Convention, and stated that he would hold the officers concerned personally responsible. The practice of water-poisoning had never before, so far as history serves, been resorted to by a people calling itself civilised, and the reasoning by which Colonel Franks sought to excuse his atrocious breach of the laws of war was as striking an example of the characteristic German plea that "necessity" makes wrong right as any that events in Europe had furnished. He stated that he "could not allow any water supplies to fall into the hands of the enemy in a usable condition." He had tried to render the wells valueless by putting salt in them, but found this insufficient. He had then resorted to cattle dip, giving orders, which in most cases were not observed, that warning notices should be displayed at the water-holes. Botha replied that warnings, even had they been displayed, would not have mitigated the crime, and renewed his threat of bringing home to individuals the responsibility.

On approaching Pforteberg, some sixty miles up the line, Botha found the enemy prepared to make a serious stand on a front stretching from that point to Reit, a few miles south. Through Pforteberg runs the railway; through Reit the main road inland. Botha despatched one force to outflank the enemy on the north and cut the line behind him at Jackalswater, a second to attack Pforteberg, and himself took command of a third, which advanced simultaneously on Riet. The three attacks were made on the morning of March 20th. At Jackalswater, Colonel Collins cut the line and captured a train, and though he was not able to dislodge the enemy from a strongly-entrenched position, he prevented reinforcements being sent down the line to Pforteberg. The enemy there resisted from dawn till 3 p.m., when they surrendered, yielding 200 men, two field guns, and two machine guns. Meanwhile, Botha had found the Germans in a strong position at Riet. Their flank rested on the Swakop river, and was further protected by six machine guns, which enfiladed the crossing of the river. In front of their line was an open field of fire, with no cover for some 800 yards, and the road approaching them was defended by two granite kopjes. Colonel C. J. Brits, who had done such excellent work in rounding up the rebels in the Union, directed the attack, and after a whole day's battle, in which the Transvaal Artillery bombarded the enemy's position with deadly precision, the Germans gave way. They destroyed the pumping plant, but left guns, ammunition and waggons.

The victory gave Botha access to a good supply of water, and cleared the road inland as well as the railway. He pushed on rapidly, his left flank holding to the railway, his right making straight across country for Windhoek. The enemy contented himself with rearguard actions, of which even the most threatening, such as the attack 700 strong on the commando under Colonel Skinner at Trekkopes on April 26th, were beaten off. Karibib, on the railway, fell on May 5th, after a forced march of thirty-five miles, carried out with great resolution in spite of intolerable heat and shortage of water. With it were taken seven locomotives and much rolling stock. Otjimbingue, sixty miles north-west of Windhoek, on the direct road across country, was reached by the right flank about the same time. On May 7th, General Botha reported with pride that in the previous five days the least distance covered in actual marching by any of the troops under his command was 190 miles, some brigades doing substantially more. About this time the arrival of aeroplanes for the Union force removed the only ascendancy hitherto enjoyed by the enemy.

WINDHOEK AND AFTER.

On May 12th, the Union troops saw at last the white walls, red roofs, and five tall wireless masts of the German capital lying in the valley before them, amongst green, bush-clad hills. General Botha rode into Windhoek with his burghers on May 12th, and hoisted the Union Jack on the Rathaus. The enemy made no resistance, and left to the care of the Union troops a white population of some 3,000, mainly women and children, and 12,000 natives. The troops, bronzed and travel-stained with their arduous desert marching, but in the best of health and spirits, were assembled before the Court House, and many of the civil population attended to hear the



German troops evacuating Keetmanshoop the day before the British arrival. [*Topical Press.*

proclamation read which promised them protection. General Botha's arrival came as a relief to them after an anxious period. Windhoek had been effectually beleagured for long before it fell. The military authorities had served out just sufficient of the necessaries of life to the white population to last two months; and a bag of meal, for instance, was worth £7 10s. in the town by the time it was captured.

The whole railway system of the colony was now in Botha's hands except the line which runs to Grootfontein in the extreme north-east. Learning that a body of the enemy still remained in the vicinity of Windhoek, Botha marched out and engaged them near Gobabis, taking 150 prisoners, with the loss of one man wounded.

The Germans now endeavoured to come to terms on the basis of an armistice till the end of the war in Europe, under which they should retain their arms. With the colony practically in his hands, Botha naturally rejected the offer. The bulk of the garrison and the settlers were then anxious to surrender, but the military authorities persuaded them to a further resistance in the hope of material German success in Europe. The capital was transferred to Grootfontein, at the extreme northern terminus of the railway system, and thither the enemy retreated, with Botha hot on their heels. The end of the campaign was marked by a crowning series of the wide and rapid enveloping movements, in almost waterless country, which had paralysed the defence throughout, and for which the burgher commandoes had shown themselves better adapted than perhaps any troops in the world. In the second fortnight in June Botha made a swift and triumphant drive up the railway from Karibib to Otavi. The Free State Brigade, to which he paid a special compliment, covered forty-two miles of arid bush country in a sixteen hours' march, and this was typical of the movements of all his units. South of Otavi he threw out columns on both flanks for a final envelopment. Brigadier-General Britz on the left made an immense detour of 200 miles, reaching the eastern edge of the Etosha Pan and clearing the country of the enemy. As a result of these remarkable forced marches all our prisoners in German hands were released, and a large proportion of the enemy's remaining forces captured.

Botha's centre, under General Myburgh, struck the final blow by defeating the enemy at Gaub, between the two extremes of the railway, Grootfontein and Tsumeb, and after sending an ultimatum, on July 9th, at Kilo, on the railway line just north of Otavi, Botha accepted from Governor Seitz the surrender of the colony. The troops were to be interned, retaining their rifles but no ammunition; all war material and the whole of the property of the colony were placed at the Union disposal; and German civil officials could remain in their homes on parole. Three thousand five hundred officers and men, with thirty-seven field guns and twenty-two machine guns, were handed over. The Germans confessed that they had had hopes of making a stand at Otavi, or, failing that, of flight towards Etosha Pan and dispersal in the direction of Portuguese Angola, but the rapidity of Botha's movements had completely disconcerted them. Colonel Franks was at first unable to credit the fact that the Union infantry had marched 270 miles through such country so quickly, and declared that they must have come most of the way by train. The enemy, on their

own admissions, had been outnumbered, out-generalled, and, above all, outmarched.

Botha and his men had added to the Empire a territory five times the size of England, with valuable diamond, copper, and lead mines, and thousands of square miles of fine stock-raising pastoral country, in the richer parts of which cocoa, coffee, silk, and even cotton can be successfully grown. They had, moreover, secured a hinterland and a railway system for one of the finest harbours in Africa—Walfish Bay—which, till then, had been derelict, but which could now play its proper part as a port that would lessen by days the journey to Rhodesia or Capetown. The full scope of Botha's achievement is seen when it is remembered how inadequate were the forces in the Union in August, 1914, for the invasion of a territory of over 300,000 square miles, with 1,200 miles of strategic railways, a garrison of well-trained, well-armed troops, and a girdle of almost impassable desert. Botha had a nucleus of perhaps 4,000 fully-trained men, and from this, with the able assistance of his colleagues, particularly General Smuts, he constructed an army of some 40,000, transported it, supplied it, led it to victory—after dealing, during its organisation, with a rebellion which involved at one time 10,000 rebels, and all this in less than a year. That the leader, the men, and the spirit for this great enterprise were found was as wonderful and heartening an outcome as any even of the world war.




General Botha arranging the terms of surrender of Windhoek with the German Mayor of the town.
[*Topical Press.*



The Old Head of Kinsale Lighthouse, off which the Lusitania sank. [*Central News.*



The funeral of some of the Lusitania victims at Queenstown. [*Topical Press.*



The Lusitania at full speed. [*Record Press.*

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA.

THE WARNING TO THE LUSITANIA'S PASSENGERS—THE STORY OF THE DISASTER—THE PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GERMAN REPLY—THE RESIGNATION OF MR. BRYAN.

ON the last day of April in this year there appeared among the steamship advertisements of the American papers the following paragraph :—

"NOTICE!

"Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her Allies, and Great Britain and her Allies; that the war zone includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain and her Allies are liable to destruction in those waters; and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her Allies do so at their own risk.

"IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY.

"WASHINGTON D.C.

"*April 22nd*, 1915."

In many of the papers this notice was placed side by side with the printed sailings of the Cunard Company, whose liner, the *Lusitania*, was announced to leave New York on the 1st of May. Telegrams, bearing fictitious names and threatening the torpedoing of the vessel, are said to have been received by prominent Americans who were intending to take the passage. Rumours rapidly spread through Washington and New York that the indiscriminate sinking of merchantmen by submarine attack was now to be carried on to a further stage, and that the German Government had singled out as a particular prey the largest of ocean passenger liners.

The *Lusitania* was without doubt the most famous ship afloat. In Germany she was almost as well known as in England. Eight years ago German vessels held for a time the supremacy of the Atlantic. For speed the Kaiser Wilhelm II., and for size the Kaiserin Auguste Victoria, were then unparalleled. During her early voyages the *Lusitania* brought back all the Atlantic records to England, and soon became the most-talked-of ship in the world. Since the beginning of the war, too, she had caught the notice of Germany conspicuously. There was, in the first week of hostilities, her historic voyage from New York, during which she skilfully eluded the cruisers

Karlsruhe and *Leipsic* lurking in her path. Above all, at the opening of the submarine campaign, when she flew American colours on approaching British waters, she had aroused fierce animosity throughout Germany. All these reasons made her a marked quarry, whose destruction would conceivably be gratifying to the Government and people of Germany. And if the main object of German "frightfulness" is to stir up world-wide horror by methods which, in Mr. Asquith's phrase, have been "carried on with a progressive disregard of the previously-accepted rules of warfare," nothing could have crowned the design more effectively than a sea calamity on the scale of the *Titanic*.

The *Lusitania* was not an armed ship. She had, it is true, been built under certain agreements, by which the British Government might requisition her to serve as an armed cruiser. But that policy had never been carried out. On her last voyage the *Lusitania* was a passenger ship, carrying a crew of 651 men, with a passenger list of over 1,200 souls, including 188 American citizens. According to the rules and conventions of civilised warfare, not one of these civilians (and among them were many children) was in peril of death from an enemy's attack.

At noon on May 1st the *Lusitania* left New York for the last time. Until the closing scenes the voyage was without any incidents apart from the ordinary experiences of an early summer crossing. It has been described as a comfortable passage, favoured by pleasant weather, the monotony of sea travel being varied by the usual games, and some concerts, at which large sums were collected for sufferers from the war. No warships were sighted, but all the way across wireless communications from shore passed to the ship, and near the end information that submarines were off the Irish coast was sent to the Captain, who received at the same time instructions from the Admiralty. For the passengers, the first outward sign of war was noticed on the night of Thursday, May 6th, when the portholes were shadowed, and all deck lights were dimmed. The look-outs were doubled, with orders to keep a sharp watch for submarines, and as soon as the Fastnet was reached on the next day the lifeboats were swung out. A little later the *Lusitania* ran into a belt of mist, the loud drone of the siren sounding, according to one of the passengers, like a note of safety, for it was argued that the great liner would not have noised abroad her presence but for the existence of a strong belief in her security. Later, when the mist lifted, with a morning of brilliant sunshine, the ship, at a moderate speed, drew towards the Old Head of Kinsale.

THE SUBMARINE SIGHTED.

Between twelve and one o'clock some of the passengers noticed that the steady onward sweep suddenly changed. The new motion has been variously described as a swaying, a zig-zagging of the ship, or a snake-like course. After a few minutes the *Lusitania* resumed her course straight ahead. It was just about this time that from the decks a strange craft was observed in the sea, on the port side, *i.e.*, between the liner and the land. Dr. Foss has the following account :--

> "We noticed the ship was making quick changes of her course, what I would call snake turns. We were informed that it was only practice. Shortly afterwards I saw between us and the land something which looked like a boat, and I was surprised that a boat should be so far from shore. Looking through my glasses, I could see a wave parting in front of the boat, which indicated that it was travelling rapidly. Several of us agreed that it looked like the upper part of a submarine, and we assumed that it was British. It was apparently keeping pace with us."

The first presage of disaster came soon after two o'clock. At that time most of the passengers were below, some of them still discussing the appearance of the swiftly-moving object which had been sighted more than an hour before. Above, there were a few pacing the decks or joining in a game of quoits. Those who were glancing seawards over the smooth water at this moment were suddenly aware that a straight, white streak on the surface was rapidly rushing towards the ship's side.

> "I was so high on the upper deck above the surface of the water that I could make out the outline of the torpedo. It appeared to me twelve feet long and possibly three feet under water, its sides bubbling with foam. I watched its passage fascinated, and in another moment came the explosion. The ship, recoiling under the force of the blow, was jarred, and lifted as if it had struck an immovable object. A column of water shot up to the bridge deck, carrying with it a lot of débris. Although I was twenty yards from the spot where it struck, I was knocked off my feet. Before I could recover myself the entire forepart of the ship was enveloped in a blinding cloud of steam, due not I think to the explosion of a second torpedo, as some thought, but to the fact that the two forehold boilers had been jammed close together, and jack-knifed upwards."—(*From Mr. Brooks's story of the disaster.*)

Some interesting points come out in the evidence given by Captain Turner at the Coroner's inquest held on bodies of the survivors.

> "We were going at a speed of eighteen knots. I was on the port side of the lower bridge when I heard the second officer, Mr. Hefford, call out 'Here's a torpedo.' I ran over to the other side and just saw the wake of it approaching the vessel, and it struck. Smoke and steam went up between the third and fourth funnel. There was a slight shock. Immediately after the explosion there was a second, but that may possibly have been internal. I at once gave the order to lower the boats down to the rails, and get all women and children into them. I also gave orders to 'Stop ship,' but we could not stop her, because the engines were out of commission. It was not safe to lower boats until speed was off. The vessel did not stop; as a matter of fact there was a perceptible headway on her at the time she went down. The moment she was struck she listed to starboard. I stood on the ship as she sank, and the *Lusitania* went down under me. She floated about eighteen minutes after the torpedo struck her. My watch stopped at 2.36½. I was picked up from among the wreckage and afterwards brought aboard a trawler. I did not see a submarine."

Although it is not certainly known how many torpedoes were fired, the stories told by survivors of the disaster give the impression that two torpedoes found their mark on the starboard side. At the enquiry held at Westminster, an interesting addition was made in the evidence of a seaman, who positively asserted that after the two shocks he noticed a third torpedo passing the stern, this time from the port to the starboard side. As Lord Mersey, the President at the Board of Trade Court of Inquiry, points out, this evidence suggests that perhaps more than one submarine was engaged in the attack.


THE WRECK.

The watertight doors had been closed before the first blow was struck. After the impact the wireless operators were busily sending out the last signals for help, and preparations for launching the boats were immediately begun. There appear to have been few signs of panic

about the doomed vessel, nothing more than excited hurryings up the displaced staircases and along the slanting decks towards boats and life-belts. Some delay, which is now seen to have been unavoidable, occurred in getting the boats away, and this delay was caused not only by the forward movement of the vessel. The heavy list to starboard swung the portside boats over the deck, and rendered them useless for service. Nevertheless, in all, twenty boats were launched, and rowed to a safe distance from the sinking ship. By this time the starboard list had gradually increased, until suddenly the *Lusitania*, with her stern lifted high in the air, dipped her bows and plunged into the depths.

It is too painful to recall the last agonising scenes. All the elements of one of the greatest of sea tragedies were there; a tragedy, moreover, in which the vast destructive forces of nature had been let loose by the hand of man. And yet, the story of all those dreadful sufferings is not without consoling records that by many life was given for life, and last kindnesses at a supreme cost were shown to the weaker and the more helpless.

The patrol vessels, hurrying to answer the distress signals, came too late to lessen in any material degree the heavy death-roll, which amounted to nearly 1,200. From the lifeboats and floating wreckage nearly 800 persons were brought ashore. No effort of any kind was made by the German submarine, or submarines, to rescue even one life. It is small wonder that the plain men of the jury at the Coroner's inquest, three days later, put into plain words the verdict: "We charge the officers of the submarine, and the German Emperor and Government of Germany under whose orders they acted, with the crime of wilful and wholesale murder." The view of a trained legal mind is reflected in equally emphatic words in the judgment of the Court of Inquiry. "It was a monstrous attack, because made with a deliberate and wholly unjustifiable intention of killing the people on board."




The boat deck of the Lusitania, showing lifeboats.

[*Photopress.*


Some interesting questions rise up out of a consideration of the circumstances of the *Lusitania's* fatal voyage. Ought the liner to have been escorted in dangerous waters by destroyers? One purpose undoubtedly at work in the prosecution of the German submarine campaign is the creation of panic, and of demands for further protection of British merchantmen at the cost of disarranging the general naval scheme. In this respect the destruction of the *Lusitania* was as ineffective as any earlier efforts. No change was made in the Admiralty's main plans, that have hitherto been so successful in securing the freedom of England from invasion, the blockade of the German High Sea Fleet, the disappearance of German sea trade, and the uninterrupted transport of troops and supplies to the many spheres of land warfare. It is recognised that to call off ships from these decisive services would be to invite disaster. "The resources at our disposal," in Mr. Churchill's words, "would not allow us to supply destroyers as escorts for merchant and passenger ships, more than two hundred of which, on an average, arrive or depart safely every day. . . . Our principle is that each merchant ship must look after itself, subject to the general arrangements made." The main principle is, of course, undoubtedly correct. Moreover, the old system of convoys of merchantmen under protection would be attended with enormous risks in the presence of submarines. Yet in particular instances special protection has already been given to ocean-going liners. In February, for example, the *Hydaspes* was convoyed through the danger zone by two destroyers. And whether the last voyage of the *Lusitania* did not call for similar exceptional treatment is a question that may well be argued. In every way she was an exceptional ship, because of her fame, her large passenger list, and, lastly, because of the sinister warnings and threats that her destruction was then a definite and remorseless object in the German submarine plans.

A difficulty for which no explanation has been offered arises over the course taken by the vessel. From the Fastnet to the Old Head of Kinsale she appears to have been on the track usually followed at the end of the eastward voyage. Along this line it was most reasonable to expect that the outrage would be attempted. Moreover,



The opening of the official enquiry into the sinking of the Lusitania: Sir Edward Carson examining Captain Turner, of the Lusitania. [*Topical Press.*

on the day previous to the disaster, two large steamers had been torpedoed in the seas off the south of Ireland. Captain Turner and Mr. Churchill have both made it known that warnings of the presence of submarines, and directions as to the liner's course, were sent by wireless



to the steamer; but it is not likely that the reasons adopted for following the ordinary course rather than a long loop voyage round the North of Ireland to the Clyde will be made public during the course of the submarine campaign. Why was the *Lusitania*, which could make over twenty-five knots, moving only at the rate of eighteen knots? According to the reason given in the evidence of the Captain, the purpose was to reach the Mersey with the tide and thus avoid a long wait for a pilot. It appears from the evidence of the Chairman of the Cunard Company that at no time since the autumn had the vessel been run at full speed. Difficulties connected with coal and labour had raised the alternative of either running the ship at twenty-one knots, maximum, or of withdrawing her from the Atlantic service. It is to be remembered that until the *Lusitania* disaster no ship steaming more quickly than fourteen knots had been torpedoed. One thing proved by this appalling calamity is that the security given by high speed has been exaggerated, and that a target 785 feet long, even when moving at a quick speed, is not invulnerable to a torpedo attack. The remark made by one of the seamen who saw the torpedo from the crow's nest, "At 100 knots we could not have escaped," is perhaps a final reply in any controversies as to the liner's speed. Such a view has the support of Lord Mersey's opinion that "the reduction of the vessel's speed was of no significance, and was proper in the circumstances."

AMERICAN INDIGNATION.

One in every ten of the victims of this terrible outrage on law and humanity was an American subject, and it was impossible that the United States Government should remain silent, especially as it had already protested against the legality of the original German Order declaring the British seas a war area which all ships would visit at their own risk. "The Government,"

the President then wrote, "would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government to a strict accountability" if American vessels or the lives of American subjects were lost in consequence of the action of German submarines under this Order (page 109). American public opinion, so far as it was reflected in the New York Press, was prepared to support the President in any measures that he might think it right to take to protect the lives of American subjects at sea. Not since the destruction of the *Maine* in Havana Harbour before the war with Spain had the surface of American opinion seemed so agitated. And the destruction of the *Lusitania*, though much the worst of the German outrages at sea, was not the only one in which American subjects had lost their lives. An American citizen had lost his life on the *Falaba* (page 114); an American vessel, the *Cushing*, had been attacked by a German aeroplane on April 28th; and on May 1st another American vessel, the *Gulflight*, had been torpedoed by a German submarine off the Scillies, and two Americans had met their death. The United States were not the only neutrals to suffer by the submarine war on commerce with Great Britain, but they were the only neutrals powerful enough to have any influence over German policy by their protests, and some at any rate of the neutral States who had suffered looked to the United States as the natural protector of their rights.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S PROTEST.

The protest of President Wilson was a firm statement of the rules of law and of humanity, expressed in language of singular adroitness. It began by recalling "the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the German Government in matters of international right, particularly in regard to the freedom of the seas," and assumed that "acts so absolutely contrary to the rules and practices and spirit of modern warfare" could not have its sanction. It well pointed out why submarine war on commerce must of necessity be inhuman and illegal.

> ". . . . the objection to their present methods of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for officers of submarines to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make her a prize, and if they cannot put a prize crew on board they cannot sink her without leaving the crew and all on board to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts, it is understood, the German Government frankly admit.
>
> "We are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken there was time enough, but even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two cases cited not so much as a warning was received."

The despatch concluded by calling on the German Government to disavow the acts of its agents, and to make reparation, so far as reparation was possible, for injuries that were without measure.

THE GERMAN REPLY.

The German reply to the American protest was received at the end of May. In the case of the *Falaba* the German defence was that the commander of the submarine had intended to allow the passengers and crew an opportunity of escape, but that the master had not obeyed orders to heave to, but fled, and summoned help by rocket signals. The defence did not fit the facts, but even if it had done it would still have been unsound. If a warship has a right to sink a vessel which refuses to stop when summoned, and resists search, it is because such resistance is in itself an admission that she is carrying contraband, and that her guilt is so evident that she recognises that her only safety is in flight, so as to escape arrest and adjudication of a Prize Court. But here was no case of the exercise of the right of search. A submarine cannot search a ship of any size, nor can she take a suspected ship into port for the judgment of a Court. She can only sink, and Germany had announced that every ship trading with our ports was liable to be sunk, irrespective of the nature of her cargo. In refusing to obey the orders of a submarine commander the *Falaba* was well within her rights; she had as much right to refuse as an ordinary citizen would have to take to his heels to escape from a man who, without a warrant for his arrest even, bade him, revolver in hand, to stand and be shot in lieu of trial. The German reply proceeded to make excuses for the sinking of the *Lusitania* which were even less in accord of the facts. It declared that she was armed with guns and manned with trained gunners, and that she carried Canadian troops and munitions of war.

> "The German Government believes that it is acting in justified self-defence in seeking by all means of warfare at its disposal to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying ammunition intended for the enemy. The British Shipping Company must have been aware of the danger to which passengers on board the *Lusitania* were exposed. Under these conditions the Company, in embarking them notwithstanding this, attempted deliberately to use the lives of American citizens as protection for the ammunition on board, and acted against the clear provisions of the American law, which expressly prohibits the forwarding of passengers on ships carrying ammunition, and provides a penalty for it. The Company was therefore wantonly guilty of the death of so many passengers. There can be no doubt, according to the definite report of the submarine's commander, which is further confirmed by all other information, that the quick sinking of the *Lusitania* is chiefly attributable to the explosion of the ammunition shipment caused by the torpedo. The *Lusitania* passengers would otherwise in all human probability have been saved."

It was true that among the cargo of the *Lusitania* were some 5,000 cases of cartridges, but the other allegations of fact in the German reply were "baseless inventions," as Lord Mersey called them in his finding. The *Lusitania* carried no masked guns nor gunners, nor was she transporting troops. The cases of cartridges were entered on her manifest, and had been passed by the New York Customs authorities. Mr. Bryan, the American Secretary of State, had himself argued at length that the manufacture of munitions for the belligerents was not a breach of neutrality; and if it was legal by American law to manufacture, it was also legal to ship them to their destination. President Wilson, in a further despatch, published on June 12th, stressed the point that she was carrying a cargo that was perfectly legitimate by the laws of the United States, and indignantly repudiated the implied charge that the American Government had been guilty of a breach of neutrality in allowing her to clear. These considerations, however, were in any case irrelevant to the main issue.

> "The sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the case, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognise and

acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or international controversy.

"Whatever may be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania*, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly for the conveyance of passengers, carrying more than 1,000 souls, who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare.


"The fact that more than a hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things, and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests.

"The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than the mere rights of property and the privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the right of humanity, which every Government honours itself in respecting, which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority."

MR. BRYAN'S RESIGNATION.

On June 9th, just before this second Note to Germany was despatched, Mr. Bryan resigned. His reasons were that he disapproved the wording of the Note to Germany, and there was considerable surprise when the text of the Note was published later to find that it was on the whole somewhat milder in tone than the first Note had been. The wording may have been modified somewhat in view of Mr. Bryan's objections, but on neither of the two specific points that he had raised was there any weakening in the position of the United States Government. Mr. Bryan had wished to offer an International Commission of Inquiry, but it was not at all obvious what there was to inquire into. He held, further, that American subjects ought to be warned by their Government against travelling on belligerent vessels, or with cargoes of ammunition. President Wilson expressly repudiated this view in his Note. "The Government of the United States," he wrote, "cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or American citizens bound on their lawful errands as passengers in merchant ships of belligerent nationality."

Mr. Bryan's resignation was interesting mainly for its bearing not so much on the particular controversy about the sinking of the *Lusitania*, but more generally on the rights of belligerents and neutrals at sea. In dissociating himself from the very moderately worded protests of President Wilson against the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Mr. Bryan showed that opinion in neutral countries was very far from accepting, even if it understood, the view—which is almost axiomatic here—that British sea-power made for the liberty of the seas. It pointed to the need of a clearer exposition than had yet been officially made of Great Britain's naval policy in relation to neutrals.



Mr. Bryan (left) and his successor, Mr. Robert Lansing. [*Topical Press.*



Part of a meeting of London business men on Tower Hill, held after the sinking of the Lusitania, and calling for the internment of all alien enemies in Great Britain. [*Photopress.*

CHAPTER XXXV.

GERMAN OUTRAGES AND BRITISH OPINION.

AN ACCUMULATION OF OUTRAGES—THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS—SUBMARINES AND ZEPPELINS—THE GAS ATTACKS—THE "LUSITANIA" AND REPORT OF LORD BRYCE'S COMMITTEE—ANTI-GERMAN OUTBURSTS—THE GOVERNMENT'S NEW POLICY TOWARDS ALIEN ENEMIES.

THE sinking of the *Lusitania* and its effect on American opinion were described in the last chapter. The effect upon British opinion was no less immediate and important. It came towards the end of a month in which the tide of popular feeling in this country against Germany and German methods of making war had been steadily rising to a height never before reached, even in the first days of the invasion of Belgium. The *Lusitania* was sunk on the 7th of May, and on the 12th was published a document which counted for even more as an indictment of German policy—the Report embodying the exhaustive and sober enquiry by Lord Bryce's Committee into the outrages committed by German troops in France and Belgium during the first four months of the war. And if these dates are taken as the end of a month of which the early part of April was the beginning, it will be found that the period is one in which the persistent and calculated cruelty of German warfare was abundantly demonstrated, either by new examples of frightfulness or the continued application of old ones, in every department of the war—in the air by Zeppelin raids, whose only purpose was to terrorise the civil population of the East Coast, in the sea by the lawless activities of the German submarines, and on land by such enormities as the use of asphyxiating gas in Flanders and the poisoning of wells in German South-West Africa. The sinking of the *Lusitania* and the publication of the Bryce Committee's Report marked the climax of this month, and the rousing in this country of what was described by Mr. Asquith, in a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, as "a temper of righteous and consuming indignation for which I believe there is no precedent or parallel in our national history." The purpose of this chapter is to examine the events which roused this temper, and its ultimate results as expressed, first, in the lamentable outbursts of anti-German rioting, and, secondly, in the increased rigour of the Government's attitude towards alien enemies in this country.

BRITISH PRISONERS IN GERMANY.

One source of anger which came to a head in the early part of April lay in the German treatment of



Packing gifts for despatch to British prisoners in Germany. [*Topical Press.*



British prisoners in Germany being marched to their daily labour. [*Sport and General.*

British prisoners. For long enough ugly stories of ill-treatment of all kinds had been creeping into the British Press in more or less trustworthy form, and on April 10th the Government published a White Paper in which it was clearly proved that the rules of the Hague Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners had been freely violated by the German authorities. The Hague Convention is quite explicit upon two points: that, with the exception of "arms, horses, and military papers," prisoners must be allowed to retain the personal belongings in their possession at the time of their capture, and that for the period of their captivity they shall be treated, as regards rations, quarters, and clothing, on the same footing as the troops of the government which captured them. Nevertheless, the White Paper and later official documents supplied authoritative proof that British prisoners had been stripped of their great coats, and in some cases of their tunics: and that, while conditions varied very greatly in different camps and under different commandants, in some of them the prisoners—so far from receiving rations on the same scale as those served out to the German troops—though "not exactly dying of starvation," could "only just keep themselves alive and no more." The absence of proper housing accommodation in some of the camps, lack of heating apparatus and winter clothing, were also proved, and the British White Paper published at the end of June, in which all these abuses were classified and contrasted with the Hague rules and the British interpretation of them in the treatment of German prisoners, was one of the most effective indictments of German war policy that has been made. It should be added, however, that largely as a result of the humane activities of the United States authorities in Germany considerable improvement in the condition of British prisoners was effected from April onwards.

The abuses which have been touched on were, in a way, official ones supported by the sanction, if not by the orders, of the German Government. They arose for the most part, no doubt, from the embarrassment which Germany's great number of prisoners were to her, and were intensified by the spirit of vehement hatred for this country which was abroad in Germany. But this same spirit of hatred was responsible for another class of hardship, the news of which was, perhaps, more bitterly received in this country than in any other. Private exhibitions of hatred and contempt made the lives of British officers and men almost insupportable on their journey from the front to the concentration camps. The evidence of Major Vandeleur, a Scottish officer, who was taken prisoner at the beginning of October, was an important part of the first British White Paper on the treatment of prisoners. Both the officers and men of his party were constantly reviled and cursed by German officers, as well as the rank and file; and to the shame of the German army it is recorded that it was an officer in it who spat upon the holder of a British commission. At Douai Major Vandeleur, four brother officers, and fifty-two men were crowded into one closed-in railway waggon from which horses had just been removed, and in which the floor was still carpeted with three inches of fresh manure. In this waggon they were boxed up for thirty hours with no food.

Worse fates than this overtook some British prisoners immediately after capture. Evidence that in some cases they had been shot in cold blood is not wanting. German deserters, examined by two Dutch journalists, declared explicitly that the Bavarian troops had done so under definitely official orders, and the British Ambassador at the Hague submitted a careful record of the evidence to Sir Edward Grey—a record which was published in this country with the authority of the Press Bureau. A deserter from the Second Bavarian Army Corps—"essentially a stupid creature," according to the journalist who examined him, "without sufficient intelligence to invent" the detailed story which he gave—spoke quite as a matter of course of having himself shot five British prisoners a few days before he deserted. The prisoners, he stated, were brought up to be shot in a formal way by a section under the command of an officer. Another Bavarian deserter spoke of an order, issued to the whole of the Bavarian Army, that no British prisoners were to be taken. Both men gave their reasons for deserting as the scarcity of food in the trenches and the harshness of their officers. Strange and terrible things happen in all armies when men lose their heads, and the existence of an official policy for the slaughter of prisoners cannot be said to be established on the testimony of these Bavarian deserters.* Such a policy, if proved, would surpass the worst of Napoleon's infamous exploits as gaoler—the steady slaughter of the surrendered Spanish garrisons for no greater crime than that they were unable to keep up, through sickness and starvation, with the march of Napoleon's troops. It will readily be imagined that the publication, through an authoritative source, of evidence pointing to such a policy did little to soothe the rising indignation of the British people.

CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE.

The German submarine blockade has been mentioned as another source of bitterness in this country. It had now been in operation for nearly two months; and while its effect upon British shipping in proportion to the number of vessels concerned was seen to be very nearly negligible, the cumulative effect of each successive example of ruthlessness was decidedly important. During the month covered by this chapter there were many such examples. On April 11th the British steamer *Harpalyce*, a relief cargo ship which was flying the large and easily recognisable flag of the American Commission for the Relief of Belgium, was torpedoed, without any warning at all, in the North Sea. There was no time to launch any boats, and those of the crew that were saved owed their lives to two Dutch vessels which were passing. No craft seem to have been too small to escape the attentions of the submarines. Trawlers were freely sunk in the North Sea, and whether the crews were given an opportunity to save their lives in their small boats, or whether, like the Grimsby trawler *Vanilla*—where the Germans drove off another trawler which was going to the rescue—their ships were sunk with their nets down and without the slightest warning or attempt at provision for the safety of the crew, seems to have been entirely at the whim of the submarine commander. Four days before the *Lusitania* was sunk, on one day alone (May 3rd) eight British trawlers

* The issue, at the end of August, 1914, of such an order to one German Brigade has been pretty clearly proved by Professor Morgan. (See article in the "Nineteenth Century and After," June, 1915.) It was, however, repudiated by the German Government and denounced as a forgery.



The result of an air raid: A wrecked house in Southend. [*L.N.A.*



The interior of one of the wrecked houses in Southend. [*Central News.*

were destroyed off the North Sea fishing grounds. And it is worth noting that, on the same day that this exploit was announced, the English papers also contained the news of the poisoning of the wells in South-West Africa and of Lieutenant-Colonel Franks's bland statement of his reasons (page 343) for the adoption of this inhuman and deeply disgraceful breach of the rules of war.

In the air the Germans were also active about this time, though with very much less damage to life and property than was afterwards the case. Two people slightly injured and some little damage to buildings was the material result of an adventure in aerial terrorism over the north-east coast on April 14th; hardly as much from another Zeppelin raid on the following day, this time over the south of the same coast. At the end of April bombs were dropped on Ipswich and Bury St. Edmunds. And on May 10th, when popular feeling had risen to its fiercest and was already, in the poorer quarters of the large towns, breaking out in anti-German rioting, curiously ill-timed fuel was added to the fire by a Zeppelin raid on Southend, in which one life was lost.



Holland on Germany's conduct of war: A cartoon which appeared in the Amsterdam "Telegraaf" with the following text below it:—

Poisoning of Wells (German South-west Africa).
Poisonous Gases (western front).
Premeditated Murder (on the Lusitania with some 2,000 non-combatants).
Conscience: "All of you who do not protest against the barbarian war methods of this monster are his accomplices!"

THE USE OF ASPHYXIATING GAS.

But among all the evidences of calculated cruelty on the part of the Germans probably none roused more widespread horror and indignation, when its nature and consequences were fully realised, than did the use of asphyxiating gas. It was first used by the Germans on April 22nd during the second battle of Ypres, and for the next three weeks attacks begun and supported by this hideous weapon were an almost daily episode on this part of the French and British front. (Their military importance and the long preparations which they had involved have been dealt with in Chapter XXIX.)

It was some days before the precise nature of the gas attack was generally understood in this country. At first the impression was that the gas was contained in shells or bombs and released upon explosion. And it is interesting to notice how promptly the Germans seized on this belief in an attempt to disguise and belittle the real nature of the attack and its barbarity. On April 23rd the German official report referred with measured indignation to the British charge that German artillery had used shells which developed asphyxiating gas on explosion—"a practice," declared these admirable custodians of belligerent properties, "which is contrary to all the laws of civilised warfare." With a somewhat suspicious precision they denied that any shells had been used whose "sole purpose" had been to spread poisonous gases: and, with a fine regard for juridical niceties, the report concluded with the statement that "the smoke-developing contrivances used by us in hand-to-hand fighting are in no manner contrary to the laws of warfare."

Under the mild masquerade of "smoke-developing contrivances" must, according to this interesting apology, be grouped the tanks of liquefied chlorine, the special masks and respirators worn by the German troops who were to use the new weapon, and all the other long-prepared apparatus for launching, with the help of a favouring breeze, a dense cloud of deadly, torturing gas against a hostile trench. This, and not the presence of gas-producing liquid in shrapnel or common shell, was the weapon on which the Germans really counted, and which they employed with such effect in the fighting round Ypres. Its use against a British trench has been described in the deposition of a Canadian officer, which was included in Dr. Haldane's report to Lord Kitchener, on the nature of the gas attack. The officer in question was himself in hospital suffering from the effects of the gas:—

"From a support trench about 600 yards from the German lines he had observed the gas. He saw first of all a white smoke rising from the German trenches to a height of about three feet. Then in front of the white smoke appeared a greenish cloud which drifted along the ground to our trenches, not rising more than about seven feet from the ground. When it reached our first trenches the men in these trenches were obliged to leave, and a number of them were killed by the effects of the gas. He made a counter-attack about fifteen minutes after the gas came over and saw 24 men lying dead from the effects of the gas on a small stretch of road leading from the advanced trenches to the supports."

AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE GAS ATTACK.

But the effects of the gas were by no means limited to the period during which the men were exposed to it. The *Kölnische Zeitung*, in an attempt to justify the new weapon, referred to the gas as "stupefying" (*betäubende*). It is hard to conceive a less apt description of its effects. Even where it left the men dead in the trenches it killed them in agony, and those who escaped immediate death only escaped, in the majority of cases, to die slowly, painfully fighting for breath in a field hospital. "The survivors," wrote Sir John French, "are in little better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a permanent character, and reduces them to a condition which points to their being invalids for life." Men who seemed to have successfully weathered a gas attack collapsed after the danger was apparently over and died a lingering and painful death in hospital. The truth was that where the gas did not asphyxiate at once, its irritant properties produced a state of acute bronchitis. The descriptions of the hospital wards where the gassed men were collected shows the full measure of the ghastly inhumanity of this new weapon which the Germans had devised. The following one was given by an English officer in a letter home:—

"Yesterday and the day before I went with —— to see some of the men in hospital at —— who were 'gassed' yesterday and the day before on Hill 60. When we got to the hospital we had no difficulty in finding out in which ward the men were, as the noise of the poor devils trying to get breath was sufficient to direct us. We were met by a doctor belonging to our division who took us into the ward. There were about twenty of the worst cases in the war on mattresses, all more or less in a sitting position, propped up against the walls. Their faces, arms, and hands were of a shiny grey-black colour, mouth open and lead-glazed eyes—all swaying slightly backwards and forwards trying to get breath. It was the most appalling sight—all those poor black faces struggling for life. What with the groaning and the noise of the efforts for breath, Colonel ——, who, as everybody knows, has had as wide an experience as anyone all over the savage parts of Africa, told me to-day that he never felt so sick as he did after the scene.

"In these cases there is practically nothing to be done for them, except to give them salt and water to try to make them sick. The effect the gas has is to fill the lungs with a watery, frothy matter, which gradually increases till it fills up the whole lungs and cogs up to the mouth: then they die. It is suffocation—slow drowning — taking, in some cases, one or two days. Eight died last night out of the twenty I saw, and most of the others I saw will die, while those who get over the gas invariably develop acute pneumonia.

"It is, without doubt, the most awful form of scientific torture. Not one of the men I saw in hospital had a scratch or wound. The nurses and doctors were all working their utmost against this terror, but one could see from the tension of their nerves that it was like fighting a hidden danger which was overtaking everyone."




Holland on the gas attack: "The New Death," a cartoon from the "Nieuwe Amsterdammer."

The German "smoke-developing contrivances" and interpretation of "the laws of civilised warfare" had provided medical science with something of a new problem. Isolated cases of chemical workers or firemen being accidentally overcome by chlorine fumes and similar gases had been known, but never before had it been necessary to protect large numbers of men against the deliberate use of such poisons. If the gas had been at all deeply inhaled there seemed to be little that could be done for the patients. The remedy

was to be sought in respirators which would minimise or prevent the initial mischief. An appeal to the public for respirators was promptly issued by the War Office, and proof of the immense effect which the news of this latest method of attack had upon popular imagination is given by the fact that within twenty-four hours all the respirators that were needed had been received. Various designs were tried and discarded, and it was only after the end of the first week in May that really effective preventives were devised and distributed to the troops. The important feature of the effective respirator lay in a pad of cotton waste saturated in a solution of sodium carbonate and hyposulphate—the "hypo" of the photographer's fixing bath—through which the wearer breathed.

The deep indignation which had been roused at home by the gas attacks was paralleled by a fury of resentment among the British troops on the Continent, who had seen at first hand and on their comrades the agonies which the gas inflicted. The sinking of the *Lusitania* and gas attacks brought into the fighting of this period a merciless anger of which little had been heard before. "I heard men go into battle with the cry of 'Remember the *Lusitania*' on their lips," said a corporal of the Black Watch who was wounded near La Bassée, "and when that cry was heard it had a terrible meaning for the Germans. It transformed the ordinary, kind-hearted soldier into an avenging fury." Nor could the Germans comfort themselves with the assurance that the horror roused by their doings was merely the disguised envy of their enemies raging with impotent fury as they contemplated brilliant extensions of "civilised warfare" which they had been unable to devise for themselves. In the leading articles and cartoons of Holland and the United States neutral opinion was quite as outspoken in its condemnation of German methods. And for all the *Kölnische Zeitung's* ingenious parallel between the Allies' military use of water—in flooding the lowlands of Flanders—and the German use of "our ally air" as a vehicle for "stupefying gases," the Government organ *Norske Intelligenssedler*, of Christiania, was found denouncing the gas attack as a "particularly repulsive weapon which will create a hate deeper and more lasting against Germans than the laying of Louvain in ruins or the sinking of the *Lusitania*."



Viscount Bryce, O.M., Chairman of the Committee which investigated the German outrages in Belgium and Northern France. [*Lafayette, Dublin.*

THE PUBLICATION OF THE BRYCE REPORT.

There had been only one other period of the war in which the popular imagination had been so greatly exercised by the reported excesses of German military practice. That period was the one covered by the sweeping advance of the German armies through Belgium and Northern France almost to the gates of Paris. It was the period when to the news of the frenzied sack of Louvain were added countless stories of individual and collective atrocities on the part of German troops, which, well authenticated or not (and at the time of their first appearance most of them were not), obtained the widest belief in this country. It so happened that, as the climax to the month dealt with in this chapter, the proven charges from this earlier period were now to be revived and made public in an authentic and conclusive form. In December, 1914, the British Government had appointed a Committee to examine and report upon the evidence of outrages alleged to have been committed by the German troops during the earlier part of the war—evidence which had been collected in great quantity by the Home Office for some three or four months before the appointment of the Committee. The Committee's Report was published on May 12th, five days after the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the day before the Government's announcement of the new policy towards alien enemies in this country. It arrived, therefore, too late to have had any effect on that section of public opinion which had already adopted rioting and alien baiting as its highly-discreditable expression of disgust at German policy; nor was the form in which the evidence was presented one which was likely to influence very greatly those poorest quarters of the large towns in which the rioting took place. But on more intelligent and responsible opinion its effect, coming after the *Lusitania* outrage and all the other evidences of brutality which have been mentioned, was immediate and considerable, and certainly produced much new support for, or, at the least, acquiescence in, the Government's new scheme for the wholesale interment and repatriation of alien enemies. Those who, during the early days of the war, had endeavoured to preserve a charitably open mind towards the conduct of the German troops, and had resolutely set down the majority of the then unsubstantiated stories of their atrocious behaviour in Belgium to the workings of war hysteria or malice, found that, after the most painstaking and fair-minded examination of a great body of evidence, there was hardly one of the worst of those earlier stories which was not corroborated or paralleled in the British Government's official report.



Anti-German rioting in London: A crowd breaking in the windows of a German shop. [*Central Press.*



A crowd watching the looting of a German house in Poplar. [*L.N.A.*

The Chairman of the Committee was Lord Bryce, and its remaining members were Sir Frederick Pollock, K.C., Sir Edward Clarke, K.C., Sir Alfred Hopkinson, K.C., Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, the Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University, Mr. Harold Cox, and, a little time after the original appointments had been made, Sir Kenelm E. Digby, K.C. In the collection and examination of the evidence the most elaborate and thorough precautions were taken to ensure its trustworthiness. Its ultimate weight was unmistakable. The Committee themselves confessed in their Report that all the evidence had been approached, both by the collectors and examiners, with considerable scepticism and an expectation that it would be influenced by passion or imagination. But as the collection and examination proceeded scepticism vanished, and it became apparent that, when all doubtful evidence had been discarded, there remained an abundant residue of level-headed, moderate testimony—and a concurrence of similar testimony from witnesses who were unknown to each other—which established the most positive and damning indictment of the conduct of the German troops. From this the Committee reported it as proved :—

> "(i.) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organised massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.
>
> "(ii.) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated, and children murdered.
>
> "(iii.) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorisation.
>
> "(iv.) That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag."

"FRIGHTFULNESS" IN PRACTICE.

The detailed report of the evidence on which these findings were based makes a sickening procession of horrors. It begins on August 4th with the burning and pillage of the frontier village of Herve and the shooting of some fifty civilians as they attempted to escape from their burning homes. And the advance of the German troops was everywhere followed by the same tale of arson, massacre, and outrage. At Melen, near Herve, it was forty men who were shot At Liège a portion of the town was systematically fired with benzine, and many inhabitants were burned alive in their houses. Women were raped in daylight in the open square of the University on the same day that the square had been the scene of the shooting of 32 civilians. On entering Namur, on August 24th, the German troops gave notice of their arrival by firing on a crowd of 150 unarmed, unresisting civilians, only ten of whom escaped. At Andenne, on the Meuse, where firing on the German troops was alleged, 400 people were massacred. And so the long catalogue of barbarities continues, covering in varying degrees of bloodiness all the districts in German occupation during the terrible months of August and September. The fact that their troops had been fired on by civilians was the excuse urged by the Germans; but hardly any pains were taken to verify the charges, or to ascertain the actual culprits, before these terrible collective vengeances were made against whole towns and villages. The habit of diary-keeping among the German troops provided the Committee with much valuable evidence on the manner in which these reprisals were made. In one diary which fell into the hands of the British authorities a Saxon officer displayed, with damning clarity, the German practice. About 200 men had been shot in the instance referred to. "There must have been some innocent men amongst them," wrote this observer, who cannot be accused of undue sympathy for the slaughtered. "*In future we shall have to hold an enquiry as to their guilt instead of shooting them.*"

The truth was as stated in the first and third of the Committee's findings. These massacres, and the accompanying pillage and arson, were not the punishment of carefully-established misconduct committed by the civilian population, but part of an official system of terrorism intended to overawe a population which might very conceivably be capable of some individual treachery. Sometimes they seem to have even been a deliberate revenge for the attacks of the lawfully-constituted Belgian army. It was "frightfulness" in practice, an official policy of "punishment" without trial and in advance of the offence—a conclusion which would be supported, apart from any other evidence, by the undoubted fact that the barbarity of the German behaviour in any of the districts cited was in direct proportion to the amount of peril or legitimate resistance which their troops were meeting there. This official terrorism was the blackest charge which the Committee's Report established against the German army. The hideous individual atrocities which it mentioned—the rapes, the mutilated corpses, the abominable slaughter of young children and women—were details which more readily arrested and horrified the average reader. But these individual abominations, as the Committee were careful to point out, were not an indictment of the official attitude of the German army, except in so far as authorised and collective terrorism opened the door to personal excess. The difference was between atrocious cruelty that was the result of individual passion, perverted instincts, or drunkenness, and cruelty that was a deliberately-thought-out system, put into practice by the German command with the cold ferocity of an intellectual conviction. The great crime which the Bryce Report fastened on the German army in the eyes of all the world was that it had made savagery not a mood but a policy.

THE STORM BREAKS.

With the news of the sinking of the *Lusitania* the anger which had been accumulating against Germany began to take shape in action against the German residents in this country. There were still a great number of these whose liberties had remained very little interfered with, in spite of the demands which had been made from time to time in a section of the Press for the prompt internment of all alien enemies, and even, in some not very responsible quarters, for the internment of naturalised Germans as well. The Government was now to yield to this agitation, but not before it had received proof that the domestic peace of the country and the safety of the German residents themselves could only be secured by such a

step. More or less complete details of the sinking of the *Lusitania* were published in the morning papers of Saturday, May 8th, and on the same day fierce anti-German rioting broke out in Liverpool and Birkenhead. In three days more than a hundred houses, supposed to be occupied by Germans, were wrecked or damaged. In Manchester and Salford there were outbursts, less considerable in the actual damage done, but equally significant as an expression of the mood of the hour. By the Wednesday the Lancashire mobs, sobered by some businesslike sentences at the police courts, were beginning to abandon their new crusade; but the day was marked by its being taken up with ferocious vigour in East London, where the fact that no lives were lost was due more to good fortune than to the amount of police protection which was at hand. Serious as was the amount of damage done—in Liverpool alone it meant a bill of some £50,000 for the ratepayers to settle—it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to this very unpleasant and discreditable disorder. Anti-German feeling took this extreme shape only in a few of the large cities, and there only among the least reputable of the people. And whatever real and uncontrollable anger began the demonstrations they were carried on to a great extent by brutal horseplay and the emerging of the inevitable hooligan. For the most part they constituted a cruel and senseless harrying of unoffending people whose only offence was their nationality; and as they were made without any intelligent discrimination, the victims were not always offenders even to this small extent. The sight of a pork butcher's shop was enough to excite the mob, though in some cases its proprietor was an Englishman. Russians and other friendly aliens suffered considerably, and those British subjects who made some attempt to protect neighbours who had been living peacefully in their midst for years were not safe from rough handling. Nothing, however, was seen in this country to equal the organised revenge which was wreaked on German property in Johannesburg and other South African towns. There anger at the sinking of the *Lusitania* blazed up into the most methodical sack and arson of German premises. The total damage done in South Africa was estimated at over a million pounds.

There were, of course, many more responsible and legitimate indications of the public temper. German members of the London Stock Exchange were requested by the Committee to absent themselves from the Exchange, and those who disregarded the warning were denied entrance by a body of the other members. Similar notices warning off, at any rate temporarily, members of German, Austrian, and Turkish nationality were posted in other Exchanges all over the country. Clubs and other institutions followed suit. For the moment not even British nationality by birth, so long as it was accompanied by enemy extraction, was safe from suspicion. At a Newcastle shipyard the workmen, by a threat to strike, secured the resignation of a manager, and the dismissal of a draughtsman and some workmen, who all were of German and Austrian antecedents. Clearly the mood of the moment would have to be recognised by the Government.

NEW RESTRICTIONS ON ALIEN ENEMIES.

Mr. Asquith announced their recognition of it in the House of Commons on May 14th. At the time that his speech was made there were 19,000 civilian aliens interned in British camps. Some 24,000 men and 16,000 women were still at liberty, subject to the old registration restrictions. All adult males of this class, "for their own safety and that of the community," were now to be interned, or, if over military age, repatriated. Women and children were also to be repatriated. Advisory Committees under the Home Office were to examine all claims for exemption, and it rested with the applicant to show cause why he should be allowed at large in the country. The presumption was to be that he was not entitled to his liberty. As for the some 8,000 naturalised British subjects of enemy birth, their harmlessness was presumed, but the power to intern them was reserved in cases where necessity or danger could be proved to the satisfaction of the Advisory Committee. It was a drastic scheme involving much private misfortune and the break up of many innocent homes, in some cases long established in this country. But the new style of war, which was, in terrible truth, war between the nations, and the pressing exigencies of the times, made it a necessary one, and, apart from a little criticism that it went too far or that it should have been taken still farther from extremists of both camps, the scheme was generally approved by the House of Commons and the public.

The new arrangements were put into force as swiftly as possible. The police met with no resistance in their huge task of rounding up four times as many aliens as had already been interned—in many cases Germans from the districts where rioting had taken place, terrified by the ordeal of the past few days, presented themselves voluntarily for arrest. But no further internments on any considerable scale could be carried out until fresh camps had been provided, and even those aliens who were anxious to secure shelter from attack found some difficulty in gaining that shelter for the moment. By the middle of June the rate of internment was still being held back by the lack of suitable camp sites, though the Advisory Committees had been vigorously at work. The English Committee had received 2,160 applications for exemption, out of which up to this time 286 applications had been granted and 1,256 refused. By the end of July internment was proceeding at the rate of 1,000 cases a week, and there still remained 6,000 aliens to be interned. The number of alien enemies, including women and children, who had been repatriated up to that time was 6,302.

THE DISHONOURED KNIGHTS.

There remains one small but highly interesting indication of the widespread change which the month dealt with in this chapter had brought about in the attitude of the British people towards their enemies. That change had shown itself in rioting among the least educated, and in the commercial and social ostracism of alien enemies, and the new internment policy of the Government, and among the middle and executive classes of society. It was also to be shown in the attitude of the Court. There had been occasional complaints ever since the beginning of the war that the names of a number of enemy princes were still included on the roll of the most famous of all British Orders of Knighthood, the Garter, and that their banners were still to be seen hanging in the Chapel of the Order at Windsor. No notice had been taken of the complaints, however, and there was no evident desire

that notice should be taken of them; for it is not necessary to be a member of the College of Heralds to perceive that a knight does not part with his honour by being at war with a sovereign who has previously recognised it. So much, at any rate, may be said for ordinary warfare. But four days after the sinking of the *Lusitania* was known an official notification was issued that the King, as Sovereign of the Order of the Garter, had given directions that the names of eight alien enemy knights should be struck off the roll of the order. The dishonoured knights were: The Emperor of Austria, the German Emperor, the King of Würtemberg, the German Crown Prince, the Grand Duke of Hesse and the Rhine, Prince Henry of Prussia, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, and the Duke of Cumberland.

Their banners were privately removed from the Chapel at Windsor, and so the incident closed. It was generally taken as a very fitting comment on the German conduct of war, the more so since it was clearly dictated by the latest developments of that conduct. If for no other reason it commended itself now to most Englishmen for having provided the opportunity for a singularly dignified and effective vindication of all that was honourable and all that had been most abused in the profession of arms.



St. George's Chapel, Windsor, showing the banners of the Garter knights. Those of the eight German and Austrian knights were removed when their names were struck off the roll of the Order.

[*Central News.*



Dockers in khaki: Lord Derby making his first inspection of the Dockers' Battalion at Liverpool. [*L.N.A.*



The Dockers' Battalion at work discharging a ship's cargo at Liverpool. [*L.N.A.*



Back to the trenches: Soldiers who have been home for a day or two on leave saying good-bye to their friends on Victoria Station, London. [*Topical Press.*

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE EXTERNALS OF WAR IN ENGLAND.

ENGLAND THE ONE INSULAR COMBATANT—RECRUITING FOR THE ARMY, THE FIRST AND LATER PHASES—THE MIDDLE CLASSES AND THE NEW ARMY—THE PROBLEM OF THE BELGIAN REFUGEES—ENGLAND AND HER WOUNDED MEN—ORGANISATION AGAINST SOCIAL DISTRESS—THE WAR AND SPORT—WOMEN AND NEW INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES.

IN two respects England stood apart from all the great Powers which plunged into war at the beginning of August, 1914. She alone was an insular Power, with the sea for a natural frontier and—dependent upon this and derivative from it—she alone was organised for war on the footing of voluntary service. These two facts conditioned vitally the results of the war, and especially the earlier results, upon the social life of the country. It has often been remarked that the Straits of Dover constitute a moral and a psychological, as well as a physical, dividing line. Our literature, our art and manners, and social life are all marked by the insularity of our lives—we have always been a people consciously on the right side of the water. And this attitude of the English mind survived the transition from a state of peace to a state of war. In the month of September the war had submerged a country which is as familiar to multitudes of Englishmen as the upper reaches of the Thames, and as quickly, if not more quickly, reached from London than some parts of the West of England. All through the first autumn of the war, landowners in the South and East of England were writing to the papers to testify that their pheasants were being unmistakably alarmed by the play of the artillery across in France.

And yet, save for the spas and seaports of the East Coast, the war remained a thing of over the threshold, an economic presence affecting the bank rate and the price of bacon, a cause of parting and a cause of bereavement, but not a physical thing which we should ever see with our own eyes. England was not called on to domesticate the war, and it became a current saying that this, that, and the other State measure, of which the reason was not at once apparent, was taken to "bring the war home" to the people. There is more reassurance in twenty-one miles of sea than in half a continent of dry land, and it was probably, again, because we had an insular attitude towards the war that it was unaccompanied in England by the striking moral reaction—in regard, for instance, to alcohol—which it brought in France and in Russia.



A khaki wedding: Cutting the wedding cake with the bridegroom's sword. [*Central News.*



Sergeants hauling the bridal coach from the church. [*Central News.*

VOLUNTARY SERVICE.

The other respect in which England stood apart, both from her Allies and her enemies, was in her continued dependence upon the professional and voluntary man of arms. Swift as were the results of the war in the manufactories and counting-houses and shops of the country, they were, for some weeks at any rate, unaccompanied by such a domestic dislocation as comes from a continental mobilisation. After the lapse of a few weeks there was, as we shall see, a general arming of even the most pacific sections of English society. But this had not yet begun. For a few weeks the general mind of England still regarded fighting as the business of the fighting man. One of the few spectacles afforded by the outbreak of war was that of the crowds of candidates around the recruiting offices, but these crowds were still, at the moment, made up out of that material on which the army always draws—the population to which the army is, even in time of peace, a possible career. The domestication of the army by the middle class had not yet occurred; and it is probable that to many a young man, thrown out of work or placed on half-pay by the outbreak of the war, it was, and remained for some weeks, an unthinkable thing that he also should go and fight.

The war, therefore, is to be conceived of as insinuating itself into the social life of England rather than taking it by any form of cataclysm or assault. And its coming was devoid of either noise or spectacle. The transition from peace to war was almost as smooth and silent as the launching of a ship. The music-halls inserted the "Marseillaise" into their programmes, and taught their audiences to identify as the Russian National Anthem what most people had only known as an old-fashioned hymn-tune; but they did little more than this—it was plain that the music-halls did not propose to lead the nation as they did before and during the South African War. There was, again, little, if any, perambulation of the streets; and in the average English town the great event manifested itself chiefly in successive proclamations on the church doors, and in the sudden swelling into quite a new significance of the familiar figure of the Territorial soldier. In many villages the commandeering of horses—all except the white and dappled ones—constituted the first real tidings of war. Horses were stopped, taken out of their shafts, bought and paid for, and spirited away into the mysteries of great events—no one knew where they had gone, but milkmen delivering their milk on foot two days after the declaration of war were the earliest effective agents in "bringing the war home."

It was, indeed, not so much an avalanche as the welling up of a flood through all sorts of unexpected cracks in the framework of society. The amateur photographer found himself an object of suspicion; the man who did a little in wireless telegraphy discovered that he had it in him to be a dangerous character; pigeon flying was a forbidden sport. England had to learn, by many painful examples, that the rifles of an army on active service contained cartridges and would go off. Quite a number of people were wounded, and several lost their lives, before it became common knowledge that the sentry, with his challenge at the cross-roads and on the bridge, was not playing a game of make-believe, in which one might join or not as one chose. Another of the early signs of war was in the appearance of officers and even of naval officers, who are especially shy of their plumage, in full uniform in omnibuses and restaurants. England discovered, what she had perhaps not known, that a considerable proportion of her more eminent medical men were Territorial officers in the Royal Army Medical Corps. The medical profession also was mobilised, and went very extensively into khaki.

Meanwhile, the Expeditionary Force had gone abroad, and the Fleet was believed to have put out to the North Sea. Whatever anticipations he may have had of the war on land, it is certain that the average man expected at sea a decision both summary and swift. Both the Press and the public tried to take the war at a much faster speed than the war was prepared to go. Probably, in those early days, the country, or rather that part of the country which was not yet on the rack of a personal anxiety, was unconsciously visualising the war as something decidedly bigger and more momentous than a General Election, but of the same kind and species, and capable, like a General Election, or any other great political crisis, of being progressively unfolded in successive editions of the evening Press. And so, late every night in August and September, as England was going to bed, there was a rush of newsboys into the peaceful suburbs of the great towns, and the news sounded very alarming and decisive until it was carried in and read. The country made experience for the first time of a Censorship. It began to get accustomed to information in small doses, and, having no news, it took to gossip. The *on dit* became once more a power in the land. The great achievement of this revivified institution was the passage through England of that large Russian force. The rumour went everywhere and it came from everywhere. The Russian force had been seen in every corner of England—no matter how unlikely the junction and no matter how fantastically on any conceivable journey the Russians must have lost their way, they had always been seen, usually the night before, and always by someone who was not present to give his evidence in person. It was like a mediæval rumour tuned up to the tension of modern times.

THE ARMY AND THE MIDDLE CLASS.

The New Army was, however, the great social phenomenon produced in England by the European War. It represented the militarisation of the English middle class. It is astonishing how few before the war were the bonds between the British army and the British public. In France the army has always been a domestic pet, but ordinary social England, on the other hand, had hardly been on nodding terms with its own army—either with officers or with men—for the British army had drawn its material from the far opposite ends of the social scale, from the highest and the lowest. There is, indeed, evidence that the courts and alleys of London and Liverpool and Bristol and Manchester were the partners of the playing-fields of Eton in the victory of Waterloo. Territorial soldiering had, it is true, become a recognised diversion of middle-class youth, but it had powerful rivals in golf and tennis, and never, to the average young man, held out the promise of a great and eminent career like cricket. We have seen that the first recruits of August represented the *levée* of the raw military material of the country. The New Army, which was to draw upon the banks and the counting-houses, to decimate the



Soldiers assisting the farmers by getting in the hay. [*Topical Press.*



School children helping in the sowing of potatoes. [*J. M. Dunn.*

active membership of tennis clubs, and to cause the carriage of golf-sticks in public places by men of military age to be "bad form," had not at the moment been born, or, at any rate, had not begun to grow.

Kitchener's Army was an army *ad hoc*. Enlistment was "for the duration of the war," and it was this which made it possible for those who had never thought of the army before. Gregarious enlistment was encouraged. Men were invited to join under guarantees that the social stratifications of civilian life would be preserved. Battalions were to be "atmospheric" and homogeneous—the nets brought up great hauls of "pals." And since a man was to go soldiering for a limited period, and in many cases among men of his own social class, it did not very much matter whether he went with a commission or in the ranks. Many, it is true, stipulated for commissions, but the great majority stood not upon the order of their going, but went. And these were the wise ones in their generation. The New Army had a double dose of original humanity, and a man made his way in it for all sorts of reasons not known at Aldershot, and not excluding the reason that he happened to be a nice fellow.

The truth is that very little of the old military caste survived the first two months of war. The social isolation of the private soldier was definitely broken down. He was to be seen constantly in the most elegant company, and it was quite possible—such were the fortunes of war—that he had younger brothers, and perhaps even nephews, whom it was his military duty to salute. And side by side with this humanisation of the army occurred what we have called the militarisation of the pacific deeps of English society. If the spectacle of army and even naval officers in the insides of omnibuses was something new, and if private soldiers in the stalls of theatres represented a social landslide, it was equally an innovation to see the elderly Nonconformist citizen in company with two soldiers of the line, who were quite obviously his sons. His acquiescence, his full sympathy even, and the tentative use in his conversation of military terms and even military slang, was not the least striking of the signs of the times. He had trained up his sons to be "honorary secretaries" in evangelical causes, and the times had made them artillerymen.



One of the New Army making himself useful in his billet.
[*Newspaper Illustrations.*

RETURN TO PHYSICAL STANDARDS.

The war was the cause of a sort of overhauling of the physique of England. There was a return to the physical standards, a reassortment of men according to age, with a cross-classification by chest measurement. The men who were just a little too old to go before the doctor began to take more or less secret stock of themselves, and to put in a modest claim to be accounted physically righteous. Conscious as they were, in many cases, of possessing more endurance and needing less sleep in the forties than in the twenties or thirties, they resented their total exclusion from the combatant strength of the country, and it was mainly from such men that a large body of special constables and home defence volunteers was recruited. The theory and practice of infantry drill became a subject of general study, and, concurrently with this, people set to work to catch up with the events which had led up to the great catastrophe of the war. The penny blue-book which stated the case for England had an enormous sale, and the book-stalls were loaded with popular expositions of Haeckel, Treitschke, and Nietzsche, while Bernhardi spoke for himself in a multitude of editions. English women read these books as assiduously as their men-folk, perhaps even more assiduously. The libraries all reported a marked resort to serious literature, not excluding even poetry. And as the winter came on, prodigies of knitting were done in khaki wool. The revival of knitting was commented on in several of the popular songs of the day.

We have seen how quietly and soberly England passed into a state of war. This mood was a promising and a reassuring symptom, especially to those who were old enough to compare the quietude and sobriety of August, 1914, with the feverishness and hysteria



The Kingsway Hall Creche, where little children, whose fathers are at the war and whose mothers are out working, are fed and looked after. [*Topical Press.*



The shortage of men workers: Women carriage cleaners at Marylebone Station. [*Record Press.*

which preceded the South African War. The Government seemed almost perverse in its determination to keep the fires of popular excitement damped down. In the first meagre accounts which came of the fighting in France the British army was treated of as a machine. There is a local patriotism as well as a national patriotism, and in England it is fostered by the mimic warfare and emulations of sport, but regimental achievements which would have set the local echoes ringing through this county or that city were suppressed, or only tardily and partially revealed. The country was left to feed on its own reserves of character and resolution, and it was very generally remarked that the early recruits moved off to their depôts as quietly and almost as forlornly as though they had been Irish harvesters on their annual migration. It was not until the first spring of the war that the military value of music—one of the oldest uses of that art—was generally perceived, and the new soldiers were given the privilege of stepping out to the nearest railway station and the unknown future which awaited them with some sort of swagger and rhythm. As for the Territorial battalions, they mainly left home in the night, and the towns which had bred them and brought them up wakened to find that they were gone.



A woman ticket inspector at work.

[*Record Press.*

THE BELGIAN REFUGEES.

And consequently the first real sight which England got of the war was its wreckage. In a great and probably typical English city the first popular rush into the streets was caused, weeks after the war had begun, by the arrival of the first Belgian refugees. These people, or at any rate the earlier parties to arrive, were given what must have been to many of them an overpowering civic reception, and were then distributed in small, and not always well-assorted, parties over all the provinces of England. There was hardly a town or a residential district of a great city in which "the Belgians" did not become a new interest in social life, and incidentally a considerable problem in handling and organisation. It was the Belgian refugees who caused the mobilisation of middle-class England into a vast army of committees. Houses which had stood empty for years were turned into institutions. "Central" committees, "housing" committees, "furnishing" committees, and "amusements" committees sprang into existence, and considerable social distinction was acquired by ladies who knew conversational French in the very advanced degree that was required. It was found that the Belgian was a guest who needed handling with much tact. England had to learn by many awkward and embarrassing examples that the Belgian nation comprises two races who are politically rather than socially unified, and that while Walloon and Flemish make excellent joint occupants of Belgium they are not to be contained together with the best results in a single house, even though it be a large one. The useful employment of the men, or of those above military age, was also a difficulty in a country where the entire industrial surface has been reclaimed and fenced about by the trade union. Glasgow distinguished itself greatly by its systematic treatment of the problem of the Belgian refugees. In Glasgow the work was municipalised from the very start, and other cities besides Glasgow experimented hopefully in Belgian workshops, the products of which were to be stored up against the day when the refugees might return to rebuild their own homes.

TREATMENT OF THE WOUNDED.

But a very powerful rival to the Belgian refugee was coming in the person of the English soldier returned broken and wounded from the war. At his first coming he was an object of deep curiosity, but very shortly he became, especially in his convalescence, a principal care and occupation of leisured society. Modern England, if she does not feel more deeply, feels more quickly than she did. The war brought out very plainly that acute sensibility to physical suffering which may be due to a more active social conscience, and is probably caused in part by the overwrought nerves of modern civilised life. We have seen how



The Volunteer Defence Movement: The National Guard entering Buckingham Palace, where they were inspected by the King. [*Topical Press.*



Members of the National Guard learning trench digging in the heart of the city on the site of the old General Post Office. [*Central Press.*



The war and the Universities: Undergraduates who have become officers in the army going into the Senate House in order to take their degrees on Degree Day at Cambridge. [*Central News*

the military plan denied to the people left at home the vicarious excitements of war which the "special correspondent" and, still more, the cinematograph operator, would have been only too glad to purvey. Nevertheless, forty years of popular education, a cheap and, in later years, an illustrated press, and the picture palace, teaching a sort of facile visualisation of strange and sometimes awful scenes, had done their work—people could not only read, but, what was still more to the point, they could read between the lines. The case of a certain "lonely corporal," who had received no letters at Christmas, having crept into the papers, scores and scores of people constituted themselves his regular correspondents; and the presents for the troops included not only woollen clothing and Christmas puddings in staggering quantities, but such refinements in life as tinted notepaper, scented soap, and boracic powder. England projected herself with all her complicated modern tastes and requirements into the trenches in the first winter of the war, and the parcels which went to the front constituted a sort of measure of the rise and the refinement of the general standard of life. As for the convalescent soldier at home, he was a patient, but even more a pet. The rule seemed to be to give him not so much the things which might conceivably be good for him as the things which he would be most likely to want. England had plainly learned the therapeutic value of amusement. He was borrowed from the hospital for organised motor-runs; he was taken to matinées; and when this was not possible, he was sung to, and played to, and danced to as he lay in bed. Many of these wounded men were reservists, who had before the war settled down to the ordinary life of the artisan in English towns, and a new communion between the classes into which society is divided, and a better understanding between rich and poor, must be counted one of the minor blessings of war to be set against its major horrors—a slight edification amid all the ruins. A Red Cross Hospital, with its shaded lawn and open windows, with some soldiers playing cricket with their free arms, and others looking on from low chairs, made one wonder, if only for the moment, whether the war was not scattering pleasures almost as lavishly as pains.

EARLY FEARS OF DISTRESS.

It was with the same quick imaginativeness that the country assembled immediately on the outbreak of war a vast and complex machinery for the relief of social distress. It is to be remembered that on August 4th, 1914, not one Englishman in ten had the vaguest idea what a state of war would mean. The country was quite destitute of the experimental data which were the common property of elderly men both in Germany and France. While the Expeditionary Force was getting a footing on the Continent, England at home was finding its way out of a maze of equally false hopes and fears. We have seen how the country quite mistook the manner in which events would be shaped by England's mastery of the seas. In one other respect the miscalculation was complete. It was expected that the war would throw a great proportion

of the people out of work. For the first few weeks it appeared as though this anticipation would prove to be correct. The cotton trade was brought almost to a standstill, and it is curious to recall that the engineering trade, in which afterwards the demand for men was greater than the supply, was almost the first and the heaviest hit. But two influences on which the country had not reckoned checked the rise of unemployment and, growing stronger in the autumn, gave the country at Christmas the air and the feeling of an abnormal prosperity.

The first of these influences was the wholesale withdrawal of able-bodied men from the industrial service of the country, and the second, operating with the first influence and intensifying its effect, the demand for war material, which speedily had large parts of industrial England working day and night. In these circumstances there was work for almost anyone and everyone with a pair of hands, and it was said that down the length of long streets in many industrial towns there had not been a better and fuller Christmas for years. Moreover, if the British Navy did not, in pitched and arrayed battle, sink the German fleet, as the average Englishman expected it would, it yet gave a substantial, if an unsensational, account of itself in the grocers' shops. Prices after the first few weeks of panic, during which England was buying-in apparently for a siege, fell almost to their pre-war level, and though it was in the order of things that they should go up again, their next ascent, when it came, was a gradual one, with which rising wages kept in some correspondence. Moreover, the well-to-do who received the war with a sudden and violent turning over of new leaves, as though it was likely to last about as long as Lent, kept their good resolutions not much longer than those which are made at the beginning of the New Year. From August 4th till about August 23rd the restaurants of England might as well have been closed. By the end of August their customers were coming back. In the third week of the war the picture palaces were recovering their audiences, and on September 5th the football season deliberately began again. The temperature of the country had returned to 98·4. It became almost a morbid symptom that it refused to rise again.



Village workers making toys to take the place of those previously supplied from Germany. [*L.N.A.*

SPORT AND AMUSEMENTS.

Indeed, throughout the first winter of war the country carried out almost the full programme of its amusements. There was, for instance, the professional football player. Although a much-threatened man, he survived as a figure and an institution through a complete winter of the war, and finished his appointed programme towards the end of April in the presence of some fifty thousand of the faithful. Vicarious athletics, the sport of "looking on," had been the cause of much misgiving to those who stood around the bedside of the sick man of civilisation, and it was believed and hoped that this would be one of the cankers of a long peace which the war would infallibly cure. It soon became evident, however, that the country had mind and to spare for the game. On Christmas Day there were 40,000 spectators at Newcastle; at Bradford, 25,000; at Blackburn, 25,000; at Sheffield, 25,000; at Bolton, 18,000; and at Chelsea, 15,000. In its progress towards the cup final on April 24th the game bore down without difficulty the obstacle of a polite but highly-scandalised protest. It is stated that the restaurants in Manchester on the day of that great event prepared for almost "unprecedented patronage," engaging waiters and waitresses from all over Lancashire and Yorkshire. The managers of the game were, however, betraying before the season was quite over a very considerable degree of nervous self-consciousness. They dwelt much on the mental recreation which they were providing for overworked men in the munitions factories, and pointed to the trenches—even the German trenches—as being all impatient for football news, and it was perhaps out of the same desire to get into better tune with the times that the band at the great match for the Cup played

through a long programme of hymns. Lord Derby's speech at the end of the match contained rather more than a sigh of relief that this diversion was at an end. For horse-racing on a modified programme, and without its usual social glamour, the defence was made that the upkeep of the best thoroughbred stock was one of the military necessities of the country.

WOMEN'S WORK.

The war, then, failed to bring about in England any of the cataclysmic changes which were expected of it. It neither produced great evils nor—as it is said to have done in France and Russia—removed them. The changes which it did make came late and had to be sought deep, but some of them, at any rate, were of a kind to outlast the war and survive into the days of peace. There was, for instance, a definite enlargement of the boundaries of women's work. The railway, for instance, lent itself in quite an unexpected degree to feminine management. From the cleaning of offices, almost immemorially the province of women, to the cleaning of railway carriages seems a step involving no question of principle, and it is curious that the mobilisation of charwomen for this work should have excited some curiosity. More significant from the social point of view was the introduction of women to duties which put them as collectors and examiners of tickets in control of the rough-and-tumble of mankind on railway platforms. The appointment of women as tramguards was an even bolder experiment, but women had only to be seen once in such a setting and thenceforth they belonged—as lift attendants and chauffeurs also—to the natural order of things. It is curious how long mankind will go on thinking itself imprisoned within doors that are not locked and will open at a touch. These wide extensions of women's work were perhaps thought by many an adequate compensation for the arrest of the agitation for the vote. It is true that masculine jealousy was placated whenever necessary by the assurance that each innovation of the kind was a war measure, but much of the social experimentation which was made in a long series of war measures has probably been made for all time.



The opening of the Red Cross Sale in London. [*Central News.*

A RETROSPECT.

THIS volume has brought the general narrative of events down to the end of the third quarter of the first year. For British readers the story has been less inspiriting than that told in the first volume. The first volume saw the British army on the broad main current of military events. In their invasion through Belgium the Germans put their chief strength on their right wing. The British were opposite, and on them fell the full force of the shock. General Joffre's strategy before the Marne was to decline his centre while accumulating armies on the German flank. Of these armies the British were the centre, and on them again fell the brunt and much of the honour of the victory of the Marne. Fortune, and the prescience of Sir John French, made the British the protagonists in the great struggle in Flanders, when the Germans, having fallen back on entrenched positions along the Aisne, sought to repeat their great encircling movements, but this time with a wider sweep along the coast from Antwerp to Calais. The second and third quarter of the year had nothing to compare with the crowded excitements of these first three months. To the rapid movement of the first three months succeeded the trench war of winter, like molten iron poured in an ice-bound mould, and spring, on which hope had been so confidently set, brought its disappointment. Neuve Chapelle was a fruit that tasted sweet, but somewhat soured in the digestion. And there was a remarkable and not an agreeable contrast between the prominent part which the small Expeditionary Force played in the early operations of the war and the comparative inactivity of the much larger British army in the spring, when General Foch began his attack on Lens.

The contrast helped to swell the wave of pessimism which began to spread over British opinion as the end of the first year approached and no progress made. Yet the sense of discouragement, natural as it was, was irrational and in great measure ill-informed. The disproportion between the achievement of the British army in the late summer and autumn and in the winter and spring was more in appearance than in reality. The distinction of the British army at the beginning of the war was for the most part in retreat, and there is one standard of strength required for retreat and another—and a much higher standard—for successful attack, or even for successful defence. The army of the summer of 1914 was even less capable of holding its ground than the army of the spring was of attacking with success the elaborately prepared positions of the enemy. Our army gained vastly in strength as the months went by, and its gain was a measure of the work of organisation that had been done in the meantime. If this work was still insufficient for the task in hand, it was proof not that no progress had been made, but that the enormous strength of the enemy's positions had been under-estimated. That fact and its causes were much to be regretted; but they did not justify the depression of spirits which became fashionable in England, and indeed, after the ill-success of April and May, was artificially cultivated in some quarters as a patriotic virtue.

Lord Kitchener's original estimate of the duration of the war, made before even he understood the great defensive power of modern entrenchments scientifically built and equipped, was three years. It was much that three months of war had established a strong probability of our winning the war; and it was too much to hope that they would bring us within sight of actual victory. The theory on which we began the war was that a comparatively small reinforcement on land would serve to turn the balance of war in favour of the Allies. Neither France nor Russia before the war expected us to supply an army of the Continental size and model. What they wanted was our sea-power, without which they stood no chance of success. By the end of the first six months it was clear that there was no such thing as a war with limited liability, and that we should have to equip ourselves with military power and become an equal partner on land, as well as the predominant partner at sea. But even then it was not generally realised that to be a great military Power meant something more than having two or three millions of men under arms. The individual cannot suddenly develop his muscles without throwing a great strain on his nervous and circulatory system. Similarly, an army is not an appendage that a nation can develop or contract at will. Any sudden increase necessarily involves a great organic change in the whole life of the nation. That would have been so in a war against any enemy, but in a war against an enemy like Germany, who for forty years had studied the art of war, and had organised its whole scientific and industrial development with a view to its enlistment in the service of the State, the resultant disturbance was proportionately greater. This country was called upon to extemporise within a year a military system of a magnitude equal to that which it had taken Europe a generation to develop. Its failure to accomplish this feat is the failure of our spring campaign. We had the men, but not the machinery of an army.

And, in justice to ourselves, it should be borne in mind that our failure was not redeemed by any conspicuous French success in the field. The Germans were not far wrong in their estimate of the material strength of France, and but for the reforms of General Joffre in the winter the French army would never have been in a condition to attack. It is impossible to exaggerate the quality of the work done by General Joffre, or the splendid qualities of endurance shown by the French people. But they were none the less inadequate to the task of expelling the Germans from France, to say nothing of Belgium. Both in Champagne and in the Woevre the results of the French attacks were small in proportion to the expenditure of life. On the two flanks, in Alsace and in Artois, the progress of the French was more substantial; yet it never looked like breaking the main line of the German resistance. Long before spring it was clear that the

French alone could not overcome the German resistance. What was to be done in the west depended partly on the assistance that the British were able to give to the French on land, partly on the success of the Russians in compelling the Germans to draw off from the western front.

The failure of the British spring campaign showed that months must elapse before the conversion of England into a first-class military Power was complete. This conversion was not solely, as seemed to be assumed in England, a question of munitions; but at any rate a superabundant supply of munitions, and especially of machine-guns and of high-explosive shells, was a primary condition of success. Reasonable Frenchmen, and all who knew the difficulties of Britain's task in effecting, as she was now required and prepared to do, a complete revolution in her ideas of national defence—a revolution extending beyond the army into all departments of the national life—were willing to wait patiently until the transformation was effected. But it is to be feared that the indiscreet zeal of some English newspaper writers, by belittling the sacrifices of Englishmen and the services that this country was rendering to the common cause, made it easy for Frenchmen who were not well-informed to misunderstand us.

All through the winter the centre of gravity of the war was in the east rather than the west. Popular opinion in England grossly over-estimated the numbers of men engaged in the war on the east, and in particular the numbers of men which Russia was capable of putting and of maintaining in the field. It may be doubted whether Russia ever had more than two million men under arms at any one time. In other words, Russia, in spite of her enormous population, never probably had as many men in the field as France. At the beginning of the war the Germans had six times as many men on the west as on the east front, where the burden of attack fell on the Austrians. The original German plans failed no less completely on the east than on the west. Not only did the Austrian offensive break down, but East Prussia was invaded and Galicia was lost. All through the winter Russia maintained her advantage over Austria, in spite of increasing German pressure on the Polish front. Yet so far from overwhelming the enemy by weight of numbers, the Russians were frequently outnumbered. The immense work done by Russia during these months has not been justly appreciated in this country. The familiar metaphor of the "steam roller" concealed from English minds the fact that all through these months the odds were steadily mounting against her. They saw that the number of Germans in the west remained fairly constant—it never sank much below two millions; they ignored for the most part the wonderful power of Austria to sustain defeat; and the idea that the Russians could possibly be outnumbered hardly ever occurred to them. And more important than the occasional and local inferiority in numbers was the constant inferiority in artillery and in technical equipment. Russia was in a position not unlike that of Britain herself in the spring of this year. She had the men, but could not equip them. And, unlike France, she did not, thanks to her geographical position, enjoy the full advantage of our command of the seas. That a country which was virtually blockaded, and had no great industrial resources to fall back upon, should do what Russia did in the autumn and winter was a great achievement, the full merits of which have not been properly recognised in this country.

Russia inflicted on Germany what Berlin regarded as its worst humiliation in the war—the invasion of East Prussia. In addition, she defeated three separate attempts on Warsaw—the first attack along the line of the Vistula, the second by way of Lodz, which was stayed on the Rawka and Bzura lines, the third further north, which was checked at the battle of Przasnysz. After the repulse of the early invasion of East Prussia, Russia's whole object was to turn the Austrian flank of Germany's defences; and, in spite of the repeated German campaigns against Warsaw, she so far succeeded that by the beginning of spring the Carpathian Passes were in her hands. It was at this juncture that our naval campaign against the Dardanelles forts was opened, and Great Britain, with the help of the French, began to take a direct part in the Eastern campaign. Russia had richly earned that assistance, and the prospects of success seemed bright.

How those prospects were clouded will be told in the next volume. But later ill-success ought not to blind us to the fact that in the late winter all the omens pointed to decisive success in the east. There were two occasions in the first nine months of the war in which very little would have given us decisive victory. The first was in September, after the battle of the Marne, when an army of 250,000 men in Belgium might not only have saved Antwerp but have ruined the whole German invasion of Belgium—perhaps ended the war then and there. The second was in February, when the Russian success in the Carpathians was at its height, and we were thinking of attacking the Dardanelles. A little more imagination and skill in our diplomacy, a little more patience and secrecy in our arrangements for attack on the Dardanelles, and early summer might have seen the Balkan States fighting on our side and a double invasion of Hungary in progress, over the Carpathian Passes and by the Balkan States on the south.

In that case the adhesion of Italy to the cause of the Allies might have brought about the downfall of Austria. As it was, her intervention, though it was the one bright spot in a spring that was full of disappointment, brought no immediate improvement, though its promise for the future was full of hope.

APPENDICES.

A.—GENERAL FRENCH'S DESPATCHES

1.—THE BATTLE OF GIVENCHY.

February 17th, 1915.

From the Field Marshal Commanding-in-chief the British Army in the Field to the Secretary of State for War :—

MY LORD,

I have the honour to forward a further report on the operations of the army under my command.

. . . . . .

In his desire to act with energy up to his instructions to demonstrate and occupy the enemy, the General Officer commanding the Indian Corps decided to take advantage of what appeared to him a favourable opportunity to launch attacks against the advanced trenches in his front on the 18th and 19th December. The attack of the Meerut Division on the left was made on the morning of the 19th with energy and determination, and was at first attended with considerable success, the enemy's advanced trenches being captured. Later on, however, a counter-attack drove them back to their original position with considerable loss.

The attack of the Lahore Division commenced at 4-30 a.m. It was carried out by two companies each of the First Highland Light Infantry and the First Battalion Fourth Gurkha Rifles of the Sirhind Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. H. Ronaldson. This attack was completely successful, two lines of the enemy's trenches being captured with little loss. Before daylight the captured trenches were filled with as many men as they would hold. The front was very restricted, communication to the rear impossible. At daybreak it was found that the position was practically untenable. Both flanks were in the air, and a supporting attack, which was late in starting, and therefore conducted during daylight, failed, although attempted with the greatest gallantry and resolution. Lieutenant-Colonel Ronaldson held on till dusk, when the whole of the captured trenches had to be evacuated, and the detachment fell back to its original line.

By the night of the 19th December nearly all the ground gained during the day had been lost

From daylight on the 20th December the enemy commenced a heavy fire from artillery and trench mortars on the whole front of the Indian Corps. This was followed by infantry attacks, which were made in especial force against Givenchy and between that place and La Quinque Rue. At about 10 a.m. the enemy succeeded in driving back the Sirhind Brigade and capturing a considerable part of Givenchy, but the Fifty-seventh Rifles and Ninth Bhopals, north of the canal, and the Connaught Rangers, south of it, stood firm. The Fifteenth Sikhs of the divisional reserve were already supporting the Sirhind Brigade. On the news of the retirement of the latter being received, the Forty-seventh Sikhs were also sent up to reinforce General Brunker.

The First Manchester Regiment, the Fourth Suffolk Regiment, and two battalions of French Territorials, under General Carnegy, were ordered to launch a vigorous counter-attack from Pont Fixé through Givenchy, to retake by a flank attack the trenches lost by the Sirhind Brigade. Orders were sent to General Carnegy to divert his attack on Givenchy village and to re-establish the situation there. A battalion of the Fifty-eighth French Division was sent to Annequin in support.

About 5 p.m. a gallant attack by the First Manchester Regiment and one company of the Fourth Suffolk Regiment had captured Givenchy and had cleared the enemy out of the two lines of trenches to the east of the village. The Ninth Bhopal Infantry and the Fifty-seventh Rifles had maintained their positions. But the enemy were still in possession of our trenches to the north of the village.

COUNTER-ATTACKS FAIL.

General Macbean, with the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, the Second Battalion Eighth Gurkha Rifles, and the Forty-seventh Sikhs, was sent up to support General Brunker, who at 2 p.m. directed General Macbean to move to a position of readiness in the second line trenches from Maris northward and to counter-attack vigorously if opportunity offered. Some considerable delay appears to have occurred, and it was not until 1 a.m. on the 21st that the Forty-seventh Sikhs and the Seventh Dragoon Guards, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Lempriere, D.S.O., of the latter regiment, were launched in counter-attack. They reached the enemy's trenches, but were driven out by enfilade fire, their gallant commander being killed.

The main attack by the remainder of General Macbean's force with the remnants of Lieutenant-Colonel Lempriere's detachment (which had again been rallied) was finally pushed in at about 4-30 a.m., and also failed.

STUBBORNNESS UNDER STRAIN.

In the northern section of the defensive line the retirement of the Second Battalion Second Gurkha Rifles at about 10 a.m. on the 20th had left the flank of the First Seaforth Highlanders on the extreme right of the Meerut Division line much exposed. This battalion was left shortly afterwards completely in the air by the retirement of the Sirhind Brigade. The Fifty-eighth Rifles therefore were ordered to support the left of the Seaforth Highlanders, to fill the gap created by the retirement of the Gurkhas.

During the whole of the afternoon strenuous efforts were made by the Seaforth Highlanders to clear the trenches to their right and left. The First Battalion Ninth Gurkha Rifles reinforced the Second Gurkhas near the orchard where the Germans were in occupation of the trenches abandoned by the latter regiment. The Garhwal Brigade was being very heavily attacked, and their trenches and loopholes were much damaged, but the Brigade continued to hold its front and attack, connecting with the Sixth Jats on the left of the Dehra Dun Brigade. No advance in force was made by the enemy, but the troops were pinned to their ground by heavy artillery fire, the Seaforth Highlanders especially suffering heavily.

Shortly before nightfall the Second Royal Highlanders, on the right of the Seaforth Highlanders, had succeeded in establishing touch with the Sirhind Brigade, and a continuous line (though dented near the orchard) existed throughout the Meerut Division.

THE FIRST CORPS ORDERED UP.

Early in the afternoon of December 20th orders were sent to the First Corps, which was then in general army reserve, to send an infantry brigade to support the Indian Corps. The First Brigade was ordered to Béthune, and reached that place at midnight on the 20th-21st December. Later in the day Sir Douglas Haig was ordered to move the whole of the First Division in support of the Indian Corps. The Third Brigade reached Béthune between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. on the 21st, and on the same date the Second Brigade arrived at Lacon at 1 p.m. The First Brigade was directed on Givenchy *via* Pont Fixé and the Third Brigade through Gorre on the trenches evacuated by the Sirhind Brigade. The Second Brigade was directed to support the Dehra Dun Brigade, being placed at the disposal of the general officer commanding the Meerut Division.

At 1 p.m. the general officer commanding the First Division directed the First Brigade to attack from the west of Givenchy in a north-easterly direction and the Third Brigade from Festubert in an east-north-easterly direction, the object being to pass the position originally held by us and to capture the German trenches 400 yards to the east of it. By 5 p.m. the First Brigade had obtained a hold in Givenchy and the ground south as far as the canal, and the Third Brigade had progressed to a point half a mile west of Festubert. By nightfall the First South Wales Borderers and the Second Welsh Regiment, of the Third Brigade, had made a lodgment in the original trenches to the north-east of Festubert, the First Gloucestershire Regiment continuing the line southward along the track east of Festubert. The First Brigade had established itself on the east side of Givenchy.

By 3 p.m. the Second Brigade was concentrated at Le Touret, and was ordered to retake the trenches which had been lost by the Dehra Dun Brigade. By 10 p.m. the support trenches west of the orchard had been carried, but the original fire trenches had been so completely destroyed that they could not be occupied. This operation was performed by the First Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the First Northamptonshire Regiment, supported by the Second King's Royal Rifle Corps in reserve. Throughout this day the units of the Indian Corps rendered all the assistance and support they could in view of their exhausted condition.

THE WHOLE POSITION RESTORED.

At 1 p.m. on the 22nd Sir Douglas Haig took over the command from Sir James Willcocks. The situation in the front line was then approximately as follows :—South of the La Bassée Canal the Connaught Rangers, of the Ferozepore Brigade, had not been attacked. North of the canal a short length of our original line was still held by the Ninth Bhopals and the Fifty-seventh Rifles, of the same brigade. Connecting with the latter was the First Brigade, holding the village of Givenchy and its eastern and northern approaches. On the left of the First Brigade was the Third Brigade. Touch had been lost between the left of the former and the right of the latter. The Third Brigade held a line along and in places advanced to the east of the Festubert road. Its left was in communication with the right of the Meerut Division line, where troops of the Second Brigade had just relieved the First Seaforth Highlanders. To the north, units of the Second Brigade held an indented line west of the orchard, connecting with half of the Second Royal Highlanders, half of the Forty-first Dogras, and the First Battalion Ninth Gurkha Rifles. From this point to the north the Sixth Jats and the whole of the Garhwal Brigade occupied the original line they held from the commencement of the operations.

The relief of most units of the southern sector was effected on the night of the 22nd December. The Meerut Division remained under the orders of the First Corps, and was not completely withdrawn until the 27th December. In the evening the position at Givenchy was practically re-established, and the Third Brigade had reoccupied the old line of trenches.

During the 23rd the enemy's activities ceased, and the whole position was restored to very much its original condition.

THE INDIANS' STEADFASTNESS.

In my last despatch I had occasion to mention the prompt and ready help I had received from the Lahore Division, under the command of Major-General H. B. B. Watkis, C.B., which was thrown into action immediately on arrival, when the British forces were very hard pressed during the battle of Ypres-Armentières. The Indian troops have fought with the utmost steadfastness and gallantry whenever they have been called upon.

"A FINE PIECE OF WORK."

On the 1st February a fine piece of work was carried out by the Fourth Brigade in the neighbourhood of Cuinchy. Some of the Second Coldstream Guards were driven from their trenches at 2-30 a.m., but made a stand some twenty yards east of them in a position which they held till morning. A counter-attack, launched at 3-15 a.m. by one company of the Irish Guards and half a company of the Second Coldstream Guards, proved unsuccessful, owing to heavy rifle fire from the east and south.

At 10-5 a.m., acting under orders of the First Division, a heavy bombardment was

opened on the lost ground for ten minutes, and this was followed immediately by an assault by about fifty men of the Second Coldstream Guards with bayonets, led by Captain A. Leigh-Bennett, followed by thirty men of the Irish Guards, led by Second Lieutenant F. F. Graham, also with bayonets. These were followed by a party of Royal Engineers with sandbags and wire. All the ground which had been lost was brilliantly retaken, the Second Coldstream Guards also taking another German trench and capturing two machine guns. Thirty-two prisoners fell into our hands.

The General Officer commanding the First Division describes the preparation by the artillery as "splendid," the high-explosive shells dropping in the exact spot with absolute precision.

In forwarding his report on this engagement, the General Officer commanding the First Army writes as follows :—

> Special credit is due (1) to Major-General Haking, commanding First Division, for the prompt manner in which he arranged this counter-attack and for the general plan of action, which was crowned with success.
>
> (2) To the General Officer commanding the Fourth Brigade (Lord Cavan) for the thorough manner in which he carried out the orders of the general officer commanding the division.
>
> (3) To the regimental officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Second Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards, who, with indomitable pluck, stormed two sets of barricades, captured three German trenches, two machine guns, and killed or made prisoners many of the enemy.

The War in the Air.

During the period under report the Royal Flying Corps has again performed splendid service. Although the weather was almost uniformly bad and the machines suffered from constant exposure, there have been only 13 days on which no actual reconnaissance has been effected. Approximately one hundred thousand miles have been flown.

In addition to the daily and constant work of reconnaissance and co-operation with the artillery, a number of aerial combats have been fought, raids carried out, detrainments harassed, parks and petrol depôts bombed, &c. Various successful bomb-dropping raids have been carried out, usually against the enemy's aircraft material

The principle of attacking hostile aircraft whenever and wherever seen (unless highly important information is being delivered) has been adhered to, and has resulted in the moral fact that enemy machines invariably beat an immediate retreat when chased. Five German aeroplanes are known to have been brought to the ground, and it would appear probable that others, though they have managed to reach their own lines, have done so in a considerably damaged condition.

The Territorials.

In my despatch of the 20th November, 1914, I referred to the reinforcements of Territorial troops which I had received, and I mentioned several units which had already been employed in the fighting line.

In the positions which I held for some years before the outbreak of this war I was brought into close contact with the Territorial Force, and I found every reason to hope and believe that when the hour of trial arrived they would justify every hope and trust which was placed in them.

The Lords Lieutenant of counties and the associations which worked under them bestowed a vast amount of labour and energy on the organisation of the Territorial Force ; and I trust it may be some recompense to them to know that I, and the principal commanders serving under me, consider that the Territorial Force has far more than justified the most sanguine hopes that any of us ventured to entertain of their value and use in the field.

Commanders of cavalry divisions are unstinted in their praise of the manner in which the yeomanry regiments attached to their brigades have done their duty both in and out of action. The service of divisional cavalry is now almost entirely performed by yeomanry, and divisional commanders report that they are very efficient.

Army corps commanders are loud in their praise of the Territorial battalions which form part of nearly all the brigades at the front in the first line, and more than one of them have told me that these battalions are fast approaching—if they have not already reached—the standard of efficiency of regular infantry.

The Officers' Training Corps.

I wish to add a word about the Officers' Training Corps. The presence of the Artists' Rifles (Twenty-eighth Battalion the London Regiment) with the army in France enabled me also to test the value of this organisation. Having had some experience in peace of the working of the Officers' Training Corps, I determined to turn the Artists' Rifles (which formed part of the Officers' Training Corps in peace time) to its legitimate use. I therefore established the battalion as a training corps for officers in the field.

The cadets pass through a course which includes some thoroughly practical training, as all cadets do a tour of 48 hours in the trenches, and afterwards write a report on what they see and notice. They also visit an observation post of a battery or group of batteries and spend some hours there. A commandant has been appointed, and he arranges and supervises the work, sets schemes for practice, administers the school, delivers lectures, and reports on the candidates. The cadets are instructed in all branches of military training suitable for platoon commanders. Machine-gun tactics, a knowledge of which is so necessary for all junior officers, is a special feature of the course of instruction.

When first started the school was able to turn out officers at the rate of 75 a month. This has since been increased to 100.

Reports received from divisional and army corps commanders on officers who have been trained at the school are most satisfactory.

The Soldiers' Endurance.

Since the date of my last report I have been able to make a close personal inspection of all the units in the command. I was most favourably impressed by all I saw.

The troops composing the army in France have been subjected to as severe a trial as it is possible to impose upon any body of men. The desperate fighting described in my last despatch had hardly been brought to a conclusion when they were called upon to face the rigours and hardships of a winter campaign. Frost and snow have alternated with periods of continuous rain. The men have been called upon to stand for many hours together almost up to their waists in bitterly cold water, only separated by one or two hundred yards from a most vigilant enemy.

Although every measure which science and medical knowledge could suggest to mitigate these hardships was employed, the sufferings of the men have been very great. In spite of all this they presented at the inspections to which I have referred a most soldier-like, splendid, though somewhat war-worn appearance. Their spirit remains high and confident ; their general health is excellent, and their condition most satisfactory.

I regard it as most unfortunate that circumstances have prevented any account of many splendid instances of courage and endurance, in the face of almost unparalleled hardship and fatigue in war, coming regularly to the knowledge of the public.

Thr Reinforcements.

Reinforcements have arrived from England with remarkable promptitude and rapidity. They have been speedily drafted into the ranks, and most of the units I inspected were nearly complete when I saw them. In appearance and quality the drafts sent out have exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I consider the army in France is much indebted to the Adjutant-General's Department at the War Office for the efficient manner in which its requirements have been met in this most essential respect.

With regard to these inspections, I may mention in particular the fine appearance presented by the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions, composed principally of battalions which had come from India. Included in the former division was the Princess Patricia's Royal Canadian Regiment. They are a magnificent set of men, and have since done excellent work in the trenches.

The Indian Troops.

Some weeks after the battle of Givenchy I made my inspection of the Indian Corps under Sir James Willcocks. The appearance they presented was most satisfactory, and fully confirmed my first opinion that the Indian troops only required rest and a little acclimatising to bring out all their fine inherent fighting qualities. I saw the whole of the Indian Cavalry Corps, under Lieutenant General Rimington, on a mounted parade soon after their arrival. They are a magnificent body of cavalry, and will, I feel sure, give the best possible account of themselves when called upon. In the meantime, at their own particular request, they have taken their turn in the trenches and performed most useful and valuable service.

The Chaplains' Devotion and Energy.

The Right Rev. Bishop Taylor Smith. C.V.O., D.D., Chaplain General to the Forces, arrived at my headquarters on the 6th January on a tour of inspection throughout the command. The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster has also visited most of the Irish regiments at the front and the principal centres on the line of communications.

In a quiet and unostentatious manner the chaplains of all denominations have worked with devotion and energy in their respective spheres. The number with the forces in the field at the commencement of the war was comparatively small, but towards the end of last year the Rev. J. M. Simms, D.D., K.H.C., principal chaplain, assisted by his secretary, the Rev. W. Drury, reorganised the branch, and placed the spiritual welfare of the soldiers on a more satisfactory footing. It is hoped that a further increase of personnel may be found possible. I cannot speak too highly of the devoted manner in which all chaplains, whether with troops in the trenches or in attendance on the sick and wounded in casualty clearing stations and hospitals on the line of communications, have worked throughout the campaign.

Admirable Medical Organisation.

Since the commencement of hostilities the work of the Royal Army Medical Corps has been carried out with untiring zeal and devotion. Whether at the front under conditions such as obtained during the fighting on the Aisne, when casualties were heavy and accommodation for their reception had to be improvised, or on the line of communications, where an average of some 11,000 patients have been daily under treatment, the organisation of the medical services has always been equal to the demands made upon it. The careful system of sanitation introduced into the army has, with the assistance of other measures, kept the troops free from any epidemic, in support of which is to be noticed that since the commencement of the war some 500 cases only of enteric have occurred.

The organisation for the first time in war of motor-ambulance convoys is due to the initiative and organising powers of Surgeon-General T. J. O'Donnell, D.S.O., ably assisted by Major P. Evans, Royal Army Medical Corps. Two of these convoys, composed entirely of Red Cross Society personnel, have done excellent work under the superintendence of regular medical officers. Twelve hospital trains ply between the front and the various bases. I have visited several of the trains when halted in stations, and have found them conducted with great comfort and efficiency.

During the more recent phase of the campaign the creation of rest depôts at the front has materially reduced the wastage of men to the line of communications.

Since the latter part of October, 1914, the whole of the medical arrangements have been in the hands of Surgeon-General Sir A. T. Sloggett, C.M.G., K.H.S., under whom Surgeon-General T. P. Woodhouse and Surgeon-General T. J. O'Donnell have been responsible for the organisation on the line of communications and at the front respectively.

THE RESOURCEFUL ENGINEERS.

The exceptional and peculiar conditions brought about by the weather have caused large demands to be made upon the resources and skill of the Royal Engineers. Every kind of expedient has had to be thought out and adopted to keep the lines of trenches and defence work effective. The Royal Engineers have shown themselves as capable of overcoming the ravages caused by violent rain and floods as they have been throughout in neutralising the effect of the enemy's artillery.

In this connection I wish particularly to mention the excellent services performed by my Chief Engineer, Brigadier-General G. H. Fowke, who has been indefatigable in supervising all such work. His ingenuity and skill have been most valuable in the local construction of the various expedients which experience has shown to be necessary in prolonged trench warfare.

I have no reason to modify in any material degree my views of the general military situation as expressed in my despatch of November 20th, 1914.

I have once more gratefully to acknowledge the valuable help and support I have received throughout this period from General Foch, General D'Urbul, and General Maud'huy, of the French Army.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief the British Army in the Field

II.—NEUVE CHAPELLE.

About the end of February many vital considerations induced me to believe that a vigorous offensive movement by the forces under my command should be planned and carried out at the earliest possible moment.

Amongst the more important reasons which convinced me of this necessity were: The general aspect of the Allied situation throughout Europe, and particularly the marked success of the Russian army in repelling the violent onslaughts of Marshal von Hindenburg; the apparent weakening of the enemy in my front, and the necessity for assisting our Russian Allies to the utmost by holding as many hostile troops as possible in the western theatre; the efforts to this end which were being made by the French forces at Arras and Champagne; and, perhaps the most weighty consideration of all, the need of fostering the offensive spirit in the troops under my command after the trying and possibly enervating experiences which they had gone through of a severe winter in the trenches.

In a former despatch I commented upon the difficulties and drawbacks which the winter weather in this climate imposes upon a vigorous offensive. Early in March these difficulties became greatly lessened by the drying up of the country and by spells of brighter weather.

I do not propose in this despatch to enter at length into the considerations which actuated me in deciding upon the plan, time, and place of my attack, but your Lordship is fully aware of these.

THE OBJECT.

As mentioned above, the main attack was carried out by units of the First Army, supported by troops of the Second Army and the general reserve.

The object of the main attack was to be the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the enemy's position at that point, and the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east of that place.

The object, nature, and scope of the attack and instructions for the conduct of the operation were communicated by me to Sir Douglas Haig in a secret memorandum dated 19th February.

The main topographical feature of this part of the theatre is a marked bridge which runs south-west from a point two miles south-west of Lille to the village of Fournes, whence two spurs run out, one due west to a height known as Haut Pommereau, the other following the line of the main road to Illies.

The buildings of the village of Neuve Chapelle run along the Rue du Bois-Fauquissart Road. There is a triangle of roads just north of the village. This area consists of a few big houses, with walls, gardens, orchards, &c., and here, with the aid of numerous machine guns, the enemy had established a strong post which flanked the approaches to the village.

The Bois du Biez, which lies roughly south-east of the village of Neuve Chapelle, influenced the course of this operation.

Full instructions as to assisting and supporting the attack were issued to the Second Army.

STORMING OF THE VILLAGE.

The battle opened at 7-30 a.m. on the 10th March by a powerful artillery bombardment of the enemy's position at Neuve Chapelle. The artillery bombardment had been well prepared and was most effective, except on the extreme northern portion of the front of attack.

At 8-5 a.m. the Twenty-third (left) and Twenty-fifth (right) Brigades of the Eighth Division assaulted the German trenches on the north-west of the village.

At the same hour the Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut Division, which occupied the position to the south of Neuve Chapelle, assaulted the German trenches in its front.

The Garhwal Brigade and the Twenty-fifth Brigade carried the enemy's lines of entrenchments where the wire entanglements had been almost entirely swept away by our shrapnel fire. The Twenty-third Brigade, however, on the north-east, was held up by the wire entanglements, which were not sufficiently cut.

At 8-5 a.m. the artillery turned on to Neuve Chapelle, and at 8-35 a.m. the advance of the infantry was continued.

The Twenty-fifth and Garhwal Brigades pushed on eastward and north-eastward respectively, and succeeded in getting a footing in the village. The Twenty-third Brigade was still held up in front of the enemy's wire entanglements, and could not progress. Heavy losses were suffered, especially in the Middlesex Regiment and the Scottish Rifles. The progress, however, of the Twenty-fifth Brigade into Neuve Chapelle, immediately to the south of the Twenty-third Brigade, had the effect of turning the southern flank of the enemy's defences in front of the Twenty-third Brigade.

This fact, combined with powerful artillery support, enabled the Twenty-third Brigade to get forward between 10 and 11 a.m., and by 11 a.m. the whole of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the roads leading northward and south-westward from the eastern end of that village were in our hands.

During this time our artillery completely cut off the village and the surrounding country from any German reinforcements which could be thrown into the fight to restore the situation by means of a curtain of shrapnel fire. Prisoners subsequently reported that all attempts at reinforcing the front line were checked.

Steps were at once taken to consolidate the position won.

REGRETTABLE DELAY: A GENERAL AND HIS RESERVES.

Considerable delay occurred after the capture of the Neuve Chapelle position. The infantry was greatly disorganised by the violent nature of the attack and by its passage through the enemy's trenches and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to get units to some extent together before pushing on. The telephonic communication being cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between front and rear most difficult. The fact of the left of the Twenty-third Brigade having been held up had kept back the Eighth Division, and had involved a portion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade in fighting to the north out of its proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment. An orchard held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened the flank of an advance towards the Aubers Ridge.

I am of opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly-expressed order of the General Officer Commanding First Army being more carefully observed.

The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome at an earlier period of the day if the General Officer Commanding Fourth Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action. As it was, the further advance did not commence before 3-30 p.m.

FURTHER ATTACKS CHECKED.

The Twenty-first Brigade was able to form up in the open on the left without a shot being fired at it, thus showing that at the time the enemy's resistance had been paralysed. The brigade pushed forward in the direction of Moulin de Piètre.

At first it made good progress, but was subsequently held up by the machine-gun fire from the houses and from a defended work in the line of the German entrenchments opposite the right of the Twenty-second Brigade.

Further to the south the Twenty-fourth Brigade, which had been directed on Piètre, was similarly held up by machine-guns in the houses and trenches at the road junction six hundred yards north-west of Piètre.

The Twenty-fifth Brigade, on the right of the Twenty-fourth, was also held up by machine-guns from a bridge held by the Germans, over the River Des Layes, which is situated to the north-west of the Bois Du Biez.

Whilst two brigades of the Meerut Division were establishing themselves on the new line, the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullundur Brigade of the Lahore Division, moved to the attack of the Bois du Biez, but were held up on the line of the River Des Layes by the German post at the bridge, which enfiladed them and brought them to a standstill.

The defended bridge over the River Des Layes and its neighbourhood immediately assumed considerable importance. Whilst artillery fire was brought to bear, as far as circumstances would permit, on this point, Sir Douglas Haig directed the First Corps to despatch one or more battalions of the First Brigade in support of the troops attacking the bridge. Three battalions were thus sent to Richebourg St. Vaast. Darkness coming on, and the enemy having brought up reinforcements, no further progress could be made, and the Indian Corps and Fourth Corps proceeded to consolidate the position they had gained.

Whilst the operations which I have thus briefly recorded were going on, the First Corps, in accordance with orders, delivered an attack in the morning from Givenchy, simultaneously with that against Neuve Chapelle; but, as the enemy's wire was insufficiently cut, very little progress could be made, and the troops at this point did little more than hold fast the Germans in front of them.

ARTILLERY HAMPERED BY CUT TELEPHONES.

On the following day, March 11th, the attack was renewed by the Fourth and Indian Corps, but it was soon seen that a further advance would be impossible until the artillery had dealt effectively with the various houses and defended localities which held up the troops along the entire front. Efforts were made to direct the artillery fire accordingly, but owing to the weather conditions, which did not permit of aerial observation, and the fact that nearly all the telephone communications between the artillery observers and their batteries had been cut, it was impossible to do so with sufficient accuracy. Even when our troops which were pressing forward occupied a house here and there, it was not possible to stop our artillery fire, and the infantry had to be withdrawn.

The two principal points which barred the advance were the same as on the preceding day—namely, the enemy's position about Moulin de Piètre and at the bridge over the River des Layes.

On the 12th March the same unfavourable conditions as regards weather prevailed, and hampered artillery action.

Although the Fourth and Indian Corps most gallantly attempted to capture the strongly-fortified positions in their front, they were unable to maintain themselves, although they succeeded in holding them for some hours.

Operations on this day were chiefly remarkable for the violent counter-attacks, supported by artillery, which were delivered by the Germans, and the ease with which they were repulsed.

CAVALRY IN READINESS.

As most of the objects for which the operations had been undertaken had been attained, and as there were reasons why I considered it inadvisable to continue the attack at that time, I directed Sir Douglas Haig on the night of the 12th to hold and consolidate the ground which had been gained by the Fourth and Indian Corps, and to suspend further offensive operations for the present.

On the morning of the 12th I informed the General Officer Commanding First Army that he could call on the Second Cavalry Division, under General Gough, for immediate support in the event of the successes of the First Army opening up opportunities for its favourable employment. This division and a brigade of the North Midland Division, which was temporarily attached to it, was moved forward for this purpose.

The Fifth Cavalry Brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, reached the Rue Bacquerot at 4 p.m., with a view to rendering immediate support; but he was informed by the General Officer Commanding Fourth Corps that the situation was not so favourable as he had hoped it would be, and that no further action by the cavalry was advisable.

General Gough's command, therefore, retired to Estaires.

The artillery of all kinds was handled with the utmost energy and skill, and rendered invaluable support in the prosecution of the attack.

THE BRITISH AND GERMAN LOSSES.

The losses during these three days' fighting were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering—

190 officers and 2,337 other ranks, killed.
359 officers and 8,174 other ranks, wounded.
23 officers and 1,728 other ranks, missing.

But the results attained were, in my opinion, wide and far-reaching.

The enemy left several thousand dead on the battlefield, which were seen and counted; and we have positive information that upwards of 12,000 wounded were removed to the north-east and east by train.

Thirty officers and 1,657 other ranks of the enemy were captured.

I can best express my estimate of this battle by quoting an extract from a Special Order of the Day which I addressed to Sir Douglas Haig and the First Army at its conclusion:—

> "I am anxious to express to you personally my warmest appreciation of the skilful manner in which you have carried out your orders, and my fervent and most heartfelt appreciation of the magnificent gallantry and devoted, tenacious courage displayed by all ranks whom you have ably led to success and victory."

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HOW THE MUNITION WORKER SAVES LIVES.

I have already commented upon the number and severity of the casualties in action which have occurred in the period under report. Here, once again, I have to draw attention to the excellent work done by Surgeon-General O'Donnell and his officers. No organisation could excel the efficiency of the arrangements—whether in regard to time, space, care and comfort, or transport—which are made for the speedy evacuation of the wounded.

I wish particularly to express my deep sense of the loss incurred by the army in general, and by the forces in France in particular, in the death of Brigadier-General J. E. Gough, V.C., C.M.G., A.D.C., late Brigadier-General, General Staff, First Army, which occurred on 22nd February as a result of a severe wound received on the 20th February when inspecting the trenches of the Fourth Corps.

I always regarded General Gough as one of our most promising military leaders of the future. His services as a staff officer throughout the campaign have been invaluable, and I had already brought his name before your Lordship for immediate promotion.

I can well understand how deeply these casualties are felt by the nation at large, but each daily report shows clearly that they are being endured on at least an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends and foes alike.

In war as it is to-day between civilised nations, armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine-gun, heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted.

The power of defence conferred by modern weapons is the main cause of the long duration of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life.

Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported by the most efficient and powerful force of artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to the artillery commanders.

I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss.

I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief the British Army in the Field.

III.—THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.

General Headquarters, 15th June, 1915.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report that since the date of my last despatch (5th April) the army in France under my command has been heavily engaged opposite both flanks of the line held by the British forces.

1. In the north the town and district of Ypres have once more in this campaign been successfully defended against vigorous and sustained attacks made by large forces of the enemy, and supported by a mass of heavy and field artillery which, not only in number but also in weight and calibre, is superior to any concentration of guns which has previously assailed that part of the line.

In the south a vigorous offensive has again been taken by troops of the First Army, in the course of which a large area of entrenched and fortified ground has been captured from the enemy, whilst valuable support has been afforded to the attack which our Allies have carried on with such marked success against the enemy's positions to the east of Arras and Lens.

THE BARBARITY OF GAS.

2. I much regret that during the period under report the fighting has been characterised on the enemy's side by a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages of civilised war and a flagrant defiance of the Hague Convention.

All the scientific resources of Germany have apparently been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into contact with it is first paralysed and then meets with a lingering and agonising death.

The enemy has invariably preceded, prepared, and supported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous volume of these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favourable.

Such weather conditions have only prevailed to any extent in the neighbourhood of Ypres, and there can be no doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially influenced the operations in that theatre, until experience suggested effective counter-measures, which have since been so perfected as to render them innocuous.

The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured these designs for a long time.

As a soldier, I cannot help expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an army which hitherto has claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes.

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4. It was at the commencement of the second battle of Ypres on the evening of the 22nd April, referred to in paragraph 2 of this report, that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre's request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines east of Ypres were posted as follows:—

From Steenstraete to the east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcappelle Road, a French Division.

Thence, in a south-easterly direction toward the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road, the Canadian Division.

Thence a Division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another Division continued the line south-east to the northern limit of the Corps on its right.

Of the Fifth Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion in Divisional Reserve and the First Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An Infantry Brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamertinghe.

THE FIRST GAS ATTACK.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m. thick, yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realise what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns.

I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident.

After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm.

THE CANADIANS' STAND.

The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the east. In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage, and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences. They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting in billets.

Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with the French right and a new line was formed.

The Second London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian Division, was posted behind the right of the French Division, and, being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. It was recaptured by the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns could not be

withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General Officer commanding the Second Army. I also directed other reserve troops from the Third Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet eventualities.

Plans with General Foch.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steenstraate and some works south of Lizerne, all of which were in occupation by the French.

The enemy having th s established himself to the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point. I directed, therefore, that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used to support and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.

At about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd connection was finally ensured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French right, about 800 yards east of the canal; but as this entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that which they had held before the attack commenced on the previous night, there were no reserves available for counter-attack until reinforcements, which were ordered up from the Second Army, were able to deploy to the east of Ypres.

Early on the morning of the 23rd I went to see General Foch, and from him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Foch informed me that it was his intention to make good the original line and regain the trenches which the French Division had lost. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my present line, assuring me that the original position would be re-established in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he had ordered up large French reinforcements, which were now on their way, and that troops from the north had already arrived to reinforce General Putz.

I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish to re-establish our old line, and agreed to co-operate in the way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position was not re-established within a limited time I could not allow the British troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.

A Critical Time.

During the whole of the 23rd the enemy's artillery was very active, and his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns which had been brought down from the coast in the neighbourhood of Ostend.

The loss of the guns on the night of the 22nd prevented this fire from being kept down, and much aggravated the situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained by the vigorous counter-attacks made by the Fifth Corps.

During the day I directed two brigades of the Third Corps and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps to be moved up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the Second Army.

In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with.

The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division, and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy's advance at all costs, led to a mixing up of units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command which was quite unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came up from the south, had to be pushed into the firing line in an area swept by artillery fire, which, owing to the capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

General Hull's Resource.

All this led to very heavy casualties, and I wish to place on record the deep admiration which I feel for the resource and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the spot.

The parts taken by Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull were reported to me as being particularly marked in this respect.

An instance of this occurred on the afternoon of the 24th, when the enemy succeeded in breaking through the line at St. Julien.

Brigadier-General Hull, acting under the orders of Lieutenant-General Alderson, organised a powerful counter-attack with his own brigade and some of the nearest available units. He was called upon to control, with only his brigade staff, parts of battalions from six separate divisions which were quite new to the ground. Although the attack did not succeed in retaking St. Julien, it effectually checked the enemy's further advance.

It was only on the morning of the 25th that the enemy were able to force back the left of the Canadian Division from the point where it had originally joined the French line.

During the night and the early morning of the 25th the enemy directed a heavy attack against the division at Brookseinde cross roads, which was supported by a powerful shell fire, but he failed to make any progress.

During the whole of this time the town of Ypres and all the roads to the east and west were uninterruptedly subjected to a violent artillery fire; but in spite of this, the supply of both food and ammunition was maintained throughout with order and efficiency.

Efforts to Recover Ground.

During the afternoon of the 25th many German prisoners were taken, including some officers. The hand-to-hand fighting was very severe, and the enemy suffered heavy loss.

During the 26th the Lahore Division and a cavalry divis on were pushed up into the fighting line, the former on the right of the French, the latter in support of the Fifth Corps.

In the afternoon the Lahore Division, in conjunction with the French right, succeeded in pushing the enemy back some little distance towards the north, but their further advance was stopped owing to the continual employment by the enemy of asphyxiating gas.

On the right of the Lahore Division the Northumberland Infantry Brigade advanced against St. Julien and actually succeeded in entering, and for a time occupying, the southern portion of that village. They were, however, eventually driven back, largely owing to gas, and finally occupied a line a short way to the south. This attack was most successfully and gallantly led by Brigadier-General Riddell, who, I regret to say, was killed during the progress of the operation.

Although no attack was made on the south-eastern side of the salient, the troops operating to the east of Ypres were subjected to heavy artillery fire from this direction, which took some of the battalions, which were advancing north to the attack, in reverse.

Some gallant attempts made by the Lahore Division on the 27th, in conjunction with the French, pushed the enemy further north; but they were partially frustrated by the constant fumes of gas to which they were exposed. In spite of this, however, a certain amount of ground was gained.

A Skilful Retirement.

The French had succeeded in retaking Lizerne, and had made some progress at Steenstraate and Het Sas, but up to the evening of the 28th no further progress had been made towards the recapture of the original line.

I sent instructions, therefore, to Sir Herbert Plumer, who was now in charge of the operation, to take preliminary measures for the retirement to the new line which had been fixed upon.

On the morning of the 29th I had another interview with General Foch, who informed me that strong reinforcements were hourly arriving to support General Putz, and urged me to postpone issuing orders for any retirement until the result of his attack, which was timed to commence at daybreak on the 30th, should be known. To this I agreed, and instructed Sir Herbert Plumer accordingly.

No substantial advance having been made by the French, I issued orders to Sir Herbert Plumer at one o'clock on May 1st to commence his withdrawal to the new line.

The retirement was commenced the following night, and the new line was occupied on the morning of May 4th.

I am of opinion that this retirement, carried out deliberately with scarcely any loss, and in the face of an enemy in position, reflects the greatest possible credit on Sir Herbert Plumer and those who so efficiently carried out his orders.

The successful conduct of this operation was the more remarkable from the fact that on the evening of May 2nd, when it was only half completed, the enemy made a heavy attack, with the usual gas accompaniment, on St. Julien and the line to the west of it.

German Attacks Driven Back.

An attack on a line to the east of Fortuin was made at the same time under similar conditions.

In both cases our troops were at first driven from their trenches by gas fumes, but on the arrival of the supporting battalions and two brigades of a cavalry division, which were sent up in support from about Potijze, all the lost trenches were regained at night.

On the 3rd May, while the retirement was still going on, another violent attack was directed on the northern face of the salient. This was also driven back with heavy loss to the enemy.

Further attempts of the enemy during the night of the 3rd to advance from the woods west of St. Julien were frustrated entirely by the fire of our artillery.

During the whole of the 4th the enemy heavily shelled the trenches we had evacuated, quite unaware that they were no longer occupied. So soon as the retirement was discovered the Germans commenced to entrench opposite our new line and to advance their guns to new positions. Our artillery, assisted by aeroplanes, caused him considerable loss in carrying out these operations.

Up to the morning of the 8th the enemy made attacks at short intervals, covered by gas, on all parts of the line to the east of Ypres, but was everywhere driven back with heavy loss.

SIR H. PLUMER'S DESPERATE BATTLE.

Throughout the whole period since the first break of the line on the night of April 22nd all the troops in this area had been constantly subjected to violent artillery bombardment from a large mass of guns with an unlimited supply of ammunition. It proved impossible whilst under so vastly superior fire of artillery to dig efficient trenches, or properly to reorganise the line, after the confusion and demoralisation caused by the first great gas surprise and the subsequent almost daily gas attacks. Nor was it until after this date (May 8th) that effective preventatives had been devised and provided. In these circumstances a violent bombardment of nearly the whole of the Fifth Corps front broke out at 7 a.m. on the morning of the 8th, which gradually concentrated on the front of the division between north and south of Frezenberg. This fire completely obliterated the trenches and caused enormous losses.

The artillery bombardment was shortly followed by a heavy infantry attack, before which our line had to give way.

Lines Broken.

I relate what happened in Sir Herbert Plumer's own words:—

"The right of one brigade was broken about 10-15 a.m.; then its centre, and then part of the left of the brigade in the next section to the south. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, however, although suffering very heavily, stuck to their fire or support trenches throughout the day. At this time two battalions were moved to General Headquarters second line astride the Menin road to support and cover the left of their division.

"At 12-25 p.m. the centre of a brigade further to the left also broke; its right

battalion, however, the First Suffolks, which had been refused to cover a gap, still held on, and were apparently surrounded and overwhelmed. Meanwhile, three more battalions had been moved up to reinforce, two other battalions were moved up in support to General Headquarters line, and an infantry brigade came up to the grounds of Vlamartinghe Chateau in corps reserve.

"At 11-30 a.m. a small party of Germans attempted to advance against the left of the British line, but were destroyed by the Second Essex Regiment.

"A counter-attack was launched at 3-30 p.m. by the First York and Lancaster Regiment, Third Middlesex Regiment, Second East Surrey Regiment, Second Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and the First Royal Warwickshire Regiment. The counter-attack reached Frezenberg, but was eventally driven back and held up on a line running about north and south through Verlorenhoek, despite repeated efforts to advance. The Twelfth London Regiment on the left succeeded at great cost in reaching the original trench line, and did considerable execution with their machine-gun.

"The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the First East Lancashire Regiment attacked in a north-easterly direction towards Wieltje, and connected the old trench line with the ground gained by the counter-attack, the line being consolidated during the night.

"During the night orders were received that two cavalry divisions would be moved up and placed at the disposal of the Fifth Corps, and a Territorial Division would be moved up to be used if required.

Terrific Shelling.

"On the 9th the Germans again repeated their bombardment. Very heavy shell fire was concentrated for two hours on the trenches of the Second Gloucestershire Regiment and Second Cameron Highlanders, followed by an infantry attack which was successfully repulsed. The Germans again bombarded the salient, and a further attack in the afternoon succeeded in occupying 150 yards of trench. The Gloucesters counter-attacked, but suffered heavily, and the attack failed. The salient being very exposed to shell fire from both flanks, as well as in front, it was deemed advisable not to attempt to retake the trench at night, and a retrenchment was therefore dug across it.

"At 3 p.m. the enemy started to shell the whole front of the centre division, and it was reported that the right brigade of this division was being heavily punished, but continued to maintain its line.

"The trenches of the brigades on the left centre were also heavily shelled during the day, and attacked by infantry. Both attacks were repulsed.

"On the 10th instant the trenches on either side of the Menin-Ypres road were shelled very severely all the morning. The Second Cameron Highlanders, Ninth Royal Scots, and the Third and Fourth King's Royal Rifles, however, repulsed an attack made, under cover of gas, with heavy loss. Finally, when the trenches had been practically destroyed and a large number of the garrison buried, the Third King's Royal Rifles and Fourth Rifle Brigade fell back to the trenches immediately west of Bellewaarde Wood. So heavy had been the shell fire that the proposal to join up the line with a switch through the wood had to be abandoned, the trees broken by the shells forming an impassable entanglement.

Enemy's Great Loss for Small Gain.

"After a comparatively quiet night and morning (10th-11th) the hostile artillery fire was concentrated on the trenches of the Second Cameron Highlanders and First Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at a slightly more northern point than on the previous day. The Germans attacked in force and gained a footing in part of the trenches, but were promptly ejected by a supporting company of the Ninth Royal Scots. After a second short artillery bombardment the Germans again attacked about 4-15 p.m., but were again repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire. A third bombardment followed, and this time the Germans succeeded in gaining a trench—or rather what was left of it—a local counter-attack failing. However, during the night the enemy were again driven out. The trench by this time being practically non-existent, the garrison found it untenable under the very heavy shell fire the enemy brought to bear upon it, and the trench was evacuated. Twice more did the German snipers creep back into it, and twice more they were ejected. Finally, a retrenchment was made, cutting off the salient which had been contested throughout the day. It was won owing solely to the superior weight and number of the enemy's guns, but both our infantry and our artillery took a very heavy toll of the enemy, and the ground lost has proved of little use to the enemy.

"On the remainder of the front the day passed comparatively quietly, though most parts of the line underwent intermittent shelling by guns of various calibre.

"With the assistance of the Royal Flying Corps the Thirty-first Heavy Battery scored a direct hit on a German gun, and the North Midland Heavy Battery got on to some German howitzers with great success.

"With the exception of another very heavy burst of shell fire against the right division early in the morning, the 12th passed uneventfully.

Cavalry in the Trenches.

"On the night of the 12th-13th the line was reorganised, the centre division retiring into army reserve to rest, and their places being taken in the trenches by the two cavalry divisions; the artillery and engineers of the centre division forming with them what is known as the 'Cavalry Force,' under the command of General de Lisle.

"On the 13th, the various reliefs having been completed without incident, the heaviest bombardment yet experienced broke out at 4-30 a.m., and continued with little intermission throughout the day. At about 7-45 a.m. the Cavalry Brigade astride the railway, having suffered very severely and their trenches having been obliterated, fell back about 800 yards. The North Somerset Yeomanry on the right of the brigade, although also suffering severely, hung on to their trenches throughout the day, and actually advanced and attacked the enemy with the bayonet The brigade on its right also maintained its position; as did also the cavalry division, except the left squadron, which, when reduced to sixteen men, fell back.

The Second Essex's Initiative.

"The Second Essex Regiment, realising the situation, promptly charged and retook the trench, holding it until relieved by the cavalry. Meanwhile a counter-attack by two cavalry brigades was launched at 2-30 p.m., and succeeded, in spite of very heavy shrapnel and rifle fire, in regaining the original line of trenches, turning out the Germans who had entered it, and in some cases pursuing them for some distance. But a very heavy shell fire was again opened on them, and they were again compelled to retire to an irregular line in rear, principally the craters of shell holes. The enemy in their counter-attack suffered very severe losses.

"The fighting in other parts of the line was little less severe. The First East Lancashire Regiment were shelled out of their trenches, but their support company and the Second Essex Regiment, again acting on their own initiative, won them back. The enemy penetrated into the farm at the north-east corner of the line, but the First Rifle Brigade, after a severe struggle, expelled them. The First Hampshire Regiment also repelled an attack, and killed every German who got within fifty yards of their trenches. The Fifth London Regiment, despite very heavy casualties, maintained their position unfalteringly. At the southern end of the line the left brigade was once again heavily shelled, as indeed was the whole front.

The Line Practically Maintained.

"At the end of a very hard day's fighting our line remained in its former position, with the exception of the short distance lost by one cavalry division. Later the line was pushed forward, and a new line was dug in a less exposed position, slightly in rear of that originally held. The night passed quietly.

"Working parties of from 1,200 to 1,800 men have been found every night by a Territorial Division and other units for work on rear lines of defence, in addition to the work performed by the garrisons in reconstructing the front line trenches which were daily destroyed by shell fire.

"The work performed by the Royal Flying Corps has been invaluable. Apart from the hostile aeroplanes actually destroyed, our airmen have prevented a great deal of aerial reconnaissance by the enemy, and have registered a large number of targets with our artillery.

"Lancashire Lynn's" Feat.

"There have been many cases of individual gallantry. As instances may be given the following:—

"During one of the heavy attacks made against our infantry gas was seen rolling forward from the enemy's trenches. Private Lynn, of the Second Lancashire Fusiliers, at once rushed to the machine gun without waiting to adjust his respirator. Single-handed he kept his gun in action the whole time the gas was rolling over, actually hoisting it on the parapet to get a better field of fire. Although nearly suffocated by the gas, he poured a stream of lead into the advancing enemy and checked their attack. He was carried to his dug-out, but, hearing another attack was imminent, he tried to get back to his gun. Twenty-four hours later he died in great agony from the effects of the gas.

"A young subaltern in a cavalry regiment went forward alone one afternoon to reconnoitre. He got into a wood, 1,200 yards in front of our lines, which he found occupied by Germans, and came back with the information that the enemy had evacuated a trench and were digging another—information which proved most valuable to the artillery as well as to his own unit.

A Night Adventure.

"A patrol of two officers and a non-commissioned officer of the First Cambridgeshires went out one night to reconnoitre a German trench 350 yards away. Creeping along the parapet of the trench, they heard sounds indicating the presence of six or seven of the enemy. Further on they heard deep snores, apparently proceeding from a dug-out immediately beneath them. Although they knew that the garrison of the trench outnumbered them, they decided to procure an identification. Unfortunately, in pulling out a clasp knife with which to cut off the sleeper's identity disc, one of the officer's revolvers went off. A conversation in agitated whispers broke out in the German trench, but the patrol crept safely away, the garrison being too startled to fire.

"Despite the very severe shelling to which the troops had been subjected, which obliterated trenches and caused very many casualties, the spirit of all ranks remains excellent. The enemy's losses, particularly on the 10th and 13th, have unquestionably been serious. On the latter day they evacuated trenches (in face of the cavalry counter-attack) in which were afterwards found quantities of equipment and some of their own wounded. The enemy have been seen stripping our dead, and on three occasions men in khaki have been seen advancing."

The Brilliant French Advance.

The fight went on by the exchange of desultory shell and rifle fire, but without any remarkable incident until the morning of May 24th. During this period, however, the French on our left had attained considerable success. On the 15th instant they captured Steenstraete and the trenches in Het Sas, and on the 16th they drove the enemy headlong over the canal, finding two thousand German dead. On the 17th they made a substantial advance on the east side of the canal, and on the 20th they repelled a German counter-attack, making a further advance in the same direction, and taking one hundred prisoners.

East of Ypres.

On the early morning of the 24th a violent outburst of gas against nearly the whole front was followed by heavy shell fire, and the most determined attack was delivered against our position east of Ypres.

The hour of attack commenced at 2-45 a.m. A large proportion of the men were asleep, and the attack was too sudden to give them time to put on their respirators.

The Second Royal Irish and the Ninth Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, overcome by gas fumes, were driven out of a farm held in front of the left Division, and this the enemy proceeded to hold and fortify.

All attempts to retake this farm during the day failed, and during the night of the 24th-25th the General Officer commanding the left Division decided to take up a new line, which, although slightly in rear of the old one, he considered to be a much better position. This operation was successfully carried out.

Throughout the day the whole line was subjected to one of the most violent artillery attacks which it had ever undergone, and the Fifth Corps and the Cavalry Divisions engaged had to fight hard to maintain their positions. On the following day, however, the line was consolidated, joining the right of the French at the same place as before, and passing through Wieltje (which was strongly fortified) in a southerly direction on to Hooge, where the cavalry have since strongly occupied the chateau, and pushed our line further east.

. . . . . .

J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief the British Army in France.

B.—THE GERMANS IN BELGIUM.

CONCLUSIONS OF LORD BRYCE'S COMMITTEE ON THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO THEM.

. . . If a line is drawn on a map from the Belgian frontier to Liège and continued to Charleroi, and a second line drawn from Liège to Malines, a sort of figure resembling an irregular Y will be formed. It is along this Y that most of the systematic (as opposed to isolated) outrages were committed. If the period from August 4th to August 30th is taken it will be found to cover most of these organised outrages. Termonde and Alost extend, it is true, beyond the Y lines, and they belong to the month of September. Murder, rape, arson, and pillage began from the moment when the German army crossed the frontier. For the first fortnight of the war the towns and villages near Liège were the chief sufferers. From the 19th of August to the end of the month outrages spread in the directions of Charleroi and Malines, and reach their period of greatest intensity. There is a certain significance in the fact that the outrages round Liège coincide with the unexpected resistance of the Belgian army in that district, and that the slaughter which reigned from the 19th August to the end of the month is contemporaneous with the period when the German army's need for a quick passage through Belgium at all costs was deemed imperative.

Here let a distinction be drawn between two classes of outrages.

Individual acts of brutality—ill-treatment of civilians, rape, plunder, and the like—were very widely committed. These are more numerous and more shocking than would be expected in warfare between civilised Powers, but they differ rather in extent than in kind from what has happened in previous though not recent wars.

In all wars many shocking and outrageous acts must be expected, for in every large army there must be a proportion of men of criminal instincts whose worst passions are unloosed by the immunity which the conditions of warfare afford. Drunkenness, moreover, may turn even a soldier who has no criminal habits into a brute, who may commit outrages at which he would himself be shocked in his sober moments, and there is evidence that intoxication was extremely prevalent among the German army, both in Belgium and in France, for plenty of wine was to be found in the villages and country houses which were pillaged. Many of the worst outrages appear to have been perpetrated by men under the influence of drink. Unfortunately, little seems to have been done to repress this source of danger.

In the present war, however—and this is the gravest charge against the German army—the evidence shows that the killing of non-combatants was carried out to an extent for which no previous war between nations claiming to be civilised (for such cases as the atrocities perpetrated by the Turks on the Bulgarian Christians in 1876, and on the Armenian Christians in 1895 and 1896, do not belong to that category) furnishes any precedent. That this killing was done as part of a deliberate plan is clear from the facts hereinbefore set forth regarding Louvain, Aerschot, Dinant, and other towns. The killing was done under orders in each place. It began at a certain fixed date, and stopped (with some few exceptions) at another fixed date. Some of the officers who carried out the work did it reluctantly, and said they were obeying directions from their chiefs. The same remarks apply to the destruction of property. House burning was part of the programme; and villages, even large parts of a city, were given to the flames as part of the terrorising policy.

Citizens of neutral states who visited Belgium in December and January report that the German authorities do not deny that non-combatants were systematically killed in large numbers during the first weeks of the invasion, and this, so far as we know, has never been officially denied. If it were denied, the flight and continued voluntary exile of thousands of Belgian refugees would go far to contradict a denial, for there is no historical parallel in modern times for the flight of a large part of a nation before an invader.

The German Government have, however, sought to justify their severities on the grounds of military necessity, and have excused them as retaliation for cases in which civilians fired on German troops. There may have been cases in which such firing occurred, but no proof has ever been given, or, to our knowledge, attempted to be given, of such cases, nor of the stories of shocking outrages perpetrated by Belgian men and women on German soldiers.

. . . . . .

Two classes of murder in particular require special mention, because one of them is almost new, and the other altogether unprecedented. The former is the seizure of peaceful citizens as so-called hostages to be kept as a pledge for the conduct of the civil population, or as a means to secure some military advantage, or to compel the payment of a contribution, the hostages being shot if the condition imposed by the arbitrary will of the invader is not fulfilled. Such hostage taking, with the penalty of death attached, has now and then happened, the most notable case being the shooting of the Archbishop of Paris and some of his clergy by the Communards of Paris in 1871, but it is opposed both to the rules of war and to every principle of justice and humanity. The latter kind of murder is the killing of the innocent inhabitants of a village because shots have been fired, or are alleged to have been fired, on the troops by someone in the village. For this practice no previous example and no justification have been or can be pleaded. Soldiers suppressing an insurrection may have sometimes slain civilians mingled with insurgents, and Napoleon's forces in Spain are said to have now and then killed promiscuously when trying to clear guerillas out of a village. But in Belgium large bodies of men, sometimes including the burgomaster and the priest, were seized, marched by officers to a spot chosen for the purpose, and there shot in cold blood, without any attempt at trial or even inquiry, under the pretence of inflicting punishment upon the village, though these unhappy victims were not even charged with having themselves committed any wrongful act, and though, in some cases at least, the village authorities had done all in their power to prevent any molestation of the invading force. Such acts are no part of war, for innocence is entitled to respect even in war. They are mere murders, just as the drowning of the innocent passengers and crews on a merchant ship is murder and not an act of war.

That these acts should have been perpetrated on the peaceful population of an unoffending country which was not at war with its invaders, but merely defending its own neutrality, guaranteed by the invading Power, may excite amazement and even incredulity. It was with amazement and almost with incredulity that the Committee first read the depositions relating to such acts. But when the evidence regarding Liège was followed by that regarding Aerschot, Louvain, Andenne, Dinant, and the other towns and villages, the cumulative effect of such a mass of concurrent testimony became irresistible, and we were driven to the conclusion that the things described had really happened. The question then arose how they could have happened. Not from mere military licence, for the discipline of the German army is proverbially stringent, and its obedience implicit. Not from any special ferocity of the troops, for whoever has travelled among the German peasantry knows that they are as kindly and good-natured as any people in Europe, and those who can recall the war of 1870 will remember that no charges resembling those proved by these depositions were then established. The excesses recently committed in Belgium were, moreover, too widespread and too uniform in their character to be mere sporadic outbursts of passion or rapacity.

The explanation seems to be that these excesses were committed—in some cases ordered, in others allowed—on a system and in pursuance of a set purpose. That purpose was to strike terror into the civil population and dishearten the Belgian troops, so as to crush down resistance and extinguish the very spirit of self-defence. The pretext that civilians had fired upon the invading troops was used to justify not merely the shooting of individual francs-tireurs, but the murder of large numbers of innocent civilians, an act absolutely forbidden by the rules of civilised warfare.

In the minds of Prussian officers War seems to have become a sort of sacred mission, one of the highest functions of the omnipotent State, which is itself as much an Army as a State. Ordinary morality and the ordinary sentiment of pity vanish in its presence, superseded by a new standard which justifies to the soldier every means that can conduce to success, however shocking to a natural sense of justice and humanity, however revolting to his own feelings. The Spirit of War is deified. Obedience to the State and its War Lord leaves no room for any other duty or feeling. Cruelty becomes legitimate when it promises victory. Proclaimed by the heads of the army, this doctrine would seem to have permeated the officers and affected even the private soldiers, leading them to justify the killing of non-combatants as an act of war, and so accustoming them to slaughter that even women and children become at last the victims. It cannot be supposed to be a national doctrine, for it neither springs from nor reflects the mind and feelings of the German people as they have heretofore been known to other nations. It is a specifically military doctrine, the outcome of a theory held by a ruling caste who have brooded and thought, written and talked, and dreamed about War until they have fallen under its obsession and been hypnotised by its spirit.

The doctrine is plainly set forth in the German Official Monograph on the usages of war on land, issued under the direction of the German staff. This book is pervaded throughout by the view that whatever military needs suggest becomes thereby lawful, and upon this principle, as the diaries show, the German officers acted.

If this explanation be the true one, the mystery is solved, and that which seemed scarcely credible becomes more intelligible, though not less pernicious. This is not the only case that history records in which a false theory, disguising itself as loyalty to a State or to a Church, has perverted the conception of Duty, and become a source of danger to the world.

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